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Prologue 
Kolhan, the land of Hos, the nation-state and Adivasi resistance 
Kolhan or Kol-sthan, literally means the place of the Hos (Kol is a generic 
name for Kolarian/ Munda1 Adivasi2 groups and sthan, in Hindi, means a 
place). Hos are an off-shoot of Mundari speakers, who had cleared forests 
and settled in the northwestern part of Ranchi, the present capital of 
Jharkhand state, as early as sixth century B.C.E (Before the Common Era) 
(Thapar and Siddiqi 1979; Corbridge 1996; Areeparampil 2002). While in 
Ranchi, the Hos broke off their parental Munda group, and moved to Kolhan 
(also called Singhbhum) around the second century A.C.E. (After the 
Common Era). This branching out (of the Hos) was due to a gradual 
transformation in the organizational leadership of Mundas caused by 
processes of state formation, which perhaps had hurt the Hos' sense of 
freedom (Dalton 1872, 1973; Roy 1970).  
In Kolhan, they occupied a few existing villages of the Bhuiyas, who had 
already been there before their arrival, as well as cleared forests to establish 
                                                      
1 The Kolarian or Munda, Astro-Asiatic language group (includes Santals, Mundas, Hos, 
Birhors, Bhumijs, Kharias and others) is considered to be the ‘first’ settlers of India. Sanathan 
Sundi, a Ho historian in Chaibasa, is convinced of this. He claims that the scripts and symbols, 
discovered at the sight of Mohenjo Daro and Harappa, Indus Valley Civilization, resembles 
their script called Varankshiti discovered by Lakho Bodra, a Ho language pundit (personal 
conversation 4 November 2011). Also see Roy (1970), Mangobinda (1989), Corbridge (1996), 
Sharma (2007), and Katju (2011) for similar arguments. 
2 Adivasi means ‘the first inhabitant’ or ‘sons/ daughters of the soil.’ The term was first 
introduced in the 1920s by the ‘Adivasi Mahasabha,’ (the great Adivasi-council) inspired by 
Birsa Munda, (the legendary ‘rebel’ leader of the Mundas of Chotanagpur, who led the 
Ulgulan, rebellion against dikus (exploitative non-Adivasi trouble-makers, see appendix-1 on 
the concept of diku). As a consequence, the British introduced the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act 
1908 to ‘protect’ Adivasi land, cultural traditions and customs, which in turn, gradually 
helped a political awakening among Adivasis, as being distinct social groups, to assert their 
territorial and ethnic rights (see Hardiman 1987; Munda and Mullick 2003). As per Census 
2001, the total Adivasi population in India was 84.3 million or eight per cent of the total 
population, over 90 per cent of them living in rural areas scoring the lowest on human-
development scale. North-eastern States have the highest tribal population followed by 
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh. The use of 
the general term ‘Adivasis’, for ‘tribes’ in this thesis does not in any way mean Adivasis to be 
a homogenous sociocultural entity, but a multi-linguistic, religious, regional and multilayered 
category. 
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new villages. According to the Munda tradition, such villages are called 
Khuntkhatti villages. The original clearers of forests, who established such 
original villages are called Khuntkattidars (Hoffman and Emelen 1938; Roy 
1970). Their traditional socio-economic, political and religio-cultural 
organization consists of munda, the village headmen, deuri, the village priest, 
manki, the paramount headmen of a group of villages (called a Pir or Ilaaka) 
and dakua, the munda’s and manki’s assistants, as main officials – still exists 
in Kolhan (see Roy 1970; Corbridge 1996; Sen 1999; Das Gupta 2011). 
The word Ho stands for three realities: one, a person in this particular Adivasi 
group, second, the Ho language, and third, the people who constitute the 
entire group. Its etymological meaning is derived from the Mundari or 
Kolarian root ‘hor,’ or ‘horo,’ which means a human person. More than 90 
per cent of the Ho population lives in Paschimi (West) Singhbhum district of 
Jharkhand state. Two neighbouring districts of Odisha and one or two 
districts in West Bengal also have a few Ho settlements. According to Census 
2001, the Hos constituted 10.5 per cent of the total Adivasi population in 
Jharkhand, roughly 744142 people. The total Adivasi population of 
Jharkhand is 7087068. The same Census report enumerated nearly a million 
Ho (language) speakers. This makes them the fourth largest tribe in 
Jharkhand after the Santals, Oraons and Mundas.  
By around the 10th century A.C.E., the Hos had established themselves as a 
very powerful people in Kolhan with extraordinary habits of fighting 
outsiders. Hence, they are also called Larka (fighting) Kols (Hos) since they 
had fought and defeated the chiefs of Porahat, Seraikela, Kharsawan, 
Mayurbhanj and even the maharaja of Chotanagpur (O’Malley 1910), who 
were part of the ancient pan-Indian networks of small-scale, feudatory, 
(warrior-caste) states-circles prior to the arrival of the British raj (see Bayley 
2000).  
The Hos and the British  
Actual British contacts with the Hos began in 1820s. However, it all came 
about as the chief of Porahat, also called the Singhbhum raja, sought the 
British East India Company’s assistance to subdue the Hos who had asserted 
and gained their independence following a prolonged split within the raja 
families of Kolhan during 1720-1765 (Streumer forthcoming, 2014). 
Although the first Ho-British encounter took place in the 1820s, the actual 
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and complete subjugation of Hos happened only a few years after the Kol 
rebellion in Chotanagpur during 1831-32 (see the Afterword for more 
details). During 1836-37, the British East India Company, under the 
leadership of Captain Thomas Wilkinson, defeated and subjugated the Hos 
and their territory completely, and established the territory into a separate 
administrative unit known as Kolhan Government Estate (KGE). KGE covers 
the entire West Singhbhum district. The British (colonial) settlement and 
administrative records, such as Craven [1898] (1998), show details of 26 Ho 
Pirs of KGE, the Ho (Adivasi) ‘preserve’ (ethno territorial enclosure). This, 
according to the British, was meant to ‘protect’ and ‘preserve’ the Hos, and 
their way of life from ‘alien exploiters’ or dikus (aliens/ strangers who are 
often troublesome and whose strangeness made/ make the Kolarians 
suspicious) who mercilessly exploited the Adivasis of Chotanagpur, the 
present Jharkhand region (Jha 1964, Singh 1978, Sahu 1985).  
Hos’ claim to be ‘the sons/ daughters of the soil’ in Kolhan 
Although there were a few Jains and Bhuiyas already in Kolhan/ Singhbhum 
before the Hos had arrived here, Hos make two strong claims to their being 
the sons and daughters of Kolhan: the first claim is made on political grounds 
and the second is more of an existential, religio-cultural and spiritual claim.  
The political basis of their claim asserts the fact that they were an 
independent people until the British subjugated and turned their territory into 
one of the earliest non-regulatory districts that were meant to remain outside 
the domain of general parliamentary regulations under the Scheduled 
Districts Act of 1874. This same concept would later be carried on to the 
Fifth Schedule of the Indian Constitution and the Panchayats Extensions to 
the Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act 1996,3 all meant in principle, to protect 
Adivasi land, culture and customs (Corbridge 1996, Sunder 2009, 2005a). 
                                                      
3 Panchayats are institutions of local democratic self-governance for the rural areas in India. 
Till 1993, this was a fit-for-all system irrespective of varying regional, cultural contexts and 
specificities. In 1996an amendment was made to make it adaptable to specific Adivasi 
contexts to suit their traditional and customary practices, however, these amended 
provisions have not yet been implemented at the state and district levels. See Sunder (2005 
a & b; 2009), Corbridge (2005), Mosse (2005), Corbridge and Harris (2000) and 
Bandyopadhyay et al (2003) for useful analyses and explanations as to how and why PESA 
Act 1996 and other such lofty Constitutional ideals and development policies lose their 
‘weight’ as they come to regional and local levels where they need to be translated into 
concrete actions that might benefit the historically marginalized ‘poorer’ people in India. 
18 
 
Besides these ‘protective’ regulations and provisions, is the Chotanagpur 
Tenancy Act (CNTA) 1908 (to prevent land transfer from Adivasis to non-
Adivasis) which was introduced as a consequence of Ulgulan, the Munda 
uprising during 1885-1900 (Singh 1966). Moreover, the mundas and mankis 
of Kolhan still hold on to what is known as ‘Wilkinson’s Rules,’ a codified 
set of Ho customs and traditional practices by which the Assistant to 
the Governor-General’s Agent, a British officer posted at Chaibasa had to 
administer the KGE. Wilkinson’s Rules clearly specifies the rights and duties 
of mundas and mankis, through whom the Kolhan system of administration 
functioned from 1837 to 1947.4  
The existential and spiritual basis of Hos’ claims to be the ‘sons and 
daughters of the soil’ rests on the territorial legitimacy they derive from Ho-
ancestors’ living presence symbolized by sasan (ancestral sacred graveyards). 
Their ancestors who first arrived here had cleared forests and established new 
villages, taking permission from the mother earth and spirits whom they have 
befriended to be guardians of villages, and who dwell in the desauli/ jahera/ 
sarna (sacred groves) of every Ho village. Ho ancestors are not only present 
at the sasan, but they also are brought into dwell at the ading (symbolic 
ancestral presence kept at the sanctuary of a Ho’s household, normally the 
interior of the kitchen where the food is cooked), customary practices, and 
collective belonging (Yorke 1976; Verardo 2003; Mundu 2003; Rachel 
2009). 
The Present Status of munda-manki (Kolhan) System  
Presently, the KGE is nominally headed by an official whose responsibilities 
have mostly been denigrated. This officer is designated as Kolhan 
Superintendent (KS). Given the over importance the centralized, post-
independence, bureaucratic Indian administrative system and its supposedly 
‘unifying’ role in India, the territorial and administrative significance of KS 
and the Kolhan (munda-manki) system has become negligible (personal 
conversation with N.D. Champia, a Ho, former MLA and speaker of united 
Bihar Legislative Assembly, 10 March 2011). 
                                                      
4 Most mundas and mankis have their personal copies of Wilkinson’s Rules translated into 
Hindi, laminated and kept safely. The manki residing at my study villages showed me theirs 
while asserting their sense of being ‘the sons of the soil’ in Kolhan (personal conversations 
during February 2011 at his residence). 
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During my conversations, in 2011 ns 2013, with the present Kolhan 
Superintendent (KS), an Oraon (Adivasi) lady from Ranchi, I came to know 
that the office of the KS has been literally reduced to a show piece, devoid of 
any fund, function and functionary. The KS also admitted that she did not 
have any reliable information about the present position of mundas and 
mankis. Moreover, as she understood it, her role was to observe what the 
mundas and mankis were doing. However, the appointment of mundas and 
mankis or their removal from the office needs the approval of both the KS 
and DC (personal conversation 21 October 2013 at KS’s office). 
Interestingly, an attendant staff at KS’s office said, ‘She [the KS] takes a 
minimum bribe of ₹ 500 even from the poorest munda to put her signature on 
any document, which is all she does’ (personal conversation at the KS’ office 
on the same date). I have come across several mundas who too have made 
similar comments about the KS during my fieldwork in 2011 and 2013. 
Moreover, indicating the perceived irrelevance of KGE, munda-manki 
(Kolhan) system, soon after the recent panchayat elections in December 
2010, held after a gap of 32 years, the district collector (DC) of West 
Singhbhum said, ‘Now that the panchayat elections are over; and so, the 
munda-manki system could be abolished’ (personal conversation on 11 
February 2011 at his office). 
According to Jamdar Laguri, the munda of Lakhipai village of Jagnathpur 
block, the original 26 Ho Pirs have been sub-divided into 89 ilaakas (areas) 
with as many mankis, 1221 mundas and 1310 dakua (assistants of a munda or 
manki). Out of these, 22 mankis, 396 mundas and 402 dakuas are not 
officially appointed (this data is based on a surveys conducted by the munda-
manki organization of Jagnathpur block during the year 2010-11).  
Manki Shivcharan Paraya, the manki of Charai Pir, near Chaibasa has been 
taking much trouble to study the historical, cultural and legal aspects of 
Wilkinson’s rule and Kolhan Government Estate for more than two decades 
now; and has acquired considerable authority on these matters.5 He plans to 
set up, what he calls, a ‘Kolhan Board’ to regulate and revive the traditional 
style of administration in KGE. This, he thinks, would enable the Hos to 
revitalize the Kolhan (munda-manki) system (personal conversations on 19 
                                                      
5 See Mundu (2006) an interesting discussion about manki Shivcharan Paraya’s efforts/ 
activities and their future scope. 
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October 2013 at his residence). 
Resistance and Disillusionment  
The Ho society in Kolhan (united-Singhbhum) has a very long history of 
struggle against dikus (oppressive and troublesome outsiders).6 As Adivasis’ 
relationship with the state has always been marked by their resistance to state 
oppression and exploitation, their experiences of brutal state-repression has 
instilled a kind of crippling fear in Adivasi psyche (Maharaj and Iyer 1982). 
Although tribals were pressing for their rights, and restoration of their lands, they were 
subjected to severe repression resulting in several deaths. The mere sight of a jeep 
would force the whole village to turn into the forest hideouts. The parasites, their 
muscle, and venal government officials would carry away tribal belongings including 
chicks and goats. In many cases even the whole hamlet was set on fire (Maharaj and 
Iyer 1982: 176).  
While the crippling fear, instilled in Adivasi psyche by both the British and 
post-British colonial repressive interventions continues to exist, there are 
more complex processes of co-optation (of more vocal and wealthy elements 
from among Adivasis) into ‘mainstream’ state-system. This was also 
characteristic of the ‘natural’ process of state formation during pre-British 
colonial times as powerful Adivasi chieftains adopted ‘high’ caste/ Rajput 
life-styles and values (Sinha 1962, 1965, 1982; Thusu 1980; Thapar1999). 
The post-British colonial state-system continues to co-opt Adivasi elites 
mainly by its affirmative action policies for the ‘creamy lair,’ and bio-politics 
(variously called ‘tribal development’ and ‘poverty alleviation’ programs) for 
marginalized Adivasis. Ghosh (2006) calls these policies as ‘inclusive and 
exclusive governmentality,’ of the post-British colonial state in India; 
Banerjee (2006) calls their effects as the ‘double bind’ of Adivasis; and Basu 
(2013) has shown, what she called, ‘politics of recognition’ instead of 
‘redistribution’ resulting from such discriminating inclusive-exclusive 
governmentality. Others have also noticed and tried to understand it variously 
(see Sengupta 1982; Chaudhuri 1982). 
                                                      
6 Diku means a stranger who creates dikkat (trouble) for Adivasis. The negative connotation 
is derived more from the ‘unknown’ factor. For example, traders have usually been dikus, but 
not enemies. A diku would be identified on the basis of both ethnic and behavioural factors. 
Accordingly, some Hos might also turn dikus when their behaviour resembles that of a 
troublesome alienating outsider/ stranger. Similarly, an outsider may, by his/ her amenable/ 
trustworthy behaviour, be accepted as an insider as well (Verardo 2003). See Appendix-1 on 
the concept of Diku. 
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This double bind of Adivasis is somewhat made clearer by Simon (1982), 
‘On the one hand, it represents the pursuit of politics of a middle class 
aspiring to its own growth within the relatively protected confines of a state. 
On the other, it poses the entire question of the incapacity of the tribals to 
adapt to the market society and the money making ethos, with all its 
hypocrisy, inhumanity, and ruthlessness towards nature and people alike’ 
(Ibid.: 229). A more realistic picture of what actually happens to Adivasis’ 
resistance movements and their emerging leadership in a system of colonial 
mode of super-exploitation and racism (the main theme of this thesis), I 
reproduce one of my most recent e-mail conversations with Xavier Dias 
(XD), an activist and writer who has spent most of his life in Kohan and 
Jharkhand. 
‘A Sad Day for the Real Jharkhandi People (31 October 2013)’ 
29 years ago (on the day Indira Gandhi was also murdered) here in the forest of 
Bandgaon Singhbhum Jharkhand one of our comrades Lal Singh Munda (Adivasi of the 
Munda tribe) was gunned down by non-Adivasi Bajrang (Hindu right wing) activists. 
The killers were also a group of landsharks. In the midst of Bandgaon the Munda 
community had their ancestral sacred graves and grove. Bajrang wanted to build a 
temple for Hanuman (Monkey god) there, and Lal Singh Munda being the Chieftain of 
the village, protested. His wife Josephine Hamsay was carrying their fourth child. 
Lal Singh Munda was a Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) activist and it was during the 
good times of this political organisation when they were leading the 'Zamin wapas 
andolan' (we are taking our forest land back movement). 
Few today remember the history behind this killing as the JMM has now become a part 
of the ruling class of the State and uses each anniversary to booster their political 
image. Josephine Hamsay is entitled to a pension and a job from the State as her 
martyred husband was declared a freedom fighter, but like the hundreds of wives of 
martyred Jharkhand Heros she has received nothing. Her youngest son (who was in her 
womb when her husband was killed) was three years ago picked up by the Paramilitary 
and declared a 'Maoist supporter/ informer’) he suffered a nervous breakdown and had 
to be in an asylum for treatment. 
Josephine phoned me just now and was telling me how difficult it was for her to 
organise these annual programmes as she does not have a job and only depends on 
agriculture and forest gathering. Yet tomorrow all the netas (politicians) will drive up to 
that mountain top in Bandgaon, in their white-starched clothes and their red beacon top 
SUVs, expect to be given a free lunch by Josephine. This is the pathetic situation of 
what happens when a strong militant mass movement gets deviated after its leaders opt 
for 'Rajniti' and abandon lokniti (ruling class power over people’s power). Johar! XD. 
The above text succinctly presents the transformation of Adivasi politics and 
leadership. My focus in this thesis is on the complex processes involved in 
these transformations. The following words of Chumru, a Ho politician, 
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former Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Member of Legislative Assembly 
(MLA), and presently an active local leader of Congress party, are revealing 
in this context. 
It is not that politicians like me do not know anything about Adivasi history, protective 
legislations and rights; I know quite a bit of everything. However, we, the political 
class, have our limitations: to conscientise the rural masses – to educate, organize and 
agitate as Dr. B.R. Ambedkar said – is a long-term process. We do not have the time 
and resources for that; our resources are limited. First of all, it takes a lot of resources, 
efforts and time to prove oneself to be able to stand for elections and to get elected. 
Once elected, our main work is to keep our key supporters (clients and patrons) in good 
humour and to try to recover the resources we have invested during the limited period 
of five years since you are never sure if you get a second chance. Within such 
constrains, our success lays in skilfully navigating between various stakeholders: top 
leaders of the party, the competing industrialists who control the party decision with 
their money power, bureaucrats and other demanding clients. To antagonize any of 
them is in our least interest. Moreover, the specific and substantial grievances and 
demands of the Hos of Kolhan get little attention in the larger political canvas at the 
state and national levels (personal conversation with Mr. Chumru, 20 August 2011 at 
Chaibasa).  
Chumru’s words clearly bring out the ‘constraints’ of not only an Adivasi 
politician, but also Indian politics and politicians in general, who ‘represent’ 
India’s marginalized social groups.  
The latest anthropological reading of Adivasi resistance in Jharkhand goes as 
follows: 
Tribal identity has become a tool of protest, and ethnic symbols such as bow and arrow 
are now associated with political campaigns launched by the Jharkhand parties. Subtle 
sighs of resistance appear when Adivasis organize demonstrations in the Ranchi streets, 
or when they stage conflicts in village theatres while knowing that the message is not 
understood by the Hindu castes. Resistance also implies “to play tribal” as when 
children are asked to perform dances before officials, and caricature their “tribal 
culture.” This everyday resistance is directed against hegemonic values of high castes 
that show contempt towards Adivasis, seen as “jungly.” Other forms of resistance 
articulate political claims and the idea that Adivasis should be part of decision-making 
regarding the exploitation of natural resources (Carrin 2013:117). 
This text succinctly and eloquently presents the nature of contemporary 
adivasi resistance in Jharkhand. Adivasis, thus, have a very long legacy of 
state-led super-exploitation, oppression, resilient resistance and 
disillusionment. 
Researcher’s Personal Experiences and Inspirations 
My contact with the Hos began in 1991 when I attended a month long Ho 
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language course at Lupungutu where I felt inspired to engage more deeply 
with the Hos and the Hodisum (the Ho country), and so to learn their 
language. Since then, while doing further studies in commerce and 
philosophy, etc., I have kept visiting Hodisum and have stayed at Ho 
households in villages especially during summer vacations. Thus, this work is 
inspired by my several years of close association with the Hos and other 
marginalized social groups in Kolhan, which began more concretely in 2000 
with my involvement with a yearlong, Jesuit-inspired non-formal rural 
education program undertaken by Tribal Research and Training Centre 
(TRTC) Chaibasa. TRTC then had this program in about 200 rural hamlets/ 
villages spread out in five Community Development Blocks (CDBs) in West 
Singhbhum district. We regularly visited these hamlets that had non-formal 
literacy centres or ‘night-schools’ and interacted with the young and old 
villagers as part of the program, which also helped further enhance my 
knowledge not only of Ho language but the Hos’ village organizations, 
culture, traditional customs, lifestyle, festivals, everyday anxieties and 
struggles. However, I also have several experiences of being suspiciously 
perceived as a diku by Hos who did not know me personally. 
In 2001, I moved to Ranchi for a four-yearlong theological studies program 
in Adivasi context. During this period, I had several opportunities to 
participate not only in celebrations of Adivasi cultural festivals such as 
Karam, Sarhul, Ba’, Hero, etc., but also in protest demonstrations mainly 
against land alienation and displacement due to large-scale ‘development’ 
projects such as Netrahat field-firing range (Tigga 1994) and Koel-Karo 
(hydroelectric) dam (Bharti 1991). My stay in Ranchi has given me 
opportunities to interact and engage with other dominant Adivasi groups of 
Jharkhand such as Santals, Mundas, Oraons and Kharias. In 2005, once 
again, I joined TRTC for another two years. During this period, I have had 
regular and close interactions with Ho villagers, as I took personal interest, 
besides my assigned job at TRTC, to promote Self-Help Groups among Ho 
men who sold fire-wood to supplement their household expenses during lean 
season. TRTC then had its integrated community development program, and 
watershed development programs of Jharkhand Tribal Development Society 
(JTDS), funded by both the Jharkhand Government and International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFAD). 
Academic/ Research Background 
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During the academic year 2007-08, I joined the Tata Institute of Social 
Sciences (TISS) for an integrated MPhil-PhD program. Towards the end of 
the academic year 2007-08, I undertook two household-level surveys, at two 
different rural Ho villages (Patatarob of Tonto block and Baralagia of 
Khuntpai block), in view of my MPhil dissertation to better understand the 
Hos’ livelihood strategies and related issues. However, as I completed the 
field survey, I was lucky enough to receive the Erasmus Mundus Scholarship 
by the European Commission for an advanced Masters-Program in Cultures 
and Development Studies (CADES) at KU Leuven Belgium during the 
academic year 2009-10. Based on the survey data and field-based experience, 
I wrote my master’s thesis for CADES: ‘Development Discourse and the 
Adivasis in Rural India: Special Reference to the Hos of West Singhbhum 
District, Jharkhand.’ As I completed the CADES program, I was awarded the 
same scholarship for the present PhD program in Political Science, which 
began on 23 September 2010, at the University of Gent (UGent). 
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General Introduction 
 
In the colonies the truth stood naked, but the citizens of the mother country 
preferred it with cloths on: the native had to love them, something in the way 
mothers are loved 
(Jean-Paul Sartre [1961] 2004: 299) 
 
The ‘new’ nations of Asia and Africa somewhat understandably insisted that 
the right to self-determination extended only to situations of ‘classic 
colonialism’, available to their ‘peoples’ only once in history: to determine 
their collective status as sovereign states within the meaning of international 
law. That right, once exercised, was extinguished for all times; this presumed 
that the ‘logic’ of colonialism, which made all sorts of different peoples, 
cultures, and territories vessels of imperial unity, should  continue in the 
post-colony … Rightless and suffering peoples still remain. 
(Upendra Baxi 2002: 36) 
 
The true ethical test is not only the readiness to save the victims, but also - 
even more, perhaps - the ruthless dedication to annihilating those who made 
them victims. 
(Slavoij Žižek 2002: 60) 
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State-society relationships in India, according to Akhil Gupta (2012), are 
characterized by structural violence. He expounds a 'deformed ethics of the 
state in India' which has kept a large proportion of its peoples in dire and 
killing poverty. Hence, he argues that 'extreme poverty should be theorized as 
a direct and culpable form of killing made possible by state policies and 
practices' (Ibid.: 5). While such callous violence has been perpetrated on 
deprived/ marginalized peoples, there exists a general indifference from the 
part of the establishments towards such violence. More interestingly, while 
the extreme suffering of people is being routinized, the very people who 
suffer such violence ostensibly hold the key to state-power in the world's 
largest democracy (Ibid.).  
In Gupta's analysis bureaucratic arbitrariness, inscription and expediency 
constitute structural violence – 'social arrangements' – with no specific 
perpetrator: 'a crime without a criminal' (Ibid.: 21). For him bureaucratic 
procedures involve corruption, inscription and literacy. Hence, the nature of 
governmental practices dissipate the state's pronounced lofty goals of helping 
the 'poor'. 'Poor' peoples’ lives are affected by corruption: their engagement 
with local officials and arbitrary bureaucratic practices of inclusion and 
exclusion inevitably result in further exclusion and suffering. Hence, Gupta 
concludes that the notions of bureaucratic efficiency and transparency in 
India would remain deficient to overcome poverty, unless 'poor' people's 
imagination of the state is altered via 'political literacy' and negotiations with 
the bureaucracy to extenuate violence.  
Furthermore, at the epilogue of Gupta’s book, he states that the structural 
violence embodied by the idea of the state in India has been most sharply 
evident while the state engages itself with Adivasis, the country's 'poorest' 
people: ‘with tribal groups one sees the logic of primitive accumulation – 
which depends on the dispossession and displacement of people already 
living on mining lands – with sharp clarity’ (Ibid.: 290). ‘The pattern of 
growth after liberal “reform” will ensure that the poor continue to be killed 
against the backdrop of a shining India’ (Ibid.: 294).  
Gupta's work is commendable to have acknowledged and, to some extent, 
exposed the prevalence of structural violence and suffering being inflicted on 
the 'poorest' people in India. However, what remains largely mystified in his 
analysis are the source and nature of what he termed a ‘deformed ethics’ that 
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enable the continued existence and reproduction of structural violence. 
Hence, his analysis tends to suggest that structural violence has an existence 
of its own devoid of any ideological instrument that forges human agency to 
shape specific forms of sociocultural processes and history. This thesis, 
hence, intends to pick up what Gupta has left undisclosed: the historical and 
ideological roots of racism and colonialism as praxis and process being at 
work in India, which might be at the root of structural violence in India. This 
thesis attempts to explicate a few naturalized and religiously legitimized 
aspects of racism and colonialism in India by historicizing the category 
‘Adivasis’ or ‘tribals,’ presently one of the most marginalized social 
minorities in India.  
It is crucial to note that the term ‘Adivasi’ as a ‘minority’ category originated 
in the early 1930s7 as a corollary of Indian nationalist movement led by a few 
elites from among the nationalist majority. Interestingly, however, while 
historicizing the category Adivasi as ‘indigenous’ people of India, beyond 
British and Mughal colonial periods, they emerge as the majority, although in 
the course of history, they have been reduced to be the most deprived 
minority today. This thesis attempts to explore some of the processes and 
praxes underlying these transformations as an essential aspect of state-
                                                      
7 Adivasi means the descendants of the ‘original’ inhabitants in India (Xaxa 1999). Hardiman 
(1987) argued, people who called themselves Adivasis did not fit in the broader term 
'subalterns' which the proponents of subaltern studies employed roughly to represent all the 
‘lower’ castes as opposed to the ‘upper’ castes sovereigns. Omvedt (1988) showed, although 
the term 'Adivasi,' as Hardiman (1987) had noted, came into existence in Chotanagpur in the 
1920s-30s, it holds much 'similarity to other “Adi” movements of the 1920s and 1930s 
mainly among ex-untouchable groups (Adi-Dravidas, Adi-Andhras, Adi-Hindus, Adi-Dharam, 
etc.) all of which had a common ideological claim of being the original inhabitants who lived 
in a society of equality until subjugated'  by some dominant groups (p. 2001). However, 
terms such as 'Adivasi,' ‘tribe,’ 'tribal', and 'Scheduled Tribes,' are all debated for their origin, 
connotations, representational and analytical applications (see Rachel 2009). Ram (2012) 
argues that the term 'Dalit' encompassed all those people categorized as Scheduled Castes, 
Scheduled Tribes, and 'Backward' Castes, although in the current political discourse, it is 
mainly confined to Scheduled Castes (formerly untouchables) and covers only those who are 
classified as Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists while excluding Muslims and Christians. Ilaiah 
(2010) conceptualizes all the so-called ‘lower’ castes, including, Dalits jointly referred to as 
Dalitbahujans (meaning the oppressed majority people of India). For a more recent and 
succinct discussion on the politics of terms like ‘tribal’ and ‘Adivasi’ see (Rycroft and 
Dasgupta 2011). I use the term 'tribes' and 'Adivasis' interchangeably, in this thesis, with a 
consistent preference to the latter, since this is both a peoples’ self-description and a 
political choice/ statement by itself (see Roy Burman 2009). 
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formation in India. Unravelling these complex and conflict-ridden historical 
processes enables deeper, critical and innovative insights into the nature of 
what is often referred to as Indian national ‘mainstream.’ For ‘history is 
precisely, applying a present consciousness to the past. We view the past 
through the prism of the present, in the hope that this will help us understand 
the present through the prism of the past’ (White 2012: 212). White has also 
argued that ‘a margin defines a page.’ In this sense, I argue, that the Adivasi 
(and Dalit) margins in India define the ‘mainstream.’ ‘In many ways,’ argues 
White, ‘the history of the minorities is that of the nation-state: that is the 
history of the processes that led to certain groups to be defined as ‘minorities’ 
(Ibid.: 210).  
The Constitution of India has categorized Adivasis as ‘Scheduled Tribes,’ 
interestingly however, it has not defined the concept. Instead, it has thrown 
out a few ‘essential’ characteristics to identify them: ‘primitive traits, 
geographical isolation, distinct culture, shy of contact with community at 
large, and economic backwardness.’8 ‘Scholars and policymakers, have never 
agreed on a definition of tribal person or tribe, leave alone the appropriate 
relationship between such communities and the Indian state’ (Stuligross 
1999: 2). However, one of the most recent anthropological works on Indian 
societies has this to say about Adivasis and mainstream: 
for scholars of postcolonial studies, ‘tribes’ are much a colonial invention as ‘castes’ 
and they do not deal with tribal societies except as colonial subjects. The subaltern 
studies group did contribute to research on tribal communities as one example of 
‘peasant rebellion’. However, as postcolonial studies, those who were concerned with 
tribal societies in connection with general theoretical and comparative issues, are rarely 
acknowledged in pan-Indian discussions. … The status of tribes or Adivasis remain 
contentious. … Theories of Hinduization or Sanskritization, that is, the question of the 
transformation of communities, have been out of fashion for a while. However, in our 
view, related questions have not been solved and the relationship between different 
communities – ‘Hindu’, ‘tribal’ and others – deserve more attention (Berger and 
Heidemann 2013: 6-7). 
The Indian government recognizes Adivasis as ‘indigenous people,’ however, 
when it comes to providing them with the rights that indigenous peoples 
enjoy elsewhere, the representatives of Indian Government would tactfully 
say that all people in India are indigenous (Xaxa 2008; Kela 2006, 2012; 
Fernandes 2013; Bourne 2013). This thesis neither argues for or against 
                                                      
8 See http://www.tribal.nic.in/Content/IntroductionScheduledTribes.aspx Website of the 
ministry of Tribal Affairs, (accessed 28 December 2013). 
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Adivasis’ indignity nor attempts to define people categorized as Scheduled 
Tribes. What it does instead is to historicize Adivasi social formations as 
people who refused to be subjugated and colonized by the ancient Indian, 
ideological statecraft which was based on the principles of ‘purity’ of the 
sovereigns and ‘impurity’ of the toiling ‘masses.’9 By doing so, it explicates 
some of the complex and long-drawn historical processes by which Adivasi 
social formations have come to be India’s most impoverished minority 
groups today, and how some of these complex and long-drawn historical 
processes work themselves out even today in Adivasi dominant pockets, also 
called ‘Scheduled Areas.’ 
Hence, the main thrust of this thesis is to show the nature and shape of Indian 
statecraft manifesting itself while it interacts with its Adivasi social 
formations. Thus, the thesis shows that the state in India,10 while interacting 
with Adivasis, bears close similarity to a typical colonial system, 
conceptualized by Jean-Paul Sartre (2001, 2004), as praxis and process. The 
praxis of oppression according to Sartre: domination, violence, alienation, 
legitimate defence of violence by racism (justificatory violence), and 
eventually the colonialist and the colonized forming a couple, producing 
antagonistic situations by one another. This praxis keeps the masses in a 
molecular aggregation to increase their sub-humanity, including, a religious 
policy favouring the most superstitious elements; an educational policy 
designed not to educate the ‘colonized’ in the colonizers’ culture and 
simultaneously to deprive them the possibility of becoming educated in their 
own culture, etc. (Ibid..). 
The process of exploitation, according to Sartre: the colonizer makes the 
colonized to work for him at starvation wages; chronic unemployment (or 
                                                      
9 Saha (1986) calls this ideology ‘Indian elitism’/ ‘brahmanical ideology,’ Sahu (2001) 
‘brahmanical Ideology,’ According to Ambedkar [1916] (2004) and Dumont [1966] (2004) this 
ideological instrument simultaneously parcels Indian society whilst providing it with an 
elusive unity. 
10 The concept ‘state’ in this thesis has to be understood anthropologically: ‘the state is not a 
discrete, monolithic entity acting impersonally above or outside society. Rather, the Sarkar – 
indifferently “state and government” in the commonest Indian vernacular terms for them – 
appears on many levels and in many centres, and its lower echelons at least are always 
staffed by people with whom some kind of social relationship can or could exist; the 
“faceless bureaucrats” actually do have faces’ Fuller and Benei (2001: 15). 
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semi-unemployment), undernourishment and population pressure, and 
poverty create a competitive antagonism, and hampers infrastructural and 
industrial development. The colonized should be nothing more than a labour 
force, which can be bought for less and less. Poverty, disease, competitive 
antagonism chatacterize their wretched existence. High birth-rate and inertia-
violence put in place by the presence-institutions, a metropolitan army, a 
praxis which occasions inorganic inertia amongst the colonized masses to 
deprive them of any possibility of reacting, even by admiring their oppressors 
and seeking to become like him keep then ensnared in endless struggle 
(Sartre 2004: 716-734).  
A pitiless and violent system: ‘the impotence-revolt of the masses and the 
inertia-violence of the army, both deserve the name of ‘praxis and process’ 
(Sartre 2004: 725).  
Thus, the thesis shows that the world’s largest democracy’s apparent 
contradictions in its processes of democratization might be better understood 
when it is analyzed as a ‘colonial civic order11’ (CCO) whose genealogy goes 
back to ancient times. It shows that colonialism and racism in India 
originated with the emergence of what is called the rise of ‘Hindu elitism’ 
(Saha 1986: 277) or ‘political Brahmanism’ (McClish 2009: sic). From the 
later Vedic phase (c. 1000-500 B.C.E.), a gradual and complex process of 
social transformations began to set in. consequently, more flexibly organized 
social formations began to turn into hierarchically arranged social order with 
graded inequality; and along with it, the idea of the Indian state emerged in 
the alluvial plains of the subcontinent (Sharma 1958; 1959; 2007). The Hindu 
elitism stresses the ‘purity’ of those came to be considered as dwija (‘twice 
born’) as against the ‘impure,’ majority toiling masses who came to be 
                                                      
11 The term colonial civic order (CCO), a term employed by Thompson (2000: 1), designates 
‘the broad arena in which states and citizens interact.’ This thesis uses both ‘mainstream’ 
and ‘colonial civic order’ interchangeably to refer the broader arena of state-society 
interactions in India to show the fluidity of interactions and negotiations while recognizing 
the blurred boundary between state and society. The term colonial civic order also signifies 
the continuity of colonialism from ancient times till date. It also implies that no colonizer 
imposes colonial structures (or system of rule) unilaterally, but it involves, as do most other 
political systems, constant negotiation of power relationships and identities (Ibid.). Such 
negotiations often came across via direct physical violence, but during ancient times, they 
occurred more routinely via everyday religio-cultural ideologies and practices and 
interactions. In ‘modern’ times, they occur across desks and tables, dominant discourses via 
newspapers and other mass communication media, movies, and sports, etc (Ibid.). 
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considered as ‘once born.’ This correlates well with Sartrean formulation of a 
perfect colonial system:  
the colonists are human beings by divine right, and the natives are subhumans. That is 
the mythical interpretation of a precise fact, since the wealth of the former depends on 
the extreme poverty of the latter. This exploitation makes the exploiter dependent upon 
the exploited. And, on another level, this dependence is at the heart of racism; it is its 
profound contradiction and bitter misfortune. .. for the colonizer, being a man means 
first of all being superior to the colonized (Sartre [1964] (2005: 37, emphasis added). 
‘The Brahmanic social order is structured to secure and preserve the total 
dominance of a small elite; for the domination of the rest of the population’ 
(Saha 1994: 66-7).12  
The Indian elites’ attribution of ‘purity’ to themselves and their act of 
distancing themselves from the rest of the toiling populations are termed in 
this thesis as the original forms of Indian colonial desires that would set the 
Indian elite on an endless cycle of ‘chasing mirage.’13 Young (1995), in the 
context of classical European colonialism, has shown ‘the emergence of 
colonial desire in history, its genealogy and its disavowal in the history of 
racialized thought.’ Young’s (1995) Colonial Desire shows how humans 
operate in complicity with historical ways of viewing ‘the other’ (Ibid.: ix). 
Said (1978) has discussed the discursive performance of colonialism and 
challenged the traditional self-devaluation while comparing cultures and the 
complicity between politics and knowledge. Bhabha (1983) has elaborately 
discussed ambivalence as an unhealthy psychological position caused by 
colonial domination. He has described it as a continuous wavering between 
wanting one thing and its opposite. Authenticity of the colonial subject gets 
                                                      
12 Saha (1986 and 1994), and Sharma (1958, 1959 and 2007) ascribe the later Vedic 
transformation of Indigenous societies affected also by Aryan invasion theory (AIT). However, 
I do not subscribe to AIT since several controversies and political strings are attached to it 
(see Elst 1999). On applying Sartre’s existential explanation of social histories and colonialism 
as a system to the nature and trend of present day social transformation taking place in 
Adivasi dominant regions, I explicate the praxis and processes of racism and colonialism 
being at work in India historically.  
13 See Breman (2010) for an explanation of the idea of people moving from ‘smaller’ places 
to ‘bigger’ places in pursuit of economic and political gains (Lakshmi, a popular pantheon of 
wealth, honour and good fortunes) while the ‘once born’ or ‘impure’ ones being condemned 
to strive in their traditional marginal spaces experiencing relative deprivations. See Lindguist 
and Handelman (2013) for a discussion on how religion and politics interact in a globalized 
‘modern’ world. See also Vinina (2012) for interesting discussions on the ideology and 
worldview or ‘mindscape’ of mediaeval Indian society and culture.  
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fluctuatingly modified in relation to others. Spivak (1987) too has traced the 
roots of cultural politics to classical colonialism.14 
 As already mentioned, this thesis historicizes Adivasis, who at this juncture 
of history, still hold on to their alternative imaginations of more egalitarian 
social relations, power, sovereignty, governance and development (some of 
which still survives as antidotes to an ever intruding capitalist Indian 
statecraft driven by political Brahmanism) to avoid the state (Shah 2007, 
2010). While doing so, it shows that the state in India embodies colonialism 
and racism, of the most ancient types, which lay at the origin of both the Idea 
of the Indian state and Adivasi social formations. Undoubtedly, Adivasis’ 
present avoidance/ escape of the ‘modern’ all-encompassing state brings 
them only multiple disadvantages: displacement, dispossession, and 
disintegration of their sociocultural systems. Moreover, Adivasi elites’ 
ambivalent participation in the colonial civic order while excluding their 
‘intimate’ co-villagers to subhuman status further aggravates such multiple 
disadvantages and degradation.  Nevertheless, the thesis concludes that a 
better understanding of Adivasis’ and other such marginalized social groups’ 
alternative imaginations and sociopolitical philosophies might help redefine 
the prevalent constructs of civilization, modernity, freedom, development and 
politics, which might, perhaps, help reverse the colonial desires that keep 
alienating people from each other.  
What follows in the rest of this introductory chapter (1) is: first, short 
thematic summaries of chapters, second, Sartre’s formulation of colonialism 
as a system and its relevance to analyze pre-classical colonial systems in so-
called ‘postcolonial societies,’ third, the concept of racism, fourth, concepts 
of structural, cultural and symbolic violence and their reproductive logics, 
fifth, the unaltered Indian system of colonialism and racism, sixth, 
methodology, seventh, methods of fieldwork and sources of data, and finally, 
researcher’s assumptions.  
Chapters and Themes 
                                                      
14 It is, however, intriguing to see how and why the last two famous scholars of Indian origin, 
and several other Indian diaspora scholars, have refused to look at the millennia-long 
homegrown colonial-style super-exploitation, oppression, and their ill-effect on marginalized 
and exploited Indian populations. See Express News Service (2013) for an interesting report 
on Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen getting disturbed while the students at the University of 
Hyderabad forced him to speak on ‘Caste and not on Coffee.’  
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Adivasis as state-fleeing and challenging people (Saha 1986, 1994; Scott 
2009), and the (Indian) state a colonial system, ‘an infernal machine of the 
practico-inert field (Sartre 2004: 228-52). The second chapter applies 
Sartre’s conceptualization of colonialism as a system with racism inherent in 
it as an ideological instrument that mystifies its oppressive logic and 
outcomes to the jati/ caste-ridden Indian history.15 While doing so, it 
reconceptualizes Adivasis (in ancient India) as peoples who had deliberately 
chosen to escape the jati/ caste-based racist and colonial praxis and process 
that had been maturing in the alluvial plains of the subcontinent at various 
time in ancient history. Later in the course of time, several Adivasi groups 
established themselves into powerful distinct social groups/ kingdoms with 
alternative modes of production, social organizations, religio-cultural 
practices, and languages in largely autonomous, forested and mountainous 
regions (Sinha 1982; Saha 1986, 1994; Skaria 1999; Kela 2012). It further, 
shows how the advent of Mughal and British colonialism conjoined with pre-
British Indian colonial ideology to make the trajectory of westernization/ 
modernization and sanskritisation, a certified model for social change in India 
to the gross detriment of Adivasis who chooses to reject this particular 
trajectory of state-formation and social change propelled by political 
Brahmanism. 
Adivasis’ chronic poverty and destitution as the other side of the ‘detached’ 
affluence of Indian elites who adhere to political Brahmanism. The third 
chapter shows that despite nearly seven decades of ‘tribal development’ and 
poverty alleviation programs, chronic poverty and destitution among the most 
marginalized Adivasis in India have only deepened. This situation has been 
brought about by two main processes. First, the processes of Indian 
colonialism in Adivasi dominant regions like Kolhan, and Jharkhand where 
more than a quarter of the country’s mineral resources have been found, and 
extracted, which does not benefits the majority inhabitants of the place. 
Second, the very process of state formation that encourages individual 
accumulation, differentiation and co-option of the relatively ‘affluent’ 
Adivasis into the system. Furthermore, the chapter also shows how the huge 
amounts of state-resources that are being allocated for ‘development’ or 
‘poverty alleviation’ (in the form of bio-politics), do not only depoliticize and 
                                                      
15 Rudolph and Rudolph (1978a) call it ‘pursuit of Lakshmi,’ Anderson (2013) ‘the Indian 
Ideology.’ 
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expand the bureaucratic control over the so-perceive ‘unruly’ or ‘dangerous’ 
deprived classes, but also aggravate inequality and create new social 
divisions. A situation has been set in place by the very processes of state 
formation whereby the affluent accumulate multiple advantages while the 
most marginalized and economically poor accumulate multiple 
disadvantages. 
Emerging Adivasi leaders, and their mediated empowerment are being 
caught up (in a deadlock) of ambivalence of violence which reproduces 
colonialism and racism. Sartre’s analysis of colonialism also shows that the 
colonialists recruit and maintain kinglets who derive their power solely from 
the prevailing colonial ideology and govern on its behalf to the disadvantage 
of the majority subjugated ‘masses.’ Thus, colonialism creates masses but 
prevents them from becoming a conscious proletariat by mystifying them 
with the caricature of their own ideology’ (2001: 136). The fourth chapter’s 
focus is on Adivasi middlemen or power-brokers or cultural interpreters. It 
shows how those accumulating and differentiating affluent Adivasi 
individuals continue to be retained as ambivalent mediators by the very logic 
of the system. Emerging leadership among Adivasis via acculturation and 
differentiation inevitably internalizes dominant discourses, language and 
socio-cultural practices due to the absence of adequate tools to critique and 
challenge the system that devours Adivasis as a distinct people. The system 
enables this process by what Bourdieu (1990) termed symbolic violence to 
explain cultural production. Processes of cultural production and co-option 
results to ‘Adverse Incorporation and (‘intimate’) Social Exclusion’ (AISE) 
(Hickey and du Toit 2007). Such incorporation involves ambivalence/ duality 
of introjection (Freire 1987; 2000). Bourdieu (1991, 1994, and 2000) argues 
that it involves misrecognition. AISE produces and maintains ambivalence of 
violence which is constitutive of a colonial system.  
The state embodies powers of exclusion, facilitates ‘intimate exclusion’ which 
invites these powers into Adivasi ethno-regional territories that are 
ostensibly protected by the same state. Land has been crucial to Adivasi 
social formations for their sustenance as a people as their identity is tied to 
land, water and forests. However, alienation of Adivasi land, that are mostly 
mountainous, and by now denuded forests, have also been found to possess 
rich mineral resources. Hence, despite Adivasi dominant regions being 
labelled as ‘protected’ ethno-territory meant to provide exclusive access to 
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Adivasis, they have been reduced to typical colonies that supply raw 
materials for the ‘development’ of an imagined ‘Indian nation.’ The fifth 
chapter, thus, shows how ostensibly protected Adivasi ethno-territories have 
become territories of multiple exclusion (as its inhabitants are ‘disabled’ to be 
beneficiaries of their own land) while others take disproportionate advantage 
by increased extraction of mineral and forest resources. It explicates the 
processes of super-exploitation and pauperization of Adivasis by the four 
powers of exclusion: regulation, force, market and legitimation. These 
powers act jointly and make their way into Adivasi ethno-territories aided by 
those Adivasis who accumulate and differentiate themselves from their co-
villagers, who share the same history, tradition and cultural values. The 
processes of individual accumulation and differentiation (encouraged by the 
processes of state formation) have been termed as ‘intimate exclusion’ or 
‘exclusion from below’ (Hall et al 2011: 20-23). 
Education of Adivasis clearly negates Adivasi identity, cultural values, and 
history to be replaced by the Indian Ideology and facilitates adverse co-
option of affluent Adivasis into Indian colonial civic order. According to 
Sartre (2001, 2004), a colonial system necessarily ‘attempts to bar the 
colonized people from the road of history’; so also in India, Adivasi children 
are denied their language rights, the means to revive their socio-cultural, 
values, and systems and to know their own history (Bijoy 2003) by way of 
imposing a centralized education system, one of Indian state’s main 
apparatuses to maintain the age-old colonial system. Chapter six focuses on 
school education in Adivasi dominant regions. It shows how Adivasi children 
in schools are indoctrinated into dominant values and discourses to condemn 
themselves for being ‘backward’ Adivasis, how a highly centralized 
education system has sought to erase Adivasi history, sociocultural values, 
language and their distinct alternative imaginations of who they are – Adivasi 
subjectivities. On the one hand, such an alien education system produces 
resistance among deprived Adivasi children who find it hard to cope with 
such violent processes of ideological imperialism, on the other hand, to make 
things worse, Adivasi children’s resistance to this imperial education has 
once again been misjudged and depicted as their inherent distaste/ inability to 
be ‘educated’.  
Towards breaking of the the systemic process of colonialism and racism that 
reproduces itself through structural, cultural and symbolic violence. The 
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final and concluding chapter-7 sums up the main arguments and insights, 
delineates the important implications of the main arguments, and suggests 
theoretical and methodological approaches to undo structural, cultural and 
symbolic violence emanating from a hitherto uninterrupted colonial system 
(caste/ jati based discrimination and oppression). These have been embodied 
in the naïve and rhetorical garbs of ‘national unity,’ ‘development’ and 
‘integration.’ The concluding section, thus, highlights the challenge, and 
alternative possibilities to provide useful analytical tools to foster solidarity 
among deprived social formations to recognize and confront the powers of 
exclusion being operationalized via political Brahmanism, and to promote 
radical democratic and revolutionary changes.  
Jean-Paul Sartre: Colonialism as a System, and its Analytical Relevance  
Sartre (2004) [1956] explains colonialism as a system which embodies 
racism, operating at different temporalities involving time-lag – from ancient-
day state systems to modern-day capitalism. Although Sartre’s inspiration of 
such a path-breaking analysis was in the context of French colonialism in 
Algeria, his emphasis is on the existential and systemic basis of colonialism, 
which makes his analytical frame applicable/ relevant beyond special and 
temporal specificities (Howells 1995; Sartre 2001). Moreover, he shows a 
remarkable understanding of the differences of perspectives and need on the 
question of land and agrarian problems – the appropriation of land, issues of 
resettlement of displaced peoples, and landlessness in general – that have 
been central to many postcolonial countries in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America  (Catalano 1986; Sartre 2001; Jameson 2004). Colonialism, 
according to Sartre (2001; 2005), embodies an intentional and systemic form 
of oppression and exploitation that could be analyzed as such.  
Sartre explicated the dialectic of négritude by his phenomenological theories 
of race. His relationship with Martinican intellectual and revolutionary Frantz 
Fanon made him an activist and a theorist of decolonization. Sartre’s theories 
of race, self, and society constitute a remarkable sociology of culture 
inspiring insightful reflections on contemporary postcolonial studies (Jules-
Rosette 2007). Sartre said in 1948, ‘Négritude [is like] … living as a woman 
who is born to die and senses her own death even in the most rewarding 
moments of her life’ (Ibid.: 245). The same might be said about the status of 
a large section of Dalits and other such marginalized people in India who 
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have suffered untouchability being practiced by the so-called ‘upper’ castes 
in India (Teltumbde 2010; Omvedt 2011). 
To understand colonialism and racism with their historical and systemic 
basis, Sartre (1958) provides a phenomenological explanation of human 
histories, aggression, violence and conflict. He begins with ‘scarcity’ as the 
initial structure of the human world (or being) which is negated and 
transcended by human needs – experiences of lack and desire, of hunger and 
thirst which represent human condition, as existence precedes essence 
(Jameson 2004: xviii). Violence and aggressivity are explained in terms of 
the situations of perceived scarcity, which is a negation in itself, and must be 
negated by human action, individual as well as organized. This is the 
fundamental project or praxis, involving pure reciprocity which forms a 
cohesive in-group. However, tension arises when, in the course of migration, 
members of a tribal group comes across a strange tribe. ‘They suddenly 
discover man as alien species, that is, as a fierce carnivorous beast who can 
lay ambushes and make tools’ (Sartre 2004: 107).  
‘In pure reciprocity, that which is Other than me is also the same. But in 
reciprocity as modified by scarcity, the same appears to us as anti-human in 
so far as this same man appears as radical Other – that is to say, as 
threatening us with death’ (p. 11-12)16 While an affinal in-group employs 
generosity, cooperation and the like to negate the initial fact – the situation of 
perceived scarcity – the threatening ‘Other’ is kept away as evil and 
dangerous to be done away with. This summarizes Sartre’s conceptualization 
of the origin of human histories – as many histories as there are as many 
modes of production and social relations/ structures and ways of life.  
Thus, the fundamental human project or praxis – a dialectical process of 
initial negation of scarcity – is intertwined with a counterfinality inextricably 
conjoined with the finalities of human action and production, a 'disjunctive 
ontological synthesis’ (Jameson 2004: xvi). This force of counterfinality 
produces practico-inertness, ‘objects which are not mere things and agencies 
which are not exactly people either’ (Jameson 2004: xxii). It is a position to 
which humans can be reduced due to the ‘immeasurable brutality people visit 
                                                      
16 This also is in line with the argument that ‘racism must be understood to be a nexus of 
material relations between populations presumed to be essentially different’ (Harrison 1995: 
47). 
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on other peoples within the world of scarcity’ (Ibid.). The ‘other’, thus, 
reduced to objects/ or to a subhuman status, in the course of historical 
processes, are treated as such. ‘The domination of power turns the subject 
into an object, (a practico-inert) position’ (Young 2005: xv). Hence, for 
Sartre, colonialism accompanies racism understood at its phenomenological 
level rather than as an ideology. ‘Phenomenology is able to conceive of the 
manifold vulnerability of the subject’s embodiment as an irreducible 
component of human existence’ (Staudigl 2007: 238). 
Racism 
‘Racism, – the grouping of people on the basis of physical appearance for the 
purpose of social discrimination’ – is although a cultural artefact, the product 
of a particular historical and cultural context, a part of the belief systems, 
arises from distinct historical, social and cultural dynamics. It is a learned 
cultural phenomenon and an acquired characteristic, real enough to produce 
dire socioeconomic and political consequences (Perry 2007: 1-2). Although, 
race is a social construct, like class and gender, it has an independent effect 
on social life. ‘Once racial stratification is established, race becomes an 
independent criterion for vertical hierarchy in society. Thereafter, different 
races experience subordination and super-ordination in society and develop 
different interests’ (Bonilla-Silvia 1997: 475). ‘Racism indeed destroys 
individuals’ potential for self-determination, inasmuch as it defines them in 
threatening terms of non-human animality, savagery, or barbarity’ (Staudigl 
2007: 250). 
Racism, as an ideology, involves certain complexity, especially, in its 
reproduction. Its expression always interacts with the extant of economic and 
political relations with other ideologies, hence, an analysis of racism must 
account for its multidimensionality and historical specificities. It also retains 
a central place in the historical development and contemporary structure of 
capitalist societies (Miles and Brown 2003). Everyday racism, however, is a 
process in which: ‘(a) socialized racist notions integrated into meanings that 
make practices immediately definable and manageable, (b) practices with 
racist implications becomes in themselves familiar and repetitive, and (c) 
underlying racial and ethnic relations are actualized and reinforced through 
these routine or familiar practices in everyday situations’ (Essed 1991: 52).  
39 
 
Solomon and Back (1996) have suggested not to view racism as a specific or 
monolithic structure of ideas, rather as a phenomenon ‘constructed and 
reconstructed through time and space by social action.’ Racism involves 
reifying minority communities as static and unchanging cultural and political 
collectivities, and establishing new patters of segregation that limit everyday 
interaction (with the racially defined). Minority communities not only get 
excluded unequally with differentiated citizen rights, but also reproduce, by 
imitation, the differentiating patterns of the majority. Thus, racism is ‘a 
flexible and constantly changing ideology’ integral to human social relations 
(Ibid.: 219).  
Sartre’s quest, however, was to uncover how ideology works in and through 
the individual in society. What makes a racist a racist? What is the experience 
of racism for those oppressed by it? Accordingly, he established that it was 
the settler who had brought the native into existence and who perpetuated his 
existence (Young 2005: x). For Sartre, all types of colonialism involve 
racism. While elaborating the systemic violence of colonialism, Sartre 
carefully differentiated between ideology and colonialism: the former 
remains insidiously instrumental17 in maintaining the systemic violence of the 
latter’s oppression.  
Colonialism denies human rights to people it has subjugated by violence, and whom it 
keeps in poverty and ignorance by force… Racism is inscribed in the events 
themselves, in the institutions, in the nature of the exchanges and the production. The 
political and social statuses reinforce one another: since the natives are subhuman, the 
declaration of Human Rights does not apply to them; conversely, since they have no 
rights, they are abandoned without protection to the inhuman forces of nature, to the 
‘iron laws’ of economics (Sartre 2004: 50).   
This is the basic context of violence, structural, cultural and symbolic and its 
systemic reproductive effects. 
                                                      
17 Žižek (1989) explains the insidious instrumentality of ideology: ‘it is a social reality whose 
very existence implies the non-knowledge of its participants as to its existence that is the 
social effectivity, the very reproduction of which implies that the individual do not know 
what they are doing. Ideology is not the false consciousness of a (social) being but this being 
itself in so far as it is supposed by false consciousness. … An ideology is really holding us only 
when we do not feel any opposition between it and reality – that is, when the ideology 
succeeds in determining the modes of our everyday experiences of reality itself’ (Ibid.: 15-16, 
49). ‘The idea of the possible end of ideology is an ideological idea par-excellence’ (L. 
Althusser 2006 quoted in Žižek 1989: 15). For more on how ideologies influence our daily 
life, see Eagleton (1991).  
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Sartre further elaborated the dialectical relationship between the oppressor 
and the oppressed. Thus, he showed how the oppressed is brought into 
participate in a colonial system: ‘a pitiless reciprocity binds the colonizers to 
the colonized, their product and their destiny’ (Ibid.: 5). The colonizers and 
their victims both remain strangled within the colonial apparatus. Thus, the 
very logic of colonialism would lead not only to the self-destruction of the 
system, but to the affirmation of the colonized ‘national selfhood’ (Haddour 
2004: xxi). In such a situation, ‘freedom is constituted by taking 
responsibility to transform oneself back into an agent’ in pure reciprocity,18 
‘ethics of individual freedom, of responsibility and authenticity within the 
larger processes of history’ (Young 2005: xv).  
To be respectful when something singular arises, to be intransigent when power offends 
against the universal . . . It is always necessary to watch out for something, a little 
beneath history, that breaks it, that agitates it; it is necessary to look, a little behind 
politics, for that which ought to limit it, unconditionally (Foucault, 1999: 134). 
Here Foucault is stressing the importance of history or genealogy, as he terms 
it, of power and domination to understand what is going on in the present. 
According to him, ‘only a single drama is ever staged…. the endlessly 
repeated play of dominations’ (Foucault 1980: 150). 
Structural, cultural and symbolic violence: oppressive exploitation, 
discrimination and their often unintelligible reproductive logic 
Staudigl (2007: 249) defines violence as ‘an intended violation of the 
embodied claims posed by embodied subjects.’ He agrees with Sartre (2004) 
in showing phenomenologically that violence is an inevitable outcome of 
human action as humans are embodied intersubjective beings. Scheper-
Hughes and Bourgis (2008) argue violence to be nonlinear, destructive, 
reproductive and even productive; it occurs in a chain or a continuum of 
mutual violations among humans. Its variations such as structural, cultural, 
symbolic, direct, and domestic violence are closely related as they might 
easily get translated into each other. Structural violence is synonymous with 
exploitative unequal power relations which results in poverty, hunger, social 
exclusion and humiliating discrimination that negatively affect individual and 
communal living. Hence, beyond its physicality, force, assault or pain, 
                                                      
18 Pure reciprocity in human relations is love for love, intimacy for intimacy, trust for trust as 
opposed to the purely ‘utilitarian’ relation of human beings to one another, and to nature 
(D’Mello 2012). 
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violence has various other dimensions. A violent assault on persons denies 
them dignity and self-respect, to which the social and cultural dimension of 
the violent action attributes further power and meaning. (Galtung 1990; Žižek 
2009). 
However, violence is not sui generis. Moreover, persons placed at various 
positions in society may perceive violence as ‘depraved’ or ‘glorious.’ One 
may admit, in the final analysis, that violence is a human condition, but it is 
present as a potential capability in all humans as its opposite: the ability to 
reject violence. Hence, ‘violence is not an essential, universal, sociological 
entity, a residue of our primate and prehistoric evolutionary origins as a 
species of hunter-killers’ (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgis 2008: 2). Humans are 
embodied social beings, hence, social relations, structures, cultural practices, 
ideas and ideologies shape human actions, including, violence in all its 
dimensions both in its expression and repression. Thus, ‘most violence is 
sadly not senseless at all;’ and yet, ‘breaking the vicious circle of violence, 
and counter-violence is an incredibly difficult project’ (Ibid.: 3, 27). Most 
of ‘both traumatic violence and other, more insidious forms of social 
suffering’ arise, at least, partly from their socio-culturally perceived 
instrumentality19 (Das 2001: 3).  
Types of Violence 
As violence is difficult to define so also are its recognition and classification.  
Violence can be everything and nothing; legitimate or illegitimate; visible or invisible; 
necessary or useless; senseless and gratuitous or utterly rational and strategic. 
Revolutionary violence, community-based massacres, and state repression are often 
painfully graphic and transparent. The everyday violence of infant mortality, slow 
starvation, disease, despair and humiliation that destroys socially marginalized humans 
with even greater frequency are usually invisible or misrecognized (Scheper-Hughes 
and Bourgis 2008: 2). 
The most common types of violence fall under three headings: (1) structural 
violence that is produced systemically; (2) physical/ subjective/ direct 
                                                      
19
 One of the main limitations of this study is that it has not explicitly dealt with the issues of 
violence and oppression from Adivasi women’s perspective. There is no doubt that Adivasi 
women face multiple exclusions and burdens within several of the issues discussed in this 
study, and perhaps Adivasi women even hold different perspectives on them. However, 
there are already a few studies that have focused specifically on Adivasi women’s issues 
exclusively (see Kishwar 1987; Das and Das 1992; Kelkar et al 2003; Rao 2008; Talmaki 2012; 
Jadhav 2013). 
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violence, the most commonsensical form of violence produced by identifiable 
subjects, e.g., visible violence such as insult, and killing; and (3) symbolic 
violence that of language based on the master signifier: patterns of social life 
encoded within language, insofar as, they reify relations of domination via 
hegemonic discourses (Žižek 2009). 
For example, symbolic violence – the sociocultural dimensions of violence 
which is inherent in hegemonic forms of discourses – often remains 
unnoticed and goes unchallenged, whilst it not only amplifies the feelings of 
shame and guilt in ‘victims,’ but also puts both the ‘victim’ and the 
perpetrator in a position of ambivalence (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgis 2008).  
Ambivalence arises from the interpretation of simultaneously present opposed forces 
that press towards opposing courses of action both on the societal and individual levels. 
It has both normative and performative aspects: the ways in which opposing values are 
shaped by social practices and discourses and the institutional and individual strategies 
of dealing with it. Structural ambivalence prompts the politics of ambivalence. The 
politics of ambivalence is the processes by which certain social positions are 
structurally spared; high degrees of ambivalence allows for an integration of opposed 
courses of action more easily at the expense of other positions (Lorenz-Mayer 2001: 
18). 
Ambivalence about violence also emerges partly from an explicit or implicit 
dichotomy between legitimate/ illegitimate, permissible or sanctioned acts of 
violence. Ambivalence results and prevails, for example, when the 
‘legitimate’ violence of the militarized state is differentiated from ‘unruly,’ 
‘illicit’ violence of revolutionaries. Commonsense often contains conflicting 
and opposed themes and values: the general understanding that people should 
be merciful and that justice should be dealt serves a conflicting duality in a 
person (Billig et al 1988). 
The Current Global Context of Economic and Political Violence 
At the global level, Farmer (2004), Žižek (2009) and O’Neil Jr. (2009) 
discuss the existence of systemic/ structural violence of colonialism and 
capitalism with their political, economic, cultural, and physical dimensions. 
Inequality is considered as ‘one of the major forms of structural violence 
based on the idea of dominance – imperialism’ within and among nations and 
nation-states. There are economic, political, military, communication and 
cultural imperialisms (Galtung 1971: 80). The ‘class-oppressed,’ the 
socioeconomically poor, are the infrastructural expression of the process of 
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oppression. The other group represent the ‘super-structural’ expression of 
oppression; and because of this, they are mutually conditioned (Ibid.: 81). 
Oppression is the experience of repeated, widespread, systemic injustice… oppressions 
are systematically reproduced in the major economic, political, and cultural institutions 
… Factors that contribute to the maintenance of oppression are: the superior power of 
the dominant group; the social production of meaning in the service of legitimating 
oppression; the self-fulfilling prophecies arising from oppression; and the distorted 
relationship between the oppressed and the oppressor (Deutsch 2006:10, 15). 
Furthermore, most political theorists agree that violence is the most glaring 
manifestation of power; and the struggle for power underlies all politics as 
echoed by Max Weber’s definition of the state: ‘the rule of men over men 
based on the means of legitimate, that is, allegedly legitimate violence’ 
(Arendt 2008: 236). It makes more sense while linking it with Marx’s 
formulation of the state as an instrument of oppression in the hands of the 
ruling class. Furthermore, a government that is ‘not held to give account of 
itself, rule by Nobody is clearly the most tyrannical of all, since there is no 
one left who could even be asked to answer for what is being done’ 
(Ibid.:1933). The violence of politics, according to Sartre, is most tyrannical 
and yet invisible in the colonial system of capitalism. 
The Uninterrupted Indian Colonialism and Racism 
Weber [1905] (2012) in his Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism 
explained how the Protestant ethic of the 16th and 17th centuries animated the 
origin of modern capitalism including the secular, urban and industrial world 
of today.  
Weber insists that social scientists must seek to understand the activities of others 
contextually by reference to the world in which they live and the nature of their motives 
for acting. Scholars must do so especially when investigating groups living in distinct 
epochs and foreign lands… Moreover, if carried along by powerful social groups, many 
patterns of religion-oriented action formulated long ago, he contends, cast long and 
wide shadows. Indeed, their impact in some cases may endure into the present, even 
though these patterns of action may today be underpinned by entirely non-religious 
motives (Ibid.: xii, emphasis added).  
In a similar manner, Bodley (2011) highlights the processes of prevalent 
ethnocide, genocide and ecocide through an anthropological critique of 
‘firmly held cultural beliefs and practices about the growth and progress that 
threatens the well-being and continued survival of humanity in the twenty-
first century. He urges, ‘an exploration of the relationship between growth, 
scale, and power through human history and periphery caused by the 
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collective social failure to restrain the natural individual drive to increase 
personal social power at the expense of others’(Ibid.: xiii). 
Given the opportunity, unrestrained aggrandizing individuals will use culture to 
transform society to benefit themselves and their direct descendants. Elites will alter 
people’s perceptions of reality. They will manipulate cosmologies and technologies to 
create the belief that elite-directed growth is natural and inevitable, even though it 
disproportionately concentrates social power and makes everyone else pay the costs 
(Ibid., emphasis added). 
Keeping Weber’s [1905] (2012) and Bodley’s (2011) insights as relevant for 
Indian situation today, this thesis attempts to apply Sartre’s (1958) 
philosophical foundation of human histories to draw a genealogy of the 
ancient idea of politics and state in India. Sharma (1959, 2001; 2007) has 
discussed a gradual transformation of more flexible and egalitarian social 
formations and consequent emergence of a powerful group signified by a 
brutal cosmology found in the Rig Vedic practices and texts. Later, a 
religiously justified ideology of the ‘purity’ of the dwija (‘twice-born’) being 
advanced in brahmanical texts, while a polluting ‘impurity’ being imposed on 
to the ‘once-born’ to keep them permanently at a sub-human status devoid of 
all human rights (Kelkar 1909; Blunt 1969: sic; Klass 1980; Cob 2007; Kane 
2007; Waughray 2009). 
The Vedas, the sacred book of the Hindus, have been in existence since 1500 BC, 
which makes the caste system at least 3500 years old. It is the longest living social 
hierarchy in the world, the first and oldest known form of systematic discrimination on 
the basis of birth, which in modern times has been labelled ‘racial discrimination.’ … 
Discrimination on the basis of race and on the basis of caste are not the same; the 
religious justification and the lack of identifiable physiognomic difference between the 
modern caste groups being the essential difference (Kane 2007: 267-8).  
Thus, the jati/ caste ideology of social subjugation, stratification, and 
oppressive exploitation of ‘impure’ toiling ‘masses,’ who were progressively 
being reduced to subhuman conditions (practico-inert status, Sartre 2004) 
within several subcolonial systems of ancient state-circles in the alluvial 
plains of Indian subcontinent (Saha 1986, 1994), have hitherto prevailed 
largely unaltered (Ambedkar 1946; Sharma 2007; Rege 2013; Anderson 
2013; Thapar 2013). While British colonialism not only relied on this age-old 
ideology to advance itself, it also contributed to solidify a more fluid social 
reality into more specific categories which further reified caste-based 
discrimination as a system. However, in post-British colonial India, despite 
the practice of untouchability being made Constitutionally illegal, the 
dominant ruling coalitions, have deliberately undermined the crimes of 
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obvious discrimination and oppression have regularly been committed on the 
weaker sections of society on an everyday basis (Paswan and Jaideva 2002; 
Sadang 2008; Ilaiah 2010; Teltumbde 2010; Roy 2014). 
Moreover, the ruling elites in India have continuously argued that caste 
discrimination was not the same as racial discrimination and that caste based 
discrimination was indigenous to India, although proved otherwise by the 
discriminatory practices of Indian diaspora elsewhere (see Pinto 2001). 
Recently, the UK government has passed a law against caste-discrimination 
in April 2013, and similarly, the European Parliament has passed a resolution 
on the same issue on 10 October 2013.20 Thus, structural and cultural 
violence have not only emerged and continue to prevail as a natural and 
‘desirable’ system by the  Indian elites, but have also been canonized, 
especially, by the privileged groups (Paswan and Jaideva 2002; Sharma 2007; 
Sadang 2008; Ilaiah 2004; 2010; Ayyar and Khandare 2013; Anderson 2013).  
Adivasis being enmeshed within (casteist ‘mainstream’) colonial civic order 
While structural violence remains symptomatic of a homegrown colonial 
system with its ideological vehicle inherent in the cultural fabric of the Indian 
subcontinent, the Indian elites look at it as a source of elusive unity and social 
order. However, most elites remain oblivious to the suffering and hardship of 
those who have been subjected to structural and cultural violence and how 
the system reproduces them.  
The texts that have survived from the early period are generally those of elite groups. 
There are hardly any written sources from those marginalized by mainstream society – 
women, dalits, forest dwellers [Adivasis], and lower castes. … Resort to the more 
influential ‘literary turn’ as it has been called, is apparent in some of the writing of the 
subaltern historians, but this is restricted so far to analyses of modern times (Thapar 
2013: 17-18). 
Adivasi social formations, whom this thesis conceptualizes as people who 
escaped the ancient racist/ caste-based state-systems of the plains but have 
been progressively acculturated and unequally incorporated in to the colonial 
civic order during ‘modern’ times, have so far been treated separately by 
academics and policy makers. Thapar (2013) argues, ‘seeing the changes as 
historical process involves the need to integrate the contribution of such 
                                                      
20 See Ghildiyal (2013) and Menon (2013) for reports on the UK and European Parliaments 
passing resolutions against caste-based discrimination respectively. 
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[alternative social forms] and groups to the making of Indian history, a 
contribution still waiting for recognition’ (Ibid.: 16). In this context, the 
following vignette helps understand how deeply Adivasi social formations 
have become unequally enmeshed and acculturated into the casteist 
mainstream and hence, they can no longer be treated independently of the 
casteist ideology. 
On 16 December 2011, I encountered an experience during a short (one hour) 
train journey from Chakradharpur to Manoharpur, along the Mumbai-Howrah 
main rail-route. As I got into a 'third-class' compartment of the train, Mantu, 
an Adivasi youth of about 26 years old, who was seated on the (same) berth 
beside two non-Adivasi men, suddenly got up from his seat and requested me 
to sit where he was sitting, i.e., on the same berth  with those two non-
Adivasi men. He himself then shifted to a seat at on the opposite berth on 
which two of his own friends, who were also travelling with him, were 
sitting. After having sat on the seat he offered, I casually asked Mantu, 'Why 
did you want me to sit here, and not on that seat where your friends are 
sitting?' He answered, 'Sir, bare-log (great people) must sit together and 
chhote-log (small or less great people) together. Obviously, he took me for a 
'great' person (soul) along with those two non-Adivasi men who had already 
been sitting on this same berth. I further asked him, 'But why do you say; or 
how do you make out a person’s ‘greatness’ or 'smallness'? Do you figure it 
out by their physical make up or some other criteria?' 'No sir,’ he replied, 
‘some people are born great and others small.' 
Conversing with Mantu till the train arrived Manoharpur, I learnt that he 
belonged to the Munda Adivasi society that had different notions of death, 
birth, life after death, ancestors and community (Mundu 2003; Verardo 2003; 
Rachel 2009). He had studied till matriculation and dropped out, since he 
could not pass his examination. He was travelling to Rourkela, a nearby city 
in Odisha on the border of Jharkhand, where the second biggest steel factory 
is situated. There in Rourkela city, he worked as a casual labourer (under a 
contractor) to earn a living. During monsoon season he also cultivated rice 
with his family at his home village, quite interior from suburbs such as 
Manoharpur which has been an important (iron-ore) mining-town.  
The above episode shows how Mantu who belong to a distinct Adivasi 
tradition comes to internalize and participate in certain aspects of the world-
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view suggested by brahmanical ideology which normalizes graded inequality 
of people as ‘great’ and ‘small’ based on birth/ rebirth – the popular Indian 
fatalism (Banaji 2013). Such fatalism in India continues to remain one of the 
most obvious and natural explanations for 'poorer' people's suffering as well 
as the elite's affluence amidst chronic poverty, malnutrition, disease, hunger-
deaths, and other such violent and cruel deprivations.21 Mantu’s case makes 
the process of Adivasis’ acculturative and unequal assimilation into the caste-
animated colonial civic order clearer.  
‘Indian elitism’ thrives on popular Indian fatalism 
The popular notions of fatalism to explain the given social inequalities in 
India as some people being born ‘great’ and others ‘small’ has a lot to do 
with discipline and orderliness of the toiling masses. It provides a basic but 
socially degrading stability whereby capitalism can thrive. It is an ‘intact 
symbolic trust, of individuals not only accepting their own responsibility for 
their fate, but also relying on the basic ‘fairness’ of the system – this 
ideological background has to be sustained through a strong educational, 
cultural apparatus’ (Žižek 2008: 2). In India this essential ‘symbolic trust’ has 
been set in place long ago, and it still continues intact (Chattopadhyaya 1985; 
Sahu 2001; Thapar 2004). The questions of power and powerlessness in such 
a system have been unquestionably treated as part and parcel of a 
(discursively) constructed ‘Indian culture’ (Devalle 1980; Ilaiah 2004; 
Metcalf 2010). 'If the Hindu society were a mere federation of mutually 
exclusive units, the matter would be simple enough. But caste is a parcelling 
of an already homogeneous unit, and the explanation of the genesis of caste is 
the explanation of this process of parcelling.' (Ambedkar [1916] (2004: 133). 
This simultaneously parcelled ‘unity’ makes the analysis of power seemingly 
unnecessary and difficult, especially in marginalized/ impoverished Adivasi 
dominant regions (Rew and Khan 2006).  
The national culture of unquestioned obedience to authority along with an acceptance 
of shoddiness must not be used as an excuse to overlook violations of corporate 
ethics. ... It is in our culture to respect authority. We are taught from childhood to listen 
and obey our elders. We grow up with the notion that our managers, the function heads 
                                                      
21 See Currie (2000), Reddy (2012), Husain (2012) and Sen (2012) for discussions on striking 
contrasts between small enclaves of mounting elite-affluence amidst extreme deprivations: 
problems of malnutrition of 'masses,' situations similar to that of famine, and hunger-deaths 
in India. 
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and business heads within our respective organizations, know more than anyone else. 
Hierarchy is revered, authority is seldom questioned. Those who dare to ask questions 
are renegades (Thakur 2013: 1). 
In ordinary circumstances questions such as, why and how, about the 
‘greatness’ or ‘smallness’ of people are seldom raised since the culturally 
produced submissive behaviours of the deprived ‘masses’ in India have 
naïvely been upheld as an inalienable aspect of India's 'great' and long 
tradition. Such notions have been canonized and glorified by a rhetoric of 
India being a 'traditional,’ ‘spiritual' and 'peaceful’ nation, having certain 
'unity in diversity.’ However, these rhetoric ‘level (unifying) of cultural 
forces are under erroneous assumptions that cultural uniformity will solve the 
problem of socioeconomic inequality in India’ (Devalle 1980: 29; 
Namboodiripad 1982, Randeria 2006; Banerjee 2006; Anderson 2013). 
Mantu’s perception and unquestioned acceptance of people’s ‘greatness’ and 
‘smallness’ hints at how Adivasis, who have so far been ‘othered’ and 
considered to be aliens to the colonial civic order, are brought to introject the 
values of jati/ caste-based (graded) inequalities.  
Hence, by conceptualizing the processes of jati/ caste based rigid gradation, 
stratification and racial discrimination of the economically ‘poorer’ people, 
especially, Adivasis and Dalitbahujans (Ilaiah 2010), as process and praxis of 
colonialism and racism, this thesis shows how these marginalized groups are 
systemically reproduced and why the majority among them continue to exist 
so marginalized. The thesis also argues that the continued existence of huge 
numbers of marginalized and impoverished people, and their imposed 
practico-inert status in various parts of the country to this day testify to the 
continued presence of racism and colonialism as praxis and process 
throughout Indian history.22  
While Ghurey’s famous definition of Adivasis as ‘backward Hindus’ (Ghurey 
1963: 19) initiated an ongoing debate about national ‘tribal’ policy whether to 
                                                      
22 See Arora (2013) for an interesting discussion on the Indian elite’s caste-based 
discriminatory practices, Parmar (2009 a & b) for reports on discrimination of Dalits in 
Gujarat, Rao et al (2013) for caste-based riots in Uttar Pradesh and the state’s role in them. 
‘The global Slavery Index 2013 by Australia’s Walk Free initiative caused hardly a ripple here 
[in India]. The index put India as the country with the largest number of modern day slaves 
but there was no outrage, no collective horror’ (Janu 2013: 1). Also visit the websites of 
‘Round table India:’ http://roundtableindia.co.in, and ‘Swara:’ http://cgnetswara.org for 
numerous reports on outrageous discrimination of Dalits and Adivasis all over India.  
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be paternalist isolation or assimilation or integration, S.L. Doshi’s (1972) 
statement – ‘The force of tribal labour must be organized on a racial basis, 
leaving aside the political interests’ (quoted in Devalle 1980: 38) – clearly 
expressed deliberate strategies to exploit and pauperize Adivasis, while at the 
same time, depoliticizing the issue. This corresponds well with Sartre’s 
formulation: colonialism and racism as praxis and process (2001; 2004: 716-
74).  
Furthermore, the successive policy documents23 have continued to treat 
Adivasis as ‘backward’ if not ‘primitive’ in accordance with dominant pre-
British, British and post-British colonial racial notions and discourses 
(Charsley 1997; Mosse 2005; AIPP 2010). While this being the general 
pattern of the Indian state’s approach to its Adivasis, successive Adivasi 
resistance movements and their leaders, demanding self-determination, 
autonomy and control over the resources in their own lands and territories, 
have either been physically eliminated or co-opted (Mullick 1993, 2004; 
Iqbal 2012) by the very logic of the Indian colonial system. ‘But the politics 
of privilege is useful in co-option and pacification of the most vocal section, 
and the middle class in Jharkhand has fulfilled this expectation of the ruling 
class at least in part’ (Ghosh and Sengupta 1982: 242). Moreover, the post-
British Indian state’s responses to constructive resistance and people’s 
movements for social justice and human rights has been characterized by its 
consistent efforts to seduce, divide, coerce, repress, and most importantly to 
co-opt the most vocal and leading elements of such movements. ‘The 
leadership of most social movements have been co-opted by concessional 
treatments’ (Kapoor 2004: 55). This thesis attempts to show how all of these 
follow a pattern that is akin to a perfect colonial system as outlined by Jean-
Paul Sartre.  
Methodology 
In his Introduction to the Study of Indian History, Kosambi [1957] (2009) 
advocated the application of Marx's dialectical materialism to study Indian 
history in order to be better able to adequately explain the continuing 
presence of poverty and destitution of vast numbers of the marginalized 
                                                      
23 Most policy documents on Scheduled Tribes (STs) in India can be found here: 
http://ncst.nic.in/index.asp?langid=1 (06 September 2013). 
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Indian populace. In this connection, he has hinted at the emergence of the 
most 'vigorous' and 'dominant' group in the course of India history and their 
gradual advancement throughout the alluvial plains, which proved to be 
detrimental to most indigenous groups that had already been living in India. 
Furthermore, Kosambi has also discussed briefly the continued presence of 
'tribal remnants' all over India, who have 'stubbornly' remained food-
gatherers, but were continuously intruded by dominant groups involving 
processes of mutual assimilation, a peculiar characteristic of Indian culture 
and history (Ibid..: 14-20). While taking Kosambi’s proposal seriously, I 
choose Sartre's (2004) Critique of Dialectical Reason to re-conceptualize 
ancient Indian history embodying ‘racism and colonialism as praxis and 
process’ (bid: 716-44) and the Adivasis as people who escaped this pitiless 
system in the alluvial plains of India.  
Concerning methodology, Sartre (2004), has combined Hegelian idealism 
and Marxian materialism together to form a processual understanding of 
knowledge. By this combination, Sartre restored a dialectical ‘spirit’ to 
Marxian materialism whereby the substance of knowledge is constituted by 
the interaction of both the real/ ideal (‘spiritual’) and the empirical/ material 
as two distinct and dynamically interlinked ontological categories. The 
recognition of this dynamic interaction of the two (contradictory) ontological 
categories, he argued, must be the starting point of knowledge. Putting the 
same idea in a simpler form Žižek (2008) states, ‘We shall be driven from 
doing to knowing and from knowing to doing in the unity of a process which 
will itself be dialectical' (p. 40). ‘Social theory,’ Žižek continues, ‘is not just 
the conceptual grounding of practice, it simultaneously accounts for why 
practice is ultimately doomed to failure… At its most radical, theory is the 
theory of failed practices: “that is why things went wrong…”’ (Ibid.: 3). 
Sartre’s definition of freedom, as the most important factor that unites humanity, 
would further clarify the essentially dialectical nature of possible human 
knowledge. For Sartre, freedom is the hallmark of being human. Human 
freedom is not only the unique human capacity to critically and ethically 
reflect upon his/ her own thoughts or reasoning but also the most important 
factor that unites humanity. Hence, to be authentically human is to be able to 
reflect upon one's desires, perceptions, cognition, thoughts and actions (the 
unique human characteristic of self-reflexivity) and to reform one's 
relationship by engaging in authentic reciprocity (dialogue). It involves 
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oneself in a continuous dialectic of being and becoming. Humans are 
essentially dialectical beings: Being involves a continuous process of 
becoming, which is made possible by freedom (critical self-reflexivity).  
We are the same because we emerged from the clay at the same date and through all the 
others; and so we are, as it were, an individual species, which has emerged at a 
particular moment through a sudden mutation; but our specific nature unites us in so far 
as it is freedom. This fraternity is not based, as is sometimes stupidly supposed, on 
physical resemblance expressing some deep identity of nature. If it were, why should 
not a pea in a can be described as the brother of another pea in the same can? We are 
brothers in so far as, following the creative act of the pledge, we are our own sons, our 
common creation (Ibid.: 437). 
When human interactions are devoid of freedom and authentic reciprocity, 
the other becomes merely a means. Here lies the initial negation of human 
dignity by which the other is made into an object or being reduced to a 
subhuman status. Such an objectified humanity, by the praxis and process of 
distorted reciprocity, is continuously reduced to subhuman-ness, thus, 
forming an 'anti-dialectical system of super-exploitation,' a 'practico-inert 
structure, a passive contradictory reciprocity of conditioning' (Ibid.: 734). 
Thus the system, an infernal machine of practico-inert, is established with its 
‘accounts of schism and functionality, of the passive activity of the 
institutional practico-inert – hierarchy, and externalization of authority, 
[marked by] the emergence of the sovereign, and serial obedience – seems to 
conflate and to identify together… The state itself is a reified group-in-fusion 
which has established itself within a milieu of seriality’ (Ibid.: 437). 
Both, those who constitute practico-inertness: the inauthentic bourgeois we-
subjects, and the alienated and reified majority group, we-objects, need to 
negate the negation of inauthenticity (Sartre 2004) to regain their ontological 
and historical vocation to be more fully human  (Freire 2000). 'It must be 
proved that a negation of a negation can be an affirmation, that conflicts – 
within a person or a group – are the motive force of history...’ (Sartre 2004: 
15). 
Adopting the Sartrian logic of dialectical reason not only enables a better 
understanding of the process of caste/ jati based discrimination and 
exploitation as a system of racism and colonialism which still continues 
unaltered, but also a more realistic historicizing and re-conceptualizing of 
Adivasi social formations as ‘distinct’ peoples who hold on to their 
alternative imaginations of equality and cultural and human dignity. This is 
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precisely because the colonial civic order continues to be animated by the 
unquestionable ‘purity,’ and unlimited affluence of the dominant ‘twice born’ 
and the perpetual deprivation, penury and servitude of the ‘impure’ or ‘once 
born’ (see Ambedkar 1946; Blunt 1969; Guru 2001; Ilaiah 2010; Teltumbde 
2010; Roy 2014).  
However, while the systemic colonialism keep producing scarcity, conflict, 
subjugation, racism and super-exploitation of the objectified ‘masses,’ on the 
one hand, certain leading elements from among the objectified ‘masses’ have 
selectively been recruited to expand the scope of super-exploitation, on the 
other, whereby the colonized becomes colonizers. In such an extremely 
complex scenario, one must be extremely careful and attentive to be able to 
explicate the processes by which unequal power relations are reproduced, 
entrenched, mystified and maintained. And hence, it becomes increasingly 
clearer that ‘no single or unitary frame-work of concepts or underlying theory 
would fit the facts. … The divisions of caste, between Brahmans, non-
Brahmans, and Adi-Dravidas, as well as those of class, between landowners, 
tenants, and agricultural labourers, were both important, that they were 
mutually irreducible … the mutual irreducibility of class and status’ must be 
kept in mind (Béteille 2008: 3-4).  
Furthermore, ‘caste was [is] not merely a social hierarchy but was inherently 
linked to issues of domination and subordination. The interlining of higher 
and lower through intermediate categories in the hierarchy prevented a 
confrontation between the dominant and the subordinated’ (Thapar 2013: 6). 
This insight goes along well with Ambedkar’s (1916) warning about the 
difficulty of analyzing and demystifying how castes emerge and reproduce 
and ‘normalize’ unequal power relations since it is a parcelling of already 
unified whole. This is also where the aspect of ‘intimate’ exclusion/ violence 
(Hall et al 2011) and the ambivalence of violence arising from intimate 
exclusion, and ‘the politics of ambivalence’ (Lorenz-Mayer 2001) 
unintelligibly operational. Sartre’s (2004) insights into the praxis and process 
of colonialism and racism, thus, becomes the most appropriate analytical 
framework to make these processes intelligible (Brown 1979; Catalano 1986; 
Charme 1991; Jules-Rosette 2007).  
For Sartre, ‘the link between structures of the historical fact is much loose 
than Marx wanted. That has to be the case because man is not reflection [of 
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his circumstances] but transcendence and innovation… Each of Sartre’s 
works reflects and expresses [human] situation… by surpassing it’ (Flynn 
1995: 227). However, there is always an ambiguity of the necessity and 
contingency in relationship. ‘The possible are realized in probability. 
Freedom moves in sphere of the probable, between total ignorance and 
certitude. The unpredictability of technological advancement, the liability of 
our bodies to the vicissitudes of physical and biological nature and, above all, 
the sheer multiplicity of the other as interpreter of our actions – the manner of 
living the event is part of the event itself – these confers a radical 
contingency on the historical enterprise’ (Ibid.: 222). ‘In sum, the historical 
object is at one and the same time material, organic and spiritual’ (Ibid.: 223). 
For Sartre, human person is an autonomous individual subject always being 
inextricably embedded in society. 
Fieldwork, Sources and Methods of Data Collection  
Geographical area  
The present study focuses on the Hos of Kolhan (one of the five divisions of 
present Jharkhand state towards the central-eastern part of India), more 
specifically, the West Singhbhum district which covers the entire Kolhan 
Government Estate (KGE) in which the Hos’ are predominant in number (see 
map-2). The district consists of plain, hilly and semi-hill areas. In plain areas, 
most Ho households, who own better quality land, live comfortably although 
one finds a number of landless Ho households being reduced to destitution in 
every hamlet even in plain areas. On the contrary, in hill and semi-hill areas, 
the number of chronically ‘poor’ and destitute households abound although 
one finds a few wealthy households living comfortably among them.  
Every Community Development Block (CDB) office in the district has 
invariably been established near railway lines or national/ state highways for 
the convenience of officers/ employees most of who are still non-Hos/ non-
Adivasis. Similarly, the highest concentration of non-Adivasi population in 
the district can be found in plains and suburbs around the district and block 
headquarters. Naturally, there exists a wide material and cultural distance 
between the Hos in hilly and semi-hill areas and the urban and suburban 
centers. The pattern of geographical distribution of affluent and destitute, and 
non-Adivasi/ Adivasi households in plain and hilly areas remains more or 
less similar in most Adivasi dominant regions in Jharkhand, its neighbouring 
54 
 
states such as Odisha, Chhattisgarh, West Bengal and other states of the 
country today (see Mehta et al 2010; Das et al 2010; SRRA 2010). 
The five villages chosen for study from three neighbouring CDBs fall in hilly 
and semi-hill areas to the north-west of West Singhbhum district (see map-5). 
These are chosen depending on their nearness and distance from the district/ 
block headquarters so as to bring a fair representation of all households in 
such areas of the district. Similarly, the three CDBs are representative of the 
whole district with respect to their score on the scale of socio-economic 
development: Tonto block has one with the least score,’ Khuntpani medium 
and Sadar-Chaibasa has the highest score, at least in terms of the literacy rate. 
While the vignettes presented in this study come from villages at various 
parts of the district, the quantitative survey data come mainly from the five 
villages selected for study two of which are fictitiously named as Huringhatu 
(small-village) in Sadar-Chaibasa block and Maranghatu (big-village) in 
Khuntpani block.  
Profiles of Selected Villages Under Study  
 A Short Historical Overview of Ho Villages 
Most Adivasi communities here lived by both jhum (slash, burn, and shifting) 
cultivation, and foraging minor forest produce as almost 50% of their 
livelihood especially during slack seasons and monsoon failure came from 
forests (Areeparampil 1988). The first settlers (Khuntkattidars) cleared the 
forest to establish a hatu (a Ho village) initially delineating its boundary after 
entering into a contract with the village-boundary and guardian-spirits 
(seemana and hatu-bongako) who act as protective agents. The hatu-bongako 
or village spirits reside at the heart of the village in the sacred-grove (jahera/ 
sarna). Singhbonga is the supreme God. Desauli, Nage-era and 
Marangbonga are spirits who dwell at the sacred-grove of the village. 
Desauli protects the village; Nage-era takes care of rains and water; and 
Maragbonga protects villagers and cattle from serious sickness. Sasan-diri or 
burial stones placed on the graves of the dead ancestors indicated the land 
that belong to a particular killi (patrilineage). The spirits of dead ancestors 
(ham Ho and dum Ho) are invited to the sanctuary of each household which 
is called the ading where strangers are not allowed to enter (Deeney 2008). 
Thus, a village has far deeper meaning and socio-cultural significance than a 
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simple collection of houses and fields (Das Gupta 2011). The village (hatu) 
also is a sphere of culture as opposed to the wild or uncultured forests (buru) 
beyond human control (Eva 2008). It is a sacred landscape where houses and 
graveyards play a greater role in ensuring the continuity of the community 
through time and space between affinity and consanguinity and life and death 
(Verardo 2003). 
Houses in a hatu are often on top of hillocks or inter-fluvial valley heads 
within shouting distance. The structure of village organisation integrated 
spaces both private and public to the total ecological, cultural and spiritual 
life of the Ho society. It contained land capable of immediate cultivation with 
considerable areas of forest and wasteland. 
The socioeconomic and political organisations of the Hos society is 
determined by descent, kinship and land tenure. It is embedded in a large 
number of killi categories (Yorke 1976). The local lineage is initially 
established by the original ancestor who founded the village. Clan 
interrelationship, on the whole, constitutes the prerequisite and basis of all 
social and ritual interactions. There are villages with single and multiple killis 
spread into various sais/ tolas (hamlets). The village and household, set 
within the web of local lineages or sub-clans, function as points of reference 
and identification of every Ho. This fundamental social unit is more 
important than the culturally distinct category of the ‘tribe.’  The clan or killi 
is constituted by all ‘descendants in the patrilineal line of a known or 
fictitious common ancestor’. The unity of a local lineage is expressed in 
terms of rights over ancestral common land. A lineage’s common ownership 
of land and its common ancestry are conceptually interrelated to the effect 
that the ancestors provide the very basis of their descendants’ existence by 
providing and passing on land. Thus, ancestors and land remain symbols of 
the unity and continuity of a lineage (Rachel 2009: 36-7).    
It is the ancestors who have given the household its rice. Descent, like land, is 
transmitted from generation to generation. The concept of lineage as the people of one 
rice-pot expresses both the relationship of the lineage to its land. The rice-pot is the 
place in which the fruit of the ancestor’s land is prepared for human consumption and 
as such it is seen as the abode of the ancestors (Yorke 1976: 96). 
The countryside was covered by a network of villages linked by affinal ties 
and by descent, as groups from one village left to start new settlements 
(Yorke 1976). The power positions of munda, manki, and diuri often 
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remained with men (not women) of the original or the prominent killi. 
Egalitarianism was limited within dominant lineages (Das Gupta 2011), 
however, ‘there is no hierarchical structure in the village; all the households 
have equal access to the economic and religious resources of the village’ 
(York 1976: 85). People who came and settled later in the village from other 
villages, by way of marriage alliances, are called eta haturenko (people of 
other villages). They had a huring (junior) position. Besides, the Hos also 
invited people who belonged to artisan or service caste groups, such as 
Gowalas (cow-herders), Tantis (weavers) Kumhars (potters) etc. who had no 
right to cultivable land but were paid for their services in kind (Sen 2008, Das 
Gupta 2011). 
Property among the Hos belong to the family and not to the individual. On the death of 
a father his sons share equally, except that the sons of the first wife are usually entitled 
to a larger share than those of other wives…. Women cannot hold property, except 
when they have a right to maintenance. If on the death of his father, the unmarried 
daughters equal the sons in number, each son may take to support, but if they all live 
with one brother, he will get extra land for their support. If any Ho wishes to sell or 
mortgage his land, the members of his family have a right to the first offer. Strictly 
speaking, by immemorial custom, a Ho cannot dispose of his lands as he chooses. The 
land does not belong to him, it is hereditary and inalienable, and it must descend to his 
sons and son’s sons. If a Ho has no direct male issue, the land goes to his brother or 
nearest kin; if he has no kith or kin, to the village community represented by the munda 
(O’Malley 1910: 79). 
However, with the establishment of Kolhan Government Estate (KGE) and 
land settlement operations since 1837, although the customary authority and 
roles of mundas and mankis were recognized and maintained, the over-
lordship of a British made them less relevant since the Hos could also 
approach the ‘modern’ overlords directly as well (Sen 2012). This obviously 
undermined traditional authorities of the mundas and mankis. Since India’s 
independence, the British overlords have been replaced by the Indian ones 
who head the district collectorate, departmental and other offices are not only 
unaware of the traditional customary system of the Hos, but also deliberately 
counteract and undermine it.  
Furthermore, (as discussed in chapter 4) commercial exploitation of forests 
and agriculture both by the British and post-British colonial state has altered 
the fertility and productivity of the land besides the recently accelerated 
extraction of mineral and accompanying pollution and deforestation not only 
have further aggravated the agrarian problems but also caused the 
disintegration of traditional village organization, cultural values, moral 
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economy and traditional bonding among Ho kinsmen/ women. Above all, the 
division of land among Hos themselves for generation have reduced the 
holding size of rice-land considerably rendering many Ho households 
landless like the already landless ‘service groups.’ However, the landlessness 
of all ‘service groups,’ who have been here for long, does not mean that all of 
them are economically poor since several of them have advanced themselves 
in non-agrarian/ non-farm livelihood activities.  
Profile of Villages under Study  
Table 1 – Basic information about the five study villages 
Village - codes V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 
Distance from Chaibasa 3 KM 7 KM 15 KM 27 KM 47 KM 
Number of Households 90 287 370 80 36 
Total population 458 1391 2191 357 192 
Hos - Adivasis (STs) 65 (72 %) 276 (96 %) 204 (55.1 %) 71 (89 %) 36 (100%) 
Other Backward Castes (OBCs) 25 (28 %) 0 120 (32.4 %) 9 (11 %) 0 
Scheduled Castes (SCs) 0 11 (4 %) 46 (12.4)   0 
Source: field survey conducted by the author (July-October 2011) 
Village one (V1) is three kilometres far from Chaibasa; it has 90 households 
with a population of 458 persons. 65 out of 90 households (72%) are Ho and 
25 (28%) households belong to service caste, categorized as OBC. There is 
no household under SC category in V1. 24 There are four killis (clans) here of 
which two are numerically dominant.  
The second village (V2) (Huringhatu) is seven kilometres away from 
Chaibasa. The total number of household here is 287 with the total population 
adding up to 1391 persons. Households fall under ST and SC categories. The 
former constitute 276 (i.e., 96 per cent of total households) and the later 
households number only 11 which is four per cent of the total number of 
households. The Hos fall under as many as 11 killis, out of which one is most 
dominant with 185 households, the second dominant killi constitute 34 
households and others count less than ten. 
The distance to Village Three (V3) (Maranghatu) from Chaibasa is 15 
kilometres. This is the biggest among all five study villages with a total 
population of 2191 living in 370 households. The village has a spot where a 
                                                      
24 Indian Census reports categorizes it population into four main social groups: Scheduled 
Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), Other Backward Castes (OBC) and General. 
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weekly market is held historically, and hence, it has attracted huge number of 
households who are generically called as ‘service groups.’ Hence, it has three 
social-group (Census categories): 204 (55%) ST; 120 (32%) OBC; and 46 
(12.4%) SC. Excepting that the ‘General’ category is absent here, this village 
might represent the demographic scenario of the entire West Singhbhum 
district with about 17 Adivasi killis which includes even a Santal household, 
besides the Hos, and 15 different service caste groups. The ‘service castes’ in 
this village own only small homesteads. A few of them are involved in 
running petty business enterprises, a few others work as contractors, 
middlemen and casual labourers. Some of them have made considerable 
advancement economically. Most of the SCs and OBCs here speak the Oriya 
language, and those who have made considerable advancement in 
socioeconomic security consider themselves better than the Hos. They 
restrain themselves from speaking Ho language. A few also wear the ‘sacred 
thread,’ a Brahmanic religious symbol to show their ‘superior’ status. 
Village Four (V4) is 27 kilometres away from Chaibasa; has a total of 80 
households with its total population numbering up to 357. The percentage of 
Ho households in this village is 89, that is 71 out of 80 and OBC household 
constitute only 11 per cent of the total household. There are five Ho killis and 
the numerically most dominant one has 35 household, the second most 
dominant killi has 19 and the rest are below 10. This village is closer to the 
reserved forest area and most villagers supplement their household income 
from collection of minor forest products besides agriculture. 
The fifth and last study village (V5) is the furthest from Chaibasa covering a 
distance of 47 kilometres.  The total population is 192 living in 36 
households, all of them Hos who belong to three killis numerically the most 
dominant one with 30 households, the second with five households and the 
third with one.  
This (V5) is a ‘forest village.’ Forest Villages (FVs) were established along 
with the introduction of ‘scientific forestry’ in India in 1864 with the creation 
of Forest Departments (FD) in various British provinces under the Indian 
Forest Act 1865.  FVs were meant to ensure the regular supply of labourers to 
exploit forests commercially. There are cases of existing villages being 
declared as FVs, besides their establishment with people imported into forests 
from elsewhere. An estimated number of 200,000 families lived in 5000 FVs 
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all over India (Prasad 1993). These were ‘temporary labour camps living in 
temporary huts and crops for food, for the forest land was “reserved” and 
these villages were expected to be shifted’ (Ibid.: 2). Although located deep 
inside the forests, these workers are kept like bonded labourers, despite 
forced labour being ‘abolished’ in 1950 (Ibid.). With the enactment of the 
recent Forest Rights Act 2006, they hold a ‘right’ to own the land on which 
they were residing so long. However, the law is yet to be implemented in 
West Singhbhum district (see chapter 2).  
Fieldwork, and Methods of Data Collection 
The data and information presented in this study primarily come from an 
eight-month-long fieldwork experiences: six months stretched out over a span 
of a year (February-March, July-August and November-December, 2011) and 
two months, September-October, in 2013. The first two months were spent 
travelling, visiting and staying at Ho villages in almost every development 
block of the district. The following four months were spent on conducting 
surveys, engaging in casual conversations, during regular visits and stay at 
different study villages, especially in Maranghatu and Huringhatu. The last 
two months in 2013 were spent on revisiting people in villages marked for 
study in order to clarify certain issues that were not clear and to confirm 
fieldwork data for their reliability and accuracy. 
Mixed method (qualitative and quantitative combine) were employed to 
collect data. Quantitative data were obtained by household-level surveys in 
all five study villages. All households in the five study villages, totalling 866 
of them, were individually visited and surveyed by the newly elected ward-
members of Panchayats, on monthly income, and landholding; occupation 
and educational attainment of the member of households. ‘Monthly income’ 
includes total income earned by all members of a household from all sources 
assessed jointly by the ward-member and the respective household-head. 
Similarly, assessment of landholding was done based on household’s khatian 
(document of holding rights) or malgujari (land-rent) payment receipts, and 
in some cases the number of pura (bundles of paddy) produced from the land 
owned by a household during a year of normal monsoon. Assessment of land 
possessed is normally difficult due to lack of accurate knowledge, besides a 
general apprehension about revealing their economic status; and hence, it 
could be undertaken only in Huringhatu (V2) where the surveyor had 
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sufficient knowledge (about all households in his village), necessary skills 
and willingness to undertake such a task.  
Literacy data is based on answers received from household heads/ members 
to questions such as the number of schooling years of the members of his/ her 
household had and not if they have functional literacy skills. It is generally 
noticed that a few years of schooling does not guarantee a Ho basic literacy 
skills due to lack of practice after his/ her school years. Moreover, there is no 
guarantee that a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to the question: if an interviewee knows 
how to read and write should be an accurate one due to his/ her shyness and 
hesitation. Hence, almost all surveys, including the decadal Census, assesses 
literacy rates based only on questions about years of formal schooling.   
Qualitative methods include mostly casual conversations, occasionally, in- 
depth personal interviews/ conversations with villagers (elders, young and 
old men, women and children – both literate and nonliterate), and key 
informants such as, munda, manki, dakua (munda and manki's assistant), 
mukhiya (the head of gram-panchayat), panchayat samiti (block level), and 
ward members in various villages, and state-functionaries such as, Block 
Development Officers (BDO), district agriculture, irrigation, education and 
welfare department heads, District Collector (DC), staff members of Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO), activists, school teachers, Ho 
contractors and middlemen, and non-Adivasi shopkeepers at Chaibasa and 
other suburbs and towns. The vignettes and incidents narrated in the thesis 
emerge from casual conversations and in-depth interviews besides personal 
observations during fieldwork conducted specifically for this study. Besides 
fieldwork, primary sources such as newspaper reports, and other periodicals 
too have been extensively used. Moreover, secondary sources such as 
existing ethnographic works on Kolarian groups of Jharkhand and other 
numerous existing literature (secondary sources) on Adivasi issues have also 
been used extensively.  
Researcher’s Assumptions 
As a person who has spent considerably long time, living and working with 
Adivasis, I would like to make my own assumptions explicit. I consider 
Adivasis’ alternative imaginations of who they are, and the distinct religio-
cultural, socioeconomic, and political organization they have developed, in 
contrast to the oppressive caste system, as very significant. Although they are 
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deeply, and unequally enmeshed in and encapsulated by the dominant 
colonial civic order, they still hold the secrets of an alternative more 
egalitarian social order. To my mind, this is evident in their display of a 
strikingly resilient spirit of resistance even at the face of unimaginable cruelty 
(Gupta 1992). However, their struggles / efforts to win a place of dignity and 
equality in the ‘modern’ world can only be earned by self-assertion’ 
(Sengupta 1982: 1). This, in Sartrean terms, must come from ‘a negation of 
negation’ of what others have made of them. It is an extremely challenging 
task given ‘the violently patriarchal culture of Indo-Gangetic Bihar’ (Simon 
1982: 228) and ‘the petrified, frozen, hypothetical racism of Indian society… 
and its barbarian inhuman culture’ (Ibid.: 230). Yet, I dare to believe that the 
marginalized Adivasis still hold the key to some ‘revolutionary ideal and 
potential’ (Bhattacharya 2013: 1)25 for the transformation of Indian culture 
and politics; and hence, their struggle is remarkable and worth the effort.  
Thus, I hope this study will contribute to a better articulation of Adivasis’ 
socioeconomic identity, values, dignity and human right. For it provides 
innovative and critical insights to emerging leaders, especially those daring 
and emerging ones, of hitherto (economically) marginalized, brutally 
repressed and discriminated Adivasi and Dalit societies, while all of us 
struggle to advance a more truly emancipatory and democratic politics and 
leadership in India.  
Sartre’s Marxist humanism calls for a critical and ethically positioned 
scholarship, if the ‘production of knowledge and activism intends to be at the 
service of emancipation (Simont 1995). Such scholarship recognizes the need 
for continuous questioning, demystification, testimony and articulation of 
different ways of thinking and living in solidarity. A critically positioned and 
ethically committed scholarship seeks to challenge manufactured consensus, 
breakdown stereotypes, and engages in imaginative working out of problems 
that are felt to be urgent. Engaging in such an attempt on a rational, 
methodologically rigorous and evidently grounded manner can be far more 
powerful (Roy 2007). For Sartre, ‘ethical radicalism is not conditional 
conditioning of freedom by value or by some inert and stationary end, but in 
                                                      
25
 Also see A. Zaidi (2013) ‘Doomed Democracy’ Frontline 14 June, 2013 for a discussion on 
Sanjay Kak’s Red Ant Dream (Mati ke lal), a recent documentary on people’s resistance in 
India; and B. D’Mello  (2013) ‘On a Long March: Sanjay Kak’s Red Ant Dream’, Monthly 
Review 14 May 2013: http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2013/dmello140513.html 
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the unconditional conditioning of these conditions that are obstacles to the 
reproduction of the end – that is, of the relations to the world in which 
freedom has been freely engaged’ (Simont 1995: 207). A humanist scholar’s 
critical task needs to hold on to a universal and single standard of basic 
human justice (and of seeking knowledge) despite ethnic, religious, linguistic 
or national affiliations. This simply means that the same standard of 
judgment is applied to both to oneself and the one who is considered to be 
‘alien’ or ‘the other’ (Roy 2007). 
Being an outsider to Adivasi social formations requires of me to speak ‘with 
an unconcealed voice, beyond what we, as a people, have been given and 
educated to see, but very much from within our own tradition’ of humanism. 
Being a part of the broader Indian society does not mean accepting – often 
uncritically – the social laws that govern it, and the self-perception of the 
collective ‘we.’ ‘It does mean situating oneself within a cultural value system 
and choosing ethical consistency over collective engagement, exposure over 
concealment’ (Ibid.: xxi). 
Having said that I also remain aware of the problems, so far, involved in the 
discussions on ‘tribe’ and ‘caste’ in India that have driven researchers to be 
doubly emotive: most discussions in India on ‘tribal’ issues have moved 
scholars to 'unscholarly anger,' and have 'produced pamphleteers’ rather than 
dispassionate analysis (Bailey 1960: 263). Moreover, several Indian scholars 
who have dared any critical analysis of caste-domination, caste-based 
discrimination, and ‘methodological nationalism’ in academic disciplines 
(Giri 2012) had to face the risk of being ostracised as ‘anti-nationals’ 
(Sharma 1959, 2001). Although such a self-reflexive criticism is still not 
without similar risks, I have tried, as far as possible, to be a dispassionate 
observer whilst attempting a deeper and broader analysis based on fieldwork.  
Fieldwork has to be performed with critical insight, taking nothing for granted, or on 
faith, but without the attitude of superiority, sentimental reformism, or spurious 
leadership (Kosambi 2009: xi). 
Analysis must, first, be broad. The world has become increasingly interconnected. 
Extreme suffering – especially when on a grand scale, as in genocide – is seldom 
divorced from the actions of the powerful. The analysis must also be historically deep 
(Farmer 2002: 432). 
Thus, a historically deeper analysis, that could reasonably explain who are 
Adivasis, is undertaken. If the answer to this question has so far been that 
they are ‘backward Hindus,’ as Ghurey (1963) famously argued, then the 
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subsequent question must inevitably have been: why and how have there 
been ‘backward’ and ‘forward’ Adivasis, Hindus, Muslims, Christians or 
Buddhists? And what historical processes must have been responsible for 
such a constructed ‘backwardness’ of certain sections of society. Kosambi 
(2009) also argued that Adivasis were those who had ‘stubbornly’ refused to 
be assimilated into ‘Indian mainstream.’ However, a more crucial question, 
that still remains to be adequately answered about his argument, has been: 
why have Adivasis been ‘stubbornly’ resisting assimilation?  
The next chapter re-conceptualizing Adivasis as ‘state-fleeing and 
challenging peoples’ who had escaped the ancient oppressive jati/ caste based 
system of colonialism and racism (that had emerged in the alluvial plains), 
into deep forests, mountainous regions of the subcontinent.  This re-
conceptualization is done by deconstructing the concept of an imagined 
Indian national mainstream.  
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Adivasis as State Fleeing and Challenging People: A 
Genealogy of Ideas and Practices Underpinning the Politics 
and State in India 
 
In almost every instance of police firing, those who have been fired upon are 
immediately called militants... When victims refuse to be victims, they are 
called terrorists and are dealt with as such. 
(Arundhati Roy 2004: 1) 
The question I ask is 'why has the state almost always been the enemy of 
people who move around? 
(James Scott 1998b: 1) 
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Introduction 
On August 1, 2011, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and Jharkhand 
Police (JP) initiated a joint operation called 'Operation Anaconda' to 'liberate' 
Saranda forest26 from the Maoists insurgents (commonly called Naxalites). 
Consequently, two villagers were shot dead; the terrified co-villagers ran into 
interior forests; three sick and injured villagers were left to themselves; 
several houses were destroyed and granaries incinerated during the operation. 
A month later, recalling the incident Binodini Devi of Talkobad village said,  
The force arrived at 8 o'clock in the morning and surrounded our village. They fired a 
few shots up in the air and we ran into the forests. None stays here anymore, we have 
come to collect some of our belongings. Police destroyed our food grains and houses. 
We never helped any Maoist; we did not support them in any way, but the police never 
listens to poor people like us (quoted from an unpublished report circulated among 
activist-groups by a correspondent of The Hindu national daily, who visited the village 
on 14 September, 2011). 
Earlier 65 families lived in Thalkobad village; after the operation only five 
people live there. The forces stayed in the area for a month27 so the 
villagers were forced to stay away from their homes (Ibid.). Sixty-four 
year old Judida Honhanga said,  
The police asked for my son who teaches in the village-school, as I failed to say 
anything, they started hitting me. They took our identity and job-cards, land-papers, and 
ration cards28 The CRPF swept through our village, destroyed our houses, and 
forcefully entered our homes making us move away. They burnt our clothes, valuables, 
money and killed our cattle. My wife is very ill; she can’t move (Ibid.). 
 
Picture 1 – A scene from post-CRPF operations in Saranda villages 
                                                      
26 Saranda used to be one of the biggest Sal tree forest in Asia covering 820 kilometres of 
thick green cover in West Singhbhum district of Jharkhand. However, now the strength of 
the forest is reduced to one-third. It has been reported that since 2000 a group of the 
Communist Party of India Maoist, a banned ('extremist') organization took refuge here. See 
EPW (2012) for details on the style and motives of various operations to cleanse ‘extremism.’ 
27 Several CRPF men were also admitted to hospitals in Ranchi with Malaria during and after 
their operation in the village. More interestingly, majority of the CRPF and JP forces are 
Adivasis themselves (Ghosh 2006), who would be ordered to kill the most deprived of their 
own society, who have chosen to live in places like Saranda and other inaccessible places like 
these.  
28 Job-cards are provided by the state functionaries as proof of eligibility to apply for work 
under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA) 2005, and 
ration-card is proof of eligibility for a household to access food and other essential items 
under the Public Distribution System (PDS). 
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.   
Injured Judida Honhanga and his sick wife   villagers collecting some of their belongings 
Saranda has been home for about 36,000 Adivasis living in 56 villages. It is 
about 280 kilometres from Ranchi, the capital of Jharkhand state. These 
villages remain completely isolated during the rainy season when the water-
level in the river, that separates the village, rises higher. There is no health 
care facility in any of these villages, the nearest health centre is about 41 
kilometres away at Manoharpur. A few villages have school-buildings, but 
classes are seldom held. They have been shut down or blown up during the 
CRPF operations. Subsistence farming, foraging and an arbitrary supply of 
food grains by the Public Distribution System (PDS) constitute the villagers' 
livelihoods (Ray 2012; Yadav 2013).  
After the operation, a few police personnel and human rights activists, 
however, said that they neither found any weapon nor any Maoist in 
Talkobad village. The actual reason for deploying the CRPF was to ensure 
a smooth extraction of iron-ore (EPW 2012; Goswami 2013; Swamy 
2013; Sambhav 2013), since Saranda forest has one of the best-quality iron 
ore deposits in Asia (Bera 2012). Moreover, since Jharkhand region 
became a separate state from the erstwhile Bihar on 15 November 2000, 
the successive governments in Jharkhand have signed several Memoranda 
of Understandings (MoUs) with national and transnational companies for 
setting up large-scale extractive and manufacturing industries (Kajulia 
2011; Chandra 2013). According to a published list of Electro Steel, a 
Chinese company, it has been allotted huge areas of land near Tholkobad 
to set up mining reserves.29  
                                                      
29 For more details about developments in Saranda see Ray (2012); for more on Saranda 
action plan, FRA (2006) and other issues see website: 
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A government official has reportedly said,  
After consistent efforts, security forces 'liberated' the area from the clutches of the 
Maoists, The central government has initiated a 'Saranda Action Plan' (SAP) 
under which the Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) will distribute solar 
lanterns and bicycles, help construction of pre-fabricated houses for 'below 
poverty line' (BPL) families under Indira Awas Yojana (IAY) [a housing scheme 
for the 'poor', named after a former Prime Minister of the Congress party] and 
bridges with the help of the Army and distribute hand-pumps for drinking water. 
The Centre [national government] will also help the Jharkhand government to 
raise one battalion (approximately 1,000 personnel) of the Indian Reserve Police 
Force by recruiting local tribal youth (HT 2011).  
However, according to an Adivasi member of the district human rights 
observers’ team, who has been directly involved with the recent 
developments in Saranda, the Hos of Saranda have not received any 
substantial help, from state functionaries till November 2013, under the 
proposed Saranda Action Plan (SAP). Villagers’ patta (documents of land-
rights) were snatched away by the CRPF men during the 'operation.' Neither 
these documents nor the new patta promised by the recent Forest Rights Act 
(FRA) 2006,30 has been returned/ issued to villagers. According to him, this 
denial of land-right-documents might be a deliberate strategy of the state 
functionaries to ensure least resistance from the villagers to future mining 
activities in Saranda (telephonic conversation, on 5 November 2013).  
Such incidents of deploying direct/ physical violence of the postcolonial 
‘state’ in India on its most marginalized and vulnerable people, within their 
constitutionally ‘protected’ ethno territory,31 have been projected by all 
mainstream media as Jharkhand state’s ‘dedicated’ efforts to ‘cleanse’ the 
Maoists ‘infected’ inaccessible, grossly eroded, remote rural terrains (Ray 
2012; Sharma 2013). Maoist insurgency since the 1990s has spread mainly in 
the country’s mineral rich, inaccessible and forested regions mostly inhabited 
by economically poorer Adivasis (Saxena 2009, 2011, Ganguly and Oetken 
2013). Although such regions in India have been ‘protected’ by the Ministry 
                                                                                                                                         
http://m.merinews.com/mobile/article/jhrm-seeksaction-taken-report-on-saranda-
development-plan/15868779 (accessed 25 May 2012); and for more on mining in Saranda, 
environment pollution and struggles of Adivasis, see Bera (2012); Yadav (2013). For more on 
minerals and Adivasi rights, see Karat (2012). 
30 See Srivastav et al (2013) for an update on the status of the implementation of FRA 2006 in 
India. 
31 See Sunder (2005b, 2009) for useful discussion of protective legislations in Jharkhand. 
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of Environment and Forests, the Fifth Schedule of the Indian Constitution 
and several other protective legislations, these are also places where the 
state’s actions have been focused since the 1990s to fuel the country’s 
‘predatory economic growth’ (Walker 2008; Sunder 2009). In other words, 
Adivasi dominant, ‘protected’ regions, abounding in minerals, have been 
turned into internal colonies/ margins that supply raw materials for the 
growth of urban centers. Since the 1990s the colonial mode of super-
exploitation in Adivasi dominant regions has aggravated with all its 
accompanying ill effects (of uncontrolled pollution of air, water and 
agricultural land) befalling upon the local inhabitants, who benefit little from 
these uncontrolled extraction activities (Areeparampil 1996; George 2009; 
Lahiri-Dutt et al 2012). Moreover, the mainstream media, which supports 
industrialisation in Jharkhand, would strategically present such violent 
operations of the repressive state apparatus as brave acts of clearing 
‘extremism infected’ areas, while the flagitious violence inflicted on Adivasi 
villagers often go unreported. This way, ‘protective-institutions’ for the 
vulnerable sections in India themselves turn the violators of all such 
protective provisions.  
More ironically, these economically poorer people, the ‘extremists,’ and 
members of the CRPF and JP who have been killed during ‘Maoist cleansing’ 
operations are Adivasis themselves, since the majority of the lowest cadres of 
the JP, CRPF and the Maoists have been recruited from among Adivasis 
(Ghosh 2006; Sunder 2006, Kumar 2009, D’Mello 2013). This situation, for 
sure, has systematically been brought about historically: continued 
commercial exploitation of timber since the mid-nineteenth century has 
adversely affected the environment, climatic conditions, soil fertility and 
social-ecology of Adivasi dominant regions in the country (Das 1992; Blaikie 
1994; Damodaran 1995; Jewitt 2008; Chaudhuri 2008; Das Gupta 2009; 
2012).32 Moreover, lack of investment in rural agrarian infrastructure and 
alternative livelihood options remain at the heart of Adivasis’ genuine 
grievances in these regions (Prakash 2007, 2011; Stuligross 2008; Saxena 
2009). In such a situation Adivasi youth, who could acquire some literacy 
skills would be recruited by the CRPF and JP. Some of them also are 
recruited by both Maoists as well as anti-Maoist militia (Saxena 2011; 
                                                      
32 See appendix-8 for the data on wood-land changes in Jharkhand (Chotanagpur) region. 
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D’Mello 2013).  
Significantly, whoever is dying is a tribal. The men in police, the boys in Salwa Judum, 
and the cadres among Naxals – all are tribals. A system has been devised that 
whosoever dies (in conflict) is a tribal. Mineral is the only big resource of this land and 
the tribals have no right over those (Sai 2013: 1).  
Thus, the Sartrean system of colonialism, in India’s Adivasi dominant 
regions, has systematically been developed. ‘Colonial exploitation is 
methodical and rigorous: expelled from their lands, restricted to unproductive 
soil, obliged to work for derisory wages, the fear of unemployment 
discourages their revolts’ (Sartre 2005: 37). 
This chapter attempts to find the historical and cultural reasons for organized 
(state) violence against Adivasis in India. In doing so, it traces a generally, an 
uninterrupted thread of a specifically Indian colonialism and racism. It shows 
how the types of violence – direct/ physical, cultural, and structural violence 
described above – have been an inevitable consequence of unresolved 
conflictual historical processes that are still being worked out in Adivasi 
dominant regions in India. Travelling far back beyond the pre-British colonial 
period, this chapter maps Adivasis’ conflicting relationship with an imagined 
pan-Indian mainstream, which according to Sharma (1959) and Saha (1986: 
286), is caused by a ‘historically determined schism’ that is being worked out 
to the present day (Kela 2006, 2012). Thus, this chapter draws a genealogy of 
the idea of a putative national mainstream that has often been posited vis-à-
vis Adivasi social formations.33 
The postcolonial Indian state's stated objectives of Adivasi ‘development’ 
policies and programs have been to bring these so-constructed 'backward' or 
'primitive’ ‘Scheduled Tribes’ into ‘national mainstream’ (Yadav 2003; 
Karlsson 2004; Srivastava 2008) although questions like, who are Adivasis, 
what constitutes the mainstream, why should Adivasis be brought into it, and 
what it means for Adivasis to be brought into mainstream, have often 
                                                      
33 A social formation is a descriptive concept which specifies the forms in which the 
conditions of existence are determined by its relations of production; it is a social entity 
organized on the basis of specific economic, political and ideological components with its 
unique territoriality and history. It is a dialectical expression of what is loosely referred to as 
'society'. The phrase, 'mode of production,' is a theoretical instrument which entails the 
material and ideological dimensions of social (relations) structures. While the latter 
constitutes the object of social science inquiry, the former functions as theoretical tool to 
achieve the object (of social science) of a conjoint (dialectical) social entity (Saha 1986: 304). 
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remained undiscussed and unanswered (Pati 2001). Thus, by drawing a 
genealogy of the imaginary/ dubious mainstream, starting from its origin, I 
show, how the idea of the mainstream and the efforts of those who represent 
it, have produced the idea of Adivasis or 'tribals,’ their ‘primitive otherness,’ 
‘backwardness,’ and ‘relative isolation’ that officially distinguish them. The 
argument is very simple: the very idea of the mainstream produces the tribal 
'primitive'; hence, a deconstruction of the former and an exposition of its 
shape would simultaneously expose the difficulty in defining the concept of 
'tribe,’ which is actually a spin-off of a very long, and uninterrupted 'praxis 
and process of racism and colonialism’ characteristic of the producers and 
representatives of the ideology of aggressive Indian nationalism.  
The journey of nations begins with the construction of 'self', the basic criteria for which 
is a preconceived homogeneity. But achieving such' a homogeneity proves elusive, and 
the search becomes an exercise in peeling an onion, which involves the shedding of 
people who do not fit the constructed identity or who question the accepted framework. 
This in turn prompts the construction of minority identities which strive to build a 
majority for themselves (Nag 2001: 4753). 
Said (1978) emphasized the essence of Orientalism as the indelible 
distinction between the superior Occidental ‘us’ and the inferiority of the 
oriental ‘other.’ The same principle is applicable to the dichotomies of Indian 
‘mainstream’ and its ‘margins’ (Jewitt 1995; Lau and Mendes 2011). The 
exclusionary mode of ‘Othering’ minorities and the double-edged political 
identity and enigma of historically marginalized cultural minorities have been 
evident in India (Prasad 1996; Jodhka 2002; Bharucha 2003). 
The agreements in this chapter are developed in the following sequence: first, 
an enduring unequal and conflict-ridden relationship between mainstream 
and its Adivasi margin is delineated. Second, a short discussion of the origin 
of ancient ideas and institutions of state in India, which embodies all 
necessary qualities of a racist and colonial system as Sartre (2001, 2005) has 
conceptualized. Third, Adivasi social formations are historicized as people 
who escaped the pre-classical (ancient) Indian (casteist) colonial system, 
which has come to exist as a headless monster in the present (‘modern’) 
times. Fourth, a few aspects of the alternative self-imaginations 
(subjectivities), that Adivasi social formations have nurtured, are highlighted 
in contrast to caste-based hierarchical societies. Fifth, the largely documented 
historical processes of state formation in Chotanagpur, the ‘refuge-zones’ of 
Adivasis are discussed to show how these can mirror even the most ancient 
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processes of social change in the Indian subcontinent. Sixth, the ubiquitous, 
frightening and multiple effects of the beastly colonial state system in Kolhan 
among the Hos is presented. And finally the conclusion recapitulates the 
main argument that Adivasi social formations are the by-product of a 
distorted ethics of long-drawn, conflict-redden and complex processes of 
state formation in India.  
Mainstream versus margins 
The idea of ‘mainstream’ corresponds to that of the state and the dominant 
segment of Indian society, while its 'margins' are broadly constituted by 
Dalitbahujans (Ilaiah 2010),34 and Adivasi social formations who were not 
even at the margins of mainstream that has been formed with concepts of 
chaturvarna (the four varnas/colours or castes), the four-fold scriptural 
division of society, the basis of jati or local endogamous groups forming the 
effective units of caste (Fox 1969; Gupta 1980; Smith 1994). Adivasis, as this 
chapter shows, were historically far out of this system. The concept of 
mainstream versus that of Adivasis, thus, assumes an ideological disjuncture 
– a 'historically determined schism which provides the basis of differentiating 
between the pan-Indian mainstream of caste society and its peripheral tribal 
societies' (Saha 1986: 286), although this disjuncture had not explicitly been 
articulated till the 1920s (Hardiman 1987; Rycroft and Dasgupta 2011).  
Consequently, more fundamental historical questions, such as, how the 
Adivasi margins have come about; why and how these ‘margins’ have 
continued to remain so, and what has been at stake in the interactions 
between mainstream and Adivasi margins, have largely remained obscure 
due to the hegemonic and benevolent rhetoric of national ‘integration,’ 
‘unity,’ and ‘development’ (Devalle 1980, 1992; Ilaiah 2004).  Moreover, 
since independence, the agents of mainstream have adopted several tactics to 
                                                      
34 Dalitbahujan actually includes (ex-untouchables or Scheduled Castes), Backward Castes 
and Adivasis (Scheduled Tribes), Muslims, women, urban poor (Ram 2012), who constitute 
more than 74 per cent of the total population of India (Sunder 2010). While Dalits and 
Backward Castes are at the bottom of Indian caste hierarchy, but within the imaginary 
boundary of mainstream, Adivasis have always been considered to be outside it. For 
example, any official document on 'tribal' development policy in India would invariably state 
that the program aims to bring the Adivasis back into the Indian national mainstream: see for 
example, the national tribal development policy (draft) 
http://mohfw.nic.in/WriteReadData/l892s/TDP-10782508.pdf   (accessed 17 June 2013). 
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pacify/ depoliticize these articulations and assertions of Adivasi identity and 
territorial autonomy. One of the most important post-independence 
pacification tactics has been the post-British colonial state’s affirmative 
action policies by which ‘mainstream’ progressively co-opts the leading or 
most vocal elements of Adivasi social formations (Sengupta 1982), while 
simultaneously maintaining and reproducing existing unequal power relations 
(Kumar 1992; Shneiderman and Shah 2013).  
In this context, Debnath (1999) has pointed out that Adivasis had 'remained 
separate but gradually became intertwined in a complex web of unequal 
economic linkages’ (Ibid.: 3112, emphasis added). Moreover, several other 
related studies have shown that Adivasi social formations differ from 
mainstream only in terms of social systems, cultural values and structures 
(Ambedkar [1979] (2004); Bailey 1960; Xaxa 1999; Verardo 2003; Rachel 
2009, Chaudhuri 2012). However, most 'tribal' studies in India have not 
probed deep enough to explain why Adivasis have come to adopt such 
distinctive social structures, values, and have kept holding on to them. More 
importantly, existing ‘tribal’ studies have paid insufficient attention to the 
‘complex web of unequal economic linkages’ that have developed within and 
outside Adivasi social formations in relation to the pan-Indian mainstream 
that encapsulates Adivasis (Saha 1986; Devalle 1992; Debnath 1999; Kela 
2006; 2012). Hence, this chapter seeks to locate and highlight these aspects 
by tracing the genealogy of the idea of the Indian state, which represents the 
idea of a putative national mainstream. This genealogy goes right back to the 
very origins of the idea of the state and rajniti (the strategy or power politics 
of the ruling-class) in India. 
State Formation Theories and the Origins of the Ancient Indian State 
Most theories on the origin of ‘state’ begin with a speculation on the state of 
nature where groups of people moved about freely, while depending entirely 
and directly on nature for food and shelter. Thence, they gradually moved 
onto a more conflicts-ridden existence until certain groups began to settle 
down and make exclusive claims on common resources (mine and thine), 
which eventually led to situations of frequent wars. Thus the universal fear of 
the war of all against all had served the emergence of sovereign powers to 
which all surrendered their liberty of thought and actions (Hobbes 2011). 
Such sovereign powers have been conceptualized as the 'collective will' with 
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its indivisible sovereignty. Anyone who refused to obey such a 'general will' 
would be forced to do so by the ‘collective will’ (Rousseau 2006). Thus, a 
genealogy of state power goes from the state of nature, to a state of fear (of 
wars and chaos) to the idea of a sovereign state. 
A similar line of argument about the origin of ‘state’ and the emergence of 
rajniti in India was advanced by R.S. Sharma (1959, 1996; 2001). He began 
from the idea of the ‘tree-of-life’ (kalpavriksha) – the state of nature – to 
'tribal' social formations characterized by more flexible social relations/ 
structures, such as, vidatha (signifying distribution, disposition and ordinance 
with the underlying principle of sacrifice), ganas (groups), sabha (assembly) 
and parishad (council) which formed and dissolved routinely with a capacity 
to restructure itself. For example, these early Vedic35 social formations had 
no public officials, no tax system, no class, and no army; notably, women too 
played very important roles. However, Sharma (1959) further showed how, 
along with the emergence of settled agriculture towards the later Vedic 
period, there emerged rigid structures with fixed territories, class-divided 
patriarchies, and bureaucracies with permanent tax systems and varna/ caste-
based coercive ideological apparatus (Ibid.: 102). Clearly, this has been the 
result of a long-drawn, gradual and conflictual transformation of more 
flexible ‘tribal’ social formations into more rigidly stratified and graded ones. 
Such transformations of certain segments of the early Vedic, more flexible, 
social formations were animated by a certain cosmology found in the 
Vedas.36 'What we find in Veda is the brutal cosmology based on killing and 
eating: higher things kill and eat lower ones, stronger eat weaker, i.e., life is a 
zero-sum game where one’s victory is another’s defeat' (Žižek 2012: 1, also 
see Omvedt 1994, 2008; Ilaiah 2004). Kāuṭilya, in his Arthaśāstra, 
                                                      
35 Ghurey (1961) proposed the beginning of Vedic period, in ancient India, to be at about 
6000 B.C.E. 
36 Kosambi (2009) and Saha (1986: 281), among several others, have quoted the Rig-Veda 
and Aitareya Brahmana to show the origin of caste based stratifications which have been the 
basis of Indian elitism which also marked the early origins of the idea of state in India. Also 
see Omvedt (1994, 2008); Fox (1969) and Puniani (2013) for discussions on the scriptural 
basis of caste and caste based socio-economic exclusion of peoples. According to Ghurey 
(1961), caste/ jati based structures had entered a thorough going development by 10 and 11 
century B.C.E., the developed caste structures remained in operation with considerable 
consistence for about a thousand years. See also Ketkar (1909) and Mandelbaum (1970) for 
more details. 
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presupposed the ancient South Asian concept of matsyanyāya (Berker 1997) 
(law of the fishes), according to which larger fish prey upon smaller ones 
(Corbridge and Harris 2000). The king's role was established by a pact made 
with the people to mitigate this law by providing protection for all (Berker 
1997; McClish 2009). 'The Law of Manu shines: its basic ideological 
operation is to unite the hierarchy of castes and the ascetic world-
renunciation by way of making purity itself the criterion of one's place in the 
caste hierarchy' (Žižek 2012: 1).37  
The opposition of the pure and the impure underlies hierarchy, which is the superiority 
of the pure to the impure, underlies the separation because the pure and the impure must 
be kept separate, and underlies the division of labour because pure and impure 
occupations must likewise be kept separate. The whole is found on the necessary and 
hierarchical coexistence of the two opposites … The persisting and ubiquitous idea of 
purity indicates a shared value system (Dumont [1966] 2004: 43, back cover page). 
Thus, Manu's law or ideology can clearly be seen as a codified form of the 
prevalent discriminatory practices based on the principles of ritual purity and 
pollution being imposed onto persons and social structures (Houcart 1950; 
Bouglé 1968; Deliege 2011). Such practices had been at the foundation of the 
ancient Indian statecraft and socio-religious and political philosophy 
(variously called, political Brahmanism) in South Asia (see Ketkar 1909; 
Ilaiah 1988; Sharma 1990; McClish 2009). 
While this sophisticated and religiously sanctified (Mahapatra 2011) political 
philosophy or political Brahmanism has been responsible for both a 
‘parcelling of an already homogenous unit’ (Ambedkar [1916] 2004: 113). 
This is a process whereby homogenous, holistic social formations, over a 
period of time, get formed into rigidly graded caste-based hierarchies. 
However, simultaneously, these parcelled and graded units, as a whole, 
provide an elusive unity, as Dumont has argued. It is to this elusive unity, 
embodies a religiously valorised graded inequality that the traditionally 
                                                      
37 Scholars have suggested that the concepts of 'purity' and 'pollution,' might have a ‘tribal’ 
origin, which was a part of certain hygienic practices. The Hos, for example, declare the new 
born baby, its mother and father as 'impure' for the first eight days in order to keep others 
away from touching them so that the new-born is kept away from possible infections.  Such 
practices might have been borrowed to legitimize an elevated position of those who had 
declared themselves to be ‘purer’ or ‘twice born’ to distance themselves ritually and 
socioeconomically from the toiling ‘impure’ 'masses' (Pfeffer 1997; Pati 2001; Rachel 2009). 
See also Guru (2006) and Sarukkai (2009) for discussion on the practice and politics of 
untouchability in India. 
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privileged and dominant elites of India have, from time to time, referred to as 
the unifying essence of an imagined idea of India (see Devalle 1980; 
Anderson 1983; Thapar 1978, 2004; Ilaiah 2004, 2010). Hence, a proper 
historicisation and scrutiny of this simultaneously parcelling and 
homogenizing Indian ideology and its consequences on various sections of 
Indian society might provide some useful innovative insights as to how it 
influences people’s everyday lives. As Breekenridge and Van der Veer 
(1993) have sought to undo the dangers of postcolonial scholarship on 
orientalism and colonialism being carried out as if these have no successor, I 
argue that scholarship on orientalism, colonialism and postcolonial 
predicaments have ended up in serious limitations/ dangers since most of it 
has conveniently assumed that these had no ideological predecessor prior to 
European classical colonialism in so-called ‘postcolonies.’  
Pre-British Colonial Statecraft: Colonialism and Racism as Praxis and 
Process  
The later Vedic transformation of more flexible ‘tribal’ social formations into 
jati/ caste-based, rigidly stratified ones with the majority toiling ‘masses’ 
being dominated by the proponents of Vedic cosmology and political 
Brahmanism might well be conceptualized as a long-drawn, conflict-ridden 
and extremely complex process of social transformation (Sharma 1959; Fox 
1971; Thapar 1999; Pati 2001) affected by the emergence of a distorted or 
modified dialectic of ‘super-exploitation’ (Sartre 1958, 2004: 734). 
According to Sartre, such transformations result from a modified, as opposed 
to, pure reciprocity in a situation of scarcity. 'In pure reciprocity, that which 
is Other than me is also the same. But in reciprocity as modified by scarcity, 
the same appears to us as anti-human in so far as this same man appears as 
radically Other – that is to say, as threatening us with death' (2004: 131-2). 
This is a situation where, ‘at a phenomenological level, the individual 
experiences the ‘Other’ as an object. Soon, the looker finds himself looked at, 
in turn, and becomes conscious of himself as an object, or rather of seeing 
himself seen as an object: “I am no longer master of the situation” (Sartre 
1958: 263). Thus, the threatening other is subjugated and reduced to a 
subhuman status by the dominant one.  
'Super-exploitation as a practico-inert process is nothing but oppression as a 
historical praxis realizing itself, determining itself and controlling itself in the 
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milieu of passive activity' (Sartre 2004: 745-8). Practico-inert is a position 
into which people are reduced to be neither objects nor things. 'It is the 
immeasurable brutality people visit on other people within the world of 
scarcity' (Jameson 2004: xxii.  
It is the [dominant] settler who has brought the native into existence and who 
perpetuates his existence... All colonialism is supported by racism – life is not simply a 
series of existential choices against circumstances: that the domination of power turns 
the subject into an object: in this situation, freedom is constituted by taking 
responsibility to transform oneself back into an agent. A refusal to accept that freedom, 
which alone defines man, reduces the individual to a state of inauthenticity. The choice 
of freedom and assuming the responsibility of authenticity requires considerable 
courage. Where the individual is defined as subhuman on account of racism, one 
understandable reaction is to aspire to the group from which he or she is excluded 
(Sartre 2005: xi).  
Thus, racism and colonialism as praxis and process reduces the ‘other’ being 
perceived as dangerous or evil in situations of scarcity. This ‘dangerous 
other’ must either be reduced to a subhuman position or done away with.38 
Such a situation is a colonial system with its structures of practico-inert 
fields, which works on an inauthentic/distorted reciprocity. Thus, colonialism 
and racism as praxis and process forms a system whereby uncontrolled 
violence is gradually transformed into controlled (economic) violence, which 
comes to assert for itself the legitimacy of rule (Sartre 2005).  
Such a conceptualization of colonialism and racism as praxis and process 
might very well agree with the emergence of the idea of ancient state in India 
whereby the surplus produced by a huge toiling majority (defined as ‘impure’ 
or 'once born') has been extracted by those claimed to be 'pure,' or 'twice 
born, self-declared sovereign gods'39 (see Ketkar 1909; Blunt 1969; Saha 
                                                      
38 In the ‘West’ originally, war criminals were executed, later they were allowed to live, (a 
concession given by the sovereigns), as slaves/ bonded men and women (Žižek 2008). In 
South Asia, conquest and state expansion took place mostly via assimilative conversion/ 
transformation animated by political Brahmanism (see Saha 1986, 1994, Pati 2001). 
39 One sees a similar subhuman/ practico-inert position being imposed upon large sections of 
society within the imaginary mainstream India even today. 'We still receive reports of barber 
shops refusing to shave Dalits. Homeowners unwilling to rent their houses to Dalits. Children 
segregated and discriminated in schools, women not allowed to draw water from wells, 
families pushed out of temples. Segregated mosques, churches, even crematoriums. 
Pervasive violence aimed at those who challenge caste discrimination. Social and economic 
boycotts for those who dare to transgress caste boundaries. Newly-weds chased and killed 
because they chose to marry outside their own caste. Rapes. Acid attacks. The list goes on 
shamelessly (Stalin 2013: 1). These videos about caste discrimination in present day India 
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1986, 1994; Ilaiah 1988; Sharma 1990, 1996, 2001). According to Galtung 
(1990), this constitutes cultural domination that leads to structural and direct 
violence. For colonialism entitles 'any sort of domination or assertion of 
control by one human group over another, often achieved by trickery and 
usually involving illegitimate means' (Page and Sonnenburge 2003: xx).40 
Following Sartre's formulation of colonialism as a system of super-
exploitation to pre-British colonial Indian state-circles, it is possible to 
conceptualize the ancient mainstream state-circles to be infernal machines of 
practico-inert that constituted the systemic praxis and process of racism and 
colonialism. The sudras and 'out-castes' were outcomes of perpetual slavery, 
and were constantly advised to look up to their masters to imitate them, since 
their freedom and reciprocity were modified by the brutal Vedic cosmology 
and Manu’s ideology of societal ordering and statecraft/ political 
Brahmanism (see Ketkar 1909; Saha 1986, 1994, Sharma 1990; Omvedt 
1994; Ambedkar 2004; McClish 2009; Rage 2013).  
Economically completely dependent on the superior classes and much exploited by 
them, socially degraded and treated with contempt, deliberately deprived of the higher 
religious and cultural values of Hindu society, they all suffer from a varying degree of 
ritual impurity, close contact with them is polluting, they are ‘untouchables’ (Fuchs 
1981: 3). 
If such a severe situation exists in today’s India even after the official 
abolition of untouchability in 1950, it must have been even more rigid and 
rampant during pre-medieval and medieval periods. In such a situation of 
being threatened to be reduced to subhuman status, it is possible that some 
who willed to live their radical imaginations of pure reciprocity, authenticity, 
and freedom, might have deliberately escaped or fled from these oppressive 
colonial, state-circles, infernal machines of the practico-inert fields, away 
                                                                                                                                         
might further enlighten the reader on the issue and its severity: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JC3C2voZjrA&feature=related; (accessed 17 November 
2013). 
40 Kaviraj (2010) has stated that the precolonial state consisted of several asymmetric social 
hierarchies: 'disaggregated into several different criteria of ranking individuals and groups – 
say, between control over economic assets, political power, and ritual status' (Kaviraj 2010: 
11). The central state was constituted by several mutually relating small-scale state-circles 
each surviving on the surplus produced by those who had been reduced to subhuman status 
at the lowest strata (Alavi 1980; Sharma 1997, 2001, 2006; Ilaiah 2004, 2010). Srinivas (1957) 
had also alluded to small-state stratified societies in pre-British India with 'clear territorial 
cleavages  ... of one chieftain or raja from the territories of others' (p. 529). Also see 
appendix-2 on the institutions and mechanisms of brahmanical social control. 
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from the ‘twice-born’ sovereigns who sought to subjugate and enslave them 
with an all-pervasive oppressive system and its ideology in the alluvial plains 
of the subcontinent.  
The permanent settlement of population is a state project in Southeast Asia that spans 
pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial regimes. … In India it might help us 
understand the relationship between the 'Mogul rulers', and later the colonial regime on 
the one hand, and hill peoples, or nomads, on the other (Scott 1998b: 1). 
Adivasi Social Formations as those who escaped ancient Indian (casteist 
colonial) statecraft 
Hence, Adivasi social formations that were/ are generally found in 
inaccessible, mountainous and forested habitations, with alternative 
sociopolitical, economic and religio-cultural imaginations and social 
structures, might more realistically be conceptualized as those radicals 
(Mangobinda 1989; Chaudhuri 2009, 2010) who rejected and escaped the 
ancient infernal machines in alluvial plains that sought to reduce them to 
subhuman status at various junctures during ancient Indian history. This 
explains why and how most Adivasi social formations in India were/ are 
found in inaccessible, thickly forested and hilly regions, and had developed 
their contrasting alternative social structures and organizations.  
In the case of the so-called ‘adivasis,’ a description of who they were and where they 
came from ought not to begin by plucking them as specimens from the [British] 
colonial era, but by examining their resistance to colonialism, and the previous history 
of the rise and fall of tribal kingdoms in a period when they were much more largely 
masters of their own fate (Bates 1995: 31). Tribal social organization pre-dates 
stratified class society. Tribes are characterized not by this or that race, habitat or 
religious practice, but (in my understanding) by the bonding fabric of kinship and joint 
ownership of the natural resources from which they make their living (Ratnagar 2003: 
17). The history of Adivasi societies – their absorption into and their distance from a 
caste based agrarian order at different times in the past – forms a crucial element of 
South Asian History (Kela 2006: 502).  
One of the most intriguing aspects of Adivasi social formations has been their 
obscurity throughout pre-British colonial and (ancient) Indian historiography, 
which calls for a more creative, fresh  and imaginative approaches to Adivasi 
history based on their life-styles, values and alternative structural and cultural 
orientations. Saha (1986, 1994) conceptualized Adivasi social formations as 
those who rejected 'the unequal processes of Hindu incorporation… both 
autochthonous and successive waves of immigrants fleeing Hinduised areas 
and totally indigenized in mountains and jungle fastness by the time state 
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control in northern India passed into the hands of Muslims, evolved over 
centuries, languages and forms of social organization which are of a totally 
different order than those which emerged in the rest of India under Hindu 
influence' (Saha 1986: 274). ‘One wonders whether the rakshasa [mythical 
demons in Hindu scriptures] were figures of fantasy as was thought earlier, or 
whether some at least represent a demonizing of the culturally alien as is 
being thought now’ Thapar 2013: 16). Kosambi (2009) referred to Adivasis 
as those who had stubbornly resisted to be part of the stratified Hindu society, 
and Ghurey (1963), had termed them as 'backward' Hindus, who are 
'imperfectly integrated' (Ibid.: 19).  
Although the former had hinted at the reason for Adivasis’ resistance to be 
unequally incorporated into a caste ridden mainstream, the later was stitching 
the garb of a Hindu nationalism to cover up the millennia old beastly colonial 
system which had just changed its head in 1947, when the British left India. 
Since then, all political parties and politicians have being overstretching this 
nationalist garb unmindful of its incapacity to cover up the violence, 
immorality and guilt of the ongoing unaltered colonial and racist practices 
while the historically colonized, discriminated and pauperized peoples, 
including Adivasis, have been urged to embrace such practices with the garb 
of nationalism on, ‘in the same way mothers are loved’ (Sartre [1961] 2008: 
299). ‘Under the garb of larger national and regional interests, the state has 
invariably pursued the interests of the dominant sections of society over the 
interests of the tribal communities’ (Xaxa 2010: 1). Not surprisingly, almost 
all specialists of Adivasi history in India have shown a consistent reluctance 
to look beyond the British colonial period (Devalle 1980; Singh 1985). 'The 
treatment of history or prehistory in tribal monographs remained, by and 
large, an exercise in speculation … Historians have compiled accounts of 
Indian tribes both ancient and modern [but] … it is often stated that the data-
base for the historical study of such non-literate societies is limited' (Singh 
1985: 12).  
… For the occasional allusions to some of these tribes in the long literary history of the 
country, they were well-nigh lost... For whatever the reasons, many of them got as far 
removed from the mainstream of the country as their inhospitable, sleepy and 
inaccessible habitat. And they were virtually lost into oblivion when enterprising 
British administrators, adventure-loving travelers, profit-making traders, and humanist 
missionaries rediscovered them … (Sarat 1982:15). 
For ‘history, at least until recently, was written only by the ruling elites of 
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states’ (Keyes et al 2010: 241). ‘The texts that have survived from the early 
period are generally that of elite groups. There are hardly any written sources 
from those marginalized by mainstream society’ (Thapar 2013: 17). 
Consequently, almost all ‘tribal’ study specialists have held the British 
colonizers solely responsible for all the anomalies of Indian society 
(Mandelbaum 1970; Ludden 2001). Whereas British colonialism along with 
exploitation of economic resources, introduced a few superior ‘technologies 
of governance’ to the pre-British colonial infernal machines that had already 
existed without altering their ideological structures, but further solidified 
them (see Bayley 2000; Mjor 2012; Lockwood 2012). ‘Colonialism did not 
destroy but relied upon the different forms of pre-capitalist relations of 
production to facilitate its processes of exploitation’ (Ghosh and Sengupta 
1982: 233). 
Singh (1985), however, has suggested the need to combine anthropology and 
history to overcome the deficiency in 'tribal' studies. Scott’s (2009) 
conceptualization of hills people is one of the most interesting and creative 
work that has combined anthropology, history and other sub-disciplines, such 
as agrarian history, to understand who the ‘hills people’ are. He has 
convincingly shown that hills people are those who deliberately avoided the 
ancient states that existed by extracting taxes and manpower for projects – 
military, architectural, religious, cultural – that benefited the rulers and 
associated elites’ (Ibid.: 238). Scott’s conceptualization of hills people allows 
for a more reasonable visualization of Adivasis as those who kept fleeing/ 
avoiding the ancient oppressive (Indian) statecraft to take refuge in various 
forested and hilly terrains of the subcontinent. For Scott (1998), the ‘hills’ 
people who are mobile, practicing slash-and-burn/ shifting cultivation, 
nomads, pastoralists, hunter-gatherers, gypsies, vagrants, itinerants, runaway 
slaves, and serfs are those who sought to deliberately avoid the earliest and 
perennial state-projects of tax and sedentarisation (Ibid..: 1).  
Tribalism can be viewed as a reaction to the formation of a complex political structure 
rather than a necessary preliminary stage in evolution (Morton Fried 1968, quoted in 
Sinha 1982: 9). In Southeast Asia, the categories of ‘tribal’ and ‘civilized’ each implies 
and defines the other. … ‘Tribe’ exist only in the context of state system of social 
relations which includes them; state exist by coming in terms with tribes (as social 
types) (Sinha 1982: 9).  
Shifting cultivation practices and other such flexible copping practices, 
according to Scott (2009), were not shaped by geographical/ ecological 
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adaptations, but were results of deliberate choices by peoples who roamed 
about state-based oppressive civilizations. Areeparampil (2002) has provided 
succinct descriptions of the Kolarians’ oral traditions which talk about their 
long wanderings much before they came to settle in regions where they are 
presently located. Similarly Sunder (2007) has described the shifting 
cultivation practices and constant movements of Dhurwa (Gond) Adivasis of 
South Bastar. Skaria (1999), Kela (2012) talk about powerful and more 
flexibly organized ‘wild’ Adivasi kingdoms of the Bhils, Gonds and Dangis. 
Skaria (1999) has shown that the site of ‘wilderness’ was ‘jangal’ which 
meant not only forest and mountain, but any regions beyond the locus of state 
control, which gradually established alliance by demanding taxes and paying 
‘salaries’ to ‘jangal’ chiefs. These descriptions of the ‘wild’ and the ‘settled 
spheres’ resonate rather well with Scott’s (2009) conceptualizations of hills 
people and state based plain’s civilizations. 
Scott (2009) has broadly charted out four eras in the history of such state-
avoiding / fleeing peoples:  
1. a stateless era;  
2. an era of small-scale states encircled by vast and easily reached stateless 
peripheries; 
3. a period in which such peripheries are shrunken and beleaguered by the expansion 
of state power; and 
4. an era in which virtually the entire globe is 'administered space' and the periphery is 
not much more than folkloric remnant (p. 324). 
Ultimately these state-evading peoples would be engulfed and eventually 
absorbed into respective nation-states, Scott (2009) concludes, ‘This is the 
history of deliberate and reactive statelessness, this is a history of those who 
got away, and state-making cannot be understood apart from it' (Ibid.: x).  
On applying Scott’s schemata to the history of Adivasi social formations, the 
second era might roughly be compared to Pre-Mughal colonial period. The 
Mughal colonial period might well be considered as the third era whereby the 
peculiar Indian statecraft, the powers of the plains had begun to expand by 
defeating, attracting and co-opting the powerful but alternatively organized 
Adivasi chieftains and social formations (see Wills 1919; Fox 1971; Thapar 
1999; 2004; 2013) and the British-led colonial expansion of state-power 
could be considered as the beginning of the third era whereby strong and 
autonomous Adivasi kingdoms and the people who constituted them were 
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subjugated and eventually incorporated into surplus producing serfs in their 
own lands as exotic or criminal ‘tribes,’ ‘aboriginals’ or ‘primitives.’  
The Shape of the Beast 
Before discussing the contrasting alternative social philosophy/ imagination/ 
subjectivities of Adivasi social formations and their present predicaments as 
hill peoples who had deliberately and reactively avoid state-projects, it is 
important to make the shape of the state in India and the mode its operation 
clearer as it has presently come to assume a hybrid combination of 
‘modern’/‘western,’41 capitalism and political Brahmanism. Jointly, as 
Rudolph and Rudolph (1978a) termed, the pursuit of Lakshmi (a popular 
Indian pantheon of wealth, power and good fortunes) that animates the 
infernal state-machine, into which the hills people of Chotanagpur would 
once again be brutally brought in by the Mughal, British and post-British 
colonial state in India. The sub-section below shows the various constituents 
of the ‘modern’ Indian state which has largely been incapable of reforming 
itself of its ancient beastly and distorted reciprocity (dialectic). For it has 
continuously refused to attend to the genuine and long-standing grievances of 
its own marginalized peoples due, once again, to its adherence to the ancient 
elitist ideology on which it has been founded (see Ambedkar 1944; Ambedkar 
- n.d.; Saha 1986; Ilaiah 2004, 2010). 
According to Saha (1986), the overarching Indian ideological statecraft 
(political Brahmanism) had already become the mainstream doxa 
(unquestioned orthodoxy) throughout pan-Indian alluvial plains during the 
long period from fourth century B.C.E. to 12 century A.C.E. According to 
Rudolphs (1987a), it was this socio-religious philosophy (political 
Brahmanism), an attractive and handy tool for effective statecraft that had 
facilitated the Mughal invasion, conquest and consolidation in India.42 The 
                                                      
41 Western refers to the hegemonic values, colonial desires, dominant discourses, beliefs, 
and policies which undergird global neoliberal capitalism. Although it developed first in 
Europe and the United States, they have pervaded the elite castes/ classes and power 
structures everywhere (Chomsky 2010). 
42 A description of the socioeconomic situation of Mughal India goes like this: 'the common 
people lived in mud-hovels, half-naked, half-starved, and from whom every drop of sap had 
been wrung out by their predatory masters, Muslim as well as Hindu ... At the height of 
Mughal splendor under Sha Jahan, over a quarter of the gross national product of the empire 
was appropriated by just 655 individuals, while the bulk of the 120 odd million people of 
83 
 
idea of the Indian state was a 'symbolic cultural order which emphasized the 
overarching significance of rulership.., the pervasive Hindu idea of the 
universal emperor (Chakravartin), who turned the wheel (chakra) and was 
the hub of its spokes, and the circle' (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987a: 86, 
1987b).  
The ‘mainstream’ doxa during Mughal period, according to Rudolphs 
(1987a), was the ‘pursuit of Lakshmi' (a popular pantheon of wealth, power 
and good fortunes), which also upheld the idea that social order requires the 
state's force; and hence, a high stateness (Ibid.). The phrase 'the pursuit of 
Lakshmi' embodies colonial desires to pursue one’s good fortunes, wealth, 
power and honour and accompanying discourses of legitimation including 
racism. The ideologies of neocolonialism and neoliberal global capitalism 
driven by the logic of the market, whereby humans and the natural world are 
used without constraint and then discarded to maximize profit, ‘some 
abstract, alien and perhaps a self-defeating notion of progress’ (Padel 2009: 
xvii), are not different from these (Young 1995, Hedges and Sacco 2012). 
These pursuers of Lakshmi do not hesitate to use economically marginalized 
people and the environment merely as a means (see Das and Padel 2010, Roy 
2009b, 2011). Moreover, the proposed model for social change in 
postcolonial India and national integration has been sankritisation and 
westernisation, whereby the 'lower' castes and Adivasis have been 
encouraged and even forced to emulate the values and lifestyles of the 'upper' 
caste elites. Although admittedly, those who are labelled as ‘lower’ and 
‘backward’ in no way benefit from such a model, since the very logic of these 
highly competitive and antagonistic processes necessarily reduces many to be 
‘backward’ while allowing only a few to make it to the ranks of the already 
powerful (Srinivas 1962; Devalle 1980; Ilaiah 2004).  
A diagrammatic representation (figure-1 below) of the post-British colonial 
state, which represents the putative mainstream, makes the shape of the 
infernal machine or the structures of super-exploitation that continuously 
reduces economically poorer people to subhuman status, clearer.  
                                                                                                                                         
India lived on a dead level of poverty' (Eraly 2007: 381). The strikingly paradoxical 
coexistence of 'Indian elitism' (Saha 1986: 77), and the extremely enslaving deprivations of 
majority 'masses' have their deep roots in the sociocultural constitution of the 'Indian-
mainstream,' which has, so far, managed to escape sustained critical scrutiny for various 
reasons. 
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Figure 1 – A systemic frame of Indian colonial civic order 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical studies show that ‘the law in action fully contradicts the law in 
books.’ The dialectic of Indian-style developmentalism is vikas 
(development) for the ‘haves,’ and vinash (destruction) for the ‘have-nots’ by 
‘myriad unconstitutional practices of expropriation governed by force of 
fraud, often beyond constitutional redress. More than sixty-five years of 
Indian development choices have created ‘endless cycles of human and social 
suffering’ for its ‘poorest’ people, and have left those displaced by 
‘development’ to ‘their own miserable fate’ (Somayaji and Talwar 2011: xv). 
It is against this doxa of the mainstream with its distorted reciprocity, and the 
pursuit of Lakshmi that Adivasi social formations with pure reciprocity and 
‘the pursuit of freedom’ the processes of state formation in the hilly and 
forested Chotanagpur plateau, must be examined for a proper/ better 
This figure is adopted from Gadgil & Guha (1995). It shows the iron triangle that 
constitute the state in India. ‘The constituents of this iron triangle are forcing the country 
into a pattern of exhaustive resource use at the expense of the environment and a majority 
of the people’ (Ibid.: 36). This clearly suggests that the ‘modern’ India state has been 
unable to reform itself of its ancient beastly ideological basis. The colonial civic order is 
maintained and reproduced by the selective co-option of leading elements from the 
marginalized groups while it gifts deprivations and material poverty to them. In a recent 
article in The Hindu, a national daily Guha (2013) says, ‘Polluted skies, dead rivers, 
disappearing forests and displacement of peasants and tribals are what we see around us 
40 years after the Chipko movement started (Ibid.: 1). 
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understanding of the present socioeconomic and political processes and 
dynamics in the region today. What has been missing in most historical 
accounts of state penetration in Chotanagpur, so far, has been a proper 
juxtaposition of Adivasi subjectivities, their sustained attachment to specific 
socio-cultural values which aids the most marginalized Adivasis to keep 
withdrawing/ retreating themselves while being hurt by cultural and structural 
violence embodied in and advanced by mainstream doxa (political 
Brahmanism) which animates the idea of the Indian state. Hence, before 
moving to discuss the process of state expansion within Adivasi social 
formations in Chotanagpur plateau, it would be appropriate to take a brief 
look at Adivasis’ alternative (imaginations/ philosophies) and subjectivities, 
although most of which have, by now, become weakened and blurred with 
mainstream doxa.    
Alternative Imaginations (Subjectivities): Special Reference to Kolarian 
(Munda) Adivasi Groups43  
Adivasi law, justice and the process of political decision-making were based 
on principles of consensus, democracy, and egalitarianism taking the holistic 
welfare of a concerned Adivasi group or ‘tribe’: a person, a household in a 
specific hatu (formerly a single lineage village) and many villages of 
different lineages forming a single ‘tribe’ (Yorke 1976; Archer 1984; Mundu 
2003). Such a locally self-governing and decision-making body constituted 
an Adivasi ‘sacral polity’ (Shah 2007; 2010) – for example, the munda-manki 
and the parha systems of the Hos and Mundas respectively. Verardo (2003) 
has highlighted ‘some distinctive Munda features, which stress equality by 
suggesting a cyclical notion of generation and by overcoming differences 
based on seniority, sex, and line of descent. Equality appears also to be the 
driving force of Mundas’ marital practices’ (Ibid.: 4). 
The sacral polity, at the village level, is headed by a munda, the headman and 
diuri, the spiritual head. A confederation of 10 to 15 villages, called a pir/ 
parha, is headed by a manki, the one used to be chosen from among many 
equal headmen (primus inter pares) of these villages (Roy 1970). Archer 
                                                      
43 References cited in this section pertains only to the Kolarian (Hos, Mundas, and Santals) 
groups in Kolhan and Jharkhand, although there are literature available on other Adivasi 
groups and on several other distinct aspects of their communal life, only a few aspects of 
Adivasi sacred polity are considered here due to lack of space. 
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(1984) showed that the traditional 'annual hunt' (a gathering of the entire 
Santal Adivasi group) constituted the sovereign authority of Santals. This 
description of Adivasis’ understanding of authority being conferred on an 
entire (inclusive) ‘tribe’ is similar to that of what Sharma (1959) had pointed 
out as existed during ancient times: a periodically dissolvable public 
authority being constituted by an entire/ single an Adivasi group. This means 
that a 'tribe,' as a becoming-people, cares to nurture their alternative 
imaginations of (a more flexible, inclusive, and routinely reformable) notions 
of sovereignty and authority, despite being continuously enveloped, 
confronted and intruded by those in pursuit of Lakshmi for centuries. 
Yorke (1976), Verardo (2003), Deeny (2008) and Rachel (2009) have 
discussed the ancestral and spirit world of the Hos in some detail. Every Ho 
household has a sanctuary called adding where ancestral spirits dwell and a 
‘Ho village remains home to ancestors within its boundaries… The relation 
between the living and the dead reveals that ancestors are integrally involved 
in Ho social and ritual life’ (Rachel: 68, 80), which is also integral to Adivasi 
sacral polity. 44 Hos imagine themselves as living within ‘a religiously 
defined boundary that is realized through a contact with the village guardian 
spirit’ or hatubonga who resides in every sarana (sacred grove, also called 
desauli of a Ho/ Munda village). There are other burubongako (spirits 
residing in wild forests and hills) of whom Hos feel threatened (Yorke 1976: 
55).  
More recent studies among the Mundas, Shah (2010) for example, provides 
some very interesting details about the Mundas’ radical, alternative visions, 
radical democratic values and practices embodied in 'a cosmology in which 
the sacred and the secular are intimately connected, even identical. This 
cosmology is based on a holistic or non-compartmental view of the different 
aspects of life such as social, material or economic, political and spiritual 
(Shah 2014). This sacral polity embodies a moral politics endorsed by the 
spirits that is neither self-interested nor divisive, and that is underpinned by 
the values of egalitarianism, consensus in decision making, and mutual aid' 
(Ibid.: 190). Shah shows that the parha (the sacral polity of the Mundas) has 
                                                      
44 See Mann (1981) and Deeny (2008) for a discussion on tribal religions in India as one 
essentially revolving around a spirit-nature-man complex. See the appendix–5 for an 
elaborate list of contrasting sociocultural, economic and political values held by Adivasi and 
non-Adivasi social formations. Also see Elwin (1943) and Guha (2001). 
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been 'imagined as an alternative, authentic, Adivasi political vision,’ (Ibid.: 
56) which has the ‘potential for a radical politics that can better serve the 
poorest people' (Ibid.: 190).45 'A corollary of this sacral polity is the 
promotion of egalitarianism, consensus in decision making, and mutual 
reciprocity and aid' (Shah 2010: 33). 
Das Gupta (2011) and Streumer (forthcoming 2014) explain how the mankis 
and mundas of Kolhan had been coercively negotiated by the agents of 
precolonial (mainstream) supra-state (‘Rajput’ chieftains/ rajas) while 
exerting their hegemony over Kolhan and the Hos, which the Hos had refused 
prior to the advent of the British raj. Since British subjugation of the Hos, the 
villagers gradually lost their ability to make their mundas and mankis 
accountable to the community due to colonial policies of co-option and 
paternalism. Verardo (2003) has shown how the Hos’ struggle to cope with 
forces of sanskritisation/ Hinduization, on the one hand, and the increased 
pace of deforestation advanced by the post-British colonial state-bureaucrat-
industrialist-contractor nexus in the region, on the other. And how these 
processes have been degenerating the Ho’s subsistence base, way of life and 
sociocultural integrity. She also shows how the proponents of the 
‘mainstream’ intruded the Hos’ refuge zones with all their accompanying 
adverse influences on the latter’s traditional religio-cultural practices, values 
and livelihood systems which have been entwined with a spirit-man-nature 
complex, on which the Hos’ life-cycle and agronomic activities depend/ed.  
The processes of state formation in Chotanagpur, thus, are processes that 
reduce these more radical, freedom loving Adivasis, their leaders and their 
alternative imaginations of an integrated, holistic community into practico-
inert status with values of graded inequality, during later Mughal and British 
raj, accompanied by callous and brutal repression, despite stiff resistance (see 
Corbridge 1996; Mullick 2004; Iqbal 2012).  
History of State Formation in Chotanagpur: Conflict, Defeat, 
Compromise, Retreat and Resistance 
The Mundari speaking Kolarians are said to be the original inhabitants of 
                                                      
45 However, Shah (2010) has also noted that the radical elements which hold the potential 
for a more radical politics have been missed and misunderstood by 'educated' young 
Adivasis, Jharkhand activists and non-Adivasis alike. 
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Jharkhand region; they developed dry jhum (slash and burn) cultivation 
techniques with rice fields and iron tools to be the first settler-cultivators of 
the place. (Thapar and Siddiqi 1979; Areeparampil 2002; Hill 2008). Villages 
were established with recognizable boundaries, guarded by deities dwelling 
in sarnas (sacred groves). Leading men, who first cleared forests, became 
both the temporal and spiritual heads of a village community who mostly 
belonged to the same marang killi (leading lineage). Other outsiders were 
affinal relatives, and craftsmen (service castes) such as blacksmiths, weavers, 
cowherds who were later accommodated into these original villages. In 
course of time, the 'heads of patrilineal clans with their office becoming 
hereditary, grew powerful; gifts, inevitably, became regulated as dues. All of 
this contributed to the encouragement of an hierarchal arrangement of power 
based on access to land and its produce, which ran counter to the original 
lineage system with its stress on egalitarianism' (Hill 2008: 74). (These 
processes of state-formation hold close similarities to the later-Vedic 
transformations already discussed in this chapter). 
While this explains the initial processes of settled agriculture and 
accompanying state formation, what facilitated the transformations of 
Adivasi sacral polity into a hierarchically graded one was political 
Brahmanism brought in by the ‘men of pen, fortunes and prowess’ (Bayley 
2000: sic). They had already established their networks here with powerful 
Adivasi chieftains who were attracted probably by the prestige and glory that 
come from the pursuit of Lakshmi. Dalton (1872, 1973) and Roy (1970) 
narrated a Hindu myth that explained the processes by which the son of a 
Munda chieftain in Chutia Nagpur, near Ranchi, was gradually converted and 
co-opted into a Nagavansi (of the genealogy of a serpant god) maharaja of 
Chotanagpur. Saha (1986) provides a succinct description of how the long 
transformational processes of a more indigenous/ egalitarian minded Durjan 
Sal, the maharaja of Chotanagpur took place and the consequences thereby 
on Adivasis (see appendix-1, 2, 3 and the afterword for more details).  
Jha (1964) and Singh (1966) has discussed the socioeconomic and political 
transformations, and the consequent Adivasi unrest in Chotanagpur. Sinha 
(1962) has explained how Rajput kings were produced out of tribal chieftains 
in central eastern India. Similarly, Wills (1919), Blunt (1969), Fox (1971), 
Kulke (1976, 1978), Singh (1971), Mahapatra (1976), Banerjee (1989) and 
Thapar (1999) have also has discussed similar models of state formation 
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theories in north and central eastern India. These are clear evidences to show 
the influence of political Brahmanism that accelerated the processes of state 
formation in more fertile/ plain regions of early Chotanagpur, however, some 
fractions of Kolarians such as Hos, Mundas, Santals, Birhors and a few others 
have consistently resisted or escaped the influence of political Brahmanism 
while the Bhumijs who were also Kolarians seemed to have embraced it 
(Sinha 1962, 1965). 
These transformations of Adivasi social formations, facilitated by political 
Brahmanism, are similar to that of sanskritisation: the chiefly families 
aspired to become Kshatriyas’ [warrior castes] while such transformations 
happen over a long period of time, the ordinary people would be relegated to 
the status of sudras [toiling serfs] who would provide labour (Thapar 2013: 
15). Thus, when the power-structures of more flexibly organized Adivasi 
social formations began to undergo tangible changes, the Hos who were more 
freedom-loving (Singh 1978) seemed to have split off the Mundas of Ranchi 
and moved to more hilly and dense forests of Kolhan (Roy 1970). There 
again, the Ho chieftains would later be contacted by the raja families which 
further put the Hos with continued interaction with mainstream (brahmanical) 
statecraft (see appendix-2 & 3 for more details).   
More interestingly, while the British invaded the inaccessible terrains of 
Chotanagpur, what the British colonial administrators and ethnologists 
witnessed was a continuum of plains-based civilizations, enthused by the 
pursuit of Lakshmi, on the one hand, and the hills-based more radically 
freedom-seeking fractions among Adivasi social-formations who sought to 
keep themselves away by retreating themselves from the subjugating 
influence of political Brahmanism. Analyzing both sanskritisation and de-
sanskritisation processes among the Ho-Mundas, Verardo (2003) has shown 
that while the wealthier Mundas emulated some of the so-called ‘higher’ 
caste behaviours resulting in the formation of new ‘castes’ in the course of 
Hindu reformist movements, there was ‘simultaneous revival of Adivasi 
culture and adherence to ancestral teachings and practices. ‘By reviving the 
ancestral notions of wilderness and mastery over forests, those who refuse to 
‘sanskritise’ remain faithful to the primordial link between land, spirit and 
people as criteria for social status. To them it is territorial precedence and the 
mediation with local spirits, rather than Brahmanical criteria of purity and 
pollution that legitimize claims to higher social ranking’ (Ibid.: 3).  
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Although Adivasis, who radically adhered to their own alternative 
imaginations (see Chaudhuri 2009; Pati 2011, 2013), posed stiff resistance 
against the compelling influence of political Brahmanism, on being defeated 
and subjugated by superior powers; they keep withdrawing/ retreating into 
farther interior/ inaccessible terrains even at the cost of leaving their fertile 
lands and homes.46 Such resistance, defeat, and retreat/ escape have brought 
and still bring them cumulative material and ideological deprivations (see 
Mullick 1993, 2004). Perhaps, this has been one of the most complex, long-
drawn, but rarely researched aspects of state formation in Adivasi dominant 
hilly and forested regions47 such as Chotanagpur plateau. 
Certainly, the British had faced serious difficulties to make sense of what was 
actually going on with their colonial subjects as it is difficult even today to 
make legible explanations.  
The distinction between 'tribal' and Hindu India was never simple or static. But 
throughout north and central India and the Western Ghats [hills] were people only 
lightly touched by the major cultures and religions who lived in part by the skills of the 
pastoralists, the slash-and-burn farmer or the hunter and gatherer. Some of these people 
had chieftains who were designated rajas by outside potentates, though often the 
individual nomadic camp or hunting family was the key political unit and the state 
hardly existed as an entity (Bayly 1995: 25). 
Bayly’s account is based on British colonial records of late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. However, the following account by Stuligross is based 
on fieldwork during more recent times. 
These kingdoms were complete with Brahmin priests, constructed genealogies, and, 
frequently, conversion to Hinduism by kings and higher-ranking subjects. This 
conversion, however, was more political than religious, in an important sense. 
Jharkhandi varieties of Hinduism, consistent with Hindu practice elsewhere, developed 
in consonance with local myths, traditions and rituals. Hence, it is perfectly consistent 
for much of the Jharkhand ‘Hindu’ community to profess that they practice ‘tribal 
culture’ (Stuligross 2008: 94).  
                                                      
46 For the most recent testimony of the Adivasis' determined rejection of caste-based 
discrimination and oppression; see (Mahawar’s (2012) testimony, 'Tribals don't believe in 
chatur-varna [the fourfold caste system] that is the basis of Hindu society. They lived with 
their native tradition, and for over five thousand years refused to get dominated by Hindus. 
Hence, they are not Hindus’ (p.1) He has made this statement after having observed Adivasi 
life and culture for the last fifty years in Bastar Chhattisgarh. 
47 See Pati (2001) for an interesting discussion on state formation/ conversion animated by 
political Brahmanism in Orissa for a period from 1700 to 2000; these are not so easily 
noticed long-drawn, complex, conflict-ridden and materially impoverishing  experiences for 
the marginalized sections of Indian society.  
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Several British ethnologists and administrator anthropologists, Dalton (1872), 
Hunter (1886), Lyall (1907) and Russell (1969), for instance, have indeed 
described these complex and bewildering socio-cultural processes of 
continuous coercion, conflict, imitation, acculturation and assimilation that 
had been taking place in a continuum during 1600-1900 in Chotanagpur and 
beyond. These are complex socio-economic and political processes of a 
natural, imitative acculturation or ‘detribalization.’ An interesting analogy the 
British ethnologists had employed to describe such a phenomenal situation, 
was that of a ‘melting pot’ in which the 'aboriginal tribes' were progressively 
and gradually being assimilated or incorporated into caste-based societies 
(Lyall 1907: 27).  
The British hegemons, in their efforts to understand their colonial subjects, 
further enumerated and categorized these fluid and continuously interacting/ 
assimilating/ acculturating social formations into ‘castes’ and ‘tribes,’ which 
artificially differentiated and consolidated more complex and changing socio-
cultural and political formations (see Mandani 2012). However, this 
intervention of the British raj also gave some legal basis for Adivasis’ 
consciousness and claims of their separate identity and tights (see below). 
The ‘sudra mode of incorporation’ of the economically poorer sections of 
Adivasis (Saha 1986: 279, 1994) or ‘discriminatory integration’ (Sahu 1986: 
11-12, 16-17; Pati 2001) or ‘secondary primitivization’ (Sinha 1982: 6) 
clearly involve cultural, symbolic and structural violence although it rendered 
itself normalized and self-reproductive by the Indian ideological statecraft 
(political Brahmanism, both the predecessor and successor of British raj). 
These very complex, conflicting and long-drawn processes continue to 
remain the main kernel of state-formation in Chotanagpur region even today.  
Secondary primitivization, withdrawal, oscillation, and regional universalization and 
participation in the caste/ peasant base of Indian civilization through the intervention of 
state formation. … the pressure of the encroaching civilization not only pulls the 
hitherto isolated tribal groups towards integration with the caste/ peasant system, they 
also generate processes of keeping some groups at a level of isolation from the 
mainstream of peasant society (Sinha 1982: 8). 
British-led invasion into these interior, inaccessible ‘refuge zones’ of Adivasi 
social formations (Mangobinda 1989; Chaudhuri 2009) not only aggravated 
the pre-British colonial system but also brought in additional direct/ physical 
violence – branding Adivasis as ‘criminal tribes,’ accusing some of them to 
be engaging in ‘human sacrifice’ which itself was a survival strategy for 
92 
 
Adivasis against a set of conditions that marginalized their world and sough 
to terrorize them to submit to the British (Padel 1995, 2009). Such direct 
violence and repression also triggered numerous insurrections, and rebellions 
from the beginning of 1700 to the end of 1800.48  
It became clear that from two sides their traditional society was being undermined: 
custom was being undermined by contract, a barter economy by a money economy; 
they had to yet learn to handle, divisions of land determined by traditional custom were 
replaced by a landlord-tenant relationship and tribal solidarity was being destroyed 
from within by Hinduisation of chiefs, and from without by the pressure of the British 
raj (Jha 1964: 240). 
As a consequence of these rebellions, the British colonists were forced to 
introduce the provisions of ethno-territorial enclosures – Scheduled district 
Act 1874, the CNTA 1909 and the Santal Pargana Tenancy Act 1949 – which 
alone provided some space for Adivasis to assert their separate identity in 
Chotanagpur during the 1920s, and arguably, whatever little lands and forests 
that have been left with Adivasis today in their ethno-territories in Jharkhand, 
is the result of these provisions that are also reflected in the Fifth Schedule of 
the Indian Constitution (see Rao 2008; Sunder 2009). Thus, although British 
colonialism initially had a terrorizing effect on Adivasis, once they were 
subjugated, has had some positive impact in relation to Adivasi land rights 
and identity. However, despite such provisions of Adivasi enclosures, the 
praxis and process and praxes of Indian colonialism and racism as a system 
has continued, even aggravated in Adivasi dominant regions during the post-
British colonial period. This has been well documented and conceptualized as 
internal colonialism (Sinha 1973; Singh 1982; Das 1992, Devalle 1992; 
Mundu 2003; Padel 2011; Kujur 2011; Toppo 2012; Dungdung 2013). ‘The 
dismantling of British colonial rule in India did not, then, simply translate 
into freedom from political-economic and psycho-cultural oppression and 
caste-race discrimination for the Adivasi’ (Kapoor 2007: 11). 
British colonial invasion was, most probably, made possible by the 
enthusiastic cooperation of the ‘men of pen, fortunes and prowess,’ the 
primary agents of the ‘mainstream,’ who not only conjointly formed the steel 
frame of the British raj (Bayley 2000; Patterson 2009) but also perpetuate the 
                                                      
48 Most significant of them being the Kol insurrection of 1831-32, in which the Hos of Kolhan 
had played a leading role, and the last being the Ulgulan, the Munda uprising under the 
leadership of legendary Adivasi rebel leader Birsa Munda during 1885-1900 in Chotanagpur 
(see Jha 1964; Singh 1966; Singh 1978; Sahu 1985). 
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iron frame of post-British Indian colonial civic order. Caste hierarchy might 
have served as the main pillar of British colonial paternalism, where ‘high’ 
caste elites bargained to maintain hierarchies of privilege in colonial society. 
For the mediating elites get rewards from their cooperation with the privilege 
of power over citizens, peasants, workers, family members and neighbours. 
No colonizer can unilaterally impose a colonial system or rule – a political 
system – it involves negotiations or power relations and identities in myriad 
ways at various levels (Thompson 2000). 
Thus, the so-called ‘mainstream’ always perceives Adivasis (whom it has 
‘othered’ and systematically marginalized) in derogatory terms as 'barbarians' 
(Thapar 1971), mlecha (ritually impure), dasyu (bandits) (Saha 1986: 277) 
chuar and dakait (thieves and robbers), jungli (wild) (Rycroft and Dasgupta 
2011: 4).  
The question of tribal separatism is increasingly coming to the fore. Sometimes it is 
raised with a profound sense of alarm as if there were a revolt, and the army ought to be 
marched in to crush it; at other times, it is raised with voyeuristic amusement at the 
tribals' quaint customs. Both these attitudes are humiliating to the tribals (Sinha 1987: 
2051).  
The mainstream, especially, the urban upper/ middle class/ caste Indians, 
have more or less kept up these racist and derogatory/ stereotypes of Adivasi, 
and other marginalized working/ farming classes, intact (see Mosse 2005, 
chapter 3). This might also partially explain why the economically 
marginalized sections of Adivasis keep retreating themselves into further 
inaccessible terrains and why the state in India treats its Adivasis in the way 
it does as shown in the narration of the CRPF and JP combined ‘operation 
Anaconda’ at the start of this chapter. 
The Beast among the Hos, in Hodisum, the Ho ‘country’ 
Today, as Scott (2009) has rightly argued, on the one hand, the multiple 
powers, technologies, and agents of the state are more sophisticated and 
ubiquitous, appearing in multiple forms and shapes. On the other hand, Ho 
villagers’ reactive statelessness brings them cumulative impoverishment 
while the spirit of resistance, mostly in forms of ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott 
1985: sic) still exists along with sporadic thunderous protests. The resisting 
core of Adivasi subjectivity might continue to remain supported by their own 
alternative imaginations as a people with self-respect, and cultural dignity 
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(Scott 2013), despite increasing deprivations, penury and hopelessness. The 
present situation of marginalized Hos, and their dormant sociocultural 
organizations caged in by the beastly presence and interference mainstream 
state institutions/ agents are succinctly represented by Mahasweta Devi 
(1981), an activist writer.  
Today the tribal existence in Singhbhum is symbolized in this simple song about a 
cowherd boy lost in the jungle: he can't go the eastern way, a tiger is there. A big black 
bear waits on the south. The wolves are on the prowl in the west. The big snake blocks 
the northern way. So the little boy waits and waits. To be eaten up by the tiger. To be 
crushed to death by the bear. To be torn to shreds by the wolves. To be swallowed by 
the snake. What are the tribals to do? Old mother Kolhan [weakened Adivasi 
subjectivity/ imagination] never answers. Her children did not beat the nagara [a big 
traditional musical drum with one side elliptically shaped, symbolizing their customary, 
cultural practices and cultural values] when the outsiders entered Kolhan. How can she 
tell them what to do? What is done, cannot be undone (p. 1597). 
Today, there are several forces/ actors that constitute the mainstream: a 
corrupt bureaucratic administration, the inert institutional presence of CRPF 
and JP, meant to instil fear in marginalized and mostly disillusioned Adivasis 
so as to turn them and their social organizations into practico-inert status, the 
capitalist industrialists whose eyes are fixed on the rich mineral resources 
beneath Adivasi land and forests, the civilizing missionaries of both the 
'syndicate Hinduism’ (Thapar 2010) and the Christian churches, several 
NGOs, and most importantly the ambivalent elite Adivasis themselves who 
have already been under misrecognition of political Brahmanism (the pursuit 
of Lakshmi) and have progressively been incorporated into mainstream via 
‘education’ and affirmative action policies: reservations in state-sector jobs, 
higher education and political representation, which make them overly 
patriotic. These elites compete among themselves to ostensibly represent 
Adivasis (Raichaudhuri 1992). Further, the Maoist ‘extremists,’ split into 
several fractions, have opened their ‘markets of protection (Shah 2006). 
While a few Adivasi and non-Adivasi leaders/  activists, who assert Adivasi 
rights, but refuse to succumb to the forces of political Brahmanism, are 
silenced or physically eliminated (Mullick 2004; Sunder 2009: conclusion, 
Iqbal 2012). The situation remain evermore complex. 
Mahasweta Devi, after her visit to Kolhan and Serengsi ghati, an inaccessible 
terrain where the Ho chieftains had defeated the mighty British during the 
early 19 century, wrote, 
Many more factories and a slow death of the countryside. It is easier in Singhbhum. It is 
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so easy to kill and terrorize and stop people with the law on your side. The ACC [a 
cement factory at Jhinkpani] is too powerful to abide by the laid down laws. … The 
tribal king's war cry could be heard from a place which was named Rajenka to 
commemorate the event. A flat stone under mowa tree marked the line of advance by 
the tribals. The atmosphere was charged with the past of a people who still recorded 
everything in the mind, not on paper. Nor do they believe in commemorating our way. 
… From Serengsi we had come to Jhinkpani. The gray countryside is still, a 
nightmarish memory. Who can save a countryside from slow and inevitable death? 
What is going to happen to the hapless villagers so wrongly and cruelly deprived of 
their land? Only the people of Singhbhum can work out a solution with continuous and 
consistent movement more potent than a sporadic and thunderous one. Under which 
leadership? I do not know (Devi 1983: 330, emphasis added).  
This description vividly explains the process of subjugation and super-
exploitation of the Hos of Kolhan that has continued ever since British 
colonial subjugation and has been aggravated during the post-independence 
period, especially, since the 1990s (Karen 1957; Kishwar 1987; Corbridge 
1982; 1996; Areeparampil 2002; George 2009; Das Gupta 2011; Damodaran 
2013). The colonial mode of mineral extraction, destruction of forests and 
degradation of environment have almost reached their limit while the slightly 
better-off slots among the Hos are being recruited to CRPF and JP, and 
brought back to be deployed to shoot and kill those more deprived, state-
avoiding and still resisting, but largely disillusioned ones who try to survive 
on their own as one finds them in Saranda and other such interior, hilly and 
remote inaccessible terrains. 
Conclusion 
This chapter began with the description of a recent terrorizing intervention by 
the repressive apparatus of the central and regional states among the most 
marginalized Ho villagers in Saranda forest. In order to understand the 
underlying logic of such violence, it moved on to discuss the ideologically 
conflicting orientations of the imaginary Indian mainstream vis-à-vis Adivasi 
social formations. By historicizing and deconstructing the idea of 
mainstream, it has shown that these two categories (Adivasi and mainstream) 
are mutually constitutive: the emergence of political Brahmanism, its long-
drawn and extremely complex suffusion, as the most dominant and attractive 
model of statecraft had its simultaneous spinoffs – the Adivasi ‘Other’ – 
those who chose to escape the ancient statecraft which viewed Adivasis as 
aliens, ‘uncivilized,’ and ‘barbarians’ probably for the very reason that they 
had chosen to be different by escaping the oppressive and exploitative 
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statecraft, the infernal machine of practico-inert fields.  
While, political Brahmanism, the Indian statecraft, the infernal machine, 
flourished in the alluvial plains, Adivasis in roughed and forested regions 
(‘refuge zones’) formed and nurtured their own alternative socioeconomic 
systems. In course of time, however, the leading elements of Adivasi social 
formations, even in their refuge zones, were progressively penetrated and be 
transformed into political Brahmanism that had emerged as the single most 
dominant ideology in the subcontinent. British colonial invasion into these 
refuge zones further aggravated this ongoing transformations accompanied 
by direct/ physical violence. Its superior technology, further, sought to count, 
categorize, and crystallize the differences between various categories (castes 
and ‘tribes’), which however, also provided a legal basis for the assertion of 
Adivasi identities. However, these processes of conflicting transformation 
continues to work out on the ground even today with its accompanying 
complexities, since the nature (shape) of the state in India continues to be the 
same.  Thus, there exists a clear continuity to the praxis and process of 
colonialism and racism in India from the ancient to the so-called ‘modern’ 
times, despite several well pronounced and lofty ideals in India’s 
Constitutional text. 
On experiencing the exploitative effects of the state in India, the infernal 
machine, more marginalized Adivasis, who feel transgressed by its 
discriminatory inclusion and exclusion, and are unable to cope with it, keep 
retreating further into deep inaccessible terrains. However, there is little 
space left ungoverned by the ‘modern’ state today. Hence, the reactive 
statelessness of Adivasis and alternative imaginations, will no longer be 
feasible as almost all the wealthier and more vocal elements among them 
have progressively been acculturated/ co-opted/ assimilated by an all-
pervasive mainstream ideology – the pursuit of Lakshmi – which drives the 
processes of state formation in India. 
The next chapter shows how the very processes of state formation in India 
produce poverty among Adivasis by facilitating accumulation of advantages 
for the elite and disadvantages for the marginalized.   
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State Formation and Poverty: Entrenched (Indian) Elitism 
Reproduces Poverty 
 
The causes of rural poverty [in India] have to be sought in semi-
feudal bondage, a system. The poor peasantry is exploited under this 
system. Moreover, because of this system the rural rich, in fact, have 
a stake in perpetuating the waste and inefficiency that is 
characteristic of precapitalist modes of production.  
(Pradhan H. Prasad 1976: 1269) 
In 1991, when economic reform started, India was at 123rd place in 
the human development Index (which takes cares of a wider range of 
components than mere calories intake). It slipped to the 134th place 
in 2011 (Jha 2013: 4). Despite a fast-growing economy and the 
largest anti-malnutrition programme, India has the world’s worst 
level of child malnutrition. 
 (J. Singh and N. Pandey 2013) 
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Introduction 
The last chapter has drawn a genealogy of the idea of politics and the state in 
India as to how they historically emerged as infernal machines that created 
serfdom and oppression for its toiling ‘masses,’ the by-product of Indian 
colonialism and racism as a system. It argued, Adivasis who had escaped 
these infernal machines of the plains, during ancient times, had formed 
themselves, in course of time, into alternative, autonomous, (Adivasi) 
‘jungle’ kingdoms. However, several of their chieftaincies have gradually 
been transformed into the structures of political Brahmanism towards the end 
of the pre-British colonial period. While these processes are still being 
worked out, most radical elements among the Adivasis still keep escaping the 
‘state-effect.’ The British and post-British colonial periods witnessed/ witness 
violent invasions of inaccessible terrains where more radical Adivasi social 
formations continue to resist their unequal incorporation into the so-called 
‘mainstream’ that still pauperizes Adivasis. 
This chapter shows the nature and magnitude of poverty and destitution 
among the present day Adivasis, as the outcome of a long-drawn out process 
of simultaneous pauperization and polarization of Adivasi social formations 
in a manner similar to that of the plains-based colonial system: chronic 
poverty, destitution, on the one hand, and individual accumulation, 
differentiation and stratification, on the other. On the whole there is ‘growth,’ 
but the ‘poor’ get ’poorer’ (Boyce 1983: 388). Consequently, the gap 
between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ has widened even within Adivasi social formations 
hitherto represented as less stratified and more egalitarian. This trajectory has 
primarily been driven by processes that grossly deprive Adivasis of their 
traditional livelihood resources in the name of ‘national development,’ whilst 
the fruits of the same has been distributed disproportionately. The two main 
trajectories of redistribution – affirmative action policies and poverty 
alleviation schemes – not only fail to meet their intended objectives but also 
encourage, normalize and deepen unequal accumulation, differentiation and 
stratification (Shneiderman and Shah 2013). Poverty alleviation schemes not 
only aid an ubiquitous spread and entrenchment of bureaucratic control over 
Adivasi social formations, but also depoliticize and demystify these very 
political issues (Corbridge et al 2005). 
Thus, while showing the crippling presence and magnitude of poverty and 
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destitution in study villages, this chapter also attempts to understand better 
how the process of state formation, mainly by administering ‘development,’ 
drives inequality and new divisions / disintegration among Adivasi social 
formations. In other words, this chapter attempts to understand how ‘state’ 
and ‘development,’ do not bring development/ wellbeing to rural Adivasi 
villagers, but deepen stratification and underdevelopment.  
This chapter first discusses how knowledge about poverty is conceptualised 
and analysed.  Second, it takes a brief look at the present Adivasi 
predicaments in an economically ‘booming’ India; and shows how the Indian 
state’s ‘will to improve’ Adivasis have not only failed but also produce and 
deepen endemic poverty. Third, it presents empirical data on Ho households 
to show the trend of deepening poverty in five study villages. Data on literacy 
rate, income diversification and accessibility of poverty alleviation schemes 
are presented and discussed in some length. Fourth, it elaborates on processes 
of accumulation of advantages by the not so ‘poor,’ and that of disadvantages 
by the most deprived among these households. Fifth, the chapter delineates 
the role of state formation in driving the deprived villagers into destitution 
while encouraging the affluent households to advance their fortunes in these 
villages. Sixth, it shows how poverty alleviation schemes strategically 
function as both bio-politics and depoliticizing machines. And finally, it 
recapitulates the main findings and arguments.  
Poverty-Knowledge, Concepts and Analytical Frameworks 
Recent debates on poverty have emphasised its multidimensionality and the 
difficulty involved in defining it. Although 'poverty' represents deprivations, 
there is little consensus on 'deprivations of what and how much;' and hence 
there is no one 'objective' way of defining and measuring poverty. (Stewart et 
al 2007: 217). Moreover, the multidimensionality of poverty cannot be 
understood by any single method, concept or approach. The most widely used 
approach to identify and measure poverty has been the 
monetary/income/expenditure-based approach (MA). Besides MA, are 
capability approach (CA), social exclusion (SE), and participatory approach 
(PA). Each of these has its own strengths and weaknesses; and they often 
overlap on certain aspects of poverty with regard to specific social groups 
and contexts.  
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A more fundamental question about measuring poverty has been: can 
monetary income (or utility) adequately measure people's well-being? MA 
generally misses the in/ adequacy in 'socially provided goods' (Stewart et al 
2007: 218). While numerical approaches to poverty may serve the purpose of 
identifying incidences of poverty, they do not measure its duration and 
multidimensionality; moreover they often miss most factors and forces that 
produce, and allow poverty to persist. Furthermore, policies based on income 
poverty measurements also often miss the dynamics of poverty: people with 
varying levels of capabilities and constraints fall into, stay in and escape 
poverty traps during the course of a year, and even seasonally (Krishna 
2010).  
Chronic poverty is characterised by extended duration in absolute poverty, 
when households are unable to meet the requirements of a basic minimum 
standard of living indicated by a poverty line. People, who are forced to live 
continuously below a poverty line, are chronically poor; while transitorily 
'poor' occasionally fall into or escape poverty (Hickey 2008). Hence, the 
concept of poverty must include notions of insecurity, vulnerability, 
destitution, incapacity, powerlessness, and ill-being since all these constrain a 
person's ability to act to fulfil his/ her aims or goals (Currie 2000).   
Harris-White (2005) defines destitution as the most extreme form of poverty 
which results from both institutionalised and non-institutionalized processes 
of political economy, law and state practices. The destitute not only become 
'nonpeople' in the sight of the state, the market and civil society institutions, 
but also are 'actively expelled' from such institutional realms. They are 
invisible to the political elite, devoid of citizenship rights, and are left to their 
own highly constrained agencies. Factors that lead to destitution are 'extreme 
deprivation' of essential commodities by way of failures of allocation, 
subsistence support systems, and collective rights. Extreme destitution leads 
to 'individuation' and utter powerlessness. For there exists processes and 
dynamics in the political economy and existing relationships in society that 
deprive persons of their control over assets, labour, savings, insurance and 
income. 'Most anti-poverty policies are irrelevant for destitute people and the 
financial resources directed towards reducing destitution are entirely 
inadequate' (Ibid.: 881). Thus, extreme poverty is not a sui generis factor or a 
consequence of global scarcity, but a system that makes marginalised people 
powerless (Loppe et al 1998). 
101 
 
Situations of poverty and prolonged deprivations are symptomatic of 
exploitative unequal relationships and structures (structural violence) that 
create and perpetuate poverty (Galtung 1990; Farmer 2004). These structures 
and relationships are often not obvious; hence, poverty analysis must be 
relational and that persistent poverty is the consequence of historically 
entrenched unequal economic and political relations (Mosse 2010). Citing the 
examples of Adivasis ('tribals') and Dalits ('ex-untouchables') being 
subordinated to the dominant classes/ castes, he claims that growing 
deprivations of these social groups result also from social categorisation and 
stereotyping. Similarly, de Haan (2007, 2011) argues, while recent poverty 
debates in India have highlighted both severe group inequalities, and identity 
issues, such debates have paid insufficient attention to the nature and extent 
of historically rooted deprivations of Dalits and Adivasis. He also points out 
that the below poverty line (BPL) listing, and categorisation of historically 
marginalised groups for 'targeted' programmes not only downplay various 
manifestations of discrimination, but also risk these social groups to be 
stigmatised, which further entrenches cultural and structural violence.  
Harris (2007) argues that although mainstream poverty analysts provide 
sophisticated calculations and detailed descriptions of peoples, regions and 
countries, they have generally failed to address the underlying relational, 
structural and historical factors that produce and maintain poverty. According 
to him, any useful poverty analysis, intending to reduce poverty, must raise 
questions like, why do the prevailing patterns of resource distribution work 
the way they do? Ignoring such crucial questions, while analysing poverty, 
might contribute to depoliticise what are in essence political problems.  
A set of recent publications by the Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC) 
provides some useful analytical tools by which the multidimensionality, 
durability and structural/ relational aspects of chronic poverty and their 
causes at local and global levels can effectively be analysed. These tools are 
based on notions of adverse incorporation and social exclusion (AISE). AISE 
perspective helps to see processes that produce and maintain poverty. It seeks 
to explore unequal power relations not only within a particular society, but 
also its relations and patterns of interaction with encapsulating societies. Such 
an approach might also be able to challenge the most common victim-
blaming theories of the metropolitan-based Indian middle class: 'Adivasis are 
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lazy, often drunk and do not work hard; that is why they continue to live in 
such poverty' (Rao 2008: 29) 
AISE's main assumption is 'that chronic poverty does not exist outside of 
underlying processes of development, but is constituted by them with wealth 
and poverty as opposite sides of the same coin,' that 'deeper roots of 
impoverishment need to be seen in historical terms' – how a region and its 
inhabitants have been 'incorporated into dominant political rule and economic 
systems that have prevailed at various periods' of history: precolonial, 
colonial and postcolonial (Hickey and du Toit 2007: 1). As is shown in the 
previous chapter, this relates to the production and maintenance of Adivasi 
marginality as a by-product of Indian national mainstream and its ideology, 
'the pursuit of Lakshmi,' and its linkages to the recent predatory growth 
policies and processes also fuelled by neoliberal global capitalism. Hence, for 
a better understanding of how and why the majority of Indian population 
continue to remain ‘poor,’ despite the country’s spectacular economic growth 
in recent years, one must analyse and see how and why a few elites in India 
have managed to join the club of dollar billionaires, making their number the 
fifth-biggest in the world49.  
A relentless, competitive and unconstrained pursuit of Lakshmi by a few, 
who have been traditional power-holders, necessitates a colonial relationship 
with the historically marginalized vast majority in manners similar to 
‘primitive accumulation and dispossession’ (Harvey 2004). Such pursuits 
adversely impact upon the livelihood resources of Dalitbahujans and 
Adivasis, especially, in the countryside while the metropolitan elites press for 
more predatory growth (Walker 2008). The persistent marginality of Adivasi 
regions and social formations might therefore be seen as a by-product of 
entrenched Indian elitism, built on a colonial exploitative relationship with its 
marginalised peoples and regions (Saha 1986: 301, Mosse 2010; Corbridge 
and Shah 2013; Damodaran 2013).  
The following section presents (household-level) quantitative data, on 
literacy rates, monthly income, households’ in/ability to access poverty 
                                                      
49 The Economic Times 20 March 2013. With as many as 120 new entrants this year, India can 
now boast a total of 7,850 Ultra High Net Worth (UHNW) individuals, according to the latest 
World Wealth Report 2013. The collective net worth of this Richie Rich club amounts to a 
phenomenal $935 billion - nearly half of India's Gross Domestic Product (Mail Today 2013).  
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alleviation schemes, and to engage in various income diversification 
activities, in study villages. The figures and tables aid a better understanding 
of the present trend and magnitude of deprivations. 
Adivasi Predicaments in a ‘booming’ India, a Bird's Eye View  
Economic development and underdevelopment are the opposite faces of the same coin 
(Philips 1977: 7).  
Talk of India being, or shortly becoming, a major economic power, just as much as the 
focus on flashy dollar billionaires who are rising in India at the rate of 17 per year, 
blithely disregards the fact that more than 800 million Indians continue to survive on 
less than $2 a day, or that just eight Indian states have more poor people than 26 of 
Africa’s poorest countries put together. … Close to 450 million Indians are forced to 
subsist on less than $1.25 a day. … The National Commission for Employment in the 
Unorganized Sector shows that almost three-quarters of the population has a daily 
purchasing power of less than ` 20 (or 40 cents) a day. (Corbridge and Shah 2013: 335). 
The paradox of spectacular economic growth in terms of real gross domestic 
product GDP and the deepening inequality and deprivations of large numbers 
of people in India has recently stimulated interesting questions and 
discussions. An increased growth rate has not reflected in a corresponding 
increase in the living standards of South Asia’s nearly half a billion deprived 
people (Ghani 2010). While various pro-growth policies have substantially 
increased the growth rate since the 1980s, paradoxically, the number of 
people living on less than 1.25 USD a day has also risen.50 This means a 
disproportionate flow of growth-induced benefits exclusively to a very small 
portion of the population, although such pro-growth policies are qualified as 
'inclusive' (Corbridge 2010; Sunder 2010).  
Several recent studies have highlighted the appropriation of economically 
vulnerable peoples’ livelihoods by a corporate controlled capitalist state in 
India. They have also shown these processes to be similar to that of primitive 
accumulation and dispossession furled by recent pro-growth policies in India 
(Walker 2008; Sunder 2010; Ganguly and Oetken 2013; Fernandes 2013). 
Moreover, while dispossessed people are left with hardly any reliable 
alternative livelihood options, their protest against such predatory policies 
along with demands for their fundamental/ Constitutional rights are perceived 
                                                      
50 The number has increased from 420 million in 1981 to 455 in 2005 in India (Ghani 2010). 
India's Global Hunger Index (GHI) improved slightly during 1996-2001, however, despite the 
gross national income (GNI) per capita being doubled during 2001-2012, GHI has stagnated 
and remains at the same level as it was in 1996 (IFPRI 2012). 
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to be ‘dangerous’ by the ruling elite. Consequently, the ruling elites devise 
poverty alleviation/ ‘development’ schemes not only to contain the 
'dangerous' effects of predatory growth but also to win votes from these 
‘dangerous classes’ (Chatterjee 2008).  
Thus, there exists not only a clear historical trajectory of elites who constitute 
the iron triangle (see the figure-1, chapter-1) traditionally in a hereditary 
manner, but also their manipulation of almost all major so-called 'reform' 
policies to their exclusive benefits (Subramanian 2014). They have 
effectively thwarted the implementation of land reform initiatives, 
disproportionately benefited from the 'green revolution,’ thence diversified 
their investments into manufacturing industries favoured by the abolition of 
'licence raj,' and have now become transnational capitalists who manipulate 
the entire regulatory system of the state (Breman 2004; Jodha 2008; Gupta 
and Sivaramakrishnan 2011), which now wants to increase the predatory 
economic growth at the cost of the country’s most vulnerable (Adivasi) 
people and their traditional livelihood resources (Walker 2008; Gupta 2012; 
Damodaran 2013; Fernandes 2013).  
Of the many tribal problems the greatest is poverty. There were once tribals and 
zamindars controlling vast estates; there are still powerful chieftains on the north-
eastern hills; but the majority of these people are among the poorest peasants in the 
world. Some have no land at all and are little better than serfs, some have no rights over 
the fields they cultivate; many have been robbed of their land; the rest struggle with 
primitive tools to scratch a living from an unfriendly soil (Singh 1990: 11). 
In a colonial infernal machine, political and economic predominance go hand in hand. 
First of all, it overcomes resistance, smashes the framework, subdues and terrorises. 
Only then the economic system will be put in place. … The structure of old tribal 
society was broken without putting anything in its place. … Assimilation taken to the 
extreme meant, quite simple, the end of colonialism; but how could one expect to get 
that from colonialism itself? (Sartre [1964] 2005: 11-12) 
What one sees here clearly is the ‘will to improve.’ Li (2008) has shown that 
the ‘will to improve’ has long and troubled history. She has explored the 
tools specialists have employed to bring ‘reforms,’ including, the shaping of 
ordinary people’s desires to match the experts colonial desires. She has 
shown how such interventions have entangles with one another to produce 
results ranging from wealth to famine, compliance to political mobilisations, 
and solidarities to oppositional identities and enduring violence.  
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Development Discourses and De-Development, Linked to the ‘Will to 
Improve’ 
The Indian state's efforts to 'develop' Adivasis have failed due not only to the 
policymakers’ ignorance of Adivasi needs, but also to their irredeemably top 
heavy nature with 80 to 90 per cent of the funds going towards maintaining 
an administrative structure which supervises the distribution of the remaining 
meagre allocations (Bhowmik 1988; Brass 1996; Padel 2012). 'The interests 
of Adivasis are largely ignored in the development paradigm. The well-being 
of these weak and voiceless communities gets trampled over the process... In 
the development paradigms of our time, there are those who do not find a 
place. Their interests are not merely ignored, but they are deeply wounded' 
(Shah 2005: 4895).  
In fact, Adivasi interests have not been ignored, but ‘development’ programs 
have been implemented strategically to advance state-bureaucratic legitimacy 
while depoliticizing the real political issues. According to Ferguson (1996), 
development interventions are organized according to the structure of 
development knowledge (discourse). While these interventions themselves 
fail, on their own terms, to deliver what they intend to, they in turn have 
regular effects of expanding and entrenching bureaucratic state power. 
‘Development apparatus’ is an ‘anti politics machine’ depoliticizing 
everything it touches, everywhere whisking political realities out of sight, all 
the while performing, almost unnoticed, its own pre-eminently political 
operation of expanding bureaucratic state power’ (Ibid.: xv).    
Adivasi ‘development’ emerges as an 'issue' primarily due to the very 
aspiration of the Ministry of Tribal Affairs to bring them into 'national 
mainstream.' This has ostensibly been done through several sets of high-
sounding ‘multi-pronged approaches’ meant for their ‘all-round 
development,’ however, with little result (Karlsson 2004). Several studies, 
however, show that the outcome of such multi-pronged approaches for 
Adivasis, as distinct social formations, to be fatal. 
In Orissa and Jharkhand, aggregate tribal population during post-independence period 
has strikingly declined reflecting their relative vulnerability, deprivation and 
movements, particularly over the recent decades. … on health and education, STs are 
the most deprived (even than the SCs aggregate) … growing relative vulnerability and 
deprivation and contemporary reversal of traditional gender equities… manifesting 
trend among tribes as they enter the mainstream (Hindu) sociocultural field, 
106 
 
acculturation process and its anti-female implications for tribal gender relations have 
been drawn the attention of researchers earlier (Maharatna 2005: 260-265). 
Moreover, the legal framework of the 'modern' state continues to reinforce a 
process of orientalism towards Adivasis rooted in colonial, evolutionary 
economic and legal discourses (Marinoa 2012; Jewitt 1995). Such 
stereotyping of people is essential for the maintenance of existing social and 
symbolic order that allows the powerful to control and influence others for 
desired outcomes (Hall 1997: 35). Ilaiah (1990, 1994) showed that the state 
system in India has been built up on the exploitation of Dalits and Adivasis in 
a colonial style as these social formations had almost permanently been 
enslaved to produce surplus for the so-called ‘upper’ castes/ classes. 
Presently, Adivasis and Dalits often face exclusion from almost every field of 
opportunity for social mobility that have been available to them via 
reservations (Thorat and Newman 2007; Harris-White and Vidyarthee 2010; 
Deshpande and Sharma 2013).  
Consequently, poverty and destitution among Dalits and Adivasis is much 
higher compared to other social groups in India (Gang et al 2008). Large 
numbers of Adivasi women and men from the central eastern states 
(Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh and Odisha) are forced to migrate 
to big cities due to lack of livelihood opportunities back home caused by 
degradation of rural agrarian and forest based livelihood resources (SRRA 
2010). Considering the country as a whole, 53.8 per cent of Scheduled Caste 
households and 61.3 per cent Adivasi households live below the poverty line 
(BPL) which has been set at a deplorably inadequate level51 (Haque 2011). 
This has been the overall outcome of nearly seven decades of development 
discourse and interventions in India, despite the huge sums of money spent 
ostensibly to alleviate ‘poverty’ (Ray 2010).  
The National Family Health Survey shows that 57 per cent of all children in 
rural Jharkhand are malnourished ad 70 per cent women are anaemic (Tigga 
2013). The Situation of rural Adivasi children is worse: about 80 per cent 
children and 85 per cent women are anaemic. Dr. Vinayak Sen, a noted 
                                                      
51 The Welfare profiles in India are measured using household consumption expenditure. The 
average poverty line for 2004-05, according to the Planning Commission (PC) of India, was 
rupees 356 per person per month in rural areas and rupees 548 in urban areas. There have 
been several controversies about the validity and adequacy of such a cut-off line for 
categorizing people into groups below and above the poverty line (see Dreze 2010). 
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paediatrician and human rights activist has shown how Adivasis in rural 
villages these days live in a state of chronic famine according to the WHO 
norms (Sen 2012). Since between 2000 and 2011 more than a hundred people 
have died due to acute hunger, of which 40 per cent belong to Adivasi social 
formations. Besides this there are issues of displacement from land, 
‘extremist’ violence and counter violence by the state forces which has seen 
marginalized people killed in violent encounters and several incidents of 
gross human rights violation by the state.52 However, these accounts of 
Adivasi deprivations do not mention that, at least in Jharkhand since 2000, 
Adivasis share 35.8 per cent of the total seats in the state legislative assembly 
(Robin 2009). These are Adivasis elites, elected from their respective, 
reserved constituencies to represent the needs and aspirations of Adivasi 
social formations, yet the majority Adivasis households in these 
constituencies continue to be increasingly impoverished. 
Household Data (indicative of socioeconomic conditions) from Five 
Villages under Study  
Literacy Rates 
Educational attainment has been considered to be one of the main indicators 
of human development. Figures-2 show the male and female literacy rates 
respectively in five rural villages under study. They are indicated by codes 
(V1, V2...); and their respective distance from Chaibasa is given along with 
village codes on the y-axis. The figure shows that both male and female 
literacy rates in these villages are very low compared to the regional and 
national literacy rates (see table-2). Further, there exists a significant 
difference/ gap in both male-female, and rural-urban literacy rates (figure-3), 
especially in V1 which is very near Chaibasa; female literacy rates in V1, V4 
and V5 are negligible.  
                                                      
52 Alam (2012) ‘Jharkhand, twelve years later: Mahtab Alam.’ I refer to these sources since 
government report do not provides social group-wise disaggregated findings on poverty, and 
most of such reports are often inaccurate. See Appendix- 6 & 7 for disaggregated data on the 
social-group-wise socioeconomic profile of Jharkhand and the percentage numbers of below 
poverty households in different districts of Jharkhand. 
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Figure 2 – male and female literacy rates 
 Source: survey conducted by the author (July-October 2011)  
 
Table 2 – Literacy rates at (regional) state and national levels (Census 2011) 
    Rural Urban 
Jharkhand 
Male 75 90 
Female 50 76 
India 
Male 79 90 
Female 59 80 
A very important fact to note about literacy in these villages is that persons 
with a few years of schooling are counted as 'literate' in the census and survey 
reports. However, most of them so recorded might have forgotten how to 
speak, read and write in Hindi, the state and national language, which is very 
different from their mother tongue, the Ho language. For the Hos seldom use 
Hindi at their home villages. 
 
39.78 37.88
59.36
23.8
38.75
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
V1 - 3 km  V2 - 7  km  V3 - 15 km V4 - 27 km V5 - 47 km
Distance from Chaibasa town
Male literacy rate (above the age of 7 years)
11.57
33.68
36.07
8.1
17.64
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
V1 - 3 km  V2 - 7  km  V3 - 15 km V4 - 27 km V5 - 47 km
Distance from Chaibasa town
Female literacy rate (above the age of 7 years)
109 
 
Economic Grouping of Households 
 
   
Figure 3 – Economic Grouping of Households: Percentage of Households in Each Group 
Source: survey conducted by the author (July-October 2011) 
 
Percentage share of social- 
groups in income categories 
V1 V2 V3 V4 
ST OBC ST SC ST SC OBC ST OBC 
Destitute (₹ 100-400) 0 0 10 0 24 28 74 7 0 
Always poor (₹ 500-800) 9 8 75 82 40 48 22 92 100 
Occasionally poor (₹ 800-1500) 54 52 12 9 16 17 2 1 0 
Comfortable (₹ 2000-3000) 32 36 2 9 11 0 1 0 0 
Affluent (₹ 5000 & above)  5 4 2 0 10 7 2 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 3 – Percentage share of social- groups in income categories 
Source: survey conducted by the author (July-October 2011) 
Households are grouped, based on aggregate monthly income,53 tentatively 
under five different economic categories: destitute, always-poor, 
occasionally-poor, comfortable and affluent. Affluent households often 
belong to the dominant killi (patrilineage), with the best quality land which 
can yield sufficient food grain for the entire year with a normal monsoon. 
                                                      
53 Aggravate monthly income of a household includes total income earned from all economic 
activities by all members of a household, including agrarian and non-agrarian activities. 
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Similarly, comfortable households have comparatively better quality 
landholding; they can produce sufficient food grains for 5-7 months with a 
good monsoon. Occasionally-poor households own some amount of land 
which might yield food grains for subsistence approximately for 3-5 months, 
provided the yearly monsoon arrive on time in sufficient measure. During the 
last few decades, however, the monsoon failed almost every alternative year 
driving many of these households into chronic poverty with absolute absence 
of any irrigation facility for paddy-cultivation. Depending on the availability 
of rain or lack of it, they may fall into or get out of poverty. Besides a highly 
irregular monsoon, any illness, or accidents may also drive them to chronic 
poverty. Thus, a permanent lack of basic economic security plagues their 
ability to engage in activities that might bring them long-term upward 
mobility (see below).  
Always-poor households own lesser quantity, and mostly eroded lands; they 
permanently remain below the poverty line (BPL) with absolute poverty 
which further reduces their ability to make decisions that affect their lives. 
Destitute households, mostly hold only small homesteads; they continuously 
struggle to keep themselves alive left to their own constrained agency. 
However, all landless households are not always-poor or destitute (as 
landholding alone does not determine their economic status). As shown in 
table-3, several landless OBC and SC households in these villages also fall 
into higher income categories, although they do not own any cultivable land.  
Village one (V1) in figure-2 above, the one nearest to Chaibasa, has a total of 
90 households. None is ‘destitute’ here. Nine per cent households are 
‘always-poor;’ 53 per cent are occasionally-poor, 33 per cent are comfortable 
and four per cent are affluent. The village’s proximity to Chaibasa town 
enables the landless (especially, the 25 OBC) households to find regular 
employment and earn relatively better wages. However, as already shown in 
figure-2, female literacy rate here remains almost negligible, which 
contradicts the generally held notion that accessing education is the most 
important way to alleviate poverty.  
The second village (V2 - Huringhatu) in figure-2 above, although not very far 
from Chaibasa, has a large majority (75 per cent) households living in 
chronic poverty, 12 per cent are occasionally-poor, nine per cent destitute, 
just two per cent each are comfortable, and affluent. A very striking 
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economic differentiation is clear with a very small group of non-poor, and a 
very large number of chronically poor households. Village three (V3 - 
Maranghatu), in figure-2 above, is special in certain respects. Unlike V5, V4, 
and V2, that have a negligible presence of non-Adivasi households, V3 has 
more of them.54 Most SC and OBC households own only small homesteads, 
as they have been the descendants of the so-called 'service castes', whose 
ancestors were later accommodated into Adivasi villages by the 
Khuntkattidars (the original clearer/ founders of Ho villages). Another very 
interesting thing in V3 is the presence of a huge number of destitute 
households (41 per cent), despite having a comparatively higher literacy rate 
to suggest, once again, that literacy alone does not necessarily lead to poverty 
alleviation. 
The fourth village (V4) has its households only in the first three categories 
with a higher percentage constituting always poor and destitute. The fifth 
village (V5) has a total of 36 households out of which 19 per cent live in 
destitution. The rest, 81 per cent households, fall under category 'always-
poor.' Ironically, though in this village, there is relatively less economic 
differentiation but more destitution. 
Economic Position of Households (in all five villages) 
 
Figure 4 – Economic position of households in all five villages 
Out of 863 households in five study villages 189 are destitute, 455 
chronically poor, 126 occasionally poor, 59 comfortable and 34 affluent. 
                                                      
54 Adivasi (ST) 55 %, Dalit (SC) 12 %, & Other Backward Caste (OBC) 32%.  
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Figure 5 – Economic position of households in all five villages (percentage) 
About 22 per cent households are destitute, 53 per cent always poor, 15 per 
cent occasionally poor, seven per cent comfortable and 4 per cent affluent. 
 
Figure 6 – Economic position of households in five villages (percentage weighted) 
‘Always poor’ households and ‘destitute’ households jointly constitute 73 per 
cent i.e. about three-fourth of the total number of households, while the 16 
per cent ‘occasionally poor’ households might fall to either side depending on 
circumstances. Only the eight per cent of households that are comfortable and 
the three per cent affluent households are economically ‘non-poor’ in these 
villages. Adivasi social formations have often been constructed as 
homogeneous and bounded social categories by researchers and policy 
makers in India (Rao 2008). However, the table and figures presented above 
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show a strikingly different picture with sharp socioeconomic differentiation 
among households. The most important findings are: (1) nearly three quarters 
of all households remain in chronic poverty and destitution; (2) very few 
households (about 11 per cent) with a comparatively higher income, display 
sharper socioeconomic differentiation; and (3) chronic poverty and 
destitution in villages correlate with their distance from urban centers, which 
points to degradation of rural agrologic systems.  
The following section discusses households' in/ability to engage in various 
safe/ precarious occupations, which in turn, reveals the nature of socio-
economic im/mobility and the extent of social exclusion.  
Villagers' Usual Occupations and Ability/ Inability to Diversify Sources 
of Income 
1. Self-employed agriculture (subsistence farming on one’s own land) 
besides collection and sale of minor forest produce constitute the main 
livelihoods activity in Adivasi villages. Agriculture in Adivasi dominant 
regions has always been subsistence-based and rain-fed devoid of 
irrigation facilities (Shah et al 1998).  
2. Agricultural labourers are people who work in other's fields either for 
wages or on the basis of reciprocation (mutual cooperation). Wages for a 
whole day’s work in these villages, during 2011, were ₹ 40 for women 
and ₹ 50 for men. Only a few affluent households within these villages 
can afford to employ paid labourers even at this wage. Hence, there exists 
a communal system of labour exchange among Adivasis known as 
madaiti, (known among the Hos as denga-depenga) where households 
exchange their labour for free (see Shah 2010; 2013). Moreover, 
agricultural works are seasonal – only during monsoon – ploughing, 
transplanting paddy, weeding, harvesting and storing (during July-
January). Most Adivasi households own some cultivable land, and engage 
in agricultural activities during monsoon season, hence, there is acute 
shortage of agricultural labour when farming activities are at their peak. 
After these seasonal agricultural works, (during the rest of the year), there 
is hardly any demand for paid labour in these villages. Hence mounting 
unemployment and denuded forests force more and more people out of 
their villages in search of casual labour in urban areas.  
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3. Casual labour: any manual work outside the village, mostly in urban or 
suburban centers with a slightly higher wage, but it involves long hours of 
travel, often on foot, to reach the work-site; it involves other related 
expenses as well. Very few persons from these villages opt for casual 
labour except those from V1 which is nearer to Chaibasa town, due to 
lack of any public transportation.  
4. Migration: men and women or couples leaving their villages to urban 
centers for a longer period – six months to one year or more in search of 
work. V2 & V3 had several (more than 50) persons each who migrate for 
work outside the region in 2011. Corbridge et al (2003) consider 
migration as an 'exit' from poverty and other traditional restrictions. 
However, to be able to migrate, one needs some basic minimum 
capabilities to find information, contacts and expenses for travel and 
familiarity with the world outside, hence, many cannot do it. Moreover, 
as men mostly migrate, women who stay back home get overburdened 
with additional responsibilities, works, and other related troubles. 
5. Petty-business: running small shops in one’s own village, including, 
taking up the dealership of public distribution system (PDS), petty 
contractorship, and trading in minor forest produce. All of these need 
some initial capital (financial and symbolic), such as basic functional 
literacy, hence, not everyone can do this. 
6. Government-jobs: persons employed at any government office such as 
army, bank, railway, schools, police, and as ex-army men with a monthly 
pension. This is one of the most economically secure occupations for 
Adivasis, however, accessible only to a few (see figure-7 below). 
7. Private-jobs: persons with contract-based jobs at private institutions, such 
as NGOs engaged in ‘development’ activities, or in private shops in 
towns. This too requires additional skills such as functional literacy and 
knowledge of the Hindi language which most Ho villagers do not have. 
8. Sale of wood: this is one of the most precarious occupations, but many 
are forced to do it. It involves cutting wood from far away forests (40-45 
kilometres), making it into pieces, drying, making bundles and 
transporting them on bicycle to be sold at a nearby town. This involves 
hard labour, risks of being fined by the police or forest guards, and social 
stigma of being economically very poor, besides being blamed for 
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contributing to increasing deforestation, all of which adversely affect 
one’s local status and self-esteem. 
 
Picture 2 – Young men engaged in selling fire-wood for making a living in rural Ho villages 
Figure 7 – Income diversification patterns: gainers and losers 
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A careful reading of figure-7 gives an idea as to what percentage of each 
income-group engages in what type of usual occupation. It reveals that the 
affluent and comfortable households engage in the most rewarding and less 
precarious occupations, while the destitute, always and occasionally poor 
ones engage in the most precarious and less rewarding occupations. This 
pattern of income diversification agrees with Ellis (2000) that households 
with better economic security are able to further diversify their income in 
more beneficial ways, while those with little or no economic security are not; 
they are often forced to engage in activities that might further worsen their 
ability for upward social mobility. For example, the affluent own the best 
quality agricultural land, engage in self-employed agriculture by employing 
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cheap village-labour, at the same time, most of them access government or 
permanent jobs in larger percentages. In short, households accumulate 
socioeconomic advantages and disadvantages depending on which economic 
group they belong to: ironically, while the affluent and comfortable ones 
accumulate advantages the ‘poorer’ households accumulate disadvantages. 
Accessibility of Poverty Alleviation/ ‘Development’ Schemes 
Among numerous poverty alleviation schemes (PASs),55 this study has taken 
into account the following schemes only (see figure-8 below). Figure-8 
shows the in/ ability of households/ individuals from each economic category 
to access poverty alleviation schemes. 
 
Figure 8 – Percentage share of income groups accessing PA schemes 
1. Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(MGNREGA) 2005 claims to ensure one hundred days’ employment a 
year to any person from any household who makes a demand for jobs. 
Table-8 shows all households with any adult who has worked in any 
                                                      
55 See Corbridge (2005) for a list of almost all poverty alleviation schemes. Also see the 
website of District rural development agency Chaibasa: 
http://chaibasa.nic.in/Dev_Section.html (accessed 10/05/2013). 
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MNREG-(Scheme) even for a day during the financial year 2010-11. It 
clearly shows that the chronically poor and destitute households have 
hardly benefited from this scheme. 
2. Below Poverty Line (BPL) card officially labels a household as ‘poor’ 
and thus makes it eligible to receive special benefits from the state, such 
as, subsidized food grains. Figure-8 shows a considerable share of 
comfortable and occasionally poor households as BPL card holders while 
it is meant only for the ‘poorest’. 
3. Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY), a food security scheme meant to ‘uplift’ 
the ‘poorest’ of the ‘poor’ households that would be provided with a 
yellow-card which makes them eligible for subsidized food grains under 
special food security schemes. In this case, as well, the occasionally poor 
households excel in accessing it, however, the comfortable and the 
affluent avail this facility more than the always poor. 
4. Indira Awas Yojana (IAY) or Indira Housing Scheme – figure-8 shows 
each economic group’s percentage share in accessing these schemes 
during the last five years. During the financial year 2010-11, amount 
distributed under IAY to a BPL household was ₹ 45,000. Figure-8 shows 
always poor and occasionally poor households as leading in accessing it, 
although others too have a considerable share in accessing it. 
5. Other Security Schemes refer to any other financial assistance received 
by any member of a household during the last one year towards repairing 
a damaged house, a monthly stipend for senior citizens (of age 60 and 
above), widows, and handicapped or victims of accidents. The affluent 
and comfortable households seem to take the lead in accessing these 
provisions more than the others.  
The percentage share of households and individuals from chronically poor 
and destitute households have limited access to poverty alleviation schemes 
compared to other groups although these are meant exclusively for them. On 
the contrary, a number of comfortable, affluent and occasionally poor 
households access PASs meant for BPL households. This shows serious 
problems of ‘targeting’ (Veron et al 2006) and the state functionaries' 
inability to identify and reach out to destitute and chronically poor 
households in these villages. Moreover, to access ‘development’ schemes, 
one needs to have the social clout which often comes with a higher 
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socioeconomic position, which creates a ‘creamy layer’56 that siphons off 
most of the development funds and schemes. This also partially explains how 
and why the chronically poor and destitute households get further socially 
excluded and marginalized, while a ‘creamy layer’ is being simultaneously 
encouraged to accumulate and cooperate with the state bureaucracy.  
The Most Deprived Villagers 
The size of an average destitute and chronically-poor household is four to six 
members. How do they manage to live with the extremely limited income 
they earn? Besides fruits, roots, leaves, fire-wood, vegetables and other food 
items they collect from the jungle, which have become increasingly scarce, 
the deprived majority in Ho villages rely on diyang (rice-beer), a semi-
alcoholic drink brewed out of fermented rice using some herbs. The 
production of diyang (for sale) is done mostly by households categorised, in 
this survey, as 'occasionally poor' or 'comfortable'. Brewing rice-bear has 
become a type of income-diversification activity for these households 
especially during years of drought and scarcity. A large majority of 'always-
poor' and 'destitute' remain consumers of diyang57. It is one of the easily 
available and most affordable necessities for these households. There are a 
number of household-heads in Huringhatu (V2) and Maranghatu (V3), for 
example, who live entirely on diyang for days together. Diyang serves a twin 
purpose: (1) it enables them to meet their minimum nutritional needs; and as 
they get drunk, and (2) it offers them temporary relief from their pressing 
anxieties about future and mounting frustrations. As one of them from 
Huringhatu said, 'I take diyang daily till I get drunk so that I can get rid of my 
worries, but when I am not drunk, I feel all the more miserable.' Some of his 
main worries are: how to feed his family, educate his children and secure 
their future (personal conversation with a few ‘destitute’ householders on 10 
August 2011 at his residence). For the state-run schools serve only the mid-
day meal (yet another poverty alleviation scheme) and no education (see 
                                                      
56 ‘Certain socially advanced persons or sections’: http://www.ncbc.nic.in/Creamylayer.html 
(27 November 2013).  
57 Wood (2003: 445) explains 'Faustian bargain': poorer people's strategic preparation for 
future involves continuous postponement of personal investment and securing rights backed 
up by correlative duties. Their condition is marked by 'destructive uncertainty' with limited 
control over relationships and events around them, obliged to live more in the present to 
discount the future. 
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chapter-6). 
Baldev and his wife have five children. His household, in Huringhatu, is in 
the ‘always poor’ economic category in our survey during 2011. His 
household has been categorized in census reports as Scheduled Caste (SC). 
He used to engage in casual labour and wood selling to earn a living. He 
owns a small homestead near Chumru’s, an Adivasi (Scheduled Tribe – ST) 
household. This household (according to our survey) fell in the ‘occasionally 
poor’ category in 2011. He and his wife Shuru Mai have no children; 
constituting one of the smallest households. During my visit to Huringhatu in 
October 2013, Baldev’s family was starving, since Baldev was unable to 
work for almost a week due to a boil on his right thigh. He has neither a BPL 
nor an Aannapurna (yellow) card. He said that he had approached both the 
munda and the newly elected panchayat mukhiya (the head of a panchayat) 
to get a ration card several times, but he did not get one. Whenever Baldev 
enquires about it, they say, ‘It hasn’t come yet.’ This is a typical response one 
gets from most bara-babus (head-clerks) at government offices in Jharkhand. 
Baldev returns silently, but frustrated since he sees the better-of co-villagers, 
with more political clout, enjoying these facilities.58 
While talking to Baldev about his ill health and consequent hardships of his 
family (in his courtyard in the evening at about 6.00 o’clock on 21 October 
2013), Shuru Mai, Chumru’s wife came closer and began talking, ‘These 
children have been starving for almost a week now, we give them some 
food,’ showing some measurement with her hands she said, ‘When we cook.’ 
Baldev’s leg with the boil was getting cured and he said in another two-three 
days’ time he would be able to do some work. On enquiring about the yearly 
monsoon, and yield in Shur’s and Chumru’s paddy fields, she said, ‘This year 
the monsoon was okay, but we could not cultivate our fields since my 
husband had fallen and broken his left hand some months ago; he can’t work. 
The damaged bone of his hand hasn’t properly been set. The doctor said that 
he might need an operation on his hand to set the bone aright, but we don’t 
have money even to go for a photo [x-ray] of the broken bone.’ On asking 
                                                      
58 The Diyang-godam (the place where rice-beer is kept and sold) is also a platform where 
the economically poor and destitute householders make fun/ jokes about the village-elites 
who always remain subservient to diku-sarkar (the alien state) although whilst discussing 
‘corruption,’ these village ‘uppers’ put all the blame on diku-sarkar (see Yorke 1976). This is 
an instance of the deployment of ‘the weapon of the week’ (Scott 1985). 
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further, why they did not ask any financial help from anyone. She says, ‘We 
do not ask anyone for money.’  
Some of the most important factors that draw one’s attention in this episode 
would perhaps be the sense of generosity, and mutual help and support in 
times of need, and dignity that Chumru’s and Baldev’s families uphold: they 
do not ask for money or food from anyone, but work hard to earn a living in 
dignity, as it is generally hard to find an Adivasi begging for money or food 
anywhere for that matter. As Yorke (1976), Verardo (2003), Mundu (2003) 
and Rachel (2009) have shown, social status for Hos does not rest entirely on 
acquiring more wealth or income, but on the legitimacy that comes from 
territorial precedence and observances of customary practices, collective 
belonging and authentic reciprocity. 
At this point, it might be interesting to relate Shah’s (2012) findings on 
farmers’ suicides among the caste-based societies in India as to how ‘suicides 
and the wider feelings of rural alienation relate to the fear of pauperization, a 
fear related to the bounded imagination of the self and others, glued by a long 
history of deeply ingrained ideologies of hierarchy…’ She argues, ‘if 
farmers’ suicides point to any crisis, it is the crisis of lack of alternative 
political and cultural imagination emerging from a rounded critique of all 
forms of injustice and violence’ (Ibid.: 1159).  
However, in contrast, and most ironically, the news about starvation deaths, 
not suicide, of many Adivasi villagers in various parts of the country do not 
create any hue and cry within the ‘Indian mainstream’ as so much they do 
with a few farmers who commit suicide for suffering while facing an 
unexpected financial loss in their pursuit of Lakshmi and the related fear of 
pauperization. ‘The deaths of 35 Birhors – a "Primitive Tribal Group" – in 
Jharkhand in October and November 2008 have been ignored by the national 
media. Official apathy contributes to the vulnerability of such marginalized 
tribal communities’ (Khera 2009: 11). 
The Most Endowed Village ‘uppers’ 
Most affluent and comfortable or ‘upper’ households possess more of the 
most fertile lands, cultivation of which supplies them with necessary food-
grain for year-round consumption. This enables them to access better 
‘education’, secure 'non-farm’ occupations aided by affirmative action 
policies – permanent jobs, in army, private and government undertakings 
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(figure-8). Several of them are ex-army men, a very few also engage in more 
entrepreneurial activities, such as PDS dealership, work as petty contractors 
and middlemen. Thus, they get ample opportunities to earn and learn new 
things, which facilitate their upward social mobility faster and further. Most 
of them have a moderate level of education and some experience of being out 
of their district or state either on short-term migration trips for exposure, as 
army men or on various training programs organized by numerous state and 
non-state ‘development’ actors. 
This ‘creamy layer’ or village 'uppers' also dominate most decision-making 
arenas in their villages, since it is they who can read, write, understand and 
speak Hindi confidently, besides their improved mobility to commute to local 
government offices with their motorbikes, in places like these where hardly 
any public transportation exists. Village ‘uppers’ also hold memberships in 
gram-sabhas (village councils), village education, forest protection and other 
such committees, and self-help groups for women and men, etc., all 
constituted ostensibly for development. They would also be elected as 
panchayat and ward heads. Undoubtedly, a thin ‘creamy layer’ emerge as 
‘men/ women of prowess, pen and good fortunes’ as it has been in India from 
time immemorial in the pattern of sanskritisation and westernisation – 
entrenched elitism – as Thapar (1999) has explicated, these processes as 
‘state effects’ during the early medieval periods: ‘the state controls 
succession to high offices and provides avenue for upward mobility to a few. 
In its ideological function, it justifies the social divisions, supports powerful 
religious systems when they are of use to the state, maintains the coherence 
of heterogeneity, for instance, by insisting on a common official language or 
by trying to inculcate a common cultural idiom’ (Ibid.: 13). 
Accumulation and Differentiation: the role of the ‘state’  
Figure-8 (above) shows the pattern of diversification: the affluent and 
comfortable households engaging in multiple and safer occupations that are 
more rewarding, while the chronically poor and destitute households being 
forced to engage in more precarious, and less rewarding occupations with 
limited diversification options and access to PASs that are ostensibly meant 
for their ‘uplift.’ This section briefly shows how the historical processes of 
state formation are still being worked out among Adivasi social formations in 
much the same fashion as they have been throughout Indian history. 
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Extension of cultivation by reclamation of land by peasantry from plains, social 
stratification, Sanskritisation and Christianisation of Chiefs/ zamindars on top, the well-
to-do headmen in the middle and the general mass at the bottom, a class of insider dikus 
[alien exploiters and trouble makers] and money lenders also grew. Tribes came closer 
to caste system. The civilising mission of Christian missionaries, British rule, 
protectionism and preservation resulted in the creation of an elite within tribal society 
(Singh 1978: 2225). 
This text eloquently sums up the role of the state in accelerating 
accumulation and incorporation of a few who have already been better 
endowed with the best quality land and their transformation via the 
instrumentality of political Brahmanism and religio-cultural idioms along the 
line of both sanskritisation and westernisation. However, these processes also 
produce equal and opposite reactions of de-sanskritisation (Pati 2001; 
Verardo 2003) often resulting from deprivations and discrimination of the 
many who were less endowed and whose alternative religio-cultural idioms 
and ideologies would not allow them to behave like the discriminating 
brahmanical elites. These long-drawn, complex, conflict-ridden, and 
contradictory sociocultural processes – ‘Sudra mode of incorporation’ (Saha 
1986: 279), ‘discriminatory integration’ (Sahu 1985: 190, 1986; Pati 2001) – 
amount to adverse incorporation and social exclusion (AISE) (Hickey and du 
Toit 2007). Any analysis of poverty in Adivasi dominant regions without 
considering these complex historical processes that are still being worked out 
here, might risk missing these (unequal) relational aspects and processes that 
produce and perpetuate poverty (see Mosse 2010).  
The hills people had political dominance of many western Indian hills and forested 
regions well into the 19th century, economic redistribution rather than systems of 
taxation characterized ‘Bhil raj’59 or autonomous ‘forest polity,’ a power centralized or 
dispersed through the jati (caste/ tribe) by the ties of alliances of chiefly kin-groups 
who struggled for prominence, drew together bands of bowmen for defense or for 
raiding the neighboring plains. Plains rulers jostled for the support of powerful Bhil 
chiefs who held rights to collect dues from villages, rights that were periodically 
renegotiated through raids (dhad) which expressed Bhil claims to sovereignty – a 
discourse of ‘wilderness,’ a mode of kingship and dominance as distinct as those of 
Kshatriya (warrior kingship) or Brahman (priesthood). … British colonialism 
transformed the dominance of ‘wilderness’ from a discourse of power into a discourse 
of marginality and the relationship between the plains and hills – structured 
interdependence (in which raiding was a political act) to one of antagonism (in which 
                                                      
59 Bhils – here a loose category of hill and forest dwellers rather than a racially, linguistically 
or ethnically distinct 
Tribe (Mosse 2005: 50). This suits a broader definition of ‘Adivasi,’ provided it is kept in mind 
why they had come/ and still come to dwell in forests and hills, in the first place. 
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raiding was a criminal practice contained by punitive expeditions) – familiar attempts 
by a government to incorporate its ‘non-state fringes,’ the social and ecological 
antithesis to the revenue paying agricultural plains (citing Skaria 1999 and Scott 1989, 
Mosse 2005: 50-51).  
These were complex and violent socioeconomic and cultural processes that 
not only altered or forced Adivasis to redefine their identity, but also reduced 
them to economic marginalization. Adjacent to these were loss of control 
over forest-based abundant livelihood resources due to commercialization of 
the same, and more entrenched alliances with the plains powers which further 
sought to ‘civilize’ them by keeping both Adivasis and forests apart. ‘Unruly 
mosaic forests were disciplined into ordered high-value timber-producing 
teak, protected from Bhils and their hunting, gathering and shifting 
cultivation. ‘Bhils lost the forest by stealth, as colonial knowledge created 
(“scientific forestry”) Bhil ignorance’ (Mosse 2005: 51). Adivasis’ restricted 
access to forests increased timber contractor’s access to it. Commercial 
felling escalated. Erosion of livelihoods due to forest demarcation led to 
Adivasi uprisings and sociocultural revival movements (see Areeparampil 
1993). Forced sedentarisation, land settlement operations shifted the 
ownership of land from the community to individuals, agricultural expansion 
and introduction of monetary economy brought in trader-moneylenders 
(sahukars) as early as 15th century (Mosse 2005). 
‘Transformation of “wilderness” from a discourse of territorial legitimacy 
and power to one of exclusion, the historical substitution of forest livelihoods 
for sahukar-funded cultivation and the move from independence to debt and 
dependence, from a complex history of forest livelihoods to rules and 
resistance and a history of unequal relationship with dominant groups in 
society’ (Mosse 2005: 52). Consequent socio-religious and cultural revival 
movements (Areeparampil 1993) of ‘integration, and contestation of 
brahmanical domination’ remained mostly unsuccessful (Pati 2013: 56; Shah 
2014).  
Further, Shah (2013) has shown how state formation among Adivasi social 
formations have been instrumental in driving class differentiation, 
accumulation and stratification.  
It was the state that brought in the outsiders in the early part of the nineteenth century, 
who then introduced a market economy and petty commodity production. It was the 
state that, in recent years, promoted education amongst the local population and created 
a few government-sector jobs reserved for Adivasis. It was the state that was creating 
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wage work in the local economy. It was the state that was promoting petty 
contractorships and the related black economy around development schemes. The state 
was playing a driving role in sowing the seeds of class differentiation in these forests 
and hills in Jharkhand (Shah 2013: 445). 
In pre-British colonial Kolhan too it was the rajas who negotiated with the 
mundas and mankis, whose authority had previously rested solely in ensuring 
the integrity, wellbeing and security of the entire village community. The 
rajas coerced them to pay tributes/ taxes which the Hos had refused (Singh 
1978) and had taken almost complete independence forcing the raja to invite 
the British to subjugate them (Streumer forthcoming 2014). Land and forests 
had previously remained the property of the entire village community; they 
never paid taxes for their lands, with the advent of the British, its ownership 
shifted from community to individual households. The authority and 
legitimacy of the sacral polity that had been based solely on the wellbeing, 
security and safety of the entire hatu (Ho village) and its guardian and 
ancestral spirits, shifted mostly to the dis/approval of subsequent overlords 
(Das Gupta 2010). The dominant households turned tax-collectors for the 
British; they began to officiate the sacral polity hereditarily. All of these 
altered a former system that had assured a minimum subsistence (‘moral 
economy of the peasant’ – Scott 1977) to all members of the village, to 
gradual disintegration and erosion.  
As already mentioned, the post-British colonial state has not only relegated 
the sacral polity of the Hos as an obstacle to the advancement of ‘national 
mainstream’ but also has actively been trying to abolish it along with 
accelerated and unrestricted exploitation of forest and mineral resources 
(Damodaran 2013) ‘making a mockery of the Fifth Schedule of Constitution 
of India’ (D.N. Champia, a Ho and a former MLA and speaker of Legislative 
Assembly of united Bihar, personal conversations, 17 August 2011 at his 
residence). Furthermore, as access to education (that actively negates Adivasi 
identity, see chapter-6) attracted the Ho elites, the postcolonial state’s 
affirmative action policies or ‘inclusive governmentality’ (Ghosh 2006) 
began to provide reserved state-sector jobs and political representation to 
Adivasi elites, which triggered a ‘rational response’ from these elites who 
drive on further individual accumulation and differentiation among them 
(Corbridge 2000).  
All of these have paved the way to ‘accumulation of economic advantages 
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and disadvantages: the tendency of a few elite households to develop further 
economically because of their already privileged positions, and the ‘poorer’ 
households to decline economically due to their already disadvantageous 
position resulting in intergenerational poverty (Boyce 1983: 387). That is, 
those with a minimum levels of economic security (an assured supply of 
food-grain for year-round consumption) only can access ‘modern’ education, 
more secure state or private-sector jobs, which facilitate further 
accumulation/ affluence and investment in urban centres (Shah 2013). Thus, 
new economic opportunities remain open mostly to the ‘uppers’ only, often 
bypassing the disadvantaged entirely. A consistent tendency of the 
differentiating Adivasi elites to ‘sanskritise,’ in this context, might well be 
seen as part of the need to legitimize their ‘fortunes’ in the sight of their 
disadvantaged co-villagers. Modern/ westernization and sanskritisation 
tendencies of the differentiating elites becomes obvious when they distance 
themselves pointing to the economically poorer and destitute householders to 
say, ‘they do not come for village/ gram-sabha (village council) meetings; 
they do not want to improve, they are only interested in drinking and 
enjoying, hence, they continue to remain as they are; we cannot do anything 
about it’ (personal conversation with village ‘uppers’ in Huringhatu and 
Marnaghatu during fieldwork in 2011).  
Poverty Alleviation Schemes (PAS): Bio-Politics and Depoliticization 
… The rise of tribal movements of an agrarian nature from the mid-1960s questioned 
the assumptions underlying tribal development, also those of community development. 
The harsh realities of the economic exploitation of tribals overtook the romanticism of 
the early years (Singh 1990: 14). 
Sartre [1964] (2005) pointed out, what he called, ‘neocolonialist 
mystification:’ the colonizer identifies and defines the problems of 
‘underdevelopment’ of colonized natives – economic, social and 
psychological – for which the former would suggest provisions of food, 
judicious reforms, increased availability of schools, hospitals and 
psychologists to deal with the latter’s ‘inferiority complex’ regarding their 
masters. The colonizer discovers and defines the ‘natives’ character: 
maltreated, malnourished, illiterate, and having an inferiority complex. It is 
by alleviating these problems, the colonizer would argue, that the natives will 
be reassured: if they eat enough to satisfy their hunger, if they can read and 
write and have works, they will no longer suffer the shame of being 
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subhuman, however, the colonizer never allows the colonized to engage in 
critical discussions of unequal power relations – politics (Ibid.: 9). This is 
what the post-British colonial Indian ‘state’ does when it insists that Adivasis 
must be brought into the ‘Indian national mainstream,’ via development 
schemes while at the same time, it makes sure that local governance 
(including the power to rightfully benefit from the exploitation of natural and 
mineral resources, and the power to decide how to spend state-development-
resources) in Adivasi dominant regions continue to remain with the dominant 
group that constitute the state’s iron triangle (chapter-2), although, of late, 
there are a few Adivasi elites also being recruited to make up this iron 
triangle. 
In a similar line of argument, Scott (1998) and Ferguson (1990) have shown 
how ‘development schemes’ become anti-political machines: they advance 
the domination of the state over its (potentially rebellious) subjects while 
simultaneously render its own political consequences unnoticed. Thus, 
Adivasi villagers seldom notice how a petty contactor becomes a  panchayat 
‘representative’ ‘to see why and how they are seized upon, understood, 
reworked and possibly contested by differently placed people within the 
population of the poor’ (Corbridge et al 2005: 4).  
Development institutions generate their own form of discourse, and this discourse 
simultaneously construct [the beneficiaries] as a particular kind of object of knowledge, 
and creates a structure of knowledge around that object. Interventions are then 
organized on the basis of this structure of knowledge, which, while ‘failing’ on their 
own terms, nonetheless have regular effects, which include the expansion and 
entrenchment of bureaucratic state power, side by side with the projection of a 
representation of economic and social life, which denies ‘politics’ and, to the extent that 
it is successful, suspends its effects. Development is an "anti-politics machine" – 
depoliticizing everything it touches, everywhere whisking political realities out of sight, 
all the while performing, almost unnoticed its own pre-eminently political operation of 
expanding bureaucratic state power (Ferguson 1990: xiv-v).  
The numerous poverty alleviation schemes for the ‘welfare’ and ‘uplift’ of 
Adivasis make the expanding bureaucratic rule ubiquitous, while at the same 
time, these schemes hardly enable the chronically poor and destitute 
households even to socially reproduce. This is bio-politics (bio-power): the 
sovereign’s ostensible ‘care’ for the life of the ‘poor.’60 ‘Bio-power 
                                                      
60 A few schemes introduced by the Jharkhand government since 2000 are telling: 
distribution of buses for unemployed youth-cooperatives, distribution of bicycles to high-
school girls, Kanyadan Yojana (donation of brides, a typical parental role in Hindu a family) 
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characterizes ‘modernity’ where the goal of power is no longer prohibitive 
legal rule, but the productive regulation of life’ (Žižek 2008: 425). Side-by-
side are problems of ‘elite capture’ (of development benefits), and the misuse 
of public funds by poorly trained and poorly paid government servants 
creating and maintaining a ‘shadow state’ (Corbridge et al 2005: 4). ‘The 
developmental projects are filtered through the class structure that keeps the 
poorest firmly outside the material benefits of such development’ (Shah 
2010: 82). 
Conclusion  
This chapter has shown that chronic poverty and destitution in Adivasi 
dominant regions are already severe. This is despite the country’s recent 
spectacular economic growth in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) 
thereby showing that the affluence of a few elite necessarily brings 
deprivations for the many in a ‘colonial civic order, the broader arena in 
which states and citizens interact’ (Thompson 2000: 1) that has been based on 
an age-old self-perpetuating colonial system in India.   
The quantitative data on literacy rate, aggregate monthly income of 
households and the pattern of income diversification, presented in this 
chapter, help understand the scale and magnitude of marginalization 
comparatively, and increasing disadvantages of those initially less endowed,61 
and above all, the state’s role in aggravating this disparity, rather than 
minimizing it. The chapter has also shown how the very process of state 
formation happens via individual accumulation and differentiation, which 
allows upward social mobility for a fairly limited slice of the population, 
which also facilitates bureaucratic control over marginalized ‘masses’ while 
simultaneously mystifying all these crucial political processes. 
                                                                                                                                         
which provides a nominal financial help to BPL households to get their daughter married, and 
provision of cheap mid-day meal for the urban destitute.  
61 These findings are also supported by other similar studies in other Adivasi dominant 
regions: a Delhi based NGO - Centre for Environment and Food Security (CEFS) in its study of 
the performance of welfare schemes in Uttar Pradesh and Odisha in 2011 found that 77 per 
cent of the most deprived households could not access a single day of MGNREGS 
employment, 34.2 per cent of most deprived Adivasi households did not have any food-
provisions. Out of 3250 sample households only four households had Annapurna cards 
(Lahangir 2012). Also see Corbridge and Srivastava (2013) for the most recent analysis on 
MNREGA provisions. 
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The chapter has also shown that the processes of state formation in Adivasi 
dominant regions have been driving Adivasis to be typical colonial subjects 
as Sartre has described: ‘colonial exploitation is methodical and rigorous: 
expelled from their lands, restricted to unproductive soil, obliged to work for 
derisory wages, the fear of unemployment discourages their revolts’ Sartre 
(2005: 37). ‘But let us be clear about it: the exhausted and underpaid 
proletariat suffered much more from exploitation than from racist 
discrimination which is the consequence of it (Ibid.: 91). 
The next chapter discusses the production of middlemen or cultural mediators 
and their mediated empowerment. It explicates more of an ambivalent 
(psychological) position of emerging village ‘uppers’ as new leaders who 
represent Adivasis.  
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The State and Adivasi Middlemen: Perpetuating the 
Ambivalence of Violence 
 
Constitutional morality is not a natural sentiment. It has to be 
cultivated. We must realize that our people have yet to learn it. 
Democracy in India is only a top-dressing on an Indian soil, which is 
essentially undemocratic. 
 
(B.R. Ambedkar quoted in Guha 2007: 103) 
 
The tribal people’s struggle is a part of the democratic struggle 
against the capitalist path of development… the democratic movement 
in the country has to recognize in the tribal people’s struggle a 
powerful ally – an ally with tremendous revolutionary potentialities 
for the realization of national democracy and socialism 
(A.B. Bardhan 1973: 57) 
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Introduction 
Chapter three has shown how state-led ‘development’ outcomes facilitate 
disproportionate accumulation, differentiation and polarisation leading to the 
affluence of a few while producing chronic poverty and destitution for the 
majority. These processes might well be seen as a crucial aspect of the very 
praxis and process of colonialism and racism which necessitates the 
production of a few elites who would both benefit from the system, and 
hence, be encouraged to advance it. Moreover, these elites have been already 
endowed with the best resources both in quantity and quality. Hence, it is 
easier for this creamy-layer to be assimilated into the colonial civic order 
than for those impoverished by it (Frère 2000), however, there exists a certain 
duality and ambiguity, since the creamy-layer would like to be ascribed as 
‘Adivasis’ partly to enjoy the benefits of affirmative action policies to 
advance their own fortunes while they hardly care about the less fortunate co-
villagers due to certain systemic deadlocks. ‘Co-option has been 
institutionalized through the policy of quotas and reservations for different 
social groups [affirmative action policies], which largely benefit only the 
elites among them, but own the trust of the entire community’ (Mukherjee 
2011: 34). 
This chapter focuses on the assimilative co-option processes of the emergent 
affluent Adivasi elite leaders to better understand their mediatory roles or 
behaviours and the limits of their mediated empowerment. It explores how 
mediators are produced; who they are and what consequences the prevalent 
mediatory processes bear for Adivasi social formations. Deviating from the 
traditional understanding of mediators or middlemen, this chapter shows how 
the emerging elites who have progressively been co-opted into the colonial 
system, which embodies ‘intimate’ violence and immorality, largely remain 
ambivalent. It explicates the ambivalence of middlemen as ‘cultural 
interpreters’ and this ambivalence as an essential ingredient of colonial 
system which contributes to its smooth maintenance.  
… But the politics of privilege is useful in co-option and pacification of the most vocal 
section, and the middleclass in Jharkhand has fulfilled this expectation of the ruling 
class at least in parts. … In earlier stages the Adivasis have tried to emulate the culture 
of the dikus, be it either along the sanskritisation path or the rank path. But none of 
these efforts have been able to raise the image of the Adivasis. Nor have the welfare 
efforts of the government any more successful to raise this image in the way of 
‘modernization’ (Ghosh and Sengupta 1982: 242, 252). 
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The chapter begins with a vignette which helps to understand processes of 
training, identification, negotiation and recruitment of Adivasi mediators by 
lower level bureaucrats, how they would gradually be co-opted to be a part of 
the broader colonial civic order, abiding by the same rules of the system. 
Then it reviews the broader theme of middlemen, the historical contexts of 
mediatory behaviour, Adivasi middlemen, and their mediated empowerment 
and ambivalence. The chapter then moves to explicate how symbolic 
violence reproduces and perpetuates intergenerational ambivalence of 
violence and Adivasi leaders’ co-option into the colonial civic order. It 
provides concrete example to show how these processes of adverse or 
unequal incorporation of Adivasis into the system actually work out on the 
ground. The concluding section shows how ambivalence of violence remain 
the facilitator of the entire process of producing and incorporating Adivasi 
middlemen into the Indian colonial civic order. 
 
Saluka is a 30 year old Ho from a village in Tonto, a community 
development block that scores the lowest on common development indicators 
in West Singhbhum.62 His village is about 18 kilometres from the block 
development office at Jhinkpani and about 37 kilometres from the district 
headquarters Chaibasa. The total population of the village is 383, of whom 
six males and five females have permanent jobs; and they stay in Chaibasa 
and Jhinkpani (an industrial suburb) where they access education for their 
children and other 'modern’ facilities. There are only eight men and seven 
women who have basic literacy skills (up to secondary school level) but none 
of them goes to the Block Development Office, except Saluka, mostly 
because they find it had to speak diku kaji, (the language of the alien 
exploiter that is Hindi, the national language) properly and hence do not feel 
confident to face the staff at the block office. 
Saluka and his younger brother make a small household. Their parents died 
when they were still young. They own about 40 acres of land – not so fertile 
devoid of any irrigation facility. This small household of Saluka and his 
brother can be placed among the few ‘comfortable’ ones in his village. 
Saluka studied till Ninth Class at a mission school, and then left the school. 
                                                      
62 This entire story was narrated to me by Saluka himself at during several rounds of our 
meetings at the weekly market of Marnghatu on Thursdays.  
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Later, he went to Punjab for a few years with a group of friends from the 
neighbouring villages in search of employment. While in Punjab, he found an 
opportunity to appear for Matriculation Examination via the National Open 
School System; and he passed the examination. A few years after his return 
from Punjab, his co-villagers suggested his name to a local Non-Government 
Organisation (NGO) that was looking for a capable person from this village 
to introduce its community ‘development’ project in this village in 2008. As a 
village level-animator with the NGO, Saluka’s work was to strengthen and 
promote the functions of gram-sabha (village-council). He also had to impart 
basic literacy and numeracy skills to interested co-villagers, (mostly non-
school going children and youth). These were different components of the 
NGO's project. As a village-level-animator, Saluka received a fixed monthly 
payment, and several types of training for capacity building from the NGO. 
In the course of time, he also became the area-leader of a youth organisation 
that has also been affiliated to the same NGO. Gradually, he became more 
active, confident and assertive.  
One day, the Village Level Worker (VLW) from the Block Development 
Office visited Saluka's village. The VLW met a physically challenged woman 
at the village who complained to him that she had not received the whole 
year's stipend63 from sarkar, the state64 and she wanted him to get it for her. 
The VLW told her that he would do so provided she gave him a cockbird 
(that he found standing at the courtyard of her house) for this service. She did 
give him the cockbird. He took it home. However, the woman did not receive 
her stipend even after waiting for several weeks in addition to losing the 
cockbird. She was distressed and helpless. Finally, she reported this incident 
to Saluka requesting his intervention.  
Saluka went to the block office and reported this incident to the Block 
Development Officer (BDO) but the officer dismissed Saluka's complaint 
saying that it was not true; that his staff would never do such a thing. Saluka 
kept visiting and challenging the BDO whenever he made trips to the town. 
                                                      
63 The Government of India has introduced several pension of (stipend) schemes for the 
physically challenged persons, widows, and senior citizens (those above 60 years), who 
belong to below poverty line (BPL) households. 
64 Most rural Adivasis see ‘the state’ being embodied in its functionaries (such as VLW, BDO, 
etc.) or in the premises of government offices such as buildings of block development office, 
see Corbridge et al (2005). 
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He told the BDO that he could prove the VLW’s misdeed, and if the BDO 
did not take immediate disciplinary action against the VLW, he would 
complain to the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) at Chaibasa. After several and 
repeated complaints, one day, the BDO called Saluka, made him sit 
comfortably in his office-chamber, and asked him to tell what had actually 
happened. After listening to Saluka’s narration about the VLW’s misdeed, 
the BDO was convinced that the story was true, that Saluka was determined 
to fight his case until he got justice. The BDO then called the VLW; scolded 
him thoroughly and ordered him to pay the woman's stipend-arrears 
immediately. He also asked him to pay a sum of rupees 400 as compensation 
for the cockbird he had usuriously collected.65 Eventually, she was paid Rs. 
1200 (stipend for six months) and was compensated for her ‘stolen’ cockbird. 
Hereafter, Saluka not only became more confident in dealing with the staff at 
the Block Development Office, but also was given due recognition by the 
BDO. Later, in 2010, he was also asked to undertake to implement a few 
schemes such as construction of mud-roads, tanks and wells, in his village 
under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(MGNREGA) 2005.66 Saluka has now become a 'mediator,' 'broker,' 
'middleman,' between the state functionary and his ‘poorer’ co-villagers. He 
recently bought a motorcycle which is a new symbol of wealth and influence, 
although a necessity to make frequent trips to the block and other offices, 
since there is no public transportation.67 Saluka's new ‘occupation’ may be 
considered as one of the most elementary forms of 'mediation' or ‘power 
brokerage' in rural villages of Jharkhand necessitated by both an ill-equipped  
state machinery to provide basic services to vast sections of its marginalised 
and impoverished rural populace (Rao 2003) who are unable to access state's 
largesse doled out ostensibly for their ‘development.’  
This chapter deals with Adivasi middlemen or ‘cultural interpreters’ and 
                                                      
65 An instance of structural violence, par excellence as Gupta (2012) explains but with 
identifiable culprits, often goes unchallenged. 
66 No schemes under MNREGA had been implemented in Saluka’s and several other 
neighbouring villages till 2010, although Singhbhum district has been one of the first 200 
districts in which the Act has officially been in force since February 2, 2006. 
67 A motorcycle is 'a fitting symbol of being a successful broker since it not only reflects 
wealth but facilitates physical mobility' (Witsoe 2012: 49). The rest of the villagers have to 
either go on foot or use their bicycles to go to the town, since there is no public 
transportation. 
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explicates how these mediators continue to remain ambivalent between the 
unequal power structures of rigid hierarchy, on the one side, and nonliterate, 
and impoverished mass of jungli Adivasis, on the other, who need to be 
‘civilized.’ It explicates how Adivasi mediators have merely been used by the 
colonial civic order as a means to advance colonialism and racism by 
complex processes of adverse incorporation involving symbolic violence. 
Symbolic violence is a Bourdieun concept which is employed here to 
explicate the process of adverse incorporation and social exclusion (AISE) 
whereby emerging Adivasi leaders have systemically been brought into 
perpetual ambivalence within the unaltered, uninterrupted and pervasive 
system of racism and colonialism. The following section examines the theme 
of middlemen in existing literature. Then diverging from existing 
conceptualisations of mediation, the chapter proceeds to reconceptualise it as 
a process involving symbolic violence to analyse and explain the complex 
processes of cultural reproduction through misrecognition or introjection by 
which emerging Adivasi elites or leaders have adversely been incorporated 
into the dominant colonial civic order which embodies cultural and structural 
violence.  
The theme of 'middlemen' or 'political fixers'  
Middlemen’s role in filling a vacuum created between the ostensibly modern, 
rational, impersonal or impartial, postcolonial bureaucratic state institutions, 
peopled mostly by ‘upper’ castes or classes and the inability of impoverished 
villagers to relate to the local bureaucracy, in India, have been discussed by 
several scholars. Bailey (1960) referred to mediators as 'brokers' who 
constituted a new class of persons with skills and knowledge required to 
assist villagers to relate to the postcolonial state. Haragopal and Reddy 
(1985) used terms such as 'fixers,' 'brokers,' and pyraveekar to refer to those 
who thrived in spaces that needed manoeuvring precisely because of the 
nature of a peculiar type of state-society relationship i.e., structural violence 
(cf. Gupta 2012). For Mitra (1991) local-elite who deal with developmental 
bureaucracy are gaon ka neta (village leader), who operate in realms of local 
politics, bureaucracy and collective protests. Manor (2000) calls them 'small-
time political fixers' who thrive due to the failure/decay of political party 
organisations in reaching out to rural villagers.  
The above mentioned studies also provide some interesting descriptions of 
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middlemen which fit well with characters such as Saluka: they have a modest 
educational achievement, but need to master the art of approaching state 
functionaries to make the wheel of administration move in support of 
favours. As they gain more experience, mediation becomes their profession, 
an important source of livelihood and influence (symbolic capital). Krishna 
(2003) provides an interesting description of the various stages and roles 
involved in the making of a mediator. According to him, naye neta (new 
leaders) initially face neglect, humiliation and failure, but eventually learn to 
deal with the babus (Indian bureaucratic staff) while they also simultaneously 
remain at the service of villagers for legitimacy and acceptance. 
In addition to being functionally literate, a new leader also needs to have personal 
qualities, including perseverance and humility and a willingness to work hard on behalf 
of villagers. To scurry around from office to office, to fill out forms and lobby 
government officials, to work on officials' behalf supervising construction labor, to fill 
out forms and keep accounts, to arrange elaborate site visits when officials or 
politicians come to the village to do all of these things and also to attend to villagers' 
everyday concerns: to take a sick person to the hospital (often in the middle of the 
night) and to keep up one's contacts among doctors, to have someone's government 
pension approved and paid out in time, to know the associated rules and the people in 
charge in the Tahsil and Block offices, to secure for someone a loan sanctioned from a 
bank (to badger, pester, entreat, implore, threaten, cajole, and bribe, if necessary) ... 
(Krishna 2003: 1189). 
Eventually, such mediatory functions develop into enduring patron-client 
relationships to the disadvantage of marginalised groups (Jeffery 2002). 
Mediation also feeds into corruption involving complex 'informal political 
networks' of ‘shadow states’ which includes bureaucrats, politicians, 
‘criminals’ or the 'legitimate' claimants (Pellissery 2007: 132). Functionally, 
such informal political networks fill the institutional vacuum at local level 
and provide some kind of order to the everyday political practices of 
postcolonial world (Brass 2006). Referring to the emergence and importance 
of a new generation ‘political activists’ among Dalits (ex-untouchables), 
Jeffrey et al (2008) have shown that ‘these young men have not been able to 
effect a broad structural transformation at the local level’ (Ibid.: 1365, 
emphasis added). They have rightly raised important questions about ‘South 
Asian political change that links party political transformation to questions of 
local level social practice and subaltern consciousness’ (Ibid.). 
Chatterjee (2004) has attempted to explain such postcolonial situations by 
framing the concept of 'political society' to deal with the ‘issues’ of subaltern 
agency. However, what has been missing in his conceptualisation is, perhaps, 
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a discourse on socioeconomic justice, due to which the emergent elite in 
postcolonial societies have failed to establish hegemony among the ‘masses’ 
(see Godavarthy 2012; Chhibber 2013). On the one hand, Chatterjee 
acknowledges that people who constitute 'political society' are displaced, 
dispossessed and marginalised by rapid processes of capitalist exploitation – 
primitive accumulation in an ostensibly democratic state thereby the 
dispossessed ‘masses’ inevitably form a 'potentially rebellious class,' who 
need to be appeased (Chatterjee 2008: 53). On the other hand, he not only 
denies agency to subalterns, but also avoids a much needed discussion on the 
issue of socioeconomic injustice (Mukherjee 2011).  
The idea of justice, in a serious and substantive sense, is not only absent in our public 
discourse, even this English word has no clear equivalent in most Indo-Aryan 
languages. Though the Urdu word insaaf exists, it is hardly used, save in Hindi films ... 
Though, in India, injustice is the order of the day, it has either ushered in disorder or 
revolution. There are two major reasons for this strange phenomenon, first, the elite’s 
ability to establish its political hegemony through [a hollow shell (see Bonner at el 
1994: sic)] democracy; and second, the absence of any serious discourse on justice, 
particularly by academics, but also by activists (Ibid.: 32, emphasis and […] added).  
Gudavarthy's (2012: Introduction) provides an interesting reinterpretation of 
Indian situation, although most of it still remains largely fuzzy and 
puzzling.68 
                                                      
68 Some of the interesting puzzles are: neoliberal economic reforms in India are marked by 
'uncivil development'; it does not account for the 'social cost of production. Subaltern politics 
as a critic of Indian development model;  neo-institutional reform In India is minimalist yet 
the state is increasingly interventionist and governmentalising; the state merely manages the 
increasing structural inequities and even reproduces them; poorer people struggle for 
survival; their inability to move beyond mere survival strategies and the need of a meaningful 
idea of democratisation, dominance without hegemony – the absence of non-coercive and 
persuasive political conditions for capitalist transformations; the subtlety of (capitalist) 
power in the neocapitalist form of production without a clear target to be mobilised against 
– also beyond a level of distress, the underprivileged are in no position to sustain and 
nurture resistance; the presence of a huge 'urban underclass', a vast number in the informal 
sector with formidable problem of conceptualisation, relatively uncommon records of 
organized collective action; desperate armed insurgency due to the increasing difficulty in 
organising agitational politics; 'elite revolt' – Rajputs, and Jats, demanding OBC and Gujjars 
ST statuses; organised protest is only for the 'civil society'; the poor are forced to move to 
'contextual negotiations' via political societies; a missing engagement  of the elite academics 
with the complex mosaic of protest-politics and its changing dynamics, and a 'discursive 
empowerment' of the subalterns; India's move from a contractual to a contractor-state with 
feudal relations still in place; the presence of a huge non-productive class due to fund-
leakages and their control over the state; the poorest without network and agency often 
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Studies on Mediation in (Jharkhand) Adivasi Contexts  
Several studies in Jharkhand and Adivasi contexts deal with 'corruption' in 
political and bureaucratic practices touch upon mediation arising due to rural 
villagers being largely unsure about the ways and procedures of an alien 
(diku) state with a weak legitimacy to govern, trust-deficit, failure of 
development interventions, (mis)representation by the members of the 
legislative assembly, the parliamentary constituencies, and Panchayat Raj 
representatives, and the consequent emergence and functioning of ‘shadow 
states,’ (Corbridge and Kumar 2002; Srivastava et al 2002; Corbridge et al 
2003; Corbridge et al 2005; Ve'ron and Williams 2006). However, most of 
these studies tend to be more state-centric, and descriptive than analytic 
(Nilsen 2013). A few others mention certain activities of middlemen who aid 
the state-sponsored mining-mafia in Kolhan and Jharkhand who enforces 
mining on ‘protected’ Adivasi lands, despite stiff resistance from local 
Adivasis (see George 2009; Lahiri-Dutt 2012). 
Raichoudhuri (1991) has pointed out a class of emerging local Ho elites who 
ostensibly represented marginalized Adivasis of Kolhan while themselves 
being indifferent to the pressing concerns/ grievances of rural Adivasis. Devi 
(1981b) discussed the failure of ‘modern’ developmental state in fulfilling its 
basic responsibilities to Adivasi citizens, and thus, forcing Adivasi women, 
due to bondage of poverty and hunger, into brokerage in rural villages of 
Kolhan, which trafficked young women and men to brick-kilns in Bihar and 
West Bengal during 1970s and 80s.  
Laru Jonko, a remarkable Ho woman, president of the Mahila Samiti of Chiriburu came 
to Chaibasa after unearthing the whereabouts of many adivasi girls who were missing 
from the interior villages of Singhbhum. These girls were working in brick-kilns around 
Calcutta.  
The story was revealing. The brick-kiln owners of West Bengal are mostly from North 
Bihar. This practice of recruitment of adivasi labour must be quite old. Adivasi women, 
                                                                                                                                         
victimised by the activities of political society; the limited capacity of Adivasis and Dalits for 
political efficacy; poorer people gifted with citing of corrupt state officials and not the new 
state that has been mutated by New Delhi; while the activities of the political society being 
depicted as illegal, the so called 'civil society' and the state actually transgress legality in 
order to maintain their dominance without hegemony; the rule of law justifies their looting to 
the paradoxical point of being themselves illegal; the structural fallout of the larger pilferage 
that seems to be endemic and integral to the growth of new classes; and , the role of the 
middlemen and community in framing the issue of subaltern agency (Gudavarthy 2012: 
extracts from Introduction, emphasis mine). 
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once concubines of the kiln owners, are sent to remote villages. The link railway 
stations are Chaibasa, Sonua, Pendrasali and Chakradharpur. These recruiting women 
are called 'sardars'. The sardars go to the village hats [weekly market] and lure young 
girls with tales of good jobs awaiting them near the magic city of Calcutta (Devi 1981b: 
1010). 
Shah (2009) has highlighted the importance of noticing the multifarious 
notions of state and moral political economy in varying contexts while 
looking at corruption and social action in rural Jharkhand. She has shown that 
‘a majority of the rural poor, primarily Adivasis want nothing to do with the 
state, do not accept the idea of the state as acting for the public good, and do 
not get involved in knowing about the practices of the state, and resurrect an 
alternative sovereignty, a parha social-polity’ (Ibid.: 310). She argues that 
ideas of morality here are historically constituted, managed and reproduced 
(Ibid., Shah 2007). In the context of Jharkhand, two possible trajectories of 
Adivasi-state relations exists: ‘a continued rejection’ of the corrupt and 
oppressive state while holding on to the idea of the ‘sacral polity of the 
parha,’ which brings further material deprivations, and a transformation of 
Adivasi moral and political economy that is happening with the emergence of 
a ‘new class of Adivasi youth aspiring to join the non-Adivasi rural elites’ 
(Shah 2009: 310-11) who perpetuate the class/ caste structure ‘that keep the 
poorest firmly outside the material benefits of such development’ (Shah 
2010: 72). 
While these studies reveal a lot about the prevalence of mediation and 
processes that necessitate and produce mediators; this chapter attempts to 
explain how these processes of mediation and Adivasi mediators’ role as 
subservient ‘cultural interpreters’ have historically been employed by the 
dominant ruling class/castes to reproduce emergent leaders’ ambivalence that 
perpetuates cultural and structural violence embodied in the colonial civic 
order. According to Sartre [1964] (2005) a colonial system indoctrinates, 
Individualistic and liberal codes in order to ruin the frameworks and the development of 
the colonized community, but maintains kinglets who drive their power solely from the 
system and who govern on its behalf. In a word, it fabricates ‘natives’ by a double 
movement which separates them from their archaic community by giving them or 
maintaining in them, the solitude of liberal individualism, a mentality whose archaism 
can only be perpetuated in relation to the archaism of the society. It creates masses but 
prevents them from becoming a conscious proletariat by mystifying them with the 
caricature of their own ideology (Ibid.: 16, emphasis original). 
Historical Contexts of Mediation, Adverse Incorporation, and Social 
Change 
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One of the important characteristics of state-society relationships in colonial 
and postcolonial societies have been the problem of mutual understanding 
between the political elite and the vast numbers of people who belong to 
‘peasant societies’ necessitating ‘clienteles politics’ (Powell 1970, sic). 
Geertz (1960) has argued that such an incongruity has basically been rooted 
in the heterogeneity of ethnicity, multicultural contexts and contradictory 
visions arising out of them: the metropolitan-based elite ‘intelligentsia’ and 
the white collar nationalists aim to build a modern nation-state along the 
western parliamentary lines, amidst numerous religious, ethnic, cultural, 
regional and linguistic groups that cling to their own intimately familiar local 
community organizations, practices, beliefs and values. In such a 
heterogeneous, and complex situation the socio-cultural integration of local 
communities with brittle ties with the ‘modern’ state, are forced into an 
imagined modern nation-state. The result would obviously be maladjustment, 
separatism, contestations and resistance to centrally formulated policies and 
programs, especially when they are at the behest of the dominant class/ 
castes. … Moreover, ‘the emancipatory aspects of nationalism were 
undermined by countless elevation of secret deals, manipulation, and the 
cynical pursuit of private interests’ (Chatterjee 1993: 3). 
Multicultural contexts such as these have also been studied employing 
concepts such as 'multiple modernities' (Eisenstadt 2000), 'twilight 
institutions,' (Lund 2006), ‘semi-autonomous social fields’ (Moore 1973), 
and 'hybridity' or 'fragility' contexts (Boege et al 2011). In Indian context, 
several village-studies during the 1950s and 1960s have discussed 
sociocultural transformations from the perspective of ‘national integration.’ 
Bailey's concepts of 'caste climb,' 'multiplex mediators' versus 'specialist 
political players,' and 'para political institutions' constitute a system whereby 
the powerful acquire material wealth and gradually convert it into political 
credit to become the main players of the game while the commoners remain 
mere spectators of the same game (Bailey, 1963, 1968).69 Srinivas' 
westernisation, and sankritisation theses: emulation of ‘higher’ caste or class 
                                                      
69 Bailey's famous explanation of ‘para political institutions' goes: they are partly regulated 
by, and partly independent of, larger encapsulating political structures; and which, so to 
speak, fight battles with these larger structures in a way which seldom end in victory, rarely 
in dramatic defeat, but usually in a long drawn stalemate and defeat by attrition' (Bailey 
1968: 281). 
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values by the ‘lower,’ along the line of movement of ‘lesser’ souls imitating 
the ‘greater’ ones in a continuum (Srinivas1956, 1962) are a few examples of 
the kind of village studies that were pursued in the 1950s and 1960s.  
Other similar concepts are 'rajputisation' (‘lower’ castes and ‘tribes’ 
emulating the values and lifestyles of Rajput (warrior) jati/ caste (Sinha 
1962), and 'kshatriyaisation' (Kulke 1976, 1978); all of these have 
contributed to naturalise a peculiar type of feudatory state formation in India 
(see Sharma 1965, 1989, 2001, 2006) by imitating the values of ‘higher’ 
castes or classes in the pursuit of Lakshmi (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987a) as a 
convenient model of social change and national integration. The Rudolphs 
also tried to explain these puzzling and complex processes of state formation 
using concepts like 'modernity of tradition' (1965), 'shared and negotiated 
sovereignty' (2010), and a continuum formed by the imitation of the ‘higher 
gods’ by the ‘lower’ in South Asian 'societies where the gods have not yet 
died' (1878b: 742).  
These studies, thus, have taken several centuries-long, caste-dominated 
assimilation and acculturation uncritically so that the material and cultural 
dispossession, displacement and misrecognition involved in these processes 
have largely remained mired. Moreover, in India, due to what is called, a 
prevalent ‘buffalo nationalism’ (Ilaiah 2004) or ‘methodological nationalism’ 
(Giri 2012), any discussion on 'castes' and 'tribe' have continued to remain 
doubly emotive: 'the tribal problem' have moved Indian scholars to 
'unscholarly anger,' and have 'produced pamphleteers rather than 
dispassionate observers' (Bailey 1960: 263, Rachel 2009), while Indian 
scholars, who have dared any critical analysis of caste domination, had to 
take the risk of being ostracised as anti-nationals (Sharma 1959, 2001). 
However, scholars like Bonner (1994), Chhibber (1995), Robb (1996, 2006) 
and Harris-White (1997), among others, have undertaken a more nuanced 
analysis of the processes of socio-political transformations in so-called 
‘postcolonial’ ‘democracies’ calling attention to the symbolic practices 
involved in informal political networks at the local, district and sub-district 
levels in India. Jeffery (2002) has pointed out the contradictions of political 
democratisation by scrutinising local political mediators/ middlemen. 
Similarly, Witsoe (2011a) has demonstrated the existence of divergent ways 
of imagining the postcolonial state that represent alternative forms of political 
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subjectivities. He argues that democracy in India has to be examined within 
the context of historical processes that have shaped the larger political 
economy within which democratic practices unfold. Witsoe (2011b) argues 
that it is inadequate to reduce postcolonial democracy as an arena of mere 
'operations of governmentality' or to 'a politics of the governed' as Chatterjee 
(2004) has done. The apparent tension between 'a disruptive politics' 
anchored on 'principles of popular sovereignty' and a 'politics of the 
governed' points towards far deeper issues in ‘postcolonial’ Indian state-
society relationships in India (Witsoe 2011b: 622, 2013).  
While Indian democracy in many ways is one of the marvels of our time; it is also clear 
that the democratic institutions in India are not functioning optimally, and their record 
in promoting social justice has only been partially successful. There is a gap between 
the rulers and the ruled, with little sign of that divide being bridged. The two – the 
rulers and the ruled – may live in the same country but often they traverse different 
universe (Razvi 2007: 673-4).70 
Berenschot (2011) has skilfully employed ethnographic methods to examine 
the local level mediators to explicate the link between socioeconomic 
transformations, political responses to such transformations, and how both 
have jointly led to the terrifying communal violence in Gujarat in 2002. 
Similarly Witsoe's (2012) historical and ethnographic exploration of brokers 
in Bihar partly explains the nature of Indian state and the complex causes and 
notions of corruption in public life. He exposes the peculiar trajectory of 
power transition from the so-called 'upper' to the 'middle' castes in Bihar in a 
similar line of sanskritisation. He calls such arenas of political empowerment 
as 'mediated empowerment' (Wistoe 2012: 53, 2013).  
Adivasi Middlemen, Mediated Empowerment, and Symbolic Violence  
Regarding the relationship between Adivasi social formations and 
postcolonial Indian state, Ambedkar (1944), Jones (1978) and Saha (1986) 
had warned that while the dominant political and economic structures of the 
encapsulating society i.e. the colonial civic order remained unaltered, it was 
almost impossible to empower the already impoverished and marginalised 
Adivasi, Dalit and other minorities despite volumes of laws and 
administrative provisions drawn up ostensibly to protect and develop them. 
Both Ambedkar (see Roy 2014) and Saha (1986) ventured into 
deconstructing the nature of the dominant Indian society, the imaginary 
                                                      
70 See appendix-4 for a short text on the contradictions in Indian society by B.R. Ambedkar. 
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mainstream which has been animated by what they termed ‘the Indian-
elitism’ or brahmanical ideology71 enthused by the pursuit of Lakshmi 
(Rudolph and Rudolph 1987a). Although Adivasis who kept fleeing such a 
crippling ideology of state-craft into deep forested and hilly regions of the 
subcontinent had devised their own distinctive, more flexible and radically 
democratic sacral polities, there have always been lines of contacts: trade 
relations, contestations, subjugation, syncretic/ symbiotic coercion, and co-
option/ appropriation (Sharma 1959; Saha 1986; Skaria 1999, Mosse 2005; 
Sunder 2007; Milanetti 2012, Kela 2012) much before the Mughal and 
British colonisers arrived (Sekher 2003). It is only by taking into account 
such conflicting, long-drawn and complex historical processes, – adverse 
incorporation and social exclusion (AISE) – and their cultural, symbolic, and 
socio-psychological consequences, which is still being worked out, that the 
puzzles and paradoxes of socioeconomic, cultural and democratic 
transformations in India can meaningfully be explored and understood. 
Symbolic Violence and Perpetuation of Structural, Cultural and Direct 
Violence 
Men make their own history, but not under conditions of their own choosing (Marx 
1852); ‘Praxis can logically be an experience both of necessity, and of freedom’ (Sartre 
2004: 79). Communication in competing styles takes on a social value and a symbolic 
efficacy (Bourdieu 1991). ‘Human agency works on exteriority by making itself 
exterior, and works on passivity by making itself passive. … The group-in-fusion 
incarnates active human praxis in a uniquely heightened fashion – a kind of praxis all 
the more distinctive in that it constitutes the production, not of things, but of other 
people and the self, of a new kind of sociality’ (Jameson 2004: xxii). 
Bourdieu (1986; 2000; 2005) provide a number of conceptual tools that aid a 
finer analysis of the link between various forms of power, domination and 
social positioning within different social fields: demarcated social spaces 
containing interconnected sets of rules, values and protocols that shape 
individuals’ access to resources, and how these are negotiated by social 
actors and mediated through acts of symbolic control (Tomlinson et al 2013). 
Bourdieu's approach tries to comprehend how social systems are reproduced 
through forms of domination, and the mobilisation of unequally-held 
                                                      
71 For more on Brahmanical ideology, see Sahu (2001) '... The depth and reach of an over-
arching, unifying Brahmanical ideology can be seen in the caste-land-power pyramid through 
much of the country, which systematically deprived the untouchables from proprietary rights 
in land and, curiously, despite situations of land abundance, reduced them to a permanent 
stock of agrestic labour' (Ibid.: 3, emphasis added). 
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relational resources, or what Bourdieu termed capitals: accumulated 
economic, cultural, social assets or access to resources that shape individuals’ 
capacity to move within the field in which they are positioned (Bourdieu 
1986).  
Social capital, i.e., the actual or potential social resources accumulated 
through wider sets of social relations, obligations, recognition and network 
linkages (Bourdieu 2000), would be converted into 'political credit' (cf. 
Bailey 1968: 284). Such linkages enable easy access to knowledge, 
information, structures and other social resources. The concept of capital 
relates to habitus: the embodied dispositions, ways of thinking and 
perceiving that constitute the scope of an individual's actions (Bourdieu 
1986). Habitus, in turn, relates closely to doxa: spontaneous beliefs or 
prevalent opinions, notions, propositions that actually sustain structures and 
systems of power. Doxa, thus, legitimates and reproduces itself in perpetuity 
via habitus. Bourdieu provides an example of doxa: people’s generally held 
belief that success in life depends on naturally endowed intellectual 
capabilities (Bourdieu and Eagleton 1991). This holds close similarity with 
the underlying ideas of fatalism in India (Banaji 2013): some people are born 
‘great’ and others ‘small,’ which normalizes various and myriad forms of 
symbolic domination. 
Symbolic control or domination imposes meanings, legitimates them by 
discursive tools of 'victim-blaming theories of human suffering, poverty and 
untimely deaths’ (Bourgois and Scheper-Hughes in Farmer 2004: 317). 
Symbolic domination permeates everyday life through symbolic violence. 
Symbolic violence includes processes and praxis whereby power relations are 
perceived not for what they objectively are, but in ‘a form which renders 
them legitimate in the eyes of the beholder’ (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990: 4). 
Symbolic violence, thus, becomes a means of domination involving 
normative categorizing, which influence and control the cognitive structuring 
of general perceptions that get established, reproduced and perpetuated 
‘naturally’ (Tomlinson et al 2013). Symbolic violence facilitates symbolic 
domination in myriads of incomprehensible ways (Enderson 1998). Thus, a 
continuous reproduction of mainstream doxa is more powerfully established 
which conceals power differences as the basis of their force (Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1990). Thus, emerging Adivasi leaders or middlemen in 
misrecognition ultimately help advance the endeavours of dominant groups 
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via their complicity, since they, as ‘cultural interpreters,’ remain ambivalent 
and most subjected to acts of symbolic violence that conceals the inherent 
power dynamics of the dominant coalition (Tomlinson 2013). 
Paulo Freire (2000) in his Pedagogy of the Oppressed, also discusses the 
processes of oppression/ dehumanisation bearing close similarity to symbolic 
violence: 
Any situation in which “A” objectively exploits “B” or hinders his/ her pursuit of self-
determination as a responsible person is one of oppression. Such a situation in itself 
constitutes violence, even when sweetened by false generosity, because it interferes 
with the individual's ontological and historical vocation to be more fully human. … 
Violence is initiated by those who oppress, who exploit, who fail to recognize others as 
persons, not by those who are oppressed, exploited, and unrecognised. The oppressed 
consciousness and the oppressor consciousness – take into consideration their 
behaviour, view of the world, their ethics. The duality of the oppressed: they are 
contradictory, divided being shaped by and exist in a concrete situation of oppression 
and violence. … An act is oppressive when it prevents people from being more fully 
human. Accordingly, these necessary restraints do not in themselves signify that 
yesterday's oppressed have become today's oppressors. … The peasant feels inferior to 
the boss because the boss seems to be the only one who knows things and is able to run 
things. … Analysis of existential situation of oppression reveals that their inception lays 
in an act of violence – initiated by those with power. … As beneficiaries of a situation 
of oppression, the oppressors do not perceive their monopoly on having more as a 
privilege which dehumanises others and themselves … (Ibid.: 54-60, emphasis added). 
Combining Sartre (2004), Bourdieu and Freire, I term symbolic violence, 
misrecognition, and the contradictory duality of the oppressed as 
ambivalence of violence72 which fixes the emerging leadership among the 
oppressed groups in a situation of perpetual state of ambivalence resulting in 
self-doubt – a general distrust in oneself, one’s tradition, cultural values and 
principles, that might limit one’s ability to commit to greater common good 
and a politics of emancipation.  
To overcome ambivalence of violence (symbolic violence) is difficult and 
time-taking, argues Bourdieu, because 'it is something you absorb like air, 
something you do not feel pressured by; it is everywhere and nowhere, and to 
escape from that is very difficult'. Conversely, internalizing, and legitimising 
the dominant authoritative power itself is a matter, which requires capacity, 
agency and intelligence. The legitimation of a dominant power by the 
                                                      
72 I am indebted to Cyril Desbruslais of Jnanadeepa Vidyapeeth, Pune for coining the term 
‘ambivalence of violence’ and, indicating its possible prevalence in Dalit and Adivasi contexts 
in India, while discussing Jean-Paul Sartre and Polo Freire in 1997 during a short course on 
‘philosophy of liberation.’ 
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dominated is never a passive affair – a matter of taking into and displacing/ 
negating oneself (Bourdieu and Eagleton 1991: 115). Thus, ‘people who are 
manipulated (here the middlemen) know a lot: more than any intellectual or 
more than any sociologist. But in a sense they also do not know it: they lack 
the instrument to grasp it, to speak about it’ and to critique and counter it. 
This kind of manipulation of people is a form of symbolic domination/ 
violence made possible by ambivalence of violence for which nobody has 
clear and full responsibility – so it is generally said ‘they are corrupted by the 
system.’ However, it produces a lot of internalized tension, a lot of bodily 
suffering – indefinite social status – those who occupy places that are subject 
to powerful contradictions. Although, it helps people to adjust, but it causes 
‘internalized contradictions’ (Bourdieu and Eagleton 1991: 117-121; Farmer 
2004). 
Adivasi Mediators, Ambivalence of Violence and AISE Evidence from 
Kolhan and Jharkhand 
Coming back to Saluka, the new leader or middleman, it is now possible to 
understand the psychological and socio-cultural trajectories of the production 
of Adivasi middlemen in the context of the broader encapsulating colonial 
civic order. Saluka and his brother have been comparatively better placed 
than most of their co-villagers because they belong to a marang killi (the 
dominant lineage) of the village; since they make a household of only two, 
and own a bigger piece of land, which provides them with an annual supply 
of food-gains well in excess of their subsistence needs. Hence, Saluka could 
also access education from a private school, and go to Punjab with his 
friends. These are favourable circumstances that helped him to enhance his 
(personal) symbolic capitals to be able to interact with dominant social fields. 
Hence, he was chosen to work with an NGO where he could further enhance 
his status, skills and self-confidence. 
While Saluka is well aware of Adivasi doxa and subjectivities, his continued 
interactions with the agents of mainstream, and engagement with the block 
development officer get him to misinterpret the corrupt or violent 
bureaucratic codes as ‘right’ procedure, the BDO as the boss who knows 
‘everything’ about the sarkar (state), for it is he who makes the immediate 
manifestation of sarkar, the Block Development Office functions as it does. 
Further, the impoverishment of Adivasi villagers, their constructed 
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‘ignorance,’ cumulative deprivations and powerlessness, ‘excessive drinking 
habits’ and ‘hand-to-mouth existence’ render truth value to victim-blaming 
theories advanced by diku officials, shopkeepers, and development actors 
(Mosse 2005, chapter-3). Furthermore, by his repeated adherence to the 
instructions of bureaucratic codes (inscription, corruption and arbitrariness) 
(see Gupta 2012), he also develops habitus akin to these codes. Thus 
ambivalence of violence gets operationalized and simultaneously normalized 
for Saluka as he takes lessons at his new found ‘career’ as a middleman, 
which alone allows him a faster and apparently feasible upward social 
mobility given the context of a dying countryside, largely impoverished co-
villagers and the mostly dormant, degraded and a rapidly disintegrating 
position of Adivasi ‘sacral polity.’  
A look at the implementation of MGNREGS in a few village might help 
further strengthen this argument. MGNREGS is meant to provide 100 days 
employment to any household who makes a demand for work under the 
MGNREG Act 2005 to create rural agrarian infrastructure. The official 
minimum wage for a day’s work under this Act is rupees 125 per day per 
person. In principle, the local administration, i.e., the block development 
officer and his staff, bear the responsibility of providing employment to 
interested villagers. However, hardly any Ho villager go to the Block 
Development Office, on their own, or demand employment under the Act. 
The block development officer is put under pressure to spend the funds 
allotted for the implementation of MGNREGS for job creation and produce 
reports as to how the money is utilised. Hence, he promotes middleman such 
as Saluka who would implement ‘job creation’ schemes. Hence, Saluka also 
was asked to undertake a few schemes of approach-road and mud-tank 
construction works in his own village. 
However, it is not the villagers who choose schemes, although in principle it 
should be so, but the schemes are distributed depending on the convenience 
of bureaucrats: the BDO decides on what scheme, how many (of them), to 
which village, and how much money to be spent on a specific scheme – 
mostly individual wells, mud-tanks and approach roads – since these are easy 
to monitor to avoid ‘corruption,’ according to the DC (personal conversation 
with the DC on 10 August 2011 at his office, Chaibasa), while the gross 
corruption that exists at all levels of the administration has been a ‘normal’ 
practice for the DC.  
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While this being the mode of implementation of MGNREGS, the role of 
gram-sabha (or panchayat) is merely to decide who gets the proposed well/ 
tank or in which hamlet of the village the approach road would be 
constructed, and who would supervise the work and pay wages to workers. 
Once a scheme is approved by the BDO, most often a non-Ho, s/he would 
release the allotted sum of money in instalments, as the progress of the work 
would be certified and approved by a Junior Engineer (JE), in most cases a 
diku. However, the BDO ‘cuts’ five per cent of the total allotment depending 
on his/her ‘commission’ and the JE normally does not certify or approve the 
work until this ‘fixed commission’ is paid either by the work-supervisor or 
the panchayat-mukhiya into whose account the amount would be sent for the 
purpose of paying wages. The ‘percentage cuts’ practiced by the BDO and JE 
has been an unquestioned and normalised practice, not ‘corruption’ (Gupta 
2005). Corruption, according to the BDO, is what the work-supervisor, 
mukhiya or munda might do, not sarkari karamcharis (the government staff) 
(personal conversation with a BDO at Khuntpani block office, 4th August 
2011); sarkari-karamcharis cannot go wrong, since they know everything 
and the Adivasis do not know anything (personal conversations with 
middlemen-contractors at Maranghatu village 15 August 2001). This has 
been the most prevalent mainstream perceptions about Adivasis in Kolhan 
and Jharkhand as it was made clear during my conversation with Ranjan, an 
elderly staff at the district record room, who is originally from north Bihar, 
but has been in Jharkhand for long: 
People like us who work here [at the government office] have a desire to learn about the 
system so that we can work well, but these Adivasis have no such desire except to ask 
or look for money. How will they develop? They cannot understand how things are 
being done and what to do and how to learn anything. Taking the names of three main 
mining industrialists in Chaibasa, he says, they are not looting, but they are doing a lot 
to develop the place (personal conversation on 22 October 2013). 
This continues to remain one of the least altered mainstream prejudices or 
stereotypes about Adivasis. 
A ‘Social-Audit’ of Schemes under MNREGA 2005 
More interesting was an episode, I witnessed in 2009, of a public-audit of the 
implementation of MGNREGS, which was organized by the district 
administration itself in accordance with the guidelines of MGNREGA 2005. 
Many NGOs were also asked to help out in making the public-audit 
‘successful’ by the District Collector. During the public-audit of a few 
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MGNREG schemes, a staff of one of the NGOs, that runs a project to ensure 
a more effective implementation of MGNREGA 2005, had instructed its staff 
to check with villagers, who have worked in MNREG Schemes, to see if the 
minimum wage was paid to them in accordance with the specifications of the 
Act. On enquiring one NGO-staff, who belongs to a ‘service caste’ from a 
nearby village, found that many workers of a Ho hamlet in Khuntpani block 
were not paid the minimum wage of Rs.125 per day.73 A few Ho villagers 
who had worked for 15 days were paid only two day’s wages, but the register 
of the supervisor and job cards of workers showed 15 or more work-days. 
This discrepancy in job card, a clear case of manipulation by the work 
supervisor, a Ho himself and the VLW a non-Ho, was brought to the notice 
of the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) who was presiding over the audit 
session. The SDO immediately directed the NGO-staff to write a formal 
complaint-note on behalf of the villagers who worked for the scheme. 
Accordingly, he wrote a complaint and submitted it to the SDO. This became 
a serious issue for the work supervisor and the VLW, who could now be 
legally held responsible for this discrepancy.  
On the same evening, soon after the audit session, the work supervisor and 
the VLW made a counter-complaint and got their left thumb impression  
(legally-accepted substitute as signature for those who are illiterate) from 
some of their gang-supporters on behalf of those villagers on whose consent 
the NGO-staff had registered the original complaint with the SDO. The 
counter-complaint stated that the workers had filed the complaint-note under 
pressure from the NGO-staff; the allegations in it are incorrect; and hence, 
the villagers would like to withdraw the former petition about the 
discrepancies in wage payment. MGNREGS supervisor and the VLW, thus, 
got the original complaint cancelled by their counter complaint.74 
                                                      
73 For more on issues of nonpayment of minimum wages to workers in Adivasi areas see Devi 
(1984). ‘While the financial allotment for schemes … are determined according to the work 
norms adopted for the National Rural Employment Programme, the workers are being 
actually paid on the basis of more onerous norms and are thus being deprived of a part of 
their legitimate wages. Complaints right up to the highest levels of government have brought 
no succour to the poor workers’ (Devi 1987: 185). 
74
 Narrated by the NGO-staff, during an evaluation meeting of the NGO’s staff members on 4 
February 2011. I attended the meeting. On 22 September 2013, I discussed this incident with 
the villagers (both men and women) in question at their hamlet/ village in Khuntpani block. 
They have not yet been paid their pending wages. 
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After the staff meeting, I requested the NGO-staff if he could come with me 
to this hamlet to talk either to the said work supervisor (also called ‘mate’) or 
to those who signed the counter-complaint. He refused my request saying that 
he was scared of the work supervisor who is a ‘big-man’ of the area. I met 
this ‘big man’ in September 2013 at his residence. While discussing the issue 
with him, he agreed that the incident was true, but he says, ‘What else can I 
do? I have to work with the VLW and BDO on sarkari projects.’ For this 
local ‘big man,’ what matters most is his gain that comes from being part of 
the system. This was much easier for him than to stand up for the rights of his 
co-villagers, which needs extraordinary courage, extra resources and time. 
Moreover, since such a process is time-taking and the final outcome would 
remain uncertain. 
Things are more complex than they appear to be: the doxa and habitus of 
‘Adivasi fields’ differ historically from that of ‘mainstream.’ Most works in 
these villages were/ are carried out mostly by communal system of labour 
exchange known as denga-depenga, where households exchanged their 
labour for free with neighbours and kinsmen and kinswomen (see Shah 
2013b). However, this communal system of labour exchange has, by now, 
been transformed into perpetual submissiveness and dependence (of 
marginalised villagers) on those few who disproportionately accumulate 
wealth and differentiate themselves from their co-villagers. Moreover, an 
annual wage rate is fixed by gram-sabha (most of whose officeholders are 
village-elites) at a rate much less than the minimum wage rate specified by 
the MNREGA 2005 guidelines. Furthermore, this annually fixed wage rate is 
often not paid in cash, but in kind, for example, reciprocation of similar work 
or a meal and drink together with all those who work; moreover, wage is 
seldom calculated and demanded as a right by those who supply the labour 
(personal conversation with S. Sundi and M. Tubid, Ho youth leaders and 
activists who work with rural villagers, 16 October 2013).  
Hence, when MGNREGS are being implemented in villages it is up to the 
work supervisor to manage the wage-payment at the village; he or she might 
do it in accordance with Ho villagers’ customary practices. The middleman 
or woman, being well aware of villagers’ position, adopts himself or herself 
to it to advance his/her interest that also serves the agenda of the dominant 
powers (here the block office staff). This episode explicates one of the subtle, 
but complex ways by which Adivasi cultural values are manipulated and 
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eventually undermined, and how ambivalence of violence actually works on 
the ground via ambivalent Adivasi middlemen who takes sides with state 
functionaries to advance his or her personal interests as well as that of the 
dominant powers with which he or she gets inevitably enmeshed, a 
framework of co-operation with differences on unequal terms.  
This not only reproduces and perpetuates the rigid hierarchical structure of 
power, but also actively deny Adivasis’ alternative imaginations and 
subjectivities. At the unconscious level, it leads to the naturalizing of 
constructed values (e.g. civilization, modernity, development, etc.) which, 
conversely, established ‘savage,’ ‘wilderness,’ ‘primitiveness’ and 
‘backwardness’ ‘as their antithesis and as objects of a reforming zeal of 
conscious affiliation proceeding under the guise of filiation’ (Said 1984, cited 
in Ashcroft et al 1989: 3), that is, a mimicking of diku proceeding from a 
desire not only to be accepted but to be adopted and absorbed in to the 
colonial civic order, the accumulating and differentiating Adivasi elite’s 
efforts from their Adivasi periphery to immerse themselves in the 
encapsulating dominant culture, denying their origin in an attempt to become 
more ‘civilized’ than the civilizing dikus.75   
Power was a dialectical phenomenon, that torturer and tortured, racist and victim, 
colonizer and colonized, the empowered and disempowered, were locked in a symbiotic 
relation in which the first could not escape the consequences of his relations with the 
second. … Colonizer and colonized are ‘similarly strangled by the colonial apparatus, 
that heavy machine,’ transformed into an oppressor or torturer, the colonizing subject 
also finds himself in a condition of ontological ambivalence: ‘both the organizer and 
the victim’, as Fanon put it, ‘of a system that has choked him and reduced him to 
silence’ (Sartre 1976a; Fanon 1980 quoted in Haddour et al 2005: xii). 
Any attempt to counter such structural violence and corrupt practices, being 
normalised, has been thwarted in ways that are sometimes unimaginable. 
Adivasi villagers, who still hold on to their alternative imaginations, certainly 
experience a diku effect with their  kinsman and kinswoman who advance 
individual accumulation and differentiation (contradictory symbolic capitals) 
at the expense of demoralizing their co-villagers in their own hamlets. 
Although the marginalized Hos might understand how such transformations 
happen, fear looms foremost in villagers’ mind while thinking of confronting 
                                                      
75 Young (1994) explains the emergence of (colonial) desire in history, its genealogy and 
disavowal in the history of racialized thought involving simultaneous attraction and 
repulsion. 
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such phenomenon.76 Ironically, some deprived Ho villagers even take pride 
in pointing to an accumulating and differentiating Adivasi as their own 
kinsman, who belong to the same killi, to prove to dikus in general that all 
Adivasis are not fools or ‘primitives’ as the general mainstream perception 
has them to be. No wonder, these local mediators (‘big-men’) would be 
elected as panchayat mukhiya, MLAs and MPs. Thus, the process of state 
formation from below (adverse or unequal incorporation) continues via the 
prevalent ambivalence of violence, but what might be the nature of such a 
state? 
Adverse Incorporation of Adivasi Leadership and Social Exclusion  
The prevalent ambivalence of Adivasi leadership has a long history as long as 
the history of Adivasis' unequal interaction with dominant mainstream which 
branded them as 'barbarians' and simultaneously kept co-opting 
(incorporating) their leadership adversely as mere token heads for the sake of 
legitimacy (see Thapar 1971, 2004; Fox 1971; Saha 1986). Among the Hos, 
the authority of the mundas and mankis, which had previously rested on the 
approval of the entire village community had gradually been shifted to the 
approval of paternalist British officers, who always knew better what was 
‘best’ for the Hos (see Das Gupta 2011). Thus the mundas and mankis were 
reduced to ambivalent and subservient middlemen whose final decision on 
any issue would depend on the ‘discretion’ of a 'sympathetic' colonial officer 
whose main interest was to advance the interests of the empire (Corbridge 
1996). Similarly, the post-British colonial state-society relationship has also 
been built up along the same trajectory: ambivalence of violence – the Hos 
continue to remain subservient to the ‘expert’ diku officer who always knows 
everything ‘better.’ 
Adivasi politics in Jharkhand and the processes by which Adivasi leadership 
has unequally been co-opted by various dominant mainstream powers such as 
political parties, industrial capitalists, and bureaucrats at various levels can be 
explained by employing the concept of ambivalence of violence, which 
clearly emerges from the recent experience of a candidate who contested 
                                                      
76 Personal conversation with villagers who have still not received their wages for work done 
under MNREGS. While asking them why they do not challenge the VLW and BDO to pay their 
wages due to them, the women say, ‘We are ready to do it, but our men lack courage. There 
is fear in their hearts.’ (Dopai village Khuntpani block, 15 October 2013). 
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elections in 2009 to the Jharkhand Legislative Assembly.  
Sonu was the director of an NGO that fought against human right violations, 
land alienation and forced displacement in Kolhan since the late 1970s. In 
2007, Rahul Gandhi, the then General Secretary of Youth Congress, visited 
Jharkhand in view of revitalising ‘his’ Congress party organisation at the 
grass roots. He wanted a young, energetic and capable leader to fight 
elections, from one of the reserved Adivasi constituencies of West 
Singhbhum, on behalf of his party. On considering Sonu's works in the 
district, the Congress party offered him a ticket to contest election. When 
election campaigns were over, a few days before the final voting day, Sonu 
was summoned by one of the leading local industrialists to his office in 
Chaibasa. After making him sit comfortably, the industrialist asked him if he 
wished to win this election. He said, 'Yes, I do'. Then Sonu was told, 'If you 
sign an agreement with me promising that you will not oppose any land 
leases for mining in this Kolhan, you will certainly win this election. If not, 
you will lose it for sure, irrespective of the party that offered you the ticket.’77 
Sonu declined signing such an agreement with this local diku capitalist and 
consequently lost the election.  
During our conversations in July 2011, Sonu told me, 'May be, I made a 
mistake, I should have signed that agreement with him to see what would 
have happened after.’ Further, about the issue of industrialisation and 
displacement of Adivasis in Kolhan in general, he said, 'I realise that it is 
almost impossible to resist mining in Kolhan but, may be, we should try to 
press the industrial capitalists to limit their greed of wanting to acquire 
thousands of acres of land at a stretch. Why cannot they take smaller pieces 
of land and do their business?’ His perception about Adivasi land rights and 
                                                      
77 It is crucial to note how local industrialists predetermine election-results prior to actual 
voting and counting of votes. In most Adivasi villages, villagers seek the opinions of 
significant village elites as to whom to vote, such as munda, and other significant middlemen 
who help/ patronize them. Hence, it is very easy for industrialists to distribute some money 
to these locally significant men to fix election outcomes. That is why villagers’ decision as to 
whom to vote might change overnight depending on who controls their collective opinion 
and decision (personal conversation with R. Pingua, a Ho who headed the Jharkhand Tribal 
Development Society in West Singhbhum district during 2006-2009, and now resides in 
Ranchi, on 5 February 2011). 
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forced displacement had changed a lot by this time.78 This way, in front of 
the prevalent, dominant discourses of ‘development,’ Adivasi land-rights, the 
significance of their protection, the dehumanizing consequences of forced 
displacement, etc. become differently legitimized, and de-development for 
Adivasis get operationalized through an ambivalent leadership. 
Sonu's case is a clear example of how ambivalence of violence plagues 
Adivasi leadership and how and why emerging leadership gets adversely 
(unequally) incorporated. Adverse incorporation and social exclusion (AISE) 
is a complex and slow process, happens over a period of time, almost 
impossible to fight unless the already entrenched ambivalence of violence is 
recognized for what it is, in the first place, and then to be reversed or negated. 
'We only become what we are by radically negating deep down what others 
have done to us.' (Sartre 1961: ii, emphasis added). Such a negation might be 
possible by elite Adivasis, provided they recognize the misrecognition 
(ambivalence) they are already being caught into, in the first place. However, 
such a negation not only needs material resources but cultural and intellectual 
too along with the renewed trust and total support of the deprived members of 
all societies, beginning with Adivasis themselves from whom the elites are 
now far removed. With both material and cultural and ideological resources 
and tools of emancipation it is possible to engage in meaningful negotiations 
and dialogue on equal terms. 
Ambivalence of Violence and Middlemen  
Ambivalence of violence neutralises corruption, unequal co-option resulting 
from an enduring nexus between bureaucrats, politicians and industrial 
capitalists, which forms the ‘shadow state’ and ‘black economy’ (Harris-
White 2003: 77, 98). West Singhbhum district, being one of the most 
mineral-rich regions in India while also 'protected' under several legislations 
and Constitutional provisions, which theoretically prevent transfer of Adivasi 
land to non-Adivasis, has always remained one of the most attractive places 
for the most corrupt bureaucrats. Industrial capitalists need to buy the District 
                                                      
78 I have been in touch with Sonu via phone-calls and friendly visits to his house during my 
field-visits since the end of 2009 when he had shared with me the copies of his 
correspondence with the Ministry of Rural Development at Jharkhand and national levels 
about corruption cases at the district level related to the misuse of funds allotted under 
MNREGA 2005 as a follow-up of his Right to Information (RTI) enquiry on a few incomplete 
check-dams in Manoharpur block. 
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Collector's (DC) discretionary power79 to get land-lease-contracts advanced 
in these Scheduled Areas. When the DC's discretionary power here is in such 
a high demand, he also need to secure and prolong his tenure as DC at 
Chaibasa. 
According to Sikendar, one of the two leading middlemen of Marngahatu 
village, the District Collector of West Singhbhum sent three million rupees in 
a suitcase as a bribe to the chairperson of the samunvaya samiti (coordinating 
committee) of the then Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) led coalition government 
in Jharkhand at the beginning of the year 2012, so that the DC at Chaibasa 
might be allowed to continue in his office for another financial year80 
(personal conversation over phone on 15 February 2012). 
More interestingly, this sum of money was sent through the ‘kindness’ of the 
local MLA, a Ho himself, a member of Jharkhand Mukti Morch (JMM). The 
said amount of bribe was received by the 'supreme' leader of JMM who then 
headed the coordination committee. While this episode was being narrated by 
Sikender, an aspiring or emerging Ho politician himself, I asked him if this 
was the case, then what might be the future of Ho disum and Ho honko (the 
Ho country and the Ho children)? His reply to this question was, 'I cannot say 
anything about it, since after winning elections, nobody can tell what would 
happen to a politician or how he or she might behave. Even if it were me, 
who got elected as MLA, I would have done the same thing'. While Sikender, 
who is fully aware of the prevalent, dominant trajectory of moral and political 
economy in Jharkhand, feels that he has no tools to fight it, but to be part of 
the system and succumb to its ‘rules.’  
The JMM, it its initial days, was one of the most powerful or important 
regional parties, in Jharkhand. It had managed to forge the support of 
                                                      
79 A.K. Patnaik who led a Bench of Supreme Court judges has said, ‘Naxalism is a result of an 
oversight of Constitutional provisions relating to Scheduled Areas and Tribes. Urbanites, 
mostly oblivious of the fifth and sixth schedules of the Constitution, are ruling the nation.’ 
(Anand 2012). 
80 'The potential for manipulation of bureaucratic positions and appointments arise due to 
politicians' control over movements of officials. These appointments and transfers are not 
policy based but on political connections and influences. A market of job-postings emerges 
where bureaucrats are motivated to pay for transfers. Politicians can then demand from 
them more illicit funds. Whereas bureaucrats transfer only a share of their bribe-income to 
politicians either for preferred transfers or to satisfy their political boss' demand' (Brussell 
2012: 79). 
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Adivasis and other such marginalised groups in Jharkhand region by its 
appeal to Jharkhandi subjectivities and sentiments that are tied to land, water, 
forest, cultural identity, and self-determination (Das 1975; Lourduswamy 
1997; Munda and Mullick 2003). However, once it began to follow the rules 
of the game, the already entrenched colonial system, it finds fewer other 
choices, since it has to continue to survive in the system, its leadership has 
often been in ambivalence, failing to negotiate on equal terms. Even Jaipal 
Singh Munda, the most powerful Adivasi leader after Birsa Munda, and the 
first Adivasi MP in the history of India, in the late 1960s also eventually had 
to succumb ambivalently to the systemic pressures in  the face of dominant 
discourses of 'national development’ and ‘unity.’81  
Conclusion  
This chapter has taken the theme of ‘power brokers’ or ‘political fixers’ to a 
deeper level of analysis to explicate how and why there have been 
middlemen and women operating in Adivasi landscape in India and what has 
been the consequences of their ‘mediated empowerment’ for Adivasi social 
formations. It has argued that the prevalence of political mediation in 
societies is a symptom that points towards deeper socioeconomic, political, 
cultural and symbolic issues that are unresolved constitutive of the historical 
processes of state formation that embody colonialism and racism. 
Thus, this chapter has shown that the post-British colonial Indian state 
invariably operates through ambivalent middlemen in Adivasi and other 
marginalized social formations advancing cultural, and structural violence by 
employing various legitimising discourses that negates Adivasi subjectivities 
in complex, coercive and insidious ways. This entire process has been 
operationalized via ambivalence of violence through which most of these 
processes keep repeating and being reproduced, and reutilized in many 
                                                      
81 Jaipal Singh Munda, the founder and most charismatic leader of Jharkhand Party could not 
help being ambivalent (‘divided loyalty’) while being confronted with mainstream powers 
and discourses of ‘national development’ (Sen 2009). Similarly Sibu Soren, the so-called 
‘JMM-supremo,’ has allegedly accepted huge sums of money to render political support to 
ruling coalitions of national political parties in the 1990s (Sinha 1987). Sen (2014) shows how 
Scheduled Caste Politics that demands representation, education, and agrarian reform get 
compromised as a consequence of caste Hindu misrecognition’ (Ibid.: 77). Most interestingly, 
although horse-riding, bribing and shifting loyalties are ‘normal’ practices in Indian politics 
for most ‘upper’ caste politicians (Pandey 2013), often accused and punished in these games 
are those who belong to the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes see Samuel (2012). 
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apparently natural or acceptable ways. 
Such complex processes are deeply rooted in long historical and socio-
cultural processes, institutions and sociocultural values that have been 
responsible for prevalent unequal power relations by control of resources and 
gross deprivations of India ‘masses.’ ‘hybridity,’ ‘fragility,’ ‘weak state’ and 
accompanying conflicts are mere symptoms of such deeper and unreconciled 
or unresolved political, and economic issues: unjust appropriation and control 
of resource by dominant groups and their efforts to keep the deprived 
populations in perpetual servitude, ignorance, and unfreedom (practico-inert 
status) typifying a perfect colonial system of super-exploitation which 
simultaneously produces kinglets or middlemen or cultural interpreters to run 
the system smoothly. 
The next chapter discusses the processes and actors of land alienation as 
powers of exclusion within Adivasi ethno-territorial enclosures. 
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Adivasis and Powers of Exclusion: People being Marginalized 
in their Ethno-Regional Territories 
 
 
“In our fields, 
In our lands, 
There is a world of richness.” 
“We have nothing to eat. 
Day by day we starve to death, and we are torn to pieces. 
The dirty madhouses, the poverty and disease make us moan…” 
 
(Extracts from Santal songs quoted in S. Devalle 1980: 5) 
 
… And what are the sacrifices the state makes to the colonialist, the 
darling gods and exporters? The answer is simple: it sacrifices the 
property of the natives to him. … The natural produce of the 
colonized country grows on the land and this land belongs to the 
‘indigenous’ population. In certain thinly populated regions, with 
large uncultivated areas, the theft of land is less apparent: what you 
see is military occupation, and forced labour. …  
(J-P Sartre [1964] 2005: 11-12). 
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Introduction 
'The Department of Mining and Geology of Jharkhand government has traced 
gold in our village-land. It scares me when I think about it', said Savan, a Ho 
who has been a lecturer at a local college. His village is near Chaibasa. 
Savan’s fear is about an impending forced eviction of villagers when some 
industrial capitalists would, one day, start mining the gold underneath their 
village. 'I am sure', he said, 'We will be thrown out from our land, sooner or 
later.' There is already a limestone mine (in the same village). One of the 
local industrialists has been extracting limestone from it for the last nine 
years (from 2001 to 2010). The mine is dug wide and deep into the ground; a 
large volume of water was being pumped out of the large open mining-pit to 
enable extraction. The villagers say that the mine causes depletion of water-
level in their wells, and there has been severe water scarcity during summer 
since the mining operations began. However, although villagers felt that the 
mine was harmful to the entire village, they could not stop its operation until 
December 2010, when the newly elected mukhiya, the chairperson of their 
panchayat stood her ground and told the mine-owner, a local non-Adivasi 
industrialist, to stop the mining operation. Consequently, it was stopped, but 
the industrialist kept sending his brokers to the mukhiya’s house to persuade 
her for a compromise, but they found her to be too 'stubborn' or 'adamant' in 
her decision. Finally, the industrialist has reportedly said, 'She is mukhiya for 
just five years; we will see who will become mukhiya next.' 
The present mukhiya's family has a reasonable level of economic security (an 
affluent Ho household) with some rice land, besides her husband's regular 
income as a bank-employee in at a local bank. Hence, the family does not 
need to depend on some easy extra income that might come in by cooperating 
with the industrialist to advance his interests to the detriment of their village 
community by depriving them of common property resources such as land 
and water. 
This piece of land, on which the mining-pit lies, had been leased out to the 
local industrialist, years ago, by the District Collector (DC) without whose 
'discretion' any lease agreement in Kolhan and Jharkhand is almost 
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impossible.82 Despite strong opposition from most villagers, the then munda 
and a few household-heads, who possess this piece of land, had agreed to 
lease it out for limestone extraction. However, mining was interrupted soon, 
in a similar fashion as it is being interrupted now, by the decision of a former 
panchayat mukhiya during the late 1970s. Later in 2001, (limestone) 
extraction resumed with a further expansion of the mine, supported once 
again, by the present munda and a few of his supporters, which continued till 
the end of 2010, up to the arrival of the newly elected mukhiya. 
This chapter discusses issues related to land and its governance in mineral-
rich Adivasi regions. It reviews discourses about ‘development’ induced land 
alienation and dispossession of Adivasis; analyses land-conflicts between 
accumulating households and co-villagers, local resistance against forced 
eviction, and resultant dilemmas. In fact, most Adivasi movements in the 
mineral-rich central eastern states – Jharkhand, Odisha and Chhattisgarh – 
have been centred on their struggle to protect jal, jungle, zamin, (water, 
forests and land) (Singh 1973; Areeparampil 1993, 1996; Singh 2002; 
Chattopadhyay 2012; Dungdung 2013). These studies, among several others, 
have highlighted the number of people displaced without adequate provisions 
of compensation, resettlement, and rehabilitation; they also provide useful 
statistics on land alienation due to large-scale 'development' projects such as 
big dams, mining and industrial establishments, national parks and other so-
called projects of ‘public’ interest in India.  
Most studies about alienation of Adivasi land have highlighted the difference 
between Adivasis' and non-Adivasis’ understanding of land: for Adivasis and 
other such marginalized people, a piece of land of their own provides them 
not only food, but also a sense of security, personhood, belonging, identity, 
public visibility, bargaining power, enhanced status, political voice and much 
more. Whereas for non-Adivasi industrialists, land is a commercial object to 
                                                      
82 Adivasi land, in principle, belongs to the village 'community;' and cannot be alienated. 
There exist a number of 'protective' legislations, such as the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act 
(CNTA) 1908, the provisions in the Fifth Schedule of article 244 of the Indian Constitutions, 
the Panchayati Raj Extension to the Scheduled Areas (PESA) 1996, and the Samata Judgment 
1995, all meant to protect Adivasi land from being alienated by non-Adivasis. All these 
legislations bestow special powers upon the 'community' to own and control its local 
resources – land, water, forest, and minerals. Further, most Hos are by now aware of these 
provisions by their repeated participation in protest movements and demonstrations against 
land alienation, organized by a few local activists and NGOs since long (Sunder 2005b, 2009).  
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be better utilized (Fernandes 1991; Fernandes and Barbora 2008; Rao 2008, 
2009; Verma 2011; Dungdung 2013; Chandra 2013). Furthermore, a central 
concern of Adivasi-land-right activists has been that rural Adivasis, mostly 
nonliterate, and unskilled to take up non-agrarian sector jobs, while being 
uprooted from their land with very little monetary compensation, would be 
left with little alternative (livelihood) options.83 In this sense, the argument 
made by Soma Munda, the legendary leader of Koel-Karo Dam-Resistance 
Movement, 'Land is what they know to live on. Money is not for them' 
(quoted in Ghosh 2006: 509), lies at the heart of most local Adivasi resistance 
movements.  
The case of the Sarda Mine in Chaibasa is typical. The villagers were not willing to 
part with their lands, which comprised their sarna [sacred grove], agricultural lands 
and house sites. In order to obtain the lease, compensation and agreement papers 
had to be signed and produced before the mining department. These signatures were 
obtained by making some tenants drunk and dragging and beating others. Those 
who still did not yield had a taste of police lathis [nightsticks] and jail life before 
their thumb impression on blank paper could be bought for a nominal sum. . . . 
Practically, every mining lease in Singhbhum is purchased in a similar way 
(excerpted from a petition filed by the Singhbhum Labor Union Chaibasa during the 
early 1980s, quoted in Stuligross 2008: 96). 
A few studies have also highlighted the inherent contradictions in 
overemphasizing the dichotomous Adivasi, non-Adivasi binary, and the role 
of 'Jharkhandi activism' in furthering the process of Adivasis' essentialized 
'otherness' and consequent exclusion (Ghosh 2006; Chatterjee 2006). Sunder 
(2009) and Kapoor (2009, 2011, 2012) have highlighted the paradoxes 
inherent in the Constitutional provisions that ‘protect’ Adivasis land whilst 
the state’s actions get more and more focused around the mineral wealth in 
Adivasi land. This contradiction is complex and enduring: on the one hand, 
Adivasis cling to the provisions of the 'protective' laws and Constitutional 
provisions, that have a British colonial origin, to fight land alienation, while 
on the other hand, the post-British colonial state's disregard, and successive 
amendments of these laws, and the manipulation of Constitutional provisions 
in favour of market forces, render these laws and provisions almost irrelevant 
(Sunder 2009; Damodaran 2013).  
More interestingly, Adivasi movements, against displacement from land, 
based on 'protective' laws, in turn, have to make supplications and appeals to 
                                                      
83 The IT and service sector whose GDP contribution is higher than the agricultural sector do 
not hold any opportunities for illiterate rural people; see Walker (2009). 
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the institutions of the same exploitative post-British colonial state to enforce 
the already diluted provisions of 'protective' laws. The situation becomes 
more complex when, there is disagreement among Adivasi politicians 
themselves about the relevance of, what they call, ‘outdated colonial’ laws.84 
However, despite such obvious contradictions and paradoxes, Sunder (2009) 
and Nilsen (2013) have argued, Adivasis' engagement with the state, rather 
than keeping it away (Shah 2007), and more strategic demand for their 
Constitutional rights, might help them to realize the meaning of democracy 
and citizenship. In a similar fashion, Kapoor (2007; 2011) has shown that 
Adivasi social movements against land alienation provide them with 
alternative learning platforms to develop political consciousness, a sense of 
identity, dignity, and human rights. These arguments are well grounded and 
optimistic. However, very few studies have highlighted the erosion of social 
ecology in Adivasi dominant regions due to strategic non-investment to 
convert these regions and its people into conflict-ridden colonies that might 
fuel the country’s economic growth. 
This chapter, thus, seeks to better understand such processes by which 
Adivasis have been systematically denied access to land (access here means 
people’s ability to benefit from land) within their own ostensibly ethno-
territorial enclosures. It shows Adivasis’ diminishing access to their own land 
as an inevitable outcome of centuries-long colonial transformations of social 
ecology in Adivasi dominant regions: deepening inequality, economic, 
ecological and political marginality through strategic non-investment that 
degrades not only agrarian infrastructure, but also Adivasi social formations 
themselves and turn both of them into conflict-ridden internal colonies. It 
also highlights the inadequacy and contradictions inherent in both traditional 
and modern systems of land governance in Adivasi regions. In order to 
highlight these processes with their accompanying nuances, the chapter re-
conceptualizes various powers and forces that alienate Adivasi land in the 
border context of 'exclusion of people's access to land.85 This exclusion or 
denial of access has systemically been brought about by strategic non-
                                                      
84 The Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (JVM) president, and former Chief Minister Babulal Marandi, 
a Santal (Adivasi), has already sated that the 'old-protective' laws are irrelevant. While Nitya 
Rao, who has conducted several years of field research among villagers in the Santal 
Parganas, has found that it is only because of SPTA 1949 that most Adivasi households in the 
region are left with at least some land of their own (Rao 2008). 
85 Access is defined broadly as ‘the ability to derive benefit from things’ (Ribot 2003: 1).  
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investment in Adivasi regions, while encouraging ‘intimate’ exclusion by 
which the ‘powers of exclusion’ (Hall et al 2011) finds their way into Adivasi 
ethno-regional territories, and advance accumulation by dispossession, 
despite strong local resistance by villagers (Levien 2012, 2013; Patnaik 
2013).  
The following section of this chapter shows the context of systemic 
marginality imposed on Adivasi regions and people from the perspective of 
'regional political ecology' (Blaikie and Brookfield 1994). The findings of a 
household-level survey on landholding and farm-based food-grain production 
by 287 households in Huringhatu demonstrate the region’s marginality and 
people’s reduced ability to benefit from their land. Then the powers that 
created such marginality are delineated and termed as ‘powers of exclusion.’ 
This is followed by a short review of the broader context of land wars, and 
discussions of a few instances of the same in Kolhan between the local state 
officials in support of industrialists, and Ho villagers. Further, the chapter 
also shows how the powers of exclusion find their way into Adivasi social 
formations via ‘intimate’ exclusion or ‘exclusion from below;’ then, an 
instance of land dispute among social ‘intimates’ in Huringhatu is discussed 
to explicate this process. This is followed by a short discussion on the types 
of changes that exclusion by intimates (co-vilagers who share same history 
and trations) or violence among intimates yield in Ho villages, and the cost 
they need to incur while accessing state-regulatory services, and finally the 
chapter’s concluding section recapitulates the main arguments. 
Political, economic, ecological marginality of Adivasi land 
This section highlights the context of politico-economic and ecological 
marginality (Blaikie and Brookfield 1994) of Adivasi dominant regions and 
their diminishing ability to utilize and derive benefits from land ostensibly 
‘protected’ for them. Such perennial marginality of a region resembles that of 
a virtual colony where governance and the delivery of basic public facilities, 
one of the main kernels of state-legitimacy, have nearly been absent whilst 
super-exploitation of mineral and forest resources have been at its peak for 
the rapid development of some focal points of growth – urban centres. In this 
way, 'the supply areas excoriate to an increasing stagnation and 
underdevelopment.' The people here continue to remain a 'marginal 
population' disorganised, and uninformed, who make demands only 'in the 
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traditional forms of supplications, petitions and complaints' (Blaikie and 
Brookfield 1994: 19-22). 
Table-4, below, provides some facts about land-based livelihood resources of 
households in Huringhatu (V2). The data serve not only to make the regional 
(geographical) marginality of Hos and their land in terms of its killing 
degradation and scarcity but also to highlight, once again, the extent of 
economic differentiation within Ho society. 
Table 4 – Land availability, land-based food security, and the people in Huringhatu village (V2) 
Cultivable rice fields 
Land-based food 
production 
Number of 
households 
Percentage 
Sub-
totals % 
No cultivable paddy 
fields 
0 months 
302 
persons 
58 58 20.21 20% 
One acre 
1-2 
months 
980 
persons 
63 
212 
21.95 
74% Two acres 
3-4 
months 
108 37.95 
Three acres 
5-6 
months 
41 14.29 
Four acres 
7-8 
months 112 
persons 
13 
17 
4.53 
6% 
Five acres 
9-11 
months 
4 1.39 
Total rice fields 492 
acres 
Total population 1394 N = 287   100   
  (Source: survey conducted by the author July-November, 2011) 
Huringhatu (V2) has 287 households with a total population of 1394 persons 
settled in five different hamlets. However, its total cultivable rice-fields 
constitute only 492 acres which will soon be further divided among 621 
male members structured on the basis of patrilineal kinship in relation to 
land. Only six per cent households (table-4) has comparatively better quality 
and larger pieces of land.  
Table 5 – Lineages wise land ownership 
Lineage  
 No. of 
households Category Lineage  
No. of 
households Category   
Sundi 185 ST 
O
w
n
  
  
so
m
e
  
 
ri
ce
-l
a
n
d
 
Samad 33 + 1 SC 
D
o
 n
o
t 
o
w
n
 r
ic
e
-
la
n
d
 
Purti 22 ST Pradhan 4 ST 
Kayam 5 ST Nag 3 ST 
Deogam 7 ST Munda 2 ST 
Banra 10 ST Bukru 5 ST 
      Kandait 10 SC 
  (Source: survey conducted by the author July-November, 2011) 
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This is a multi-lineage village with 11 killis (patrilineages) of which six killis 
are ‘latecomers’ who do not own cultivable paddy fields. They constitute a 
total of 58 households, of which 34 belong to a single ‘Samad’ killi of the 
Mundas. One killi (Bukru) with 10 households and a single household from 
the Samad killi are categorized as SCs in census records. 
Undoubtedly, shortage of cultivable land, declining land productivity, and 
chronic food insecurity are the most pressing problems in this village. As 
shown in table-4, about 20 per cent of the total households do not own any 
rice field; they possess only small homesteads and depend mostly on a 
nominal wage labour, sale of firewood, and other foraging activities to earn a 
living throughout the year. For about 74 per cent household’s food-grain 
suffices for self-consumption less than half a year (1-6 months); their 
situation is no different from that of the landless households for the rest of 
the months. Only 13 households produce food grains sufficient for seven to 
eight months and just four of them nine to eleven months; these two together 
form only six per cent of the total households. This being the case only when 
the yearly monsoon is normal, with absolutely no irrigation facility for rice 
cultivation, a failure of monsoon (which often happens) brings severe food-
scarcity and malnutrition.  
Besides rice-fields, some households own small plots of upper-land which is 
predominantly hilly, stony and unproductive red-soil, devoid of any provision 
to prevent soil erosion. A few households cultivate sorghum, millets, pulses 
and staple maize occasionally on upper-lands during rainy season.86 Apart 
from rice-land, the less fertile stony upper lands and homesteads, there is 
something classified as 'wastelands' which comprises of uncultivated grass 
and woods; much of it has been officially termed as 'forests' although frost-
cover has mostly been denuded. Hos used to reclaim these 'wastelands' with 
the munda’s permission. However, this practice has become unaffordable for 
                                                      
86 Cultivation of upper-lands with no provision against soil-erosion has been one of the 
main reasons for cumulative ecological marginality due to large-scale soil erosion (Blaikie 
and Brookfield 1994) which is a politico-economic issue that forms a vicious circle of 
marginality, and underdevelopment: soil erosion of one household becomes the 
development of another whose land is better positioned at the valley bottom (Blaikie 
1994). Interestingly, such huge loss of topsoil is not even seen as soil-erosion; and no 
remedial measure has been taken to prevent this serious problem by development actors 
either (Mosse 2005: chapter-3), including those from the state agriculture department, 
NGOs, and the emerging local leaders in the Adivasi regions.  
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most households without substantial financial support from the state (Yorke 
1976), which has not happened so far even after the enactment of the much 
talked about Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(MGNREGA) 2005, which has provisions for land-reclamation.87 Moreover, 
almost all of these so-called 'wastelands' have officially been recorded as 
‘owned by the state’ since the last settlement operations in 1963-65 (Upadhya 
2009), although state functionaries have not yet been able to access these 
'wastelands' extensively due to local resistance by Ho villagers, except a few 
instances where it has been accessed by the local industrialists for extractive 
mining with the help of the village munda, and a few elites as described at the 
beginning of this chapter.  
Since the 1990s (the liberal economic reform period), mining and 
industrialisation have accelerated on forest lands causing further damage to 
environment and surrounding agricultural lands (Areeparampil 1996; George 
2009; Munshi 2012; Bera 2012; Lahiri-Dutt et al 2012). Moreover, rural 
agrarian infrastructure has been neglected almost entirely, despite substantial 
fund allotments made ostensibly to improve rural agriculture and irrigation 
facilities. With the state’s clear option for ‘development’ by industrialisation 
(Rao 2003), the use of huge sums of funds simultaneously being allotted to 
rural development, agriculture and irrigation departments remains to be 
investigated.88 
                                                      
87 The MGNREGA has provisions for land reclamation, protecting, maintaining and improving 
cultivable land, constructing check-dams, and sustainable small-scale irrigation facilities to 
improve the rural agrarian infrastructure. Its main purpose is to create employment for the 
rural poor whilst creating durable rural agricultural infrastructure (Haque 2011). See 
Mahapatra et al (2011) and Corbridge and Srivastava (2013) on the failure of MNREGA 2005. 
In West Singhbhum district, several check-dams are made on bureaucratic records only by 
executive engineers at the district welfare, public works and irrigation departments while 
drawing money in the name of 'development' schemes, including MGNREGS. An inquiry 
under the Right to Information Act (RTI) 2005 by a local Congress party leader, in 2010 
revealed that more than a hundred million rupees, estimated cost for six check-dams, were 
withdrawn from the district exchequer by a few executive engineers. It took almost two 
years, after repeated complaints to the central and state ministries of rural development 
department, to force the DC to investigate the mismanagement of funds, in which the DC 
himself was allegedly involved. Only one of the six accused engineers is arrested by the end 
of 2011 (personal conversations with the local leader, who did the RTI enquiry, at his house 
in Manoharpur during on 11 August 2010). 
88 According to Sikender (a Ho) and Anand (of a weaver-caste group), the two leading 
middlemen-contractors from Maranghatu, “huge sums of money have been allotted to 
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Land revenue collected from Chotanagpur was 40 pise for cess for health, 40 pise as 
cess for roads, education etc.... Chotanagpur had 2% land under irrigation in 1981 and 
5% under electrification. Lift irrigation is for show and publicity (Devi 1981:1012).  
The total irrigated land in Kolhan has remained about three per cent of the net 
sown area, for several years. There is hardly any reliable data on irrigation in 
West Singhbhum at the concerned department (personal conversations with 
the department heads on 12 November 2011, and information acquired 
through Right to Information Act 2005 application filed by the author in 
2011). Moreover, almost all Adivasi regions in the country have been by-
passed by the ‘green revolution’ (Shah et al 1998). Jharkhand state’s 
agricultural sector has specifically suffered from consistent non-investment in 
rural agrarian infrastructure (Prakash 2001, 2011). This gross neglect gets 
clearly reflected in the diminishing contribution of the agricultural sector to 
the state GDP: while the manufacturing sector contributed about 27 per cent 
of SGDP, it employs only 10 per cent of the total population; whereas the 
agriculture sector, which engages 60 per cent of the total population, 
contributed only 22 per cent of the state GDP in 2001. It has further declined 
to 14.5 per cent in 201089. Such an abysmally poor performance of the 
agriculture sector, which employs more than 90 per cent of Adivasis and 
other marginalized social groups, speaks eloquently about the predicament of 
rural Adivasi villagers.  
                                                                                                                                         
‘improve’ agriculture practices, irrigation facilities, and rural infrastructure every year, 
however, the villagers’ have little knowledge of it. Bureaucrats at the concerned 
departments from the state, district to block levels are entrusted to ‘spend’ these resources. 
The contractors, mostly clients of politicians, take bids to construct bridges, culvers, check-
dams, roads, and community halls, etc. About 40 % of the total allotted funds goes back, in 
the form of ‘fixed’ percentage cuts (bribe), to bureaucrats, and executive engineers, who 
would share it with their political bosses, at ‘fixed’ percentage rates. The contractors make 
sure that they get at least 10 % of the total estimated sum for their time, efforts and 
resources spent while making frequent trips to government offices and fulfilling other 
tiresome and often humiliating ‘official’ formalities. The remaining 50 % of the funds might 
be used to build something on the ground for visibility sake. Moreover, the workers of 
various political parties, in turn, approach the bureaucrats for their (pre-fixed or negotiated) 
contributions towards party-funds. Thus, 50 % of the state development resources get 
wasted every year in the name of infrastructure ‘development,’ while the other 50 % gets 
circulated and absorbed among bureaucrats, contractors and politicians (personal 
conversations during the first week of August 2011 with Sinkendar and Dayanand at their 
respective residences). 
89 Calculated using 2011 data from the Central Statistical Organization (CSO). 
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In a context of diversified rural livelihoods, the contribution of agricultural production 
to household subsistence has been declining. This trend has been reinforced by a 
decline in public investment, stagnant growth and fluctuating prices for agricultural 
products (Rao 2006: 1). 
It might well be argued that the socio-political, economic and economic 
marginality of Adivasi social formations have systematically been produced 
in order to exploit natural and human resources that have been locked in here: 
land, water, minerals, forest, and cheap labour (Sinha 1978; Devi 1981; 
Sengupta 1982; Areeparampil 1996) to advance the rapid ‘development’ 
urban centres (see Karan 1957; Kishwar 1987; Das 1992; Corbridge 1996; 
Saxena 2009, 2011; Damodaran 2013).  
A quarter of mining activity in India is carried out in Singhbhum [Kolhan]. Formerly 
mostly forested land, today has been brought under cultivation or reduced to rocky 
waste by increasing deforestation... Most of the land remains with the Hos due to lack 
of irrigation, electricity, and low productivity in agriculture. … Besides large-scale land 
alienation due to mining, industrialization and big dams, external political structures, 
owing their allegiance to an exploitative, hierarchical government machinery, the Hos 
are forced to practice a non-viable subsistence agriculture, with soil fertility destroyed, 
no irrigation and other technological inputs. ... Most families supplement farm income 
with other sources – working other people's land, collection and sale of forest produce, 
and seasonal migration as casual labour in mines, construction industries, brick kilns 
and other work-sites. Children perform about 90 per cent of the total labour in villages. 
.. Most lucrative jobs in the industries have gone to non-tribals. … All the families 
grow one major rice crop a year which they sow during the monsoon. However, when 
rains fail or are delayed, there is not even one crop a year. Even one year's monsoon 
failure causes scarcity. Often, the crops fail for several years in succession. As a result, 
food scarcity is a chronic problem for most families (Kishwar 1987: 95-6).  
While investment in rural agrarian infrastructure diminished, the number of 
small-scale extraction-industries multiplied which only brings further 
degradation to rural agrarian environment and disintegration of Adivasi social 
formations. Besides this, the united Bihar government encouraged migration 
of ‘middle’ and ‘lower’ caste groups from north Bihar to Jharkhand region 
who have increasingly been grabbing most employment opportunities and 
displacing Adivasis from their lands in Adivasi dominant regions (Devi 1981, 
1983; Stuligross 2008). 
Chotanagara [a Ho village] had no Sahus [a middle caste/ jati] till 1962, now there are 
four Sahus who act as money lenders, land usurpers and police agents... Malaria ridden 
poor villages, no doctors and staff in health centres, death or disease, epidemics cause a 
witch-hunt.... Till now rupees 30,000 million have been spent for tribal development. 
The Sixth [Five Year Plan] has allotted rupees 8,000 million but even after the five year 
plans nothing has reached the area (Devi 1981b: 1012).  
These were some of the complex processes by which Adivasi regions in 
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India have been made into what they have come to be today- a typical colony 
of chronically malnourished people.  
Sheer physical fatigue will stupefy them, starved and ill, if they have any spirit left, 
fear will finish the job; guns are levelled at the peasant; civilians come to take over his 
land and force him by dint of flogging to till the land for them. if he fight, the soldiers 
fire and he’s a dead man; if he gives in, he degrades himself and he is no longer a man 
at all; shame and fear will split his character and make his inmost self fall to pieces 
(Sartre [1961] 2004: 230-31). 
To aid a better understanding of all these processes historically, the main 
actors involved here are conceptualized as four powers of exclusion. 
Powers of Exclusion and Adivasis 
Our land vanished like dust before storm, our fields, our homes, all disappeared. The 
ones who came were not human beings. … The forest disappears, they make the four 
corners unclean. Oh, we had our ancestors’ graves (a Mundari song recorded by 
Mahasweta Devi 1995, quoted in Ashokan and Rangarajan 2011). 
The four powers of exclusion, according to Hall et al (2011), are: regulation, 
force, market and legitimation'. Regulation refers to authorities and 
institutions, both state and customary, for governing land use and land-
transfers: the set of rules regarding access to land and conditions of use.  
Force is violence or the threat of violence, which is brought to bear by both 
the state and non-state actors to forcefully evict people from their land. 
Market denies access to land by setting prices, boosting more individualized 
claims to land for more commercialized uses such as, mineral extraction 
industries of production and export. Legitimation tries to establish various 
moral grounds for exclusive claims to land. In Adivasi contexts it can be both 
by Adivasis claiming exclusive access to land in their ethno-territory and the 
agents of the state and industry by advancing discourses of ‘national 
development,’ while dispossessing Adivasi villagers of their land (Ibid..).  
These powers interact constantly to deny people's access to land. The state, 
thus, violates its own Constitutional provisions by advancing the logic of 
market forces. Legitimation further entrenches regulation by presenting/ 
constructing the market and force as being politically and socially acceptable 
for exclusion. An examination of these four powers of exclusion provides 
significant insights into land struggles by people as to who loses and who 
gains and how (Ibid.).  
Whilst it is useful to separate these four powers of exclusion for analytical purposes, in 
practice they are interwoven and work in strikingly complex ways. For example, when 
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land is being acquired people with market-power are in a better position to have access 
to the powers of regulation and coercion. This fusion of the economic and the political 
has profound implications for the functioning of land markets and for the dynamics of 
exclusion. At the cutting edge of their interaction, the powers with modern, globalized 
processes such as industrialization, and urbanization often end up looking more violent, 
lawless and barbarous than the 'lawlessness,' 'remoteness,' 'backwardness' associated 
with poor people whose lands are acquired (Hall et al: 140-1, emphasis added).  
All these powers have been active in Kolhan, Jharkhand and other 
neighbouring mineral-rich states since long. Regulation of access to land has 
been of two types: customary and state-administered. Customary practices 
came into conflict with exogenously imposed regulations (land-taxes) in 
Kolhan since around the thirteenth century as the ‘raja’ families demanded 
land-tax from the Hos. When the Hos had regained their independence during 
1720-1765 (Streumer forthcoming 2014), the ‘raja’ took the help of the East 
India Company which deployed direct violence on them in 1820-21 and 
1831-32 (Singh 1978; Sahu 1985; Das Gupta 2011; Streumer forthcoming 
2014). Once the British raj was entrenched, restrictions on traditional forest-
based agro-ecological practices, forced sedentarization, shift from communal 
to individual land-ownership, and agrarian expansion had led to the entry of 
monetary economy and usurping moneylenders. Consequent debt-traps, 
famines and insurrections eventuated in large-scale expatriation of Adivasis 
followed (Damodaran 1995; Chaudhuri 2008; Das Gupta 2009, 2011). In 
addition, two mutually contradictory legislations – ethno-territorial isolation/ 
enclosure, along with land acquisition further confused the scenario and 
aggravated the dispossession of Adivasis: while the Scheduled District Act 
1874 sought to protect Adivasis, the Land Acquisition Act 1894 encouraged 
mineral extraction and land alienation within the same ethno-territory 
(Corbridge 1996).  
Famine relief was the only development work and policy, defused and fragmentary; the 
provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act 1885, the Central provinces act 1898 and 1920, 
the CNTA 1908, and the Central Provinces Land alienation act 1918 covered a few 
segments of the Indian tribes (Singh 1972: 393-4). 
Since the discovery of coal, iron and other minerals in Jharkhand and Kolhan 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, the powers of state (regulation) 
and market have endlessly sought to acquire land, commercialize forests and 
extract minerals (Karan 1957; Kishwar 1987; Mundu 2003; Sunder 2009; 
Padel 2011). Coal extraction, iron and steel industries and their allied service 
centres got established. Coal processing centres, iron ore mines, stone 
171 
 
crushers, steel factories and dams for water and hydro-electric power for 
industry gained prominence (EPW 1981; Baduri 1991; Areeparampil 1996; 
George 2009). Vast areas of agricultural and forest lands were acquired at 
various times with the help of military and police forces to advance the 
market powers of exclusion while grossly neglecting investment to enhance 
predominantly land-based local peoples’ livelihood activities (Dias 1989; 
Devi 1981, 1983a, 1983b; Das 1991, 1992; Chandha 1993; Prakash 2001; 
Stuligross 2008; Dungdung 2013). Meanwhile, increasingly large numbers of 
immigrants from north Bihar, who had acquired Adivasi land by pushing 
them to further interior hills and denuded infertile lands gained economic and 
political power in these regions. Immigration of non-Adivasis into and 
emigration of Adivasis from Jharkhand region in search of livelihood options 
in other states and big cities reduced the ‘sons of the soil’ to an impoverished 
‘minority’ in their own land (Singh 1978; Weiner 1987; Stuligross 2008; Das 
Gupta 2012). 
Legitimation appeared as discourses of 'national development' by classical 
and neoclassical economists,90 ‘development’ specialists and political actors 
alike advocate to faster industrialization which brings only displacement and 
dispossession for Adivasis (Carrin 2013). Jharkhandi activists and aspiring 
Adivasi politicians91 retort them with legitimation discourses of 'Adivasi 
culture', 'identity', 'existence', demanding stricter enforcement of the 
provisions of ethno-territorial enclosures and preservation. During the post-
reform or liberalization period, however, the pace of industrialization, 
urbanization and alienation of Adivasi land have accelerated unimaginably 
(Areeparampil 1996; Walker 2008; Kujur 2011; Walter 2013; Damodaran 
2013). Despite widespread, localized protest against displacement, 
                                                      
90 According to David Harvey, neoliberalism is a project on behalf of the capitalist classes that 
advance by ‘accumulation by dispossession’ – the tendency of the elite to turn over public 
resources into private hands to enhance profit accumulation, while condemning the ‘poor’ 
for their economic poverty (Harvey 2004). 
91 Almost all Adivasi politicians use the rhetoric of ‘Adivasi culture and identity being tied to 
water, forest and land (jal, jungle and zamin) to invoke rural Adivasi’s sentiments to mobilize 
and keep them as ‘vote-banks.’ Soon after elections, they would have little option except to 
make an alliance with the powers of exclusion (conversations with Chumru, an ex-Bhartiya 
Janata Party – BJP – MLA who now is an active supporter of the Congress Party, 25 
September 2011 at Chaibasa). 
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environmental pollution and increasing incidents of health hazards,92 the 
number of small-scale mineral extractive industries has multiplied.  
An important point to note at this point is that the ‘granting’ of a separate 
statehood to Jharkhand took place only in 2000, only when these powers of 
exclusion acquired sufficient economic and political clout in an otherwise 
Adivasi dominant Jharkhand region, to be confident enough to advance their 
interests through the (diku) colonial state system. About ten years after 
liberalization in the 1990s, these powers, that stress on industrialization, had 
acquired sufficient political clout and confidence here by processes that have 
already been explained: strategic non-investment, accelerated extraction, and 
increased immigration of caste-groups and emigration of Adivasis (see 
Weiner 1978; Stuligross 2008). Thus, Jharkhand now is a separate ‘Adivasi 
state’ whose resources are controlled by powers that have created Adivasi 
‘primitiveness’ and continue to reinforce Adivasis’ practico-inert status or 
‘backwardness’ to be ‘civilized’ and ‘developed’ by these very powers. The 
surest way to the ‘development’ of Jharkhand, for these powers, is by 
aggravating extraction and industrialization (Rao 2003, 2008; Verma 2011, 
Carrin 2013). Consequently, more than 400 memoranda of understanding 
(MoUs) with domestic and transnational companies to set up large and small-
scale industries have already been signed by all successive governments in 13 
years (Kajulia 2011, Chandra 2013).  
However, these exploitative powers who are eager to form a government, 
with little legitimacy on the ground to rule (Shah 2006), have been unable to 
actually acquire larger plots of land due to strong, but localized Adivasi 
resistance movements (Swami 2012). 93 This has created a continuous 
situation of ‘land wars’ in Jharkhand, especially since 1990s. This might also 
partially explain the enduring optical instability and uncertainty in Jharkhand 
since it gained a separate statehood. The following section contextualizes 
land ‘wards’or struggles in the broader political economy of ‘access to land’ 
                                                      
92 Reports of workers deaths due to pollution related sicknesses and accidents are common 
in Jharkhand see Ojha (2012) 'Rising silicosis cases in state worry National Human Rights 
Commission', The Times of India, a national daily, 27 June. See also George (2009) and Lahiri-
Dutt et al (2012) discussion on the tactics the Industrialists and politicians employ to 
manufacture people's consensus to acquire land. 
93 Following Karl Polanyi, Hall et al (2011: 9) observe, 'Land is not an ordinary commodity but 
the basis of life, and hence exclusion from access to land is continuously subject to what he 
calls counter-movements recalling land’s social function. 
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to show why poorer people such as Adivasis need to cling to their so-called 
'traditional' livelihood resources in a colonial civic order characterized by 
cultural, structural, and direct violence, whose latest and predominant 
manifestations, during the postreform era, have been extremely predatory 
(Walker 2008; Hall et al 2011, Levien 2012, 2013, Damodaran 2013). 
The Broader Context: 'de-agrarianisation', and 'land wars'  
Most land-based conflicts and struggles of 'traditional' land-based societies in 
developing countries have an apparently contradictory character: on the one 
hand, increasing 'de-agrarianisation,' whereby the marginalized people want 
to escape from 'unprofitable' agriculture; whilst on the other hand, they refuse 
to give up whatever little 'unproductive' land they possess (Rigg 2006). In 
other words, marginalized people resist large-scale industrialization and land-
grab, since their aspirations and desires for a better life are frustrated. Irony 
lies in the fact that ‘poorer’ people have to routinely fear displacement and 
dispossession by the very processes that enable other people to enjoy a better 
life (cf. Levin 2012, 2013). Li (2009, 2011) has shown that rural people's 
collective mobilizations against eviction, or for reoccupation of disputed 
land, or clutter to hold on to their tiny 'inefficient' plots, are not solely 
inspired by their desire to conserve an ancient way of life, but their 
mobilization and resistance movements reject the unequal terms of their 
inclusion in new economies: 'terms that increase the gap between the rich and 
the poor and make the poor more vulnerable' (Li 2009: 643. Hence, 
marginalized people's engagement in land-wars must be seen as their demand 
for equality and cultural dignity (Scott 2013). 
The following section discusses a few recent unreported94 instances of ‘land 
wars’ by Ho villagers in Kolhan. 
Powers of Exclusion, Incidents of Land Grab and Grass-Roots 
Resistance in Kolhan 
Sud (2012) explicates the role of state functionaries as brokers who provide 
land to private capital while violating the state’s pronounced environment 
laws to industrialists’ interests in India. ‘The state plays a central role in both 
                                                      
94 Sharma (2013) shows how the mainstream-media tactfully avoids reporting incidents of 
grassroots protests by villagers to land acquisition advanced by the powers of exclusion while 
they highlight even the smallest incidents of so-called ‘extremist’ violence in India. 
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economic liberalization and Hindu nationalism, whose proponents actively 
access and employ state resources, power and network to attain their mission 
to perpetuate their dominance’ (Ibid.: 113). This is a succinct and precise 
description of the powers of exclusion in India acting in coalition. Similar, 
but more sober attempts have been made in Kolhan and Jharkhand by the 
‘state’ to acquire and to initiate extraction on already ‘officially’ leased out 
pieces of land. Table-5 gives a few such failed attempts owing to protests by 
Ho villagers.  
Table 6 – Unreported trials of land grab and resistance in Kolhan95 
Sl. No. Villages CDBs Year Purpose Acres 
1 Jeteya Jagnathpur 2011 Mineral exploration NA 
2 Aaburu Khuntpani 2010 Quartz 46 
3 Bara Kuntia Khuntpani 2011 SR Steel plant 16 
4 Ulijari Sadar-Chaibasa 2009 DSR Steel plant 2000 
5 Kotsona Khuntpani 2010 CRPF (camp) complex 100 
6 Surjabasa Jhinkpani 2007-08 Limestone mine 5 
7 Bara Guira Sadar-Chaibasa 2010 Limestone mine 8 
8 Pusalota Chakradharpur 2012 Solar Power Plant* 86 
9 Kundruhatu Chakradharpur 2012-13 CRPF (camp) complex 101 
10 Nakahasa Tonto 1993 & 2012 Limestone 12 
Source: Manki, a grassroots organizer of youva-jumur a youth organization Chaibasa 
(November 2013). 
(*) The actual purpose of land acquisition here was to establish a permanent CRPF camp but 
the villagers were told that it was for a solar power plant. 
The Incident at Village-1: Jeteya 
On July 8 2011, Mr. Hemant Soren96, the then deputy and present Chief 
Minister of Jharkhand state made an appeal to the people of Kolhan via local 
dailies that some sarkari karamcharis (government-staff) would visit certain 
villages to conduct mineral exploration activities. On the following day, the 
people of Jeteya village in Jagnathpur block noticed a few strangers drilling 
on their land. Villagers moved closer and asked the strangers what they were 
                                                      
95 These instances of ‘land-wars’ are from seven neighbouring development blocks only; 
similar incidents routinely happen in other blocks, especially in Noamundi and Manoharpur 
in West Singhbhum, where one of the best quality iron-ore deposits of Asia have been 
located. 
96 Mr. Soren is a Santal Adivasi himself, was then Deputy Chief-Minister of the BJP led 
coalition government which fell by the end of 2012, and since early 2013 the Chief-Minister 
of the JMM led Congress supported government. 
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doing. They replied arrogantly, 'You do not have to know what we are doing. 
We are from the sarkar.' Soon, more villagers, mostly women, gathered 
around them from nearby households; they caught hold of those sarkari 
karamcharis and gave them a thorough beating and sent them back saying, 
'This is our land and you should not enter our village hereafter without our 
permission.'  
After two days, the Sub-Divisional Officers (SDO) of Jagnathpur and 
Chaibasa, and an officer of the mines and mineral department tried to 
organize an aam-sabha (public meeting) of protesting villagers. Meanwhile, 
the villagers sought some assistance from the Jharkhandi Organisation for 
Human Rights (JOHAR), an NGO at Chaibasa, as to how best they could 
deal with the sarkar in this matter. During the public meeting, the officials 
tried to pacify the villagers arguing that the sarkar was only exploring 
mineral deposits; it had no intention to do anything with the land. One of the 
JOHAR staff, a lawyer, challenged this argument saying that such an action 
of the sarkar resembled that of a thief putting his / her hand into someone's 
pocket to see if there was some money in it, which obviously was an 
offensive act. That was why the villagers gave a fitting response to the 
sarkar’s provocative action. The meeting ended there without any desired 
outcome. 
Later, the officials invited a few representatives of the villagers to attend a 
meeting at the SDO's office at Jagnathpur. The villagers refused to attend the 
meeting. Again, on 24th July the SDO and Block Development Officer 
(BDO) of Jagnathpur planned to arrange a public meeting to have a dialogue 
with the protesting villagers at a middle-school building in the locality. 
People gathered there and, as a sign of their presence under protest, had their 
mouths covered with strips of black cloth (black ribbons) carrying placards 
stating, 'We do not want to talk, BDO and SDO go back.'97 Thus, this 
meeting, once again, ended with the failure of the sarkar to convince the 
                                                      
97 Originally, some of the people, as usual, suggested that they would come to the meeting 
with battle-axes, bows and arrows that have been considered to be their 'traditional 
weapons'. However, one of the members of the JOHAR team, a former Member and 
chairman of the (united Bihar) Legislative Assembly (MLA) advised villagers not to carry their 
so-called 'traditional weapons' to register their protest, but to do it in a more democratic 
manner; he proposed the idea of cloth of black ribbons to cover their mouth and carrying 
placards with printed messages. 
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resisting villagers.  
Meanwhile the people decided to organize a protest rally in front of the 
Jagnathpur Block Office on 5th August. More than 3,000 people had gathered 
there. They came on foot from far and nearby villages, despite heavy rains. 
They carried banners with slogans of protest. Village headmen, and the newly 
elected representatives of the Gram-Panchayats (GPs) also joined the 
demonstration. The protesters had also prepared a memorandum addressing 
the Governor of Jharkhand state against illegal land acquisition. Interestingly, 
as soon as the officers at the Block and SDO Office noticed such a big 
procession proceeding towards the office-premises, they got out of the offices 
and ran away for fear of being attacked (as narrated by D.N. Champia, a 
former Member of Legislative Assembly, presently a part time social worker 
or activist, August 21, 2011). 
The Incident at Village-10: Nakahasa 
Here land was being acquired to extract limestone by an industrialist. He had 
already leased the land by bribing a few village ‘uppers’ and the munda 
secretly. However, the actual extraction of limestone was not possible without 
the villagers’ consent. A few village ‘uppers’ and the munda were already 
paid by the agents of a mining industrialist on the condition that they would 
manage the protesting villagers to ensure least resistance to measuring the 
land to demarcate the mining area. However, as the villagers came to know 
about this, they opposed and filed several complaints with the district 
collector (DC), SDO, additional district collector (ADC) and Superintended 
of Police (SP), the main officials at the district administration requesting 
them not to allow mining in their village. They did not get any positive 
response from the administration. On 18 March 2013 some women of the 
village got the news that the industrialist’s men would arrive the village to 
measure the land. By about one o’clock in the afternoon a few men arrived in 
a Bolero van. Soon the villagers gathered, stopped them and gave them a 
thorough beating, put them in the van and sent them back.  
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Strategic media coverage and discrimination of Adivasis 
These incidents of grassroot level resistance by Adivasi villagers to the 
powers of exclusion often go unreported by both the local and national media 
like newspapers and television. West Singhbhum witnessed an increased 
number of such incidents during 2009-13, during the term of a particular 
person who took charge as DC (District Collector), who is said to be ‘corrupt 
to the core,’ and notorious in ‘seeking bribes’98 (Of course, this DC does have 
an identifiable face, name and address). These incidents of land-grabbing and 
consequent conflicts have also brought in several groups of young men who 
                                                      
98 Personal conversation with Sonu, who unearthed the DC’s involvement with the MNREGS 
scam in Manoharpur block in 2010, 10 August 2013 at his residence. 
Source: M. Tubid, organizer 
Youva-Jumur (a local organization 
rural Ho yough) (October 2013) 
 
Picture 3 – Villagers beat up and chase 
away the agents of land-grabbing 
industrialists 
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claim to be Maoists, who find acceptance in several rural villages on their 
offer to help ‘protect’ the Hos’ land from diku Sarkar.99 However, incidents 
of so-called ‘extremist’ violence get immediate attention of the mass media 
as the state’s deployment of repressive force might also get legitimized by 
such selective reportage (see Sharma 2013). 
In this context, interestingly, a Bench of the Supreme Court of India led by 
Justice A K Patnaik reportedly has said, ‘Nobody looks at Schedules V and 
VI of the Constitution and the result is Naxalism. Urbanites are ruling the 
nation. Even several union of India counsel are oblivious of these provisions 
under the Constitution’ (Anand 2012, emphasis added). However, making 
such intelligent statements, while ignoring bureaucratic corruption100 is one 
thing, and to be able to make sure that such violations of Constitutional 
provisions by oblivious urbanites do not get repeated is another. While the 
‘expert’ urbanites, with the primary motive to make more money for 
themselves, disregarding Constitutional provisions, arrive to rule Adivasi 
regions characterized by complex cultural and historical specificities, these 
situations might turn more worse and complex.  
While such oblivious ‘expert’ urbanites remain one of the primary reasons for 
aggravating the predicaments of already impoverished and conflict-ridden 
Adivasi dominant regions, the remedy offered by the Planning Commission 
of India is to allot more funds in terms of what they call Backward Regions 
Grand Fund (BRGF) since 2006-07 and Integrated Action Plan (IAP) since 
2010-11 for ‘development’ of ‘extremist’ affected areas.101 However, once 
again the same urbanite ‘experts,’ DC and SP are entrusted with the sole 
authority and responsibility to decide how these huge financial resources are 
to be spent. And this has been done despite the presence of a newly and 
locally elected Panchayat system at the district, block and village levels since 
                                                      
99 See Shah (2006 & 2010) for interesting discussions on how Maoists or Naxalites work in 
collaboration with state bureaucrats, including the police, contractors and politicians in 
Jharkhand.  
100 ‘As incidents from the more backward tribal dominated regions of Orissa reveal, the 
bureaucrat-contractor-politician nexus continues to ensure that the tribals are denied even 
those rights that assure a meaningful existence, such as a right to identity and to livelihood’ 
(Das 2003: 4429).  
101  See <http://planningcommission.nic.in/news/conference/part4.pdf> for more details on 
BRGF and <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=79472> for IAP (both accessed on 
17 December 2013). 
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the end of 2010. However, Adivasis, as Lutz and Munda (1980) have argued, 
were ‘never considered advanced enough to be able to handle anything with 
full responsibility’ (Lutz and Munda 1980: 102), a typical colonial mindset 
reinforced by racism. Consequently, what one ultimately has is a perfect 
colonial system, in place, reproducing itself with its accompanying 
immorality, and violence being aggravated by the same systemic processes 
and praxes.  
To complete the systemic colonial processes, there have been CRPF and the 
police forces raiding villages and households at night hunting for Maoist 
‘extremists.’ A Ho youth each has been picked up and put in jail from 
Pasubera (in 2011) and Baipi (in 2013) villages respectively labelling them as 
Maoists. During the CRPF hunting operations in 20013 for Maoists, four 
women in Itchahatu, two in Baipi and one in Munduedal villages were 
allegedly abused by them (personal conversations with M. Tubid, 21 October 
2013 at Chaibasa). A battalion of CRPF arrived Chaibasa in 2004, in addition 
to the increased number of police stations in KGE where there has not been 
one during the British raj. The CRPF has been trying to get a piece of land to 
set up its inert-institution to instil and maintain fear in already scared 
villagers necessary for the forced ‘civilizing’ activities of successive Bihar 
and Jharkhand governments since Independence (Maharaj and Iyer 1982, 
Saxena 2011). ‘Conquest was achieved by violence; over-exploitation and 
oppression demand the maintenance of violence, which entails the presence 
of the army’ (Sartre 2005: 21).  
These processes are also closely linked to the larger processes of 
‘accumulation by dispossession’ Harvey (2004) whereby the state and market 
forces jointly act to facilitate the accumulation of capital by a few while 
dispossessing a vast majority of their basic livelihood resources. ‘The 
inability to accumulate through expanded reproduction on a sustained basis 
has been paralleled by a rise in attempts to accumulate by dispossession’ 
(Ibid.: 63). ‘In the case of India’s development model, displacement caused 
by large projects has actually resulted in a transfer of resources from the 
weaker sections of society to more privileged ones. Mega dams, in particular, 
create victims of development – mainly tribals who never share the gains of 
development’ (Mohanti 2005: 1318). 
Harvey has argued that the analysis of the dynamics of capitalism as a mode 
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of production in Marxian analysis has been contradicted by the ‘pinhead 
formulations of neoclassical economics’ to produce a differentiated and 
urbanised space-economy. The typical neoclassical analysis places its 
emphasis on land, labour and capital, the neoclassical trinity, instead of 
landlords, labourers and capitalists. In doing so the neo-classicists remain 
‘happier’ and advance more ‘efficient’ dealings with things than with people. 
The Marxian emphasis on social relations and social change have, thus, been 
jeopardised (Gregory 2006: 8). 
The logic of a colonial system makes the colonizer sacrifice the needs of the ‘native’ 
population. The increasing rigor of the colonial system is very evident: first it occupies 
the country, then it takes away the land and exploits the former owners at starvation 
rates. ‘Then, with mechanization, this cheap labor is still too expensive; you finish up 
taking from the natives their very right to work. All that is left for the natives to do, in 
their own land, at a time of great prosperity, is to die of starvation’ (Sartre 2001b: 14 
emphasis original).  
The following section explicates how the powers of exclusion or 
dispossession actually make their way into Ho villages via what Hall et al 
(2011) terms as ‘intimate’ exclusion or ‘exclusion from below.’ 
'Intimate' Exclusion  
Powers of exclusion at local, regional, national and transnational levels 
interact and interpenetrate societies and institutions contributing to 'intimate' 
exclusion among social intimates. Neighbours and kin, exclude each other 
from access to land and resources. 'Intimate' exclusion occurs among kin and 
co-villagers who share the same tradition, history, and access to common and 
collectively inherited land by a rapid process of differentiation, also 
accelerated by uneven distribution of development benefits, promoting 
further exclusion among ‘intimates’ (Hall et al 2011: 145). 
'The tension produced by exclusion's double edge is intense at an intimate 
scale, as each villager's assertion of a right to exclude runs up against another 
villager’s claim for access (Ibid..: 146). While notions such as ‘shared 
poverty,’ ‘moral economy,’ and obligations to apply a ‘subsistence 
guarantee’ are either negated or exaggerated. The opposing notions that 
market calculus and market-based powers of exclusion operate in a social 
vacuum is also incorrect; for market is mediated by social calibrations of 
many kinds (Ibid.: 147). It takes human agency – socially situated practices – 
to create and sustain the conditions necessary for market to operate, and to 
insinuate 'the market' into intimate relations to the point that it overrides other 
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considerations (Ibid.).  
The following episode from Huringhatu explicates the process of 'intimate' 
exclusion or ‘exclusion from below.’ 
Intimate Exclusion in Huringhatu  
Mangal, a 47 year old Ho from Huringhatu has been in conflict with the 
munda, the village headman over a piece of 15 acres of land for quite some 
time. This piece of property did not belong to anyone after one of the 
munda's cousins died issueless several years ago. The Munda became the 
custodian of this piece of land when he began to pay malgujari (land-tax) for 
it. A few years later the munda's two nephews, who live with him at the same 
joint family, began to cultivate the rice-fields of this property for themselves. 
However, according to the Hos’ customary practices, such pieces of un-
owned property must be divided among all the nearest agnates of the same 
killi (patrilineage). According to Mangal, this piece of land must be divided 
into three, as his diseased uncle had three brothers; and one of them was 
Mangal's father. Thus, Mangal and his brothers asked the munda to divide 
this piece of land into three. However, the munda's nephews refused to accept 
this proposal. They challenged Mangal asking him to produce kursinama (the 
record of landownership via inheritance) which would prove his entitlement 
to a share of this property.  
On asking Mangal, if the issue could be settled by the gram-sabha, the 
village council, whose head is the munda, he said, 
No, the munda's nephews are too selfish, strong and dangerous to deal with; they 
do not listen to anyone else's opinion; and do not hesitate to inflict any harm. 
Moreover, the munda, without having any offspring of his own, aged and 
physically weak himself, has to depend on his nephews. Hence, they manipulate 
all his decisions even that of the gram-sabha. However, since his nephews (one 
of them, an ex-military man) are so dangerous, no villager would dare to confront 
the munda for fear of violence (personal conversations on 19 Dec, 2011 at 
Mangal’s residence). 
Hence, Mangal decided to access kursinama from the district record-room at 
Chaibasa.102 He approached a non-Adivasi broker from a neighbouring 
                                                      
102 Most rural Adivasis do not access the record-room themselves; only lawyers and their 
broker-agents normally do it. Huge and arbitrary amounts of money are taken from poorer 
villagers for accessing land-records, which provides a source of livelihood for several brokers, 
and an additional income for lawyers, and record-room staff. 
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village, and struck a deal with him to get a copy of kursinama. The broker 
agreed to deliver it to him for Rs. 20,000. Mangal and his cousins jointly 
collected the amount, and paid the broker first; and the kursinama was 
delivered to Mangal. However, on receiving a copy of it, he found that the 
most crucial information on it was missing. It was marked as 'broken'; and 
hence, it did not serve any purpose. Mangal had to spend Rs. 20,000 uselessly 
as he approached a state-regulatory institution (via a broker) for a small 
service from a state-institution, to which he is actually entitled. Perhaps, 
accessing the land records, at the record-room, himself might have worked 
better for Mangal than going through the broker.  
Finally, Mangal says that he now has two options left: first, to go for a violent 
confrontation with his ‘intimately’ excluding cousins. He said, he would not 
hesitate to go to any extent to make sure that he and his cousins get their due 
share of the property in question as they do not want the munda's nephews to 
enjoy it all by themselves. More interestingly, his second option, he said, was 
to request the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) to distribute the disputed 
property among the landless households in the same village; however, he 
added, he was unsure about the possible outcomes of either options; making 
obvious the intensity of dread and ambiguity involved in land conflicts 
among intimates. A third option could have been to change the right to 
headman-ship of the present munda family as it is possible to do so according 
to the Ho customary practices, however, given the fragmented and 
disintegrated state of the village ‘community,’ perhaps, for Mangal it did not 
appear to be as a feasible third option. 
Moreover, this instance of ‘intimate’ exclusion via unjust land accumulation 
and dispute in Huringhatu points mainly to two aspects: one, the type of 
social change it induces in Adivasi social formations; and two, the cost that 
Adivasis incur while approaching the post-British colonial state institutions 
for services actually entitled to any citizen of the world’s largest democracy.  
‘Intimate’ Exclusion, Colonial Desire, and Consequences 
This incident of land dispute and conflict reveals several processes at work in 
Ho society today. 'Intimate' exclusion produces jealousy, contestations, 
conflict, and fear among social intimates. One of the root causes of intimate 
exclusion has already been traced to historical processes of state-formation in 
Adivasi regions which drives on individual accumulation and social 
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differentiation for those already well endowed, on the one hand, and poverty 
and social exclusion for the less-endowed majority on the other (chapter-3). 
The founding families (of the dominant patrilineage) traditionally possessed 
the best land, established themselves as village officials, offered protection, 
and later became tax-collectors for the colonists. Thus, the office of the 
headman, which once used to be the custodian of Ho customary practices, 
and cultural values, has now become mostly devoid of legitimacy with those 
accumulating and differentiating elites. Over the years it has also become 
patriarchal and hereditary (Roy 1970; Areeparampil 1988; Sunder 2005b; 
Kela 2012). 
The affluent or elite among the Hos have always opted to escape the 
'wilderness' constructed by the nationalist scholars, and everyday struggles of 
the already marginalized rural villagers. In course of time, the weakest among 
the affluent families, who were unable or uninterested to pursue this 
particular trend of upward mobility, inherited the village offices and stuck to 
the somewhat 'frozen' customary practices (Sunder 2007), relied on the 
British colonial paternal tilts, such as the Wilkinson's rule, the munda-manki 
(Kolhan) system, and the CNTA 1908 to assert their, largely ambivalent, 
authority, although still largely relevant for the rest of the nonliterate 
villagers who look up to their sacral polity to be always true and authentic.  
While traditional authority remains still relevant for more deprived villagers 
in their everyday life, those intimately excluding or differentiating village 
'uppers,' who get stronger, and confident enough to face up to the non-Ho 
world, hardly care about the Kolhan system except when they want to use it 
to mobilize the marginalized villagers’ votes to advance their own ‘political 
career.’ Thus, the few village 'uppers,' especially, the many ex-military and 
emerging contractor-middlemen, do tactfully use the Kolhan system to 
advance their own interests and that of the colonial civic order. Thus, 
individual accumulation, socioeconomic differentiation and uneven access to 
‘development’ resources, induced by the post-British colonial state and 
market powers, result in 'intimate' exclusion among villagers producing 
verities of 'exclusion from below' effecting the gradual, long-term 
disintegration of traditional authority. Simultaneously, the notions of ‘shared 
history,’ ‘shared poverty,’ and ‘moral economy’ fade away or become 
increasingly dormant, leaving Adivasi social ecologies to be conflict-ridden 
typical colonies with their emerging ambivalent colonial kinglets acting to 
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advance the colonial logic of super-exploitation. 
The Cost of Encountering State Institutions 
Another important aspect that such land dispute among ‘intimates’ reveals is 
the cost of accessing state-regulatory institutions – the record-room, for 
instance, by Ho villagers. The bureaucracy and the regulatory arrangements 
of land tenure, among other administrative arrangements in Kolhan, and 
Jharkhand, create an elaborate informal network of lawyers, bureaucrats, 
middlemen, politicians and their agents. Most Adivasi villagers, like Mangal 
of Huringhatu, have to pay heavy costs to access any service to which they 
are actually entitled. Even after incurring such heavy costs, the end result 
often remains arbitrary as Gupta (2012) has shown that bureaucratic practices 
render structural violence. Sharan (2009) and Rao (2009) have highlighted 
the costs, arbitrariness and uncertainty involved while dealing with regulatory 
arrangements ostensibly to restore alienated Adivasi lands. There are various 
‘protective’ legislations in Jharkhand, however, they hardly help 
economically poorer Adivasis to prevent land alienation in practice.103 About 
land related dispute settlements among Adivasis of Santal Pargana region, in 
Jharkhand; Rao (2009) says,  
The first attempt is always to resolve disputes locally, but if violence erupts … Then 
there is no option but to use the state regulatory process. Yet there is much to be desired 
from the functioning of the courts ... in 95 per cent of the cases, the parties stop 
attending after some time. Apart from the difficulties in court procedures, there is also 
no way of ensuring that the order given finally is implemented at the village level. The 
party with power, both economic and social, tends to get the better deal in practice. This 
includes the locally dominant individuals, but also institutions of the state (Ibid.: 79-
81). 
Moreover, state-institutions, which regulate land-tenure, have always been 
interacting jointly with the powers of market via the pursuers of Lakshmi, 
mostly ‘upper’ castes immigrants from neighbouring states, who have been 
the commanders in chief or heads of military and police forces, bureaucracy, 
and powers of legitimation (academics, development policy makers and 
‘professionals’ of mass media and even human rights activists) in Kolhan, 
and Jharkhand. Such joint interactions of these powers of exclusion – 
regulation, market, force and legitimation – frequently invoke fears of 
                                                      
103 Some of these are CNTA 1908, Santal Pargana Tenancy Act (SPTA) 1949, Land Acquisition 
Act (LAA) 1894, Coal Bearing Act 1957, and the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe 
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989. 
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violent, involuntary eviction of Adivasi villagers. Consequently, the villagers 
protest and ‘disrupt’ the state’s 'development' projects such as medium and 
large-scale dams,104 proposed large-scale industrial establishments, extractive 
industries, and Central Reserve Force (CRPF) camps or centre in West 
Singhbhum, and at other places in Jharkhand.  
Projects such as these, which hardly benefit marginalized Adivasis, have 
always come to predominantly Adivasi regions or margins accompanied by 
violent forces that evict them without any prior information, consent or 
adequate compensation (see Dias 1983; Devi 1981a; EPW 1980; Chadha 
1993; Pati 2006; EPW 2012; Dungdung 2013). When protests and disruption 
by local villagers occur, the reaction of state functionaries have always been a 
strategic abandonment of these initiatives, till the grassroots protests and 
demonstrations, often qualified as being ‘anti-development,’ disperse and 
weaken to reinitiate the same temporarily abandoned projects so that the state 
functionaries invariably draw benefit from such repeated initiatives while 
‘development’ projects as such face continuous dilemma and inertia (see 
Sunder 2009). 
Conclusion 
The chapter began with episodes of Adivasi villagers living in fear of 
anytime eviction since their land contains rich mineral wealth which would 
be exploited by powers that unjustly dispossess them. While Adivasi 
villagers oppose such super-exploitative powers embedded in the colonial 
civic order, they are not only branded as being antidevelopment, but also 
their lands and agrarian infrastructure has strategically been kept away from 
                                                      
104 In West Singhbhum district alone, there are about 11 medium and large-scale dam 
projects, that had begun in the 1970s, still 'under construction,' and left in dilemma due to 
local protests mainly caused by bureaucratic arrogance, that does not even have the 
willingness to undertake a proper survey of households that would be displaced. On 
employing the right to information Act 2005, I received some details of a few proposed dams 
under construction, displacement, and compensation from the department of irrigation. The 
documents do not provide any details of households that would be displaced due to these 
projects; they only have a few names of those households who have come to take 
compensation. During my interactions with villages around a half-finished irrigation dam at 
Ponsoa in Sonua block of West Singhbhum, the villagers said that those who got 
compensation were people who were already better-of; others have not gone to the 
department office for any compensation, but have cleared some forest tracts further deep 
into inaccessible mountainous regions (personal conversations 7-8 July 2011). 
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any meaningful investments that might improve sustainable alternative 
livelihood opportunities for villagers who depend heavily on the agricultural 
sector. Consequently, Adivasi regions have been increasingly turned into 
marginal places typifying colonies that supply raw materials and cheap 
labour to feed urban centres of ‘development’. 
Employing concepts such as ‘political, economic and ecological 
marginality,’ ‘powers of exclusion,’ ‘access’ as people’s ability to benefit 
from resources, ‘dispossession by accumulation,’ and ‘intimate exclusion’ 
this chapter has analyzed processes of land alienation, local resistance 
movements confronting powers of exclusion and their consequences for 
Adivasis. It has shown, in some detail, how various complex socioeconomic 
and political processes of systematic exclusion of people from accessing 
resources take place, which in turn, creates land-wars, increased 
deprivations, and a spiral of social exclusion, counter movements, violent 
conflicts, and repressive state interventions. All of these further advance 
deprivations and social exclusion that complete a typical colonial and racist 
system, which reproduces itself while reducing Adivasi social formations 
into disintegrated, and fragmented groups of impoverished individuals.  
The next chapter explicates the role of education in shaping the ideological 
instrument to advance processes of pauperization and self-alienation of 
Adivasis more systematically and strategically. 
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The will to Educate and ‘Civilize’: Indian State's Efforts to 
educate its Adivasis 
 
Alienation and murder drive the institutions of civilization. 
(Layla AbdelRahim 2009: 1) 
 
The business is conducted with flying colors and by experts; the 
‘psychological services’ weren’t established yesterday; nor was 
brainwashing. And yet, in spite of all these efforts, their ends are nowhere 
achieved. 
(J-P Sartre [1961] 2004: 231) 
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Introduction 
The Additional District Programme Officer (ADPO) of the Jharkhand Siksha 
Pariyojana (Jharkhand Education Project – JEP) said, 'There is no school 
teacher in the district who would like to send his or her children to a 
government school for education, but all of them would prefer to work at 
government schools.' This statement summarises the situation of state-
managed schools in Kolhan, Jharkhand and other central eastern states of 
India: huge sums of money have been spent in terms of constructing school 
buildings, recruiting teachers and paying a handsome monthly salary to 
appointed teachers, besides other related expenses, but still the quality of 
education remains abysmally low so that no one wants to send their children 
to government schools, however, everyone likes a handsome monthly income 
without doing any serious work.  
The continuing failure of the Indian state to invest in universal primary education could 
reasonably be described as an act of violence, both against the government’s own stated 
intentions and against those girls and boys who are refused the funds and institutions 
needed to improve their life-chances of choices. (Corbridge and Harris 2000: 167).  
This argument, no doubt, reflects a serious concern for the well-being of 
millions of 'illiterate' and out of school children in India, especially those 
children of economically poorer households, who cannot access education 
due to social exclusion, poverty, discrimination and the abysmally poor 
quality of and irrelevant education provided to them by the state in India. The 
statement also goes well with the idea of promoting human rights, quicker 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, and poverty reduction, 
since it has often been argued that education increases people's 'substantive 
freedoms' in terms of gainful employment, and political liberties which 
enable people to combat historical disadvantages. (Dréze and Sen 1995, 
2002).  
Education, no doubt, is the key to enhance life-chances and choices, however, 
the content of education and the method of its implementation largely 
determine its outcomes. If the educational curriculum and pedagogy produce 
and reproduce unjust structures rather than expose and critique them, then 
they might produce negative results for the historically marginalized or 
disadvantaged social groups (Bourdieu and Jean-Claude 1977). In this sense, 
education, notwithstanding all good intentions and efforts, might produce 
unintended or contradictory outcomes. ‘After Foucault, it is difficult to state 
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undauntedly that education is concerned solely with doing good to people and 
promoting social progress. It is not unusual to listen to undergraduates or 
teachers speaking about the relationship between schools and the production 
of disciplined bodies, or to refer to histories of education in terms of 
genealogies.’ (Dusel 2010: 27). 
In this chapter, I intend to show how the Indian state's efforts to educate 
Adivasi children in Kolhan and Jharkhand, like other well intentioned 
poverty alleviation schemes to 'improve' Adivasis, yield contradictory 
outcomes not only by systematically denying Adivasis self-respect and 
cultural dignity, but also by reducing the economically deprived and 
marginalised children and parents to a more degraded existence, making 
Adivasi children’s school-life one of everyday humiliation and exercises in 
self-denial. I argue that this unheeded aspect of Indian education itself can be 
one of the main reasons for Adivasis' ‘option’ to be non-literate and their 
constructed 'backwardness.' 
In two most recent articles, Higham and Shah (2013a, 2013b) have shown 
that education and affirmative action in Jharkhand jointly acts as a 
'contradictory resource' for Adivasis in two ways: (1) job reservations provide 
Adivasis access to relatively badly paid and less secure jobs as para-teachers 
compared to non-Adivasi traditional elites who move out and diversify their 
income several times more than the former do; and (2) educated young 
Adivasis 'emulate the norms, values and ways of life of the local elite', which 
introduces and entrenches new divisions and inequalities within Adivasi 
social formations (2013a: 1). This process, according to Higham and Shah, is 
partly explained by 'market-led gains within the private education sector for 
more advantaged sections of society that outweigh the predominately state-
led improvements for Adivasis'. Thus, the state's affirmative action remains 
limited in improving the relative positions of 'socioeconomically 
marginalized groups' (2013b: 80). 
Higham and Shah's admittedly partial explanation for education and 
affirmative action to be a 'contradictory resource,' this chapter argues, is due 
to two reasons: first, they have paid little attention to the content and nature 
of education in terms of what ‘education’ does to Adivasi subjectivities; and 
second, they have assumed the idea of ‘the state’ to be a neutral and given 
entity with some 'universal features.' Thus, this chapter exposes a double 
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problem with education: first: government schools do not offer schooling, 
despite investments made, with the more affluent sending their children to 
English medium private or Missionary schools. And second, the educational 
curriculum and pedagogy enforce cultural and symbolic violence on Adivasis 
as they tend to negate their cultural values, and subjectivities while 
indoctrinating Adivasis into the colonial civic order. 
This chapter, thus, attempts to add a few more aspects to Higham and Shah’s 
findings about education of Adivasi children to bring a more holistic 
understanding of the educational scenario in Adivasi dominant regions, 
regarding its outcome, and how and why education produces contradictory 
outcomes. Taking Freire's fundamental thesis: there is no neutral education; 
and education is either for domestication or for freedom (1977), and by citing 
the example of the Ho Adivasi society in Jharkhand, the chapter shows how 
and why the noble vision of 'education for all' in India turns out to be 
contradictory and counterproductive. By doing so  it shows that the content of 
education for Adivasis, and the method of its delivery have systematically 
been programmed to enslave or domesticate them, rather than liberate them; 
and hence, while maintaining a curriculum and pedagogy that domesticate 
Adivasis, the noble intentions of enhancing people’s 'substantive freedom' is 
untenable. 
The following three vignettes – one and three from Huringhatu (V2), and two 
from a village in Jagnathpur block in West Singhbhum district – and an 
observation from Huringhatu provide the background and context to the 
argument I advance in the course of this chapter. This is followed by a short 
discussion on how education can perpetuate distorted praxis and processes. A 
short history of Indian Education System and policies would explicate how 
entrenched unequal power relations have been normalized in India. Further 
the chapter shows how new educational inequalities produce humiliation to 
poorer Adivasi households, which in turn produces resistance in forms of 
weapons of the weak. Such latent forms of resistance render the state’s 
educational interventions, such as ‘education for all,’ a continuous failure in 
Adivasi dominant regions. This argument is explicated by field based data on 
school enrolment, daily attendance and educational outcomes in study 
villages. Furthermore, observations about home-school polarities, 
ambivalence of violence caused by discrimination, denial of history, language 
and cultural values and dignity to Adivasi children by imposing an alien 
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education system run mostly by no-Hos who cannot understand or speak the 
young Ho children’s language are delineated. Then, the chapter provides a 
few individual experiences of ‘educated’ Adivasis who recognize and rework 
their experience of the ambivalence of violence in their lives by taking 
individual initiatives not only to help themselves but also to reach out to their 
co-villagers. And the final section of this chapter recapitulates the main 
findings and arguments.  
Vignette-1 Kishore is the village headman’s (munda) elder brother who 
has received his formal education from a government aided mission school105 
and has now retired from his 40 years-long service at Tata Iron and Steel 
Company (TISCO) Jamshedpur, an industrial city about 67 kilometres from 
his home village, Huringhatu which is seven kilometres from Chaibasa town. 
He has been staying and working at Jamshedpur all these years, although he, 
along with his family, kept visiting the village, since he still holds a share of 
his ancestral rice-land at the village. After his retirement from the job at 
TISCO, he has built a house at Huringhatu for himself, for he feels more 
comfortable to stay at the village than in Jamshedpur city. He has two 
children; both of them hold postgraduate degrees and are working – one at 
Chaibasa and the other in Jamshedpur.  
I happened to visit his house during my field work, in December 2011, as the 
munda directed me to talk with him saying, 'Kishore can tell you more about 
school education at the village.’ While chatting with Kishore about the 
education of Adivasi children, he said, 
These people keep drinking diyang (rice-beer) and remain drunk day and night, and in 
that same state of being drunk, their women conceive and give birth to children. So the 
children also remain ‘drunk’ and grow up in a semi-conscious state of mind from the 
moment of conception. How can one expect such a child to study and make his/ her life 
for any better? That is why these people would continue to be like this, no matter, 
whatever you do to make them better their situation (personal conversation 11 
November 2011). 
This is a striking example of how ‘educated’ affluent Adivasis justifying their 
‘fortunes,’ whose very pursuits have marginalized and produced the practico-
                                                      
105 There are three different categories of schools: 1. government schools; 2. private/ 
minority owned, but government aided schools; and 3. private/ mission unaided schools. 
Most English-medium schools in India fall under the third category, however, they need to 
be approved by the state's regulatory body to be able to issue valid certificates to students 
under a board of education or university. 
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inertness of their co-villagers. I spoke to yet another affluent ‘educated’ Ho, 
who has just retried from a high level government job, about social changes 
among Hos as a result of education. He gave many examples of educational 
changes in Ho society; I present two most interesting ones here. First, he said 
‘earlier times, Adivasi women in rural villagers did not use cloths to cover 
the upper part of their body, but now almost all of them use. This is a major 
change.’ Second, referring to his two ‘well-educated’ daughters, he said, ‘on 
being educated, Adivasi girls become far more versatile and outspoken than 
boys; hence, it is difficult to get competent male partners for educated Ho 
women’ (personal conversations on 23 March 2011, at his residence in 
Chaibasa). 
These conversations reflect a certain ambivalent and contradictory 
positioning of affluent Adivasis whose ‘education’ has denied them their 
proud history, alternative imaginations, and cultural dignity. Being far 
removed from the everyday struggles of their deprived co-villagers, they 
neither understand the deprived co-villagers’ present predicaments, nor do 
they get fully absorbed into a caste-divided colonial civic order whose 
paternalistic provisions of affirmative policies keep them pacified and 
ambivalent. Further discussion on such contradictory positioning of 
‘educated’ affluent Hos will be taken up towards the later part of this chapter. 
For now, the second vignette follows. 
Vignette-2 Devan, a Ho from a rural village, lives in a small rented-room 
with seven children (his nieces, nephews and grandchildren) at Jaganathpur 
suburb, about 22 kilometres away from their home village. Devan has been a 
clerk at the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL), a public sector mining 
company. While talking about his own education, the sacrifices his parents 
had to make to educate him, and so on, he said: 
I have realized the value of education in my life. Hence, after my retirement from the 
job at SAIL, I have come here to Jagnathpur with these children (pointing to the 
children) to make it possible for me to avail the best possible education, I can afford, 
for these children. Although there is a school building in every village/ hamlet in 
Kolhan now, no education is being provided to children who attend these sarkari 
(government) schools. I am using my own pension-money, time and energy to educate, 
them at this nearby English-medium school (run by a private agency), because these 
children are our future.  
Hence, I remain with them; cook food for them; and try to help them in their studies. 
They go to their home villages only for a few days during school-holidays. They need 
to be here to study, back home they have no facilities such as proper light at night to 
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study, no functioning schools, no teacher to give them tuitions, and so on. They need to 
concentrate on their studies and do their daily homework to survive in a highly 
competitive English school environment (personal conversation 2 August 2011). 
Vignette-3 Back at Huringhatu is Vijay Ho who passed out from a local 
government high school and holds a bachelor’s degree from a local 
government college at Chaibasa. After trying hard to qualify himself for a job 
unsuccessfully, he remained at home cultivating his smallholding. His family 
now consists of seven members (parents, three boys, and a girl). He regrets 
that he could not send any of his children to a 'good' school (meaning, a few 
mission schools in and around Chaibasa, which are more expensive than 
government schools). His eldest son of 15 years has been attending the 
government-middle-school (primary and upper-primary combined) at the 
village, but left attending school after the eighth class. During my last visit to 
his house Vijay said: 
I feel so frustrated about not being able to send at least my little daughter (his youngest 
child) to a 'good' school. Instead, she goes to the sarkari-school at the village; what will 
she learn there? Nothing. Children get only food and no education these days in sarkari 
schools (personal conversation 19 February 2011). 
An Observation 
In the same village, one finds the members of economically poorer and 
destitute households, who constitute the majority, stubbornly refusing to 
speak 'diku-kaji' (a term they use to refer to Hindi, the national language, 
meaning, the language of the alien exploiter and troublemaker). They 
struggle day and night to survive, fighting chronic hunger and destitution, 
keep consuming diyang (rice-beer) which serves them both some nutritional 
needs, and gives a short escape from the mounting frustration and 
hopelessness that have become part of their everyday lives over several years 
of exploitation and discrimination (as the forgoing chapters have already 
shown).  
Indeed, their life-style, often seen from a distance, provides 'empirical 
evidence' to victim-blaming theories generally proposed by a few Adivasi 
elites like Kishore in Vignette-1, and most non-Adivasis at Chaibasa and 
other urban areas to explain the 'failure of education' and ‘development’ in 
Kolhan, Jharkhand and other Adivasi dominant pockets in the central eastern 
states of India. Such deep seated and unchallenged prejudices, which drive 
most ‘educational,’ ‘developmental’ and ‘welfare’ policies, have a long 
history – a dialectic of praxis and process akin to colonialism and racism. 
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How Education Perpetuates Colonialism and Racism as Praxis and 
Process? 
Wills (1977) showed how caged resentments that always run short of outright 
confrontation would lead to supplanted individual identity despite formal 
education and how social reproduction is sustained at individual level, which 
accounts for the subordinate’s agreement with the conditions. Biddle (2001) 
has discussed how educational policy and practice affect different classes and 
ethnic groups variously in multicultural contexts. Steiner (2003) has 
explicated the politics of imparting education, ‘Teaching could be considered 
an exercise, open or hidden, of power relations. The Teacher has 
psychological, social, and physical powers. S/he can reward and punish, 
exclude and rise’ (quoted in Dusel 2010: 29). Furthermore, Bourdieu and 
Passeron [1977] (1990) have explicated several complex and unintelligible 
ways of cultural and societal reproduction via symbolic violence involved in 
educational (reproductive) processes that imposes dominant values and 
practices on younger generations without critical reflection about their future 
consequences for those being subordinated. 
Ball (2005) has pointed out education’s capacity to affect social inequality, 
reproduce and maintain it. He emphasises the need to develop an ‘effective 
policy analysis,’ an analysis of policy events, the rational of changes 
underpinning them, and ‘the application of such an analysis to education 
policy and specifically to the “privatisation” of public education and its 
effects on social justice, and what it means to be educated.’ He emphasises 
the need for ‘continuing attempts to understand the particular role of social 
class in all this – and the different educational ontology of upper, middle and 
working class families’ (Ibid.: 277). A short history of the educational visions 
and policies in India brings to light the logic of their choices and how these 
policies have been operationalized to maintain and reproduce the colonial 
civic order intact. 
A Short History of Education in India 
Education in ancient India was much advanced and classical, but it was 
meant only for the dwija (the 'twice born'), a few elite. According to Dhillon 
(2010) the two main ancient formal education systems in India were 
Brahmanical and Buddhist, and were accessible only to a few elites. The so-
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called 'lower' castes were not only denied their right to education and 
knowledge, but the treasures of their experiential knowledge, embedded in 
folklores, were also being appropriated by the so-called 'upper' castes (Ilaiah 
2010). Of course, Adivasis have been invisible in ancient India as they kept 
escaping the domineering powers and ideologies manifested in violent and 
oppressive structures of exploitation – taxes, rents, forced free labour, and 
humiliations (see Saha 1986 along with Scott 2009). However, these state-
fleeing people (Adivasis) had developed their own alternative systems to 
socialize the young among them (see below). 
The present system of so-called 'universal' education in India is a 
continuation of colonial education introduced to advance pre-British, British 
and post-British colonizers' interests. Its continuity has been well preserved 
since it suited the post-British (ruling) elite's broader nationalist rhetoric of 
‘national unity’ (Guha 1997; Chatterjee 1993) devoid of socioeconomic 
justice and equal opportunity (Ilaiah 2004, 2010). The aim of British-colonial 
education in India is emboldened in T.B. Macauly's famous Minutes of 1835: 
the creation of a class of anglicised Indians who would serve as cultural 
intermediaries between the colonizer and their Indian subjects. Macauly said,  
We must do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the 
millions whom we govern, a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in 
tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect... (Macauly 1835 quoted in: Sharp 1965: 
116).  
This system got a ready acceptance among the so-called 'upper' castes/ 
classes of India, who had extended their cooperation to the British (Bayley 
2000; Patterson 2009: chapter 2). The postcolonial elites made a minimum 
possible modifications to the British-colonial system of education in India, 
which suited the interests of dominant castes/ classes, and established it as the 
only authorized means to socialise the Indian 'masses' (see Acharya 1978; 
Desai 1992; Guha 1997; Benei 2008; Ilaiah 2010). 
The question of power was reduced to an elite contest with no room left in it for the 
South Asian people except as an inert mass deployed by the dominant elements to serve 
their own ends according to strategies of their own intervention. ... An authorized 
alternative to colonialist discourse pitted against the authorized nationalist 
historiography from its inception; it would have no place for a long time yet in class-
rooms and curricula. Far from being promoted as an aid to the education of the young, 
it was destined to be classified as forbidden for all – young and old (Guha 1997: x, 
211). 
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Moreover, the elite in India always resisted any meaningful reform in the 
education system for it served to maintain their status-quo. For example, 
during his address to a conference on education in 1948, Jawaharlal Nehru, 
the first Prime Minister of India, had remarked:  
Whenever conferences were called to form a plan for education in India, the tendency, 
as a rule, was to maintain the existing system with slight modification. This must not 
happen now. Great changes have taken place in the country and the educational system 
must also be in keeping with them. The entire basis of education must be revolutionized 
(quoted in Ghosh, 2000: 178).  
While this revolution is yet to take place, on the contrary, there have been 
more conservative efforts to rewrite history to serve vested interests.106  
The spread of education has brought about little fundamental change in the pattern of 
inequality in Indian society to meet the ends of both justice and efficiency. It is well 
known that one pays very little for education in best universities in India, but a great 
deal for education in even a moderately good school. ... The less fortunate cannot send 
their children to good schools, and those who go to poor schools have poor chances in 
the competition for places in the universities. No doubt, the expansion of university 
education creates new opportunities, but it does not create new opportunities equally for 
all sections of society (Béteille 1983: 15).  
Consequently, education in India confers social advantages and opens up new 
avenues of social mobility for a few (Kothari 1964; Ilaiah 1994; Joshi 2013), 
while introducing new and powerful forms of social inequality and 
separation. This bars the mobility and emancipation of the underprivileged 
majority107 (Viswanathan and Nair 2001; Tilak 2010; Mooij and Majumdar 
2011; Froerer 2011, 2012). In addition to endemic poverty and related 
learning disadvantages, economically poorer students also face the hegemonic 
and crippling caste/ varna ideology, and different forms of social exclusions 
based on caste and socio-economic status. Caste/ jati based discriminatory 
treatment (cultural and structural violence) of school children in India still 
persists as it has been considered normal (Vilaskar 2010; Ray and Majumder 
2010; Desai and Dube 2012; Borooah 2012; Neelakandan and Patil 2012).   
Even under the guise of Constitutional obligations the state of India has abdicated its 
responsibility to educate all. Education has turned out to be a boon for a privileged few. 
Further, in their pursuit of economic accumulation the government of the country has 
iniquitously exploited and perpetuated mass illiteracy (Desai 1992: 2). 
                                                      
106 See Delhi Historians' Group [DGH] (2001), Hassan (2002) and Roy (2003) for more details. 
107 For reports on discrimination of Dalit professors, students and employees at institutions 
of higher education in India, see Jha (2013), Kumar (2011) and The Hindu (2013). 
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Educating Adivasis 
Most studies on Adivasi education do not discuss the nature and content of 
formal education, which has been meant to reproduce and perpetuate 
inequality (Sunder 2002, 2010a, b, & c). A seminar volume on 'Tribal' 
Education in India (1967) noted the sheer difficulty against which 'tribal' 
education was being carried out. The seminar report admitted the existence of 
a huge educational disparity among and within Adivasi communities; it also 
mentioned a range of Adivasi responses to modern education: an avid thirst 
for education, indifference, and even hostility. The seminar volume also 
recognized the challenges of making education worthwhile and attractive to 
Adivasis (Haines 1968). The context of this challenge needs to be understood, 
once again, from its historicalness.  
Pre-British Colonial Education in Chotanagpur and Kolhan 
Prior to British colonial invasion into Adivasi dominant regions, Adivasi 
social formations had their own indigenous systems of socialization and 
governance, integral to their sacral polities. Toppo (1979) and Ambash 
(1995) have discussed the educational roles of the youth dormitory systems 
of the Mundas (giti-ora) and the Oraons (dumkuria) where the youth (boys 
and girls) separately gathered regularly to learn about social conduct and 
family life under the constant guidance of specially appointed elders. 
However, later these ancient institutions disintegrated with increasing 
external interferences (Roy 1935). By the end of the 19th Century, most 
indigenous institutions and knowledge systems had become grossly eroded or 
dormant (Furer-Haimendorf 1950; Hasnain 1990; Mahanti 1995). 
Furthermore, there remains a dearth of proper information on Adivasis, and 
indigenous knowledge or education systems precisely because of orality and 
non-literary which characterize Adivasi traditions besides their constructed 
‘barbarity’ and ‘backwardness. 
British Colonial Era   
'Modern' education among Adivasis of Kolhan and Chotanagpur was initiated 
by the British by the mid-nineteenth century. In 1839 the British officers in 
Chotanagpur entrusted Christian missionaries with the mission of 'civilizing' 
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the 'barbarians.’108 The missionaries' main preoccupation was to advance 
their mission-paradigm of the 19th Century, which was not Adivasi friendly. 
Hence, missionary education benefited only a few who valorised it without 
either integrating the indigenous systems of knowledge with missionary 
education or enabling Adivasi social formations to revive their own 
indigenous systems and practices (Bara 2010). The disjunction between the 
'educated' and nonliterate Adivasi has some of its roots here, which has not 
yet been bridged.  
Although some British officials wanted to empower Adivasis by providing 
them with relevant education which would enable them to protect their lands 
from alien exploiters, the means to achieve this goal was limited due to 
unavailability of teachers other than caste Hindus who exploited Adivasis. 
Moreover, the 'upper' caste Hindus were against British officers’ efforts to 
educate Adivasis and other 'lower' castes (Bara 2005). Bara has quoted from 
a colonial report, 'The gurus [teachers] are for the most part prejudiced Lalas 
and regard the tribes as mlechcha [unclean]; and the landowning classes are 
hostile to the education of the classes below them. It will be a long time 
before the children of the Hindus, Kols or Sonthals really read [study] 
together in one school' (Ibid.: 631). Moreover, Adivasis with their general 
animosity to outsiders, and initial lukewarm attitude to 'modern' education, 
largely stayed away from these new institutions. In this context, 'the social 
and cultural conditions of the Hos deteriorated' faster under British raj' (Ibid.: 
634). 
Formal education for the Hos of Kolhan (Singhbhum) began in 1841 as a part 
of the ‘civilizing’ mission of the British, carried out via Christian 
missionaries, which the mundas and mankis, the traditional Ho aristocracy, 
initially hesitantly approached as the missionaries were against the 'hundred 
and one bongas' (spirits) that ruled the Ho social, religious and cultural 
systems.109 However, in 1890, there were 281 primary, seven middle (of this 
                                                      
108 European understandings of the power of literacy encouraged Spaniards in the New 
World to discount the value of indigenous graphic systems and to disparage Mesoamerican 
languages as untruthful, unreliable, and products of the devil. The dark side of the new 
knowledge-orders born out of the Renaissance was a new interweaving of literacy, 
knowledge, and colonization in a new cultural order which Mignolo dubs 'coloniality' 
(Ballantyne 2011: 232). 
109 More interestingly, the most pronounced aim of education for Hos was to end witch-craft 
and sokhaism seen by the British officials as one of the most awful social evils. However, in 
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two were missionary) schools and one high school in united Singhbhum 
(which included the present Singhbhum East and West, and Saraikela-
Kharsawan districts) (Choudhury 1958: 164). According to census report 
1901, the total literacy rate in Singhbhum was 2.5 per cent (4.8 % male and 
0.3 % female). Exactly a century later census 2001 reported the total literacy 
rate of Adivasis in Kolhan as 27.9 per cent (42.2 % male and 13.62 % 
female).  
Post-British Colonial Period 
The education system in united Bihar (of which Jharkhand was a part till 
2000) is said to have collapsed completely since the late 1960s and early 
1970s during the period of Sampurna Kranti, the ‘total revolution’ 
movement initiated and led by J.P. Narayan, a Gandhian Socialist, who 
had encouraged both high school and college students, in big numbers all 
over Bihar, to take part in this movement. This led to criminalisation of 
student groups, and disinterestedness of teachers who lost their ‘control’ 
over students.110 Mahasweta Devi described the situation of school 
education in Kolhan in the 1980s, a decade before the UNICEF funded 
Bihar Education Project (BEP)111 began in the 1990s, 
                                                                                                                                         
1958 there were still, at least, a dozen murders committed annually due to witch-hunts in 
Kolhan although, ironically, a good deal of Adivasi culture had disintegrated (Choudhury 
1958). Even today, for that matter, the annual statistics of murders related to witch-hunt in 
Kolhan remains almost the same as it was in 1958 (personal conversations with women 
activists working with the victims of rape and witch-hunting at Chaibasa, 10 November 
2011). However, most recently Chaudhuri (2013) has shown that witch-hunts must not be 
viewed as exotic / primitive rituals of a ‘backward’ community, but as a powerful protest by a 
community against its oppressors. Hence, incidents of witch-hunting must be analyzed 
within the backdrop of a community’s relationship with its encapsulating, dominant and rigid 
power relations, patronage and social-distance.  
110 Personal conversation with Dr. C.K. Pati, a historian, at his residence at Chaibasa, about 
the situation of education in Kolhan and Jharkhand (21 August 2011). 
111 With the UN declaration of 1990 as the International Literacy Year, the idea of 
universalising primary education found its place in Bihar, the most 'backward' and 'illiterate' 
state, initially funded by the UNICEF to provide education for all children between the age of 
6-14 (Sarva Shiksha Abiyan – SSA – ‘education for all movement’). This project was known as 
Bihar Education Project (BEP) which also initiated the District Primary Education Program 
(DPEP). Since 2001, SSA has been funded by the World Bank; and in Jharkhand the project is 
called Jharkhand Education Project (JEP). See DRCWC (2011) for more details on SSA in 
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There is a primary school for every hundred homesteads. The teachers have their own 
business or shops to look after. Teachers from North Bihar posted here involved in 
money lending, buying land and taking land on contacts. Stipend money for children 
comes in lump-sum, a cut is taken by them ... A Mundari song runs like this, 'Rando, 
Rando, come to the school! Mata, Mata, where are you? Rando and Mata and the other 
boys graze the cow, tend the goat. The Masterji [teacher] sits in his shop' (Devi 1981a: 
1012). 
By this time, there were five Hindi medium mission schools in and around 
Chaibasa, and from the 1990s onwards, the number of English-medium 
schools began multiplying due to the elites’ demand for better education for 
their children while the government educational institutions became 
increasingly corrupt and dysfunctional,112 although the number of school-
buildings have multiplied since the JEP began in 2001. Today, while the 
deprived and historically marginalised Adivasi children are provided food 
(mid-day-meal) at government schools with a view to increase the number of 
enrolments as a proof for the success of World Bank funded JEP, while an 
expanding private or English-medium education markets cater to the elites’ 
needs to educate their children (Garg and Mandal 2013). While Adivasi 
children from elite households manage to cope with the dominant values and 
life-styles imparted by a highly centralised education or syllabus system or 
curriculum, children from deprived Adivasi households fail to do so. Thus, 
while the elite, and upper middle classes or castes opt for more expensive 
private education, the government schools try to attract children from the 
most deprived households who are blamed for their ‘poverty’ and 
‘backwardness.’ Hence, there emerge victim-blaming theories that explain 
the ‘failure’ of ‘tribal-education,’ on the one hand, and resistance (along the 
line of weapons of the weak) from poorer Adivasi children and their parents, 
on the other. 
                                                                                                                                         
Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Chhattisgarh; for Jharkhand, see also Higham and Shah (2013a, 
2013b) and http://www.jepc.nic.in/SSA.htm, the website of JEP (28 December 2012). 
112 Huge sums of teachers' salary began to be arrears, for the last 15-20 years no promotion 
and or appointment of new teachers; despite increased numbers of students about 50 times 
more, there has been no revision of the procedures in recruiting teachers for the last 50 
years (Prabhat Khabar, a local daily, 11 November 2011); from primary to higher secondary 
schools, there have been 57,596 regular teachers' and 80,500 para-teachers' posts lying 
vacant (Hindustan, a local daily, 28 November 2011); although no now teacher was 
appointed during the last 11 years, the appointment policy has been altered seven times 
(Prabhat Khabar 12 December 2011). 
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Adivasi Resistance to the Will to Educate and Improve 
'The promise of formal education comes at the cost of Adivasi cultural 
identity and local knowledge. Even while recognizing that in all cases, 
educational processes are fundamentally cultural processes... Adivasis in 
general, and not just their children, are seen as people for whom compulsion 
must be exercised in their own best interest' (Sunder 2010b: 123). 'Formal 
education may both destroy and create ‘indigenous’ identities and claim to 
possess indigenous knowledge' (Sunder 2010a: 21). According to Xaxa 
(2001)Adivasis have made comparatively less progress in education since 
their central concern has been to secure control over land and natural 
resources in their territories, rather than upward mobility within the caste-
ridden mainstream; Adivasi children face language problems in schools; they 
resist individualistic values intrinsic to the prevalent educational systems 
based on ranking and competition; and moreover they lack role models in 
educational and emancipatory leadership like, at least, the one the Dalits have 
in Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. Although, Adivasis want to educate their children the 
hegemonic formal schooling practices in India, desiring to create rational 
citizen-subjects out of diverse population legitimates prevailing dominant 
constructions of Adivasi population as 'backward' (Balagopalan 2003).  
'Educational homogenisation' is state formation by force. It imposes national 
education standards to turn people into similar individuals. The educational 
system aims to level people, make them disciplined, passive and obedient 
(Chomsky 2010). From Adivasis’ point of view, Chomsky's argument proves 
to be true about the state's will to educate them. As dominant discourses have 
always viewed Adivasi subjectivities and cultural practices derogatory, and 
hence, to be eliminated. The efforts of the state in India to ‘reform’ Adivasi 
societies and to mould them into the image of the dominant society embodies 
violence. Such an alien and violent 'will to improve' inevitably produces 
resistance (Li 2008). The state, as a mechanism, uses the ‘hegemony of the 
dominant ideology’ to pacify cultural and ideological differences. Its 
repressive apparatus suppresses any dissent; and its ideological apparatus 
socialises the state's subjects into dominant ideology. Both apparatuses 
involve force and violence in many different ways; and there is no sharp 
distinction between these two (Althusser 1971: 73; Bourdieu 1974). 'Where 
there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this 
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resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power' (Foucault 
1990: 95).These forms of resistance seldom emerge as violent protests.  
Based on these explanations, I show that imposition of projects like JEP on 
deprived and marginalized Adivasis might cause more harm than good, and 
whatever outcome has been cited in JEP reports as ‘achievements’ might not 
add up even to nullify the gross negativities it might be producing in the lives 
of economically poorer Adivasis.  
The State's Elementary Education for Hos (JEP in Kolhan) 
The annual working plan and budget (AWP & B 2011) of JEP provides much 
details such as the numbers of habitations with and without school buildings 
in West Singhbhum, enrolled and dropped out children, and teachers and so 
forth. According to JEP guidelines, there should be a primary school (PS) 
building for every child within a distance of one kilometre and an upper 
primary school (UPS) building in every three kilometres; a teacher for every 
35 students in PS, and one for every 40 students in UPS. There were 2,238 
'functioning' PSs with a requirement of 6,125 teachers; and 708 functioning 
UPSs that require 2,487 teachers to cater to the educational needs of 312,091 
children in 8,803 habitations in West Singhbhum district. About half of the 
required number of teachers' posts remain vacant (AWP & B 2011). 
However, despite these existing arrangements, the outcomes JEP has 
produced, so far, among the Hos is deplorable. Based on a survey of primary 
and middle schools in study villages, I show how JEP works on the ground. 
Table 7 – Total number of children (age 6-14), Enrolment & Attendance in Government 
Schools (Standards I-VIII) 
Village  Total population 
(age 6-14) 
Enrolment at schools Daily attendance  Children at  
 private schools 
 
Schools Number % Number %   
V1  114 36 31.58 15 41.67 NA  
V2  313 168 53.67 69 41.07 12 (3.8 %)*  
V3  431 218 50.58 128 58.72 20 (4.6%)*  
V4  96 42 43.75 18 42.86 NA  
V5  58 36 62.07 12 33.33 Nil  
  1012 500 49.41 242 48.4   
Source: survey by the author (November 2011) 
(*) Percentage of total population in V2 & V3 (age 6 – 14) 
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Figure 9 – Percentage of children's enrolment and daily attendance (age group 6-14) 
Table-7 shows the extremely poor response, in terms of enrolment and daily 
attendance, of Ho children to JEP managed government schools in five 
villages. Out of 1012 children of age group 6-14, more than half are out of 
school (not enrolled), and out of the total enrolled 500 children, less than half 
of them attend these schools on a daily basis. Such an abysmally low figure 
of attendance by enrolled children, despite the free mid-day-meal (MDM) 
being served, speaks a lot about the relevance and quality of education in 
these schools. All children who attend these schools are from economically 
poorer households. A few children from better-of households in V2 and V3 
attend an unaided mission school in the locality.  
 
Table 8 – Educational Attainment of Population (age group 15-59) in Five Villages 
Villages 
Total 
Population  
(age 15-59) 
Middle school 
(UPS) 
Secondary 
school (HS) 
Matriculate Higher 
Secondary 
Bachelors  
 Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
V1 369 0 0.00 73 19.78 45 12.20 4 1.08 6 1.63 
V2 1115 132 11.84 128 11.48 54 4.84 25 2.24 15 1.35 
V3 1344 171 12.72 143 10.64 120 8.93 74 5.51 26 1.93 
V4 262 15 5.73 7 2.67 2 0.76 3 1.15 1 0.38 
V5 151 4 2.65 0 0 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0 
 3241 322 9.94 351 10.83 221 6.82 106 3.27 48 1.48* 
Source: survey conducted by the author (July - November 2011) 
(*) Percentage of total village population (age 15 - 59) 
 
49.41
48.4
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Figure 10 – Educational Attainment of 3241 persons (age group 15-59 
At the primary level the daily attendance of enrolled children is about 50% 
(table-7), however, Table-8 shows that only 11 per cent (average of 9.94 & 
10.83) of the children attend upper primary (UPS) and secondary or high 
schools. This means that as children advance to higher classes, they stop 
attending school (drop out increases as they go higher). Only seven per cent 
of them clear Matriculation; those who make it to Higher Secondary 
constitute only 3.27 per cent and the segment that manages to complete a 
Bachelor’s Degree is merely 1.48 per cent of the total population. Most 
among those who have made it to matriculation, higher secondary and 
bachelors have been students of either a few mission schools or a few better 
functioning government schools right in the heart of Chaibasa town.  
Table 9 – Levels of educational attainment among major Adivasi groups Jharkhand 
Percentage 
Adivasis 
Literate without 
formal education 
below 
Primary Primary Middle 
Matric 
& HSE 
Tech-
nical 
Bach-
elors 
All 3 30.6 28.6 17.7 16.5 0.1 3.5 
Santals 3.5 34.3 30 17 13.2 0.1 2 
Oraons 3.4 26.9 25 18.5 20.8 0.2 5.9 
Mundas 3.8 27.9 29.6 18.9 17.1 0.1 3.7 
Hos 3.4 26.4 28.4 19.9 19.7 0.1 3.1 
Kharias 2 26 26.5 18.3 21.4 0.1 5.6 
Kharwars 5.5 38.2 32.3 11.3 10.8 0.1 1.8 
Lohras 3.5 35.5 30.5 16.1 12.5 0.1 1.9 
Bhumij 2.4 36.1 32.8 15.9 11.1 0 1.4 
Source: Kumar (2008: 3114) based on Census of India 2001 
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The census data on Adivasis’ educational attainment at the state level also 
show113 a similar pattern of dropouts as they move from lower to higher 
classes. Hence, one might conclude that the government schools hardly 
provide any education to Ho children in these villages except that, these days, 
they feed a few children with the Mid Day Meal (MDM). Most students, who 
attend rural government schools, run by JEP, drop out of school before they 
enter a secondary school, and most of those who manage to enter one fail to 
clear the matriculate examination. Clearly there might be other reasons than 
poor school infrastructure, and quality of teaching which contribute to this 
situation of the failure of Adivasi education in India. The following section 
elucidates a few of them.  
Observations and Insights from the Field 
Although, MDM feeds a few children in schools, several parents expressed a 
feeling of shame and ignominy that they are forced to send their children to 
school just for food and not for education. This is also because, none of the 
village-uppers’ children attend JEP schools, but instead they seek ‘better’ 
education in private schools. Hence, sending children to JEP schools, which 
provide food instead of education, inevitably reflects one's economic 
insecurity or vulnerability or 'backwardness'. Thus, government schools in 
Adivasi dominant areas, while they fail to deliver relevant and quality 
education, reproduce social inequality, divisions, humiliation and negativity.  
The only 'beneficiaries' of the JEP among the Hos of these five villages are a 
very few local para-teachers, appointed on contract basis, who receive a 
monthly salary much less than that received by regular teachers who are 
mostly non-local, and non-Hos. However, the JEP has its statistics neat and 
tidy with the number of school buildings, teachers appointed or vacant posts, 
number of enrolled students, and those dropped out ever ready for reporting 
and 'evaluation.’ The process goes on as it reflects the nation's 'commitment' 
and 'will' to educate its 'backward,' 'uncivilized,' and 'illiterate,' population 
called the 'scheduled tribes.'  
‘Tribals share a major part of the population and no program of their uplift can meet 
success unless carefully controlled studies break the deep-rooted dogma about their 
inborn backwardness’ (Sinha 1976: back cover page). 
                                                      
113 Higher percentage of matric and higher secondary and bachelors in aggregate census data 
might be due to the ‘creamy layer’ who stay at urban centres. 
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While talking to teachers about Ho children’s poor attendance, their 
explanations would invariably begin with children's inability to learn due to 
'backwardness:' Hos' lack of awareness about the usefulness of education, 
economic poverty, parents' need to keep children at home due to economic 
constraints, and the like. If one points out the school-home polarity, language 
barrier, cultural and language differences of teachers and students, the teacher 
would immediately shift the blame on to the Sarkar (government) for not 
taking these issues into consideration. Parents, on the other hand, would 
complain about teacher absenteeism, school activities being reduced merely 
to forging food-materials, cooking and serving the mid-day-meal (MDM), 
and thus, relegating learning and education to the last in the teachers’ priority 
list.  
While talking to teachers about their absenteeism and low quality education 
in these schools, they would say, 
You, know, there is no clerk or peon at the school, we teachers have to look after 
everything: the responsibility of constructing or repairing school buildings, 
provisioning for MDM, keeping track of all kinds of expenditures (accounts), 
producing monthly reports for JEP office, all these besides teaching. Moreover, there 
are children of different age-groups from class I–V, mostly one teacher would be 
managing these five different age-groups simultaneously in just two class-rooms, and 
one of us would always be out with election duties, census works or some other kind of 
surveys the government always wants us to do (personal conversations with teachers in 
November 2011 at various government schools at study villages). 
The teachers' list of responsibilities goes on and on.  
Kripa, a local para-teacher, who has worked with a Women’s NGO for 
several years prior to her present job said the following about a non-Adivasi 
JEP supervisor who occasionally comes to ‘inspect’ the function of school 
where she teaches,  
As soon as he comes for inspection, the first thing he wants is money (as bribe) along 
with regular ready-made reports and accounts. If you refuse to pay the regular bribe, 
then he would threaten you with finding faults with everything you do; if you pay, you 
have no tension; and he would soon disappear quietly.  
One day, Kripa confronted a supervisor, asking him, 'Why do you ask for a 
bribe from us without even doing your work?' After this, the supervisor went 
to a class room to test the students. The students got scared; and did not give 
any answer to his questions. After the supervisor left, the regular teacher, an 
Oraon (Adivasi) woman, who often succumbs to the pressures from 
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supervisors, told Kripa, 'Being a para-teacher, you talk a bit too much' 
(personal conversation, 21 November 2011, at the school).  
Thus, the state’s externally imposed educational projects such as the JEP on 
the one hand, needs legitimation evidenced by Adivasi ‘backwardness’ and 
Ho children’s’ distaste for learning and the nation’s commitment to provide 
education for all on the other. However, the very fact of forced educational 
homogenisation, violence, and humiliation it brings on the poorer Ho 
children and their parents make it a failure. Corruption inevitably breeds in 
such situations where project resources are utilized to disempower the 
beneficiary. 
Home-School Polarity 
On spending some time in a village school premises, one observes many 
more things regarding differences in language and cultural values: Ho 
children in villages understand and speak only the Ho language. Hindi, the 
National language in which primary education has been imparted, has very 
little in common with Ho in terms of sentence structure, vocabulary, 
expressions, and even pronunciation. One of the minor, but significant 
cultural differences, for example, is about the common greetings (salutation): 
Hos normally greet each other by touching the tips of of the fingers of the 
other with theirs while saying 'Juaar' [Johar] to express gratitude, respect, 
familiarity and a mark of an egalitarian acceptance of the other irrespective of 
one's socio economic status and other such differences. However, at schools, 
Ho children are strictly instructed by non-Adivasi teachers to say, 'pranaam,' 
with both hands joined, to teachers and visitors. This creates a marked 
distance and hierarchical difference deliberately avoiding touch and physical 
proximity.  
Further, one who has stayed or spent time with Ho households may also 
observe that a Ho child is seldom scolded or punished by his or her parents, 
however, at schools, children get a lot of scolding and are forced to undergo 
several other disciplinary regulations, all of which, constitute both physical 
and symbolic violence, as Freire and Shor (1987: 123) have explained. 
Education for Ho children imparted here at these schools ‘impose silence’ on 
children by the very order of the things in school environment, especially in 
this case, where there is a considerable home-school polarity regarding 
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linguistic and cultural differences. All this amounts to cultural imperialism 
involving the ‘universalization of a dominant group’s experience and culture 
and establishing it as the norm’ (Young 2011: 59). 
Ambivalence of Violence Arising from Discrimination, Denial of History, 
Language, and Cultural Dignity  
Several recent studies have shown that Adivasi and Dalit children face 
widespread verbal abuse from 'upper' jati/ caste teachers who are in majority, 
typifying their hegemonic narrative towards traditionally marginalised groups 
regarding commensal relations and the menial works the 'lower' castes or 
classes have been forced to perform. This critically disables first generation 
Adivasi and Dalit learners. (Balagopalan and Subrahmanian 2003; Mooij and 
Majumdar 2011; Malikapurath and Patil 2012). While jati/ caste based 
discrimination of Adivasi children in class rooms, which clearly establishes 
the prevalence of cultural and structural violence continue to be inflicted on 
them, debates about making their mother tongue as the medium of instruction 
at least at primary schools have not yet been concluded, despite clear 
Constitutional provisions supporting this important cause (see Nambisan 
1994; Shotton 1998).  
An alien medium of instruction at initial schooling causes several crucial 
problems to Adivasi children: they do not understand text books and 
curricula; non-Adivasi teachers look upon them as inferior to other children 
by an unfair evaluation of their cognitive abilities, which neglect the 
variations in Adivasi social ecology, despite Adivasi children actually being 
culturally and cognitively more competent than children of other groups 
(Gautam 2003). Adivasi children's skills and abilities are highly developed 
and extremely sophisticated. However, a programme of schooling, which 
stresses only on literacy and numeracy, while neglecting the distinct socio-
ecological, cultural and psychological characteristics of Adivasi children, is 
highly unlikely to make any significant impact (Ibid.). Moreover, the 
educational practices of the dominant population has little value in an Adivasi 
cultural milieu precisely because they do not match the Adivasi lifestyle 
(Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas 2009; Mohanti et al 2009; Pahru 2010). 
According to Magga et al (2013), the practice of providing school education 
to indigenous children through dominant national or regional languages 
contradicts all solid theories and research results; it violates the parents’ right 
209 
 
to intergenerational transmission of cultural values, including language. Such 
an enforced language regime results in subtractive education. It reduces a 
children’s linguistic repertoire, and creates pedagogical and psychological 
barriers; it hinders the development of children's capabilities besides children 
being effectively transferred, both linguistically and culturally, to the 
dominant group, while contributing to the disappearance of the world's 
linguistic diversity. It eventually deprives the dominated or oppressed social 
groups by denying them of the cultural instruments necessary to assert their 
identity and human rights (Ibid.).  
A tribal child’s first steps into school are steps into an alien world – a world he or she 
barely understands because, somewhere as he or she walks into her first classroom, the 
ties are snapped.  His or her resources, languages, means of communication, knowledge 
of her world and her culture are set aside in a system that proudly calls itself human 
resource development (Ibid.: 6). 
Citing some of the important problems faced by Adivasi children during the 
initial stages of their schooling due to fundamental differences in indigenous 
sociocultural values and pedagogies, and that of formal hegemonic 
educational standards Philipson and Skutnabb-Kangas (2009) and Kapoor 
(2009) have explained how hegemonic formal education erases the history of 
oppression by depoliticising a dissenting minority community of their 
transgressed subjectivities. A strategically homogenizing education system 
planned and implemented by the dominant powers makes the oppressed to 
internalize ‘myths’ and ‘lies’ since these have purposefully been imposed 
upon the people, while actively negating their subjectivities. Consequently, 
the oppressed people feel ignorant and become dependent on the culture of 
the oppressors, the ‘experts’, specialists in society (Goulet 1980; Philipson 
and Skutnabb-Kangas 2009: 30).  
Freire (1985) has explained how people become ambivalent as a result of 
personal and societal interactions of unequal power relations that influence 
perspectives and positionings. 
The relationships between the dominator and the dominated reflect the greater social 
context, even when formally personal. Such relationships imply the introjection by the 
dominated of the cultural myths of the dominator. Similarly, the dependent society 
introjects the values and life-style of the metropolitan society, since the structure of the 
latter shapes that of the former. This results in the duality of the dependent society, its 
ambiguity, its being and not being itself, and the ambivalence characteristic of its long 
experience of dependency, both attracted by and rejecting the metropolitan society 
(Ibid..: 73, emphasis added).  
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When the dominant society continuously subjugates, indoctrinates and 
domesticate the minorities, the result is 'naturalisation' of oppression, 
structural and cultural violence, and their reproduction via ambivalence of 
violence. This explains the case of Kishor, the affluent Ho in Vignette-1 in 
Huringhatu, who has introjected the ‘myths,’ ‘lies,’ styles and life-worlds of 
the dominant society via formal education.  Yet he remains in his home-
village after retirement from the job since he feels more at home here. 
However, his ambivalence towards his co-villagers is evident from the fact 
that he neither understands the predicaments of the destitute, nonliterate, 
impoverished, yet resisting co-villagers, nor is he able to do anything to 
change their situation. Hence, people like him naturally employ the usual 
'victim-blaming theories' of laziness, ignorance and drunkenness of those 
economically poorer Hos in Vignette-4 to justify their own uncomfortable 
ambivalent position. This also explains why and how an 'educated' Adivasis 
comes to emulate some of the styles and values of ‘traditional oppressive 
elites’ (Shah 2009; Higham Shah 2013a).  
Thus, formal education systematically denies Adivasi cultural ethos, values 
and subjectivities to Adivasi children by erasing their history, culture and 
language (Trouillot, M-R. 1995; Benei 2008) while simultaneously 
indoctrinating them into dominant values of graded inequality and 
domination. Such an education makes elite Adivasis, who were deprived of 
their own history and cultural values, to define one’s impoverished 
neighbours and co-villagers as 'backward,' 'uncivilized,' and seemingly 
subconscious, hopelessly incorrigible drunkards. Here, the less privileged co-
villagers are, thus, being reduced to a practico-inert status by the ‘educated’ 
privileged (Galtung 1970, 1990; Sartre 2005). Thus, a few ‘educated’ 
privileged Adivasis in a predominantly poor village might turn it into a small 
colony with racism being an essential part of the processes and praxis. 
Vignette-2, at the beginning of this chapter, presents the troubles Devan, a 
householder, whose economic position might be termed as ‘comfortable,’ 
takes to ‘catch up’ with those of the dominant society via education that 
invariably negates the cultural ethos and values of Adivasi social formations. 
He spends all his time and resources to get the best possible education for his 
nieces and nephews leaving the village and staying in a suburb away from 
their home village. Thus, these children are kept away from the everyday 
realities of their less-privileged co-villagers, but at home with the life-world 
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of the dominant – state school systems organized to discipline, pacify, and 
level, reducing education to test-taking and market-driven competencies 
(Chomsky 2010) – which also teaches children to look derogatorily on what 
constitutes Adivasis, while actively made to imitate or introject the dominant 
values and styles. 
Vijay in Vignette-3, who belongs to an occasionally poor household in 
Huringhatu tries his best to formally educate his children with available or 
possible facilities (the government school at his village), but the eldest one, 
who managed to reach eighth class, has already dropped out as he decides not 
to go to school anymore. Thus, Vijay feels frustrated about not being able to 
send at least his little daughter to the nearby mission school while facing 
financial constraints about paying a fixed monthly fee at the unaided mission 
school, which charges a nominal fee from every child to pay the teachers’ 
salary. 
The economically poorer Hos in Huringhatu have literally being reduced to a 
‘culture of silence’ by dispossession and impoverishment of both economic 
and cultural resources. Yet, again they are being blamed for the situation they 
find themselves in and on which they have little control. They experience 
ignominy, humiliation and frustration. Little children are ill-treated, 
discriminated and scolded for their ‘inability’ to learn in an alien language 
that they hear for the first time in life. If the children run away from school 
out of fear, as it often happens, the diku teachers would say, ‘Look at these 
Adivasi children; they do not want to study.’ This is one of the obvious and 
‘normal’ explanations for the ‘failure’ of education in Adivasi dominant 
regions advanced by dikus. 
If those among the SCs and STs who ascend the ladder of social and economic progress 
do not spare a glance at those left behind, it is because the mainstream has tended to 
undermine and undervalue their culture (Thekekara 1991: 26). 
Adivasis’ Individual Initiatives to Overcome Ambivalence of Violence: 
Evidences from the Field 
What Freire (1985) calls introjection involves 'misrecognition' or 'symbolic 
violence' (Bourdieu 1998; Žižek 2009), similar to Marx’s 'false 
consciousness' (Eyerman 1981) whereby people internalise dominant 
discourses and emulate dominant practices as the most appropriate ones. 
Dominant discourses might also make people perceive even most intolerable 
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conditions of existence as acceptable and natural (Smith and Osborn 2007). 
Such naturalisation of unequal power relations and resultant sufferings are 
routinely carried out in education by processes of de-historicisation and 
universalisation – ‘always  and everywhere has it been this way’ – ‘whereby 
arbitrary workings of power are enabled to continue’ (Emirbayer and Johnson 
2008: 47-8). Symbolic violence often leads people also to (unjustly) blame 
themselves for their own suffering whilst the role of society remains hidden 
(Bourdieu 1998, 1999). Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence stored in 
doxa and habitus (ambivalence of violence, conflicts hidden under the surface 
of common sense notions which rule social reality) helps understand  how 
people come to accept their own domination while they, in turn, dominate 
those weaker than themselves. However, such naturalised, arbitrary workings 
of power always accompany self-doubt and suffering (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992, 2001).  
However, by recognizing and getting in touch with such self-doubt and 
disturbing ambivalence people look for various ways to overcome these 
difficulties to find their way to greater personal freedom. In order to make 
this argument clear, I cite below the personal experiences of three 'educated' 
Adivasis who have managed to recognize their suffering of self-doubt and 
ambivalence caused by symbolic violence (ambivalence of violence) 
involved in prevalent formal education system, and have consciously sought 
to undo or overcome it. 
Ramesh is a Ho from Manjhari block of Kolhan who had his Higher 
Secondary Education from a school in Chaibasa. He works now as a railway 
employee in Lukhnow, Uttar Pradesh (UP). We had a long conversation in 
his home where I stayed a night in March 2011. He had come to his home 
village for Mage-Parab, the biggest annual feast of the Hos of Kolhan. 
During our conversations, he talked about some of his experiences of being a 
(third class) railway employee in UP,  
The first thing people in UP ask you is your jati/ caste. When you tell them that you are 
an Adivasi, they begin to look down upon you as they do it with Dalits [ex-
untouchables]. I had serious problems dealing with such a situation initially; I began to 
consume alcohol; there was no peace at home; and my first child could not enjoy a 
peaceful atmosphere at home. After a few years, I got several chances to attend a few 
conferences and conventions organised by the BAMCEF (All India Backward and 
Minority Employees’ Federation), during which I came to know about the reality of 
caste-based discrimination and the troubles it creates for economically poorer people of 
the 'lower' castes or classes. I also started reading the works of Baba Saheb Ambedkar. 
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Gradually, I began to analyse and understand our own history, identity and rights, I can 
now accept myself as I am. Now, I enjoy a lot of peace within and at home. My 
younger children are doing well in studies and they are confident about themselves 
(personal conversation, 24 March 2011). 
Ruby Hembrom from the Santal Society, after eight years of her work in the 
field of law, service-industry, social development, learning, research and 
development, has rediscovered herself and has recently set up a 
documentation and publishing enterprise – adivaani. She tells her story, 
My education, training, skills and career define only part of who I am; my identity as a 
tribal, a Santal, is fundamental to my being, and that completes who I am. But is that 
enough? Life for me is about fulfilling one’s potential. In the many ways I’ve redefined 
who I am; the adivaani dream has made me come alive all over again…   
It all started at a tender age. "During my days at La Martiniere for Girls, one of my 
friends used to tell me that I must polish my face every morning like I polish my shoes. 
It was humiliating. My friends refused to sit with me in the classroom," Hembrom said, 
pointing out that such incidents urged her to do her bit for the progress of tribals.114 
Joy Raj Eric Tudu, a co-founder of adivaani shares some of his 
experiences: 
I never took life seriously, until my engagement with real Adivasi lives and real 
Adivasi issues brought me face to face with their plight. … I recognized and witnessed 
how people were cheated and exploited for generations in my own neighbourhood. 
While all this was happening around me, I was living a completely different life, where 
focusing on securing my future by all possible means was the goal… From being far 
removed from the real Adivasi situation and the Adivasi movement … the purpose of 
my life has changed completely. Now, I take pride in being a part of making history 
available to the present day people and to the generations to come and adivaani is an 
extension of that desire (adivaani website: 2013).  
There are several factors that contribute to the ambivalent and contradictory 
positioning of 'educated' Adivasis. Most 'educated' privileged Adivasis, who 
have been in urban centres for education, often continue to remain far 
removed from the everyday struggles of their co-villagers as most of them 
would be staying at boarding schools in towns and cities to avail better 
schools and other facilities that are not available in rural villages. Once they 
complete schooling successfully, they proceed further to bigger cities for 
higher education, and then once on a job, they rarely come back to their home 
villages. Furthermore, their already better-of parents would say, 'Oh, we had 
to struggle a lot to get education, and now we do not want our children to 
                                                      
114 Source: http://adivaani.org/category/inside-out/ (29 January 2013), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2378306/Tribal-woman-quits-IT-
multi-national-bring-folklore-masses.html#ixzz2oi3PUWBQ (27 December 2013). 
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struggle as we did; hence, we want to provide them the best possible 
education.’ The Vignette 2 presented at the beginning of this chapter would 
typify this situation. This is a situation where the 'educated' parents have 
already internalized the discursive 'mainstream' stereotype of Adivasis as 
jungli and incapable of learning, thus the desire to escape the ‘wilderness’ by 
‘colonial desire’ (Young 1995). However, these ‘educated’ ones continue to 
remain ‘Adivasis’ by inscription mostly to access the benefits of affirmative 
action policies, a ‘rational response’ of Adivasi elites to the ‘development’ 
rationale of the post-British colonial state (Corbridge 1987: 252). 
Friere (1985) showed that only children from financially better-of households 
of subjugated social formations are able to cope with the violence of 
stereotyping while learning with the children of dominant society. Moreover, 
the 'mainstream' education system, as already shown, has continuously 
sought to deny Adivasis their history, language, cultural values that mark 
identity by processes of dehistoricisation and universalisation so that 
'educated' Adivasis, in turn, have systematically been assimilated into the 
colonial civic order which blames the less privileged Adivasis for their 
poverty and suffering. This ambivalence of violence has thus been produced 
and reproduced via formal education in India which not only denies Adivasis 
their language, history, and cultural values, but also actively indoctrinates 
them into the colonial civic order that has violently silenced and pushed 
Adivasis into wretchedness due to the very process of cultural and structural 
violence it embodies.   
The above three instances clearly make visible not only the reproduction of 
Adivasis’ ambivalence, self-doubt and suffering via formal education, but 
also their search for self-rediscovery (overcoming misrecognition) via 
alternative learning platforms that re-embraces their identity by undoing the 
ambivalence of violence. Thus, to come to terms with one’s real self and be 
at peace one needs to negate the negation of oneself by those who dominate 
(Sartre 2004). This needs reinstating the erased Adivasi history, challenging 
the on-going universalization and naturalisation of existing unequal power 
relations via dominant discourses, effectively challenging stereotypical 
constructions of Adivasis, and sustained critical reflections on Adivasi status 
as products of a ruptured history scarred by millennia long cultural 
domination and oppression. 
215 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how and why school education in Adivasi dominant 
regions have been a failure, and produces contradictory outcomes. School 
education for Adivasis does not serve the purpose it intends to due to its 
irrelevant content, and its abysmally deplorable quality which creates merely 
an occasion for wastage of funds by corruption and mismanagement besides 
producing negative instances of humiliation and consequent resistance among 
economically poorer Adivasi children and their parents. However, ironically, 
Adivasis, who have been victims of such cultural and symbolic violence are 
once again blamed for this grave and continued failure of an imperial regime, 
a colonial system that reproduces itself. 
Furthermore, formal education in general in India naturalizes unequal power 
relations; and thus, it reproduces and maintains ambivalence of violence. In 
order to undo this, ‘educated’ Adivasis themselves need to find alternative 
platforms and take special personal efforts, which might not be available to 
all of them. Hence, most ‘educated’ Adivasis become victims turned 
oppressors, who not only emulate the values and life-styles of the dominant 
castes or classes but also keep blaming their own less-privileged co-villagers 
who are victims of the prevalent systemic violence and the ambivalence it 
produces. Thus, the content and nature (curriculum and pedagogy) of 
education matters very much in determining the direction of social change. 
The next chapter recapitulates the main argument of the thesis, delineates its 
most important and immediate implications and provides methodological 
outlines towards processes that might help undoing structural, cultural and 
symbolic violence to foster radical social democracy and emancipatory 
politics of Adivasis and other marginalized social formations in India and 
beyond. 
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General Conclusion 
 
Identities are neither timeless and unchanging, nor homogenous. 
(Romila Thapar 2013: 7) 
The challenges posed to social sciences and humanities research in 
forecasting South Asia’s future trends of development is huge due to 
cognitive biases.  
Lawrence Saez 2013: 1) 
Truth is partial, accessible only when one takes sides, and is no less universal 
for this reason. 
(Slavoij Žižek 2009: 6) 
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Introduction 
This thesis began by endorsing Gupta's (2012) argument that structural 
violence characterizes state-society relationships in India, and it is most 
pictorial when the state interacts with its marginalized Adivasi groups, the 
'poorest' people. Then, the thesis proceeded to demystify structural violence 
to show that the state system in India functions on its historically, 
homegrown or pre-classical colonialism and racism as praxis and process 
based on a distorted logic of reciprocity. In order to make visible the 
historical sources of structural violence it historicized the Adivasi category 
(which broadly represents India’s most marginalized classes of peoples) 
beyond the ‘modern’ Indian history. While doing so it has exposed the origin, 
spread and deeply entrenched ancient varna/ caste-based discrimination, 
conceptualized in this thesis, as colonialism and racism. Thus, the thesis has 
argued that the emergence of such a colonial state-system and its gradual 
growth into a full-fledged infernal machine of practico-inert fields in the 
alluvial plains has had its corollary effects resulting in the formation of more 
flexibly and democratically organized groups – Adivasis – who had escaped 
or fled into the mountainous forests.  
While Adivasis who, thus, kept escaping the ancient colonial infernal state-
systems were termed as ‘barbarians’ on forested and mountainous tracts, the 
sudras (the ‘lowest’ toiling castes) and ‘outcastes’ or ‘untouchables’ 
(‘impure’) castes were already reduced to practico-inert or subhuman 
positions as the infrastructure of the infernal state machines in the alluvial 
plains.  These were caught in bondage or shackled by fear and were forced to 
remain at the outskirts of state-based plains settlements of the subcontinents. 
The thesis has also argued that the continued subhuman existence of a large 
percentage of Dalitbahujans (the majority oppressed social groups) within 
Indian ‘mainstream,’ and that of Adivasi social formation in environmentally 
degraded, inaccessible, mountainous and mineral rich regions of India today 
testifies the unaltered continuation of ancient (pre-classic) colonial and racist 
praxis and process embodied in the Indian colonial civic order or 
‘mainstream’ represented by ‘the state’ in India.  
Thus, it is not difficult to understand why it is today’s most marginalized 
Adivasis who keep resisting and challenging their unequal incorporation into 
such a colonial civic order. Their resistance to the unrestricted advancement 
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of the colonial desires (of all those consciously and unconsciously adhere to 
political Brahmanism) veiled under the garb of official nationalism, 
necessitates the deployment of armed forces by the very colonial logic of the 
state-system. Thus, the Indian state and its Adivasis are the two diametrically 
opposite poles of a single phenomenon – the Indian colonial civic order – 
throughout India’s long history. Naturally, the pictorial evidence of structural 
violence being most evident in Adivasi dominant regions, that Gupta (2012) 
mentions at the epilogue of his book, stands correct.  
While these remain the mains thematic arguments, the supporting arguments 
and field materials are presented in subsequent chapters. Chapter Two on 
state formation has explicated the historical processes of co-opting or 
subjugating Adivasi chieftains and resisting retreat of unequally coerced 
Adivasis by holding on to their subjectivities (alternative imaginations of 
who they are) of their ‘sacral polities.’  Chapter Three has shown how the 
distorted (colonial) logic of state formation still works out among Adivasi 
social formations producing poverty and destitution for the many weaker 
ones, and fortunes for a few already well- endowed. Chapter Four has 
explicated how these already well-endowed have continuously been recruited 
to the system only on condition that they follow the same rules and logic of 
the system while being Adivasis by ascription. This is where ambivalence of 
violence, the vehicle that reproduces the system, is located. Chapter Five 
(The fifth chapter) has shown how the powers of exclusion deprive and 
reduces Adivasis in their ethno-territories, their social ecology eroded, 
solidarity destroyed via antagonistic competition and atomization by means 
of state-facilitated accumulation and differentiation practices of   social 
‘intimates.’ Chapter Six (on education) has, to some extent, made explicit 
how the Indian education system prepares Adivasi elites to be fitting colonial 
kinglets to serve the colonial state-system while the colonial citizens so 
produced in turn reduce their co-villagers to subhuman (practico-inert) status. 
On the one hand, the ongoing praxis and process of colonialism and racism is 
fuelled by colonial desires advocated by political Brahmanism, whose origin 
in India might be traced back to the constructed ‘purity’ (divinity) of the 
dominant elite, which has been justified by a superstitiously projected and 
fixated ‘impurity’ of those doomed to be servants. In the course of time, the 
original brahmanical desire kept adopting newer forms, such as rational 
liberalism, neoliberal capitalism and their legitimation by dominant 
219 
 
discourses of ‘national development’ and ‘economic growth.’ Thus, they 
move on endlessly, caught up in an endless exercise of chasing a mirage, 
which produces endless and unintelligible distortions and contradictions. On 
the other hand, Adivasis’ original imaginations, of more egalitarian, 
democratic, redistributing and securely bound societies whose power-
relations (embodied in sacral polities were more flexible and even dissoluble 
by themselves) have been driving them to the opposite direction, nonetheless 
with inevitable deprivations and contradictions in changing times. In between 
these two main trajectories are numerous contradictions arising out of the 
ambivalence of ‘intimate’ exclusion or violence, and the contemporary 
puzzles of Indian politics thereof. 
However, before discussing these trajectories, it is important to delineate the 
immediate and crucial implications of the main arguments of this thesis.  
Important and Immediate Implications 
Re-conceptualizing Adivasis as state avoiding and challenging people 
contradicts the prevalent conceptions of ‘Adivasi’ or ‘Scheduled Tribe’ 
category as ‘remnants’ of historical evolution as the evolution and race 
theorists have them. It also challenges some of the taken for granted notions 
that Adivasis are ‘primitive,’ ‘backward,’ ‘uneconomic,’ ‘isolated’ and 
‘victims of development,’ notwithstanding the increased deprivations 
imposed upon them by others. Instead, while presenting Adivasis as state 
avoiding and challenging people, the thesis has clearly disclosed certain 
praxes and processes that have driven Adivasis to their present predicaments. 
Their extremely impoverished marginality today ultimately exposes the 
unimaginable cruelty that the Indian colonial civic order – the formal state 
apparatus, its official agents and colonial citizens – as a whole embodies. 
Citing a single instance suffices to make this point strike home: the south 
Indian state of Kerala has been highly acclaimed worldwide for its 
achievements of a higher level life expectancy and nearly hundred per cent 
literacy rates. However, the same state’s Adivasi children die of malnutrition 
and hunger almost every day, which does not create any sense of injustice 
among its ‘civilized’ citizens and those in power. ‘The continuing deaths of 
infants and children due to malnutrition in Attappady, the only tribal block in 
Kerala, reflects the state government’s apathy towards addressing issues 
germane to the tribals residing in the region’ (Manikandan 2014: 1). 
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This thesis strongly challenges the axiomatic notion that Adivasis’ 
deprivations, starvation, and deaths are entirely caused due to issues that are 
‘germane to them.’ On the contrary, the thesis has shown that the issue is 
primarily with the so-called ‘mainstream.’ It has pointed out that the 
proposed model or pattern of social change in India has been sanskritisation 
and westernization, a process animated by what Rudolph and Rudolph 
(1978a) termed as ‘the pursuit of Lakshmi,’ the unrestrained strive to hoard 
wealth, honour, power and fortunes; and to pass it onto a rigidly restricted 
privileged posterity, defined by jati/ caste. While this being the case, the 
pursuers of Lakshmi remain blissfully unmindful of the deprivations and 
violence it imposes on people who have been historically alienated. 
Moreover, the mantra of political Brahmanism – pursuit of Lakshmi – also 
goes well with logic of neoliberal global capitalism’s maxim: let the 
marketplace rule unconstrained, while human beings and the natural world be 
used and then discarded to maximize profit (Hedges and Sacco 2012).  
Moreover, the thesis has also pointed out that the economically more 
deprived Adivasis, with subsistence-based, more sustainable life-style, and 
distinct cultural values (ethos), despite being pauperized to the maximum, 
still pose a sharp ideological contrast and challenge to the pursuit of Lakshmi 
even today. Hence, Adivasis and their imaginations of a ‘sacral polity’ has 
not only been the antithesis of political Brahmanism, but also a serious threat 
to the 'Hindutva [Hindu-ness] of capitalist development' (Desai 2011: sic; 
Kapoor 2009; Gatade 2011; Mander 2012; EPW 2012). Hence, in the eyes of 
political Brahmanism, Adivasis must be done away with, since they not only 
challenge it, but also their resisting presence announces the former’s 
deceptiveness although Adivasis have so far been constructed otherwise. 
Thus, this reconceptualization of Adivasi category has highlighted their 
agency, alternative imaginations of a more democratic and egalitarian 
society, and cultural dignity, despite the continued impoverishment and 
pauperization imposed up on them. Moreover, Adivasis reject and challenge 
the dominant values of graded inequality and the classical colonial exercise 
of chasing a mirage (colonial desires) advanced in India by political 
Brahmanism. This also shows how they derive meaning, values and a sense 
of integrity from their alternative cosmologies, subjectivities of territorial 
precedence and collective belongingness, authentic reciprocity, mutual aid, 
and a holistic understanding of life and its symbiotic interrelatedness with 
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nature (Padel et al 2013). They keep pursuing a subsistence mode of 
production based on foraging and self-employed agriculture which facilitate 
more flexible social organizations with more egalitarian, communitarian and 
radical democratic principles of their sacral polity (Roy 1970; Fortier 2009; 
Shah 2007, 2010).   
Having said this at this point, nevertheless, the thesis also raises serious 
challenges and questions about the Adivasi-ness of accumulating and 
differentiating Adivasi elites, since their new-found ‘fortunes’ and colonial 
desires have distanced themselves far from their co-villagers. Most of them 
remain largely ambivalent, oblivious, often far removed from the daily 
struggles and longings (subjectivities) of their fellow Adivasi-life-worlds. 
Moreover, they, consciously or unconsciously, contribute to the ongoing 
pauperization of their less-fortunate and impoverished co-villagers as a 
consequence of the ambivalence of violence embodied in the colonial civic 
order and its state-system, besides several other factors. However, Adivasis 
who are already in positions of power might now be able to muster courage 
to rightfully assert theirs and their less-fortunate co-villagers’ Constitutional 
and Fundamental Rights. This would be a real challenge to Adivasi elites to 
create trust and credibility among their own marginalized co-villagers rather 
than blaming them for their constructed ‘backwardness.’ Only by doing this 
will the affluent Adivasi be able to challenge the distorted ethics of political 
Brahmanism and its adherents, the trend setters, whose super-exploitation not 
only of marginalized people, but also the ecology constitute the Indian 
colonial system.115 Hence, the emerging elites from among the marginalized 
                                                      
115 The Tribal Affairs Minister Kishore Chandra Deo has spoken out at different public fora 
against the ongoing abuse of Adivasis’ rights by the state assisted agents of the corporate 
powers. He has also written to Chief Ministers of different state governments to implement 
legislations that provide special Constitutional rights to Adivasis in Scheduled Areas (see 
Goswami 2012; Tehelka 2012). This might be seen a positive (productive) consequence of 
the recently publicized Naxalite violence (Sharma 2013) in Adivasi-dominant regions of the 
country, as it has also gained some space in the mainstream media to discuss pressing 
Adivasi ‘issues.’ It is also important to note, in this context, the case of Soni Sori, an Adivasi 
woman teacher from Chhattisgarh who showed extraordinary courage to stand by her 
convictions at the face of state-police-terror and unimaginably inhuman physical torture 
under police custody. The outrageous deceptiveness and schizophrenic fear of the ruling 
elites, who make up the present Chhattisgarh government, is evident in its recent attempts 
‘implicate noted Sociologist Prof. Nandini Sundar, Head of Department of Sociology, Dellhi 
School of Economics and others associated with her, for alleged links with banned Maoists in 
Chhattisgarh… This is yet another attempt by the Chhattisgarh government to threaten, 
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social groups will do well to realize that their dignity lies in actively 
challenging and rejecting political Brahmanism and not in imitating or 
introjecting it. 
The rest of this chapter charts out the two opposite trajectories: one, the 
Indian elites’ endless chase of mirages facilitated by political Brahmanism; 
and the other, Adivasis alternative imaginations (subjectivities) centred on 
‘sacral polity’ and endless retreat. Then, it discusses the politics of 
ambivalence in India. Further, it presents Sartre’s philosophy of histories or 
philosophical anthropology to suggest a way out for bringing the two 
opposite trajectories together to engage in meaningful confrontation, 
dialogue, mutual appreciation and better understanding to move towards a 
more meaningful and relevant concept of development as enhancement of 
freedom, solidarity, equality, human dignity and sustainability.  
The Two Contradictory Trajectories: 
1. Political Brahmanism or Indian Elitism: Chasing Mirages 
The first and second chapters of this thesis has located the self-attributed 
‘purity’ (divinity) of the dominant castes to be at the origin of an Indian 
colonial desire. This self-attributed divinity occurs in the context of scarcity; 
it is scarcity interiorized or simply unrestrained greed and pride. This has 
gradually developed into pursuit of Lakshmi, an unrestricted, competitive and 
antagonistic strife for wealth, power, honour and good fortunes at the cost of 
the greater common good, freedom of being and becoming more human. 
Thus, political Brahmanism fits well with the ideologies of classical 
(European) colonialism and contemporary neoliberal global capitalism that 
also survives mainly by chasing similar mirages variously projected as 
‘economic growth,’ ‘modernity,’ ‘development’ and so on.  
Currently, these alliances of colonial desires are ‘exploding into a whole way 
of life, encompassing everything from private banking conditions to 
invitation-only health clinics … Those with money,  increasingly lock their 
entire lives behind closed doors. Rather than attend media-heavy events, they 
arrange private concerts, fashion shows and art exhibitions in their own 
homes. They shop after-hours, and have their neighbours (and potential 
                                                                                                                                         
intimidate and silence anyone raising issues of accountability by state police and government 
to Constitutional requirements and human rights laws…’ (Sinha 2014: 1). 
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friends) vetted for class cash’ (Emily Flynn 2007, quoted in Žižek 2009: 4).   
Thus, a new global class has emerged ‘with, say, an Indian passport, a castle 
in Scotland, a pied-à-terre in Manhattan and a private Caribbean island – the 
paradox is that the members of this global class dine privately, shop and view 
art privately, everything is private, private, private.’ While they create their 
enclaves or ‘private empires,’ their contact with the outside world comes in 
two forms: business and humanitarianism (protecting the environment, 
fighting against diseases, supporting the arts, etc.). ‘They live mostly in a 
pristine nature – whether trekking in Patagonia or swimming in the 
translucent waters of their private islands.’ However, these gated superrich 
fear external social life. ‘They insulate themselves from the dangers of 
mingling with ordinary people. … While ordinary people swarm through the 
dangers of streets down below, they float around on a higher level, up in the 
air.’ And their primary concerns are how to minimize security risks – disease, 
exposure to threats of violent crime, and so forth. ‘Are not these “global 
citizens” living in secluded areas the true counter-pole to those living in 
slums and other “white spots” of the public sphere? They are, indeed, two 
sides of the same coin, the two extremes of the new class division’ (Žižek 
2009: 4-5).  
What these pursuers of Lakshmi qualify as 'successful' models have proved to 
be more barbaric, brutal, and harsh in India (see Das and Padel 2010, Roy 
2010, 2011). These models drive people into homogenous nation states to 
serve the political and economic interests of imperial and colonizing powers 
spread around the world. ‘The process of nation-state formation is millennia 
old, involving suppression, homogenization and control, the leading themes 
of state policy. Today “western” ideology permeates the farthest reaches of 
the global north, south, east and west.' Indigenous communitarian, non-
western values coexist and resist the 'western' domination inside the 
boundaries of virtually all nation-states. ''western,' refers to the hegemonic 
values, beliefs, and policies which undergird global neoliberal capitalism,' 
although, first developed in Europe and the United States, 'they now pervade 
elite classes/ castes and power structures worldwide' (Chomsky 2010: 9-11; 
also see Galtung 1990).  
These transnational elite classes, who chase the mirage of their private 
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empires, also propagate the idea of one nation, and one people.116 Such 
processes of forced nation-state formation simultaneously advances 
neoliberal global economic policies which suppress cultural and linguistic 
diversity via educational standardization, atomization of communal bindings 
(Ibid.). For they apparently legitimize more advanced colonial desires in the 
eyes of pauperized masses (Reich 1975). 
In India’s case, ‘The Brahmanical law-books repeatedly stressed that the king 
should be guided by the laws laid down in the Dharmasastras [Manu’s law 
book which stresses the social positions, duties and rights of jatis/ castes] and 
by the customs prevalent in India’ (Sharma 2007: 179). Sharma’s (1959) 
comments on the advice being given to ancient ruling elites of India by 
Kautilya, the author of Artha Sastra (the science of material wealth), are 
interesting: ‘strikingly enough, Kautilya makes the deliberate use of 
superstitions in hoodwinking the masses and thus securing their loyalty to the 
state’ (Ibid.: 236). This bears close similarities to an anecdote that shows how 
power is always in excess, and hence corrupt. 
Where does a wise man hide a leaf? In the forest! But what does he do if there is no 
forest? He grows a forest to hide it in, said the priest in an obscure voice. A fearful sin! 
… And if a man had to hide a dead body, he would make a field of dead bodies to hide 
it in. (Žižek 2008: 95). 
Power distorts truth or presents untruth as truth to legitimize, secure and 
persist while rendering other forms of knowledge as ignorance. Such is the 
insidious dynamics of power and domination, 'culturally schizophrenic: being 
present and yet not visible, being visible and yet not present' (Macado 2000: 
11). The pre-British Indian colonial polity rested on political Brahmanism to 
forge oppressive hegemony (see Peabody 2003). The state in united Bihar has 
almost been identical with the ‘upper’ caste elites (Sushmita 2014) while the 
emerging leadership of the ‘Backward Castes or Classes’ inevitably come to 
adhere to political Brahmanism (see Witsoe 2012, 2013), perhaps, due to 
want of alternative models or it takes extraordinary courage to fight the 
prevalent system. Thus, the ruling elites, in India in general, conveniently 
adhere to political Brahmanism not only to make the toiling masses act as it 
chooses, but also to defend the elites’ privileges and fortunes. The resiliency 
of caste-based inequalities in India must therefore be traced to the efforts of 
the adherents of political Brahmanism to manipulate and deceive the millions 
                                                      
116 The reference here is to ethnic nationalism in India (Aloysius 1997). 
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of India’s non-literate ‘masses,’ so kept, to their advantage. 
This manipulative, and of late, desperate deceptiveness, evident in the Indian 
education system, does not promote critical discussion and thinking. The 
Indian elites’ deliberate efforts to manipulate history is a clear symptom of 
deep rooted fear of being challenged of their colonial desires and privileges 
(Sharma 2007, Ilaiah 2004). Hence, it is very evident that the Indian elites 
would keep defending and falsely justifying their colonial desires, but are 
afraid of any move towards equitable social change and meaningful 
democratization.117 For example, a recent sociological ‘experiment’ on jati/ 
caste-based beliefs, and practices in Karnataka, India shows that,  
1. There has been continued disconnect between academic writing on caste and society 
and popular narratives about caste; 
2. There has really been no serious discussion or intellectual reflection on the dynamics 
of caste;  
3. Caste is not discussed in public domain, instead of discussions there are only 
judgments;  
4. Quite many public intellectuals are reluctant to write about caste and most often 
discussions on caste are reduced to that of reservations [affirmative action policies];  
5. Caste practices have been sustained by various truths and beliefs; and that 
6. Bringing sociological insights into public domain – disseminating academic insights 
on caste through (vernacular) mass media is important (Guru and Sarukai 2014: 28-
29).  
In short, the dominant castes in India have time and again refused to 
publically discuss and deconstruct the-taken-for-granted truths, beliefs, and 
practices that facilitate, produce and reproduce caste-based domination, 
discrimination and oppression in India. Understandably because they have 
been the main beneficiaries of this system, and hence, the real deadlock 
would be both the fear of losing their privileges, on the one hand, and being 
blamed, as a group that deliberately perpetuates the system, on the other. 
Thus, a section of the evidently embarrassed Indian elites118 have recently 
begun either to deny the existence of caste-based discrimination altogether or 
                                                      
117 A study undertaken by the Asian Centre for Human Rights shows that the Government of 
India funds only to NGOs that perform service delivery and not to NGOs that engage in 
activities related to enforcing the rule of law and democracy. Moreover, NGOs allegedly had 
to pay about 15% to 30% of the grants to have their projects approved – ‘bribe to processes 
the applications.’ (Chakma 2013). 
118 See Menon (2014) ‘The Embarrassed Modern Hindu’ Outlook Magazine 24 February. 
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to blame it entirely on European (British) colonialism and orientalism. One of 
the best examples of a desperate effort to deny not only the existence of caste 
system but also Hinduism as a religion, while being oblivious of the 
grassroots Indian realities, could be found in a recent book Reconceptualising 
India Studies by Rao (2012). Thus political Brahmanism might well be 
tagged with self-attributed divinity the basic (Indian) colonial desire, 
interiorized scarcity, schizophrenic fear, violence and deceptiveness while it 
ardently tries to adhere to newer colonial desires of neoliberal global 
capitalism. 
It is apt now, in contrast to Indian elitism, to take a look at Adivasi social 
formations to see how they exercise self-restraint especially in relation to the 
use of resources, in sharp contrast to the so-called ‘mainstream’ society. 
2. Adivasis and Their Sacral Polity: an Exercise of Freedom 
On examining Adivasis’ relationship with the natural environment 
historically, one finds that they had developed what could be termed as the 
‘socialism of abundance,’ where no one goes hungry, in sharp contrast to the 
caste-divided plains societies which were traditionally considered ‘civilized.’ 
For example, O’Malley (1910) caught this important aspect of the Hos of 
Kolhan in his District Gazetteer of Singhbhum, Seraikela and Kharsawan. 
‘There has not been a famine here since 1866, chiefly because the majority of 
the population are aboriginals and a considerable part of their food supply 
consists of edible forest products’ (Ibid.: 120).  
Adivasis’ socially devised restraint displayed in their management of forests 
in turn reflects the nature of these social formations (Corbridge 1996). Sarat 
Chandra Roy had caught the Mundas’ traditional way of using forest 
resources. 
It is in the months of Chait or Baisik (March to May) before the rains set in, that in 
many villages the Munda and Pahan, on a day appointed beforehand, lead the villagers 
into the village-jungles and the necessary fuel and timber for the year is cut down by 
the villagers from a specified part of the jungle, leaving the other part or parts to be 
similarly dealt with by rotation in successive years. And the wood thus cut down is then 
taken home by the villagers according to their respective needs. By this prudent use 
procedure, the village jungles can never be devastated (Roy 1970: 63).  
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Most recently, anthropologist Felix Padel tells his experience of the Dongaria 
Kondhs who have so far resisted bauxite mining by Vedanta, a multinational 
company, in Niyamgiri hills in Odisha in Eastern India.  
The Dongaria observe ‘niyam,’ which are the traditional rules of restraint about what is 
taken from nature. Tribal religion is based on respect for the natural world. The 
Dongaria taboo on cutting forests on mountain summits, and in particular felling trees 
on the mountain top under dispute, Niyam Dongar, is a brilliant example of this. … 
They understand, perhaps better than most scientists, that the forests on top of the 
mountain holds deposits of water, which ensure that the flow of the perennial streams 
that are such a striking feature of the Niyamgiri range. The bauxite deposit at the top of 
Niyam Dongar acts as a sponge that soaks up the monsoon rain, holding it and releasing 
it slowly throughout hot summer months.119 
It needs to be understood that tribal societies such as Dongaria are extremely developed 
in certain areas where mainstream society is itself backward or underdeveloped. ... in 
maintaining restrain towards nature, which is the basis of real or long-term 
sustainability; in the tradition of dance and song through which tribal people actively 
entertain themselves, instead of becoming passive consumers of media promoted 
‘stars’; and in a value system which emphasizes sharing instead of competition. .. If you 
attend a tribal council you will find these are models of real democracy – people speak 
their minds fearlessly, and the aim is consensus. ... The Adivasi system allows 
contestants to speak their mind freely before fining both sides (usually), and using these 
fines to pay for a fest of reconciliation. … ‘Adivasi Economics’ emphasizes on restraint 
towards the environment. It may be that the Dongarias’ grassroots democracy will even 
inspire a large-scale shift throughout India towards an economic system that is based on 
ecological principles (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, Mahasweta Devi, who has known Adivasis well enough to 
publish extensively on Adivasi lives and struggles in India, has recently 
‘termed Adivasis as “the most civilized people” to whom Indian forests, 
rivers and mountains owe their survival.’120 Furthermore, Shah (2010) 
describes, in some detail, how the Mundas of Jharkhand practice certain 
faith-based (spirit-animated) procedures to elect officials to their ‘sacral 
polity’ which is non-sectarian and radically democratic. 
These citations are in no way meant to ‘romanticize’ Adivasi social 
formations. However, it is important to reiterate that Adivasis have developed 
and lived their sociocultural systems that might have contrasted sharply with 
that of the rigidly hierarchically graded ones of the plains, when they had 
more control of their own lives. This thesis has, to some extent, traced the 
                                                      
119 Padel (2014) ‘Interview: anthropologist Felix Padel on Life and Struggle in Niyamgiri.’ 
Padel also mentions the title of his (latest) co-authored book: Ecology, Economy: Quest for a 
socially informed connection, in which he has highlighted ‘Adivasi Economics.’ 
120 Devi (2012) ‘Adivasis most civilized people.’  
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processes of gradual parcelling of such holistically integrated Adivasi social 
formations, in Chotanagpur plateau during the course of India’s long history. 
It has also shown that the most marginalized sections of these social 
formations still cherish and live these alternative imaginations of an 
integrated and holistic view of a more radically democratic and egalitarian 
society in their everyday lives (Shah 2010; 2014). 
However, as Žižek (2008) has argued, ‘the secular-progressive culture has 
swept away traditional beliefs.’ The specialists of ‘progress,’ ‘modernity’ and 
‘development,’ while debating about traditionalism versus secular, liberal 
relativism, have thrown the baby out with the bath water which looked murky 
precisely because the baby was inside it. (Ibid.: 41, 276). This relates to the 
Sartrean view of ‘progress,’ as ‘a ruling class mystification designated to 
stave off social change (in conjunction with his acknowledgment of the 
usefulness of scientific and technological progress).’ For Sartre, ‘progress’ 
can be negative due to the alienation resulting in practico-inert. However, he 
also referred to ‘progress’ as positive practico-inert embodied, for example, 
in civil rights legislation or other forms of democratization (Howell 1995: 7). 
The violence and ambivalence of ‘modernity’ is evident while it invents 
‘some mode of being together, and simultaneously deprives of any support in 
traditional ways of life, in inherited religions or ethnic life-forms’ (Žižek: 
425).  
The Context of Ambivalence in India: Conversion of Sacral Polities into 
Political Brahmanism 
Sharma (1959) has tried to show how ‘tribal’ social formations had managed 
to control their chieftains in power by various ritual practices that were 
integral to their being together as more egalitarian communities, at least, in 
their own (numerous and independent) in-groups during ancient times.  
The savage Timmes of Sierraleone, who elect their king, reserved to themselves the 
right of beating him on the eve of his coronation; and they availed themselves of this 
constitutional privilege with such hearty goodwill that sometimes the unhappy 
monarchs does not long survive his elevation to the throne. It seems that the practice 
was meant to test the endurance of the king – a rite of initiation or a test to find out the 
power of endurance in the tribal chief (Ibid.: 123).  
According to him, when social transformations in ancient Indian history 
began to take place during the later Vedic period when the brahmanas 
(ancient Indian priests) ‘laid hold of such indigenous ritual practices to assert 
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their power over the king, and later it came to be interpreted as the king’s 
exemption from the operation of law’ (Ibid..).  
Chapter Two of this thesis has shown that most theories of state-formation in 
north India agree that a long-drawn and conflict-ridden conversion of the 
principles of Adivasi sacral polities into that of political Brahmanism lies at 
the heart of the process. This involved a gradual assimilation or conversion of 
powerful Adivasi chieftains into raja-status while relegating the lower strata 
to the status of ‘impure’ serfs and consequent resistance in forms of the 
weapons of the weak. Such conflicting, long-drawn and complex processes 
mark one of the main characteristics of India’s unrecorded ‘history from 
below.’ Hence, it is crucial to account for the phenomenon of a classic 
‘victim mentality’ of those who suffered repeatedly, from generation to 
generation, the traumatic effects and oppressive outcomes of Indian racism 
and colonialism that political Brahmanism entails: historical or generational 
trauma associated with the parcelling of more holistic and egalitarian social 
units (Heart 2003; Evans-Campbell 2008; Braun 2014). This is an important 
theme for further research: the intergenerational trauma or accumulated 
ambivalence of ‘intimate’ exclusion facilitated by political Brahmanism 
which embodies the peculiar Indian racism and colonialism.  
Accordingly, one also sees Adivasi elites’ tactics of attributing higher status 
or qualities to themselves and inferior qualities to their deprived co-villagers 
to justify their fortunes that come by activities of unequal accumulation and 
differentiation. Sinha (1986) has referred to such processes of state formation 
in Chotanagpur as ‘secondary primitivisation.’These processes obviously 
involved consequent conflicts, co-option, distortion of holistic communities, 
and sociocultural revival movements to reconfigure identities from below, 
compromise (cf. Pati 2001) and resultant ambivalence. This neglected aspect 
of the processes of state-formation in India needs further probing as to how it 
produces self-doubt and ambivalence among emerging leadership. Chapter 
Three, Four and Five of this thesis have highlighted how the pursuit of 
Lakshmi, adopted or introjected by Adivasi elites, and consequent 
differentiation produce ‘intimate’exclusion/ violence and ambivalence 
among co-villagers. Chapter Six of this thesis (on education) has, to some 
extent, highlighted how dehistoricisation has been operationalized by 
deliberately denying Adivasi history and cultural values to Adivasi children 
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while indoctrinating them with the dominant myths.  
Gramsci has argued, hegemony for rule is produced by the elite providing‘a 
moral, intellectual and cultural leadership’ (Krutz 1996: 103). Following 
Gramsci’s formulation of hegemony, certain ‘subaltern historians’ in India 
have argued that what they find in India is ‘domination without 
hegemony.’121 However, this thesis has shown that co-option and deception, 
in general, have been the general pattern of state formation in Adivasi 
dominant regions throughout Indian history. Hence, the production of 
hegemony in India cannot be based on any moral or intellectual ground, but 
on a colonial and racially segregated and sectarian style, by invoking 
divisive, ethnic, and communal sentiments among ordinary people. Such 
manipulation of India’s vast sections of non-literate people’s accumulated 
fear, and ambivalence arising from intergenerational trauma of Indian 
colonialism and racism produce (a kind of life-negating) hegemony (see 
Ilaiah 2004, 2010). A more spectacular display of this ambivalence of 
violence might be seen in the ‘elite revolt’ (Corbridge and Harris 2000) under 
the banner of a peculiar brand of cultural or religious nationalism advanced 
by the missionaries of 'syndicate Hinduism'122 (Thapar 2010; Narayan 2008; 
Desai 2011).  
Thus, the Indian democracy might well be described as a colonial civic order 
that embodies most characteristics of a standard colonial system. Hence, it is 
understandable that instead of civil society, what one finds in India are 
‘uncivil or political societies’ constituted by both its colonial citizens and 
subjects. The fluidity of their statuses range from ‘colonial subjects,’ who 
have no rights, to ‘subaltern’ citizens, whose rights are limited by privileged 
elites, to ‘full’ citizens who enjoy a maximum of rights under the 
constitutions, subsequent legislations, and state policies (Thompson 2000: 2). 
This colonial civic order is thus founded on a dehumanizing colonial violence 
and deceptiveness of political Brahmanism whose outcome on its sufferers is 
termed in this thesis as ambivalence of violence. 
                                                      
121 My reference here is to Ranajit Guha (1989) and his Subaltern Studies Group (SSG). Also 
see Ludden (2001); Singh (2002), Kamat (2004), Metcalf (2010) and Chibber (2013) for 
critiques of SS. 
122 See Reghunath (2014) for discussions on a Hindu believer’s radical services to the Sangh 
Parivar, the family of Hindu-fundamentalist organizations. 
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Understanding Indian Politics Operationalized by the Ambivalence 
of Violence 
What it is and how it has been operationalized in India 
Ambivalence of violence is constitutive of structural and cultural violence, 
whose roots were traced, by the chapters of this thesis, to the emergence of a 
pitiless colonial infernal machine, the ancient Indian state animated by the 
brahmanical ideology of ‘purity’ and ‘pollution.’ Such unrestraint pursuit of 
Lakshmi creates a situation of scarcity and violence of alienation or 
‘intimate’ exclusion. The ambivalence that results from such exclusionary 
violence might be seen as one of the main constitutive aspects of Indian 
society, culture and politics. Thus, the concept, of ambivalence of violence, 
might help better understand several apparent paradoxes and puzzles in state-
society relationships in India. 
Ambivalence of violence is the paradox in human psyche that permits the co-
existence of guilt and evil; it has a natural inclination to suppress evil while 
being simultaneously ambivalent about the same (Baumeister 1997). 
Ambivalence of the oppressed emerges from the fact that their life-world is 
shaped, in multiple ways, by the subordination they repeatedly experience 
throughout long historical stereotyping, humiliation and repression. Even 
their repertoires of contention are shaped by the powers of the dominant 
social groups (Bates 1975). Such ambivalence of violence enables violence to 
flourish (Baumeister 1997). It is a state of mind arising also from a 
combination of routinized and internalized forms of both moralities and 
cruelties. The sectarian politics of communal violence in Indian colonial civic 
order has been triggered often by invoking such ambivalence prevalent 
among both the colonial subjects and citizens alike. That is why, most 
ironically, often the victims of such violence would themselves later be made 
perpetrators, as the floating ambivalence would easily be manipulated by 
those in power to retain power (see Bhaviskar 2005; Narayan 2009; 
Chaturvedi 2011; Berenschot 2011; Bhaviskar and Raka 2011).  
All these clashes took place between high caste Hindus and Adivasis or Harijans 
[Dalits]. Yet, it is evident that they were not sparked off by caste issues, but by 
economic and political issues. The landless laborers demand higher wages and land, 
and they have begun to organize themselves to fight for these interests. The dominant 
rural class, however, uses its political, economic and cultural power, including direct 
violence, to keep the rural proletariat ‘in palace,’ as they say… The ruling class very 
232 
 
skillfully uses caste discrimination, caste feelings and the feudal dependence of the 
untouchable laborers on the land-lord as weapons (Maria Mies 1976, quoted in Devalle 
1980: 11). 
This text clearly brings out how skillfully the dominant groups perpetuate and 
manipulate the ambivalence of already subordinated groups to their own 
advantage. Ambivalence of violence both contributes and constitutes 
systemic or structural violence. It justifies, solidifies and sustains unequal 
power relations and structures by prolonged and unchallenged jati/ caste-
based racism and colonialism. Colonialism as a system continues to exist by 
what Sartre (2005: 9) calls, ‘neocolonialist mystifications.’ 
An enduring ambivalence of political leadership in India is evident in the 
ongoing discursive justification of repeatedly committed crimes of large-
scale corruption, planned and systematically executed genocidal communal 
polarization, riots and killing (Engineer 1991; Tambiah 1996; Wilichowski 
2012). Moreover the dominant style of public reasoning advanced almost 
daily on Indian mass media is something like this: ‘others have done it 
therefore we too do it’ or ‘all others are doing it therefore we can also do it.’ 
Thus, one sees political leadership in India competing for tragedy amidst 
mounting crisis of political (party) coalitions to forge legitimacy to stay in 
power. 
...The focus on the innocence or culpability of certain politicians has politicized the 
public debate on communal violence… The current debate stimulates people to 
condone communal violence for the sake of defending one's political preferences and, 
worse still, enables political leaders to construe any criticism of the handling of the 
Gujarat violence as 'anti-Hindu'. For instance, as long as debates on communal violence 
have the character of being about Congress versus BJP, voters as well as politicians will 
be stimulated to defend and legitimize the occurrence of violence (Berenschot 2011: 
ix). 
This is underlined by a single idea: forget violence, forget the complicity of the state in 
its systematic aiding and abetting of violence, forget a few thousand dead and move 
forward. To be fair to Modi, this is not unique to him but part and parcel of a body of 
‘ethics’ that a lot of us transcending political affiliations have consciously and 
unconsciously absorbed for centuries. ... War, killing and violence, therefore, ought 
never to be matters of shame and remorse. ... Philosophical and metaphysical arguments 
of a higher order will always be summoned to justify violence and legitimize killing in 
the name of abstractions such as ‘nation’, ‘people’ and ‘patriotism’ (Sharma 2014; 
1).123 
These are clear symptoms of societal decadence perhaps mainly due to an 
                                                      
123 See Sharma (2014) ‘Where will a condoning of acquisitiveness and fratricidal violence lead 
us?’ 
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education system that refuses to promote critical thinking about prevalent 
crippling sociocultural praxes while simultaneously indoctrinating its 
younger generations with deceptive and skillfully manipulated 
historiographies (see Sharma 2007: preface and introduction). Manipulated 
historiographies and dehistoricisation nurture symbolic violence (Emirbayer 
and Johnson 2008). Hence, it is crucial to understand how the long-mystified 
caste-based discrimination and oppression reproduces itself in various forms 
via ambivalence of violence. This thesis has, to some extent, attempted to 
show how it operates in India’s Adivasi dominant regions. Added to this 
complexity is the ambivalence of the emerging elites, from within all 
historically marginalized groups, who in turn alienate their own less-fortunate 
group-members or co-villagers and reproduce practico-inert. This is a 
peculiar outcome of sanskritisation and westernization model as it 
necessarily functions on the logic: accumulation by a few and poverty, 
‘intimate’ exclusion and suffering for many.  
The following section explicates Sartre’s philosophical anthropology and 
history to better understand the dialectical relationship of social conditioning 
of violence and both individual and social projects to overcome it. For ‘a 
lucid view of the darkest situation is already, in itself, an act of optimism’ 
(Sartre, quoted in Rhiannon 1995:143).   
Sartrean Framework for Undoing Ambivalence of Violence by 
Understanding its Mechanisms  
One of the central aims of Sartre’s criticism of colonialism and imperialism 
was to expose the violence they embody, and their complex interrelations and 
reproductive mechanisms. He has not only made these unintelligible 
processes intelligible, but also charted out a powerful vision of a socialist 
society being centred on human persons and freedom. His existential 
philosophical maxim is: ‘I am condemned to be free’ (Gelblum 1970: 76). 
Sartre emphasizes the aspects of self-knowledge and self-determination, and 
thence how humans can make the kind of people they want be. He rejects any 
doctrine of predeterminism, which rules out the possibility for humans to 
rework and integrate the ‘already existing dispositions, character traits, and 
emotional patterns’ (Howell 1995: 4). Sartre’s (2004) posthumously 
published Critique of Dialectical Reason (CDR) offers the possibility of a 
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new ontology and epistemology of liberation, intellectually committed to 
social and political transformation on a global scale.  
Violence Arising Out of Human Interrelatedness 
A phenomenological understanding of human and societal realities – the 
dialectic of individuals’ embodied interrelatedness, for Sartre, is crucial in 
understanding and reworking the constraints they come to impose. His 
philosophy of histories points towards the centrality of struggle and the 
impossibility of reconciliation: the unavoidable notions of fraternity and 
violence. Historically, the existentialist dialectic of humans’ embodied 
interrelatedness generates otherness and restores synthesis – it goes from 
inertia to spontaneity to inertia, and this dialectic being the agent, marks 
history as a continuous violent interchange. Sartre (2004) in his CDR says, 
‘Man lives in a universe where the future is a thing, where the idea is an 
object and where the violence of matter is the mid-wife of history [social 
change]’ (Ibid.: 181). The objectified ideas and the violence of matter 
constitutes practico-inert which ‘denotes the realm of sedimented praxis of 
passivity and of counter-finality. It extends and defines the nothing of 
otherness and recalcitrance’ (Flynn 1995: 241, emphasis added).  
Practico-inert does exert a kind of negative, deforming influence on individuals and 
collective projects – a free inertial, objective, negative exigencies made possible by the 
colonialist or the capitalist ‘system’ on their practico-inertness in the ‘logic’ of a series 
of human decisions that entail unintended, contradictory consequences … on the ‘serial 
rationality.’ … In effect, practico-inertness serves to connect a class of automatic and 
impersonal forces with underlying praxis while retaining a certain rationality of its 
own: ‘there is a rationality of the theoretical and practical behavior of an agent as a 
member of a series [a social whole mediated by the practico-inert]’. It is the ‘logic’ of 
otherness, of exteriority, of passivity, of alienation, of social impotence, and ‘flight.’ 
‘Serial reason’ as ‘a special case of dialectical Reason’ (Ibid.: 241, emphasis added). 
Thus, alienation occurs in the course of human interactions since humans are 
embodied individuals who need to employ symbols to create and interpret 
meaning. Abstraction occurs as objective spirit or culture gets shaped as 
practico-inert such as, prison communes, or bourgeois practice of 
respectability – aesthetic and religious norms, etc. (Flynn 1995: 242). The     
latter could also be termed as colonial desires (Young 1995). Violence or 
exclusion (of the ‘other’), thus, originates and accumulates, as explained at 
the introductory chapter-1, in the context of material scarcity produced by 
specific types of colonial desires and competition between the haves and 
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have-nots. It ultimately results in ‘practico-inert mediation’ which forms 
violence: ‘the sentence of things upon persons – modified by the brute fact of 
material scarcity’. However, Sartre admits that within in-groups, that have 
been formed into extremes, passivity (practico-inert) might disappear when 
collectivities entirely reabsorb their alienated members or subgroups (Flynn 
1995: 242). This is in-group solidarity in extreme circumstances.  
While this being the human existential reality that necessarily produces 
violence, in the context of perceived scarcity and the threatening otherness of 
the other, the only way out is the conscious development and application of 
critical self-reflexivity, which for Sartre, is human freedom.  
Freedom Defines Human Beings 
Sartre resolves a necessarily distorted historical dialectics that produce 
alienation and practico-inert by combining individual freedom, of 
responsibility, and of authenticity within the larger processes of history. 
Freedom is the unique human capacity for critical self-reflexivity.  
Sartre points out a ceaseless opposition between humans’ freedom of choice 
and the objectified burden of their past choices: ‘each configuration of 
dialectical reality is conditioned by the previous one, while preserving and 
superseding it at the same time.’ Yet, ‘while preconfiguration may preserve 
another, it can never simply be reduced to its predecessor’. Thus, ‘not only 
does the past constrain what is possible in the present, the present, in a 
fundamental way, also determines the past’ (Brown 1979: 4).  Sartre’s 
emphasis on the historical subject in society marks the main difference in the 
dialectic he proposes and that of the so-called ‘Marxists.’ The historical 
social subject’s freedom, subjectivity and creativity are stressed while he or 
she transcends the constraints imposed on him or her. Hence, Sartre’s 
philosophical anthropology underlines the maxim: ‘you can always make 
something out of what had been made of you’ (Flynn 1995: 254). 
Jopling (1995) summarizes Sartre’s moral psychology: integrity, justice, 
prudence, courage, magnanimity sincerity, authenticity are not inherent 
innate human dispositions, but are acquired by training, practice or reflection. 
They, to some extent, reveal what humans have made of themselves. They 
express a society’s moral outlook that has been developed by its members, 
and not as they just happen to have. Similarly, self-determination, agency, 
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responsibility, the unity of a life, moral reasoning and self-knowledge, all of 
these need to be cultivated by conscious efforts. One sees people,   
who by reasoning, choice, or moral reflection arrive at their moral outlook and view of 
the good life; who have achieved a level of personal and interpersonal integrity, by 
assuming a stance of self-criticism and self-questioning toward their desire, beliefs, 
volition, actions, and habits; and who know with some acuity what they are doing with 
their lives, and what their true goals are. Obviously, not everyone attains this level of 
moral autonomy and self-knowledge, but we hold it as an ideal to which all must aspire, 
and we evaluate ourselves and others in light of it. .. Its absence is manifested in self-
deception or self-ignorance – a moral shortcoming (Jopling 1995: 104). 
Thus, Sartre would agree with Engels that ‘active social forces work exactly 
like natural forces, blindly forcibly, destructively, so long as we do not 
understand and reckon with them. But when once we grasp their action, their 
direction, their effects, it depends only up on ourselves to subject them more 
and more to our own will and by means of them to reach our own ends…’ 
(Engels 1954, quoted in Jopling 1995: 134). Without entering into a 
discussion on the ‘ends’ of human endeavours, it suffice to say that humans 
need to exercise critical self-awareness and self-restraint to reduce structural, 
cultural and direct violence, especially, in a multi ethnic, linguistic and multi-
cultural society. These so-called human qualities are not natural but needs 
conscious cultivation via proper socialization, critical reflections and 
practice, namely, by historically grounded critical education and organic 
praxes.  
Relevance for Indian Situation 
Interestingly, the six Indian philosophical systems, – Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya, 
Vaisheshika, Mimamsa, and Vedanta – developed clearly with the influence 
of Buddhism towards the beginning of the first century A.C.E, discuss the 
‘ends’ of human life and salvation (Sharma 2007). In fact, Gelblum (1970) 
and Larson (1998) have shown that the classical Samkhya philosophy is 
compatible with Sartre’s philosophical anthropology being discussed here. 
However, ironically, the Indian elites have neither practised these 
philosophical insights themselves (see Sharma 2013 a & b)124 nor have they 
                                                      
124 Sharma (2013 a, b) discusses as to how and why Indian elites broke with the mystical and 
theological dimensions of Indian religious and philosophical schools of thought that had been 
renewed by Chaitaniya and Ramakrishna. 
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let the historically marginalized peoples to develop their own by the forceful 
imposition of a centralized and deceptive education system, originally 
intended and introduced by the British-colonists, that comfortably suits the 
advancement of the newer colonial desires of the trend-setters (Ilaiah 1996). 
It is interesting to note Kancha Ilaiah’s (the author of Why I am not a Hindu) 
comments about some of the responses he had received on one of his books 
from his Indian friends: ‘predictably, orthodox Brahmins were angry, but so 
too were some “socialist” Brahmins. Actually, that did not surprise me at all, 
because they read Marx’s Capital just as they read the Vedas – reciting it – 
not a critical reading.’ However, he also received a few responses from a few 
Tamil Brahmans saying that ‘they discovered what was wrong with their 
religion and culture and how they must change if they are to survive.’125  
The Indian elites, who attribute divinity to themselves, must realize that ‘the 
maturity of democratic consciousness can be measured by how we treat, not 
their own descendants and dependents, but members of the classes or castes 
other than one’s own, because they constitute the ‘other' side of our 
society.’126 All alienated histories of the ‘other’ must become truly ‘ours’ not 
just ‘theirs.’ This needs conscious efforts to promote ‘a nuanced quasi-
objectivity in common subjectivity,’ positive values of mutuality and ‘free’ 
(or non-alienating) ‘alterity’ among groups and their members (Flynn 1995: 
230). For ‘life develops in spirals: it always passes through the same point, 
but at different levels of integration and complexity’ (Rhiannon 1995: 71). 
‘To experience oneself, to take risks, to discover oneself by discovering 
things, to change while changing the world. This is to live, what better is 
there? I would refuse to be a God if it were offered to me. Down to the 
simple fact of being permanently in danger, there is nothing that cannot be a 
source of enjoyment’ (Simont 1995: 208). Such realizations might, hopefully, 
bring some changes in Indian elites’ futile exercises of chasing mirage. For 
‘the way we perceive both ourselves and others reflects a profound 
ambivalence in our reaction to requirements of civilization. Human condition 
is balanced on the edge of an existential paradox – our consciousness and 
imagination rise above physical world of nature, yet they are inextricably 
linked to the natural processes’ (Charme 1991: 251). Hence, every colonial 
                                                      
125 Sikond (2007) ‘Interview with Kancha Ilaiah, the author of Why I am not a Hindu.’ 
126 Kancha Ilaiah quoted in Yadav, B. (2010) ‘Insight into Dalitbahujan writings’ 
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desire must be critically scrutinized in a given historical and sociocultural 
context as to what consequences they bear for society at large. 
Ilaiah (2004, 2010) has convincingly shown that India’s future hopes for a 
more civilized society rests in Dalitbahujans and Adivasis. These two terms, 
according to him, broadly encompasses almost all working class populations 
in India irrespective of their religious or cultural affiliations. They already 
have, to some extent, lived experiences of ideals such as egalitarianism, 
freedom, authentic reciprocity and radical democracy. Hence, there is an 
urgent need to rediscover erased histories, sociocultural values and 
revolutionary ideals of India’s marginalized social formations to build a 
renewed Indian (social) democracy (Ibid..). Notwithstanding, however, the 
prevalent politics of ambivalence by which the emerging leadership among 
the working class populations of India have progressively been co-opted and 
assimilated into the colonial civic order.  
The complexity of the Indian situation must be understood in this 
simultaneous processes: on the one hand, colonial desires of self-attributed 
‘purity,’ and pursuit of Lakshmi keep parcelling homogenous and holistically 
integrated social groups into estranged collectivities of atomized (individual) 
members (Ambedkar 1916). While simultaneously, on the other hand, there 
are also ambivalent, imperial, and aggressive religious nationalist and 
capitalist efforts to homogenize – processes that bear close similarity to 
fascism – aggregated by the pressures of neoliberal global capitalism 
(Engineer 1994; Gregor 2006; Pun any 2004; Ilaiah 2004; Lobo 2009).127 The 
paradox of Indian colonial desires and related activity of chasing mirages of 
an imaginary ‘India’ (see Aloysius 1997) to be ‘shining’ and emerging as a 
‘super economic power,’ have alienated a large section of the Indian elites 
(colonial citizens) to such an extent that they remain largely oblivious to what 
constitutes the everyday life-worlds of India’s marginalized majority peoples 
– Adivasis and Dalitbahujans (broadly and fluidly, ‘colonial subjects’ as 
opposed to ‘colonial citizens’). 
Adivasi resistance, assertion of identity and self-determination run against the 
grain of such homogenizing rhetoric, and aggressive nationalism in India 
                                                      
127 Also see Gatade (2013) for discussion as to how sections of Dalits being co-opted to 
spread communal violence and Banaji (2011) for explorations of ‘cultures of resistance’ in 
India ‘that are hostile to democracy.’ 
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driven also by global neoliberal capitalist powers of exclusion (Das and Padel 
2010; Roy 2011; Padel et al 2013). They (Adivasi assertions) also provide 
hope for the preservation and viability of communal ways of life and 
Indigenous cultural values. Their alternative imaginations point also to viable 
options for 'successful defiance,' independent efforts of independent action 
(Chomsky 2010: 9-11).128 These might seem threatening to the advocates of 
neoliberal global capitalism in India, which is neocolonialism par-excellence. 
This Indian colonialism has always been accompanied by direct physical 
violence of military coups, cultural violence of educational homogenization, 
structural violence of chronic poverty and destitution, unequal access to 
development resources, deprivation of emancipatory education, disrespect for 
and denial of indigenous identity, denial of historical memory to the 
oppressed groups by manipulated historiographies (chapters in this thesis), 
and abuse of democratic procedures wherein ‘both crime and money play an 
important role in winning elections (Sastry 2014: 43). 
Possible Strategies for Solidarity and Confrontation 
Hence, perhaps, it is possible for Adivasis and Dalitbahujans to learn from 
their traditions the principles of radical (social) democracy to ensure 
accountability, transparency and egalitarian socialism, for the recognition and 
affirmation of their ‘legality and dignity’ (George 2010: 1) from their own 
elected representatives at various levels, to begin with. This would be the 
beginning of an ongoing exercise of re-inventing the old universal in every 
new historical situation (Žižek 2008). For an alternative conception of 
socialism must embrace a relentless ‘struggle to democratize power across all 
the centres of social activity – in private as well as in compulsory obligations, 
in the family and the neighbourhood and the nursery and the shopping centre 
as well as in the public office or at the point of production’ (Hall 1984: 29).  
Although this might sound too utopian an idea, there are people who have 
proved that it is possible. The extraordinary story of Marinaleda, a Spanish 
communist model village, has proved it in practice.  The revolutionary leader 
of this village is determined to change the system into one that is not 
capitalistic, where people are considered merchandise: while they are 
                                                      
128 Chomsky (2013) says, indigenous people all over the world are leading the fight against 
neoliberal capitalism. 
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profitable, they are used, and when they are no longer profitable, they are 
discarded. They have determined to change these cruel and inhuman values 
replacing it with unions, parties and organizations that promote a different 
system, with human beings at the core (Hancox 2013).  
It might be possible for affluent Adivasis to do this if they rediscover and re-
embrace the ideals in their own sacral polities that are still cherished by their 
deprived co-villagers instead of introjecting/ emulating political Brahmanism 
which does not in any way bring them cultural dignity. The challenge is to 
make this practico-inert fields of historically marginalized societies and their 
alternative imaginations dynamically adaptable, compatible and workable for 
the present times. For this there must be an ongoing transformation, both at 
personal and at the broader communal levels. To chart out these necessary 
but difficult processes of transformation or rather a re-embrace with total and 
non-judgemental solidarity in detail, goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Hence a story that embodies the basic principles of this necessary reformation 
might do better. 
The story is told of a Zulu girl who lived in a village where all the 
marriageable young women wore necklaces. Hers, however, was different 
and more beautiful than those worn by any of the others. As a result the girls 
became jealous of her. One day as she was walking alone along the river, she 
met a group of other girls, who told her that they all have thrown their 
necklaces into the river as an offering to the river god. They urged her to 
make the same sacrifice. So the girl took off her beautiful necklace and cast it 
into the river. Then all the girls laughed as they pulled out their necklaces 
from their pockets and ran off gleefully. Deeply saddened, the girl continued 
to walk slowly along the river; but then she heard a voice within say, ‘Jump 
in!’ So she jumped into the river at that very spot. As she reached the bottom 
of the rtiver she swam into a cave where she met an old woman who had 
been much hurt by life. The woman said to her, ‘Kiss my scars and sores.’ 
The girl said, ‘I will do so gladly.’ When the girl had done so, suddenly the 
woman was completely healed and she looked young and beautiful again. 
The woman said to the girl, ‘Since you have done this for me, I will make 
you invisible to the demons so that they cannot harm you.’ At that very 
moment the girl heard a voice of a demon saying, ‘I smell flesh; I smell 
flesh.’ The demon, however, could not see her and went away. Then the 
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woman gave her a new necklace, even more beautiful than the one she had 
lost (Beesing et al 1984: 215). 
The challenge for today’s Adivasi elites is to cast aside the vanity, false pride 
and dignity that their colonial desires and pursuit of Lakshmi have bestowed 
on them, which marks their in-authenticity at the face of their deprived co-
villagers. It is only when they are ready to risk becoming like the Zulu girl 
who not only threw her cherished necklace but also readily and willingly 
embraced and kissed the old, deformed and hurt woman to bring her life back 
anew. This old woman represents the falsely constructed practico-inertness of 
marginalized Adivasis today, which needs a re-embrace with the abundance 
of Adivasis’ radical socialism. This might be the path to solidarity and real 
empowerment. 
Thus, Adivasi people’s journey to real empowerment might begin only when 
the affluent elites among them and their sympathizers begin to understand 
and appreciate their rich history, cultural heritage, values of freedom, 
authentic reciprocity, consensus, egalitarianism and the possibility of the 
abundance of radical socialism, and above all, how their uncritical adherence 
of brahmanical tactics and colonial desires have brought them to the present 
predicaments. For, as Sartre says, a lucid understanding of the historical 
processes and praxes, that have created the present predicaments, is itself a 
cause for optimism, since one now has some clarity as to how to rework the 
present predicament into a true emancipatory politics for a better future for 
all.  
The same story holds great lessons for the alienated Indian elites who busy 
themselves chasing mirages of building ‘private empires’ while projecting an 
evasive idea of India to further legitimize their colonial desires. They also 
need to realize their indulgence, in-authenticity and unsustainability of 
unrestrained colonial pursuits. For they now miss the beauty, struggle, risk 
and meaning life offers when one is willing to restore the estranged other’s 
egality and cultural dignity in authentic reciprocity. Unless they risk a re-
embrace of the practico-inert that have been created in Indian society, the 
main deadlock to the processes of meaningful democratization, they will 
continue to suffer from schizophrenic insecurity.  
Democracy is not a formal matter of electoral politics or constitutionalism. 
Instead, it is the real passage of power to the powerless, though electoral 
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politics and constitutionalism can enable it to happen. People have to 
democratize formal democracies for themselves (Hall 1984: 29, emphasis 
added). This needs education that promotes critical self-reflexivity and 
knowledge to analyze and understand how an increasingly complex society 
functions. Certainly, democratization does not happen all at once, through 
one centre – by simply ‘smashing the state,’ ‘as the sort of socialist thinking 
which is fixated on the state would have it. It has to happen across a 
multiplicity of sites in social life, on many different fronts, including, of 
course, the state itself, whose tendency to concentrate power is precisely what 
constitutes it as a barrier to socialism.’ It is crucial for people to realize this 
and formulate viable strategies (Ibid.).  Arundhati Roy, a brilliant and 
committed writer has proposed a viable strategy.  
Our strategy should be not only to confront empire, but to lay siege to it, to deprive it of 
oxygen; to shame it, to mock it with our art, our music, our brilliance, our sheer 
relentlessness and our ability to tell our own stories. Stories that are different from the 
ones we were being brainwashed to believe.  
The corporate revolution will collapse if we refuse to buy what they are selling – their 
ideas, their version of history, their wars, their weapons, and their notion of inevitability 
(Roy 2003: 5).  
Such strategies are necessary to make the private empire-builders to realize 
that their colonial desires might collapse if the working classes, who have so 
far been pauperized and atomized, undermine some of the falsely propagated 
colonial desires. Grounded on patiently and carefully throughout alternative 
ideological, critical and creative works might be able to make these powers of 
exclusion to suddenly realize that their powers are afflicted by unnaturally 
high-pitch voices (Žižek 2009).  
 
 
 
  
  
243 
 
Afterword: A Short History of Adivasis’ Resistance to ‘the state’ in 
Kolhan and Jharkhand 
Ethnicity and nationalism are not ‘given’ but are social political constructions. They 
are modern phenomena inseparably connected with the activities of the modern 
centralizing state (Brass 1991: front cover). 
It is obvious that these attacks on the oppressed masses are integral to the repeated 
attempts of the ruling class to exterminate political questions with military might… The 
state’s decisions regarding repression over the struggling masses were taken under the 
complete guidance of the feudal forces… In Bihar, landlords are not just a ruling class, 
getting the state machinery to do their bidding, but are themselves part of or extensions 
of the state. (Sushmita 2014: 42, 43). 
Pre-British Colonial Attempts, the Hos’ Independence and ‘protected’ 
KGE or Hodisum (the Ho country) under British Colonialism 
British intrusion into Kolhan, as in other places, took place via the ‘men of 
fortunes and prowess,’ whose networks had constituted part of the ancient 
Indian feudal state-system.129 A few agents of this network of landlords – the 
Singh raja family of Porahat that claimed the right to rule and to collect tax in 
Singhbhum – had entered Kolhan around the beginning of the 13th Century 
A.C.E.130 According to Streumer (forthcoming 2014), during 1720-1765 the 
Singh family was split and weakened due to disputes among its members, and 
the Hos regained their independence. ‘The power shift was clear. The 
Mundari speakers in present-day Kolhan rendered irrelevant the military 
function of most of the Singh forts, and they, with some marginal exceptions, 
stopped paying taxes to the Singhs’ (Ibid.). 
The powerless Jagannath Singh, the then Singhbhum raja, made alliances 
with neighbouring rajas to gain control over the Hos. However, the Hos 
defeated all their attempts to subjugate them. Eventually, in 1767, while 
Jagannath Singh, the raja of Singhbhum was kept in confinement by his 
                                                      
129 Bayly (2000) refers to a groups of 'men of pen, fortunes and prowess’ – Rajputs/ Kshatriya 
[warrior castes] and their attendant Brahmins [priestly/ scribal castes] (also see Stokes 1973). 
Brahmins were occasional visitors to Singhbhum (Sen 2008) at the service of local Adivasi 
chieftains who wished to ‘upgrade’ their status to Rajputs/ Kshatriyas (see Sinha 1962, 1965). 
Thus, a pan-Indian, supra-state network had already been established much before the 
British had arrived; it was this network that the British administrators had initially taken into 
confidence to advance their colonial interests, which these ‘men of fortunes and prowess’ 
enthusiastically agreed to advance (Bayly 2000: sic). 
130 Personal conversations with the youngest surviving member of the ‘raja’ family at 
Manoharpur (18 February 2011). 
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cousin Subnath Singh. Eventually, Pitambar, Jagannath’s uncle asked for the 
British East India Company’s (BEIC) assistance to bring the Hos under 
control, in return to which the raja was ‘desirous of putting his territories 
under the Company’s protection, and paying them an annual revenue’ 
(Streumer forthcoming 2014). A part of Pitambar’s account to BEIC’s 
Midinapur resident sounded, ‘Singhbhum formerly contained near 14,000 
villages but only about 500 are at present in the raja's possession; of the 
others some are gone to ruin and the rest are in the hands of the Kols, a tribe 
of plundering banditti’ (quoted in Streumer forthcoming 2014). Leaving the 
500 villages aside, the entire Kolhan was in the hands of Hos for several 
decades; and no traveller passed through it without fear of the Larka 
(fighting) Hos (O' Malley 1910). 
In 1820 the Singhbhum raja became a feudatory of British agency. In 1821 
the British employed a large force to reduce/ subjugate the Hos. While 
surrendering partially to the British, the Hos had earnestly requested the 
British to be taken under their direct rule (Ibid.). However, the British agents 
forced the Ho chieftains into an agreement: the Hos must pay a fixed land-
rent to the raja’s men and to be obedient to the raja. The Hos, however, did 
not honour this agreement. Moreover, Kolhan was in regular turmoil which 
eventually culminated in the Kol insurrection (1831-32) in which the Hos 
played a major role (Choudhury 1958; Jha 1964). Hence, in 1836 the British 
decided to thoroughly subjugate the Hos. This was done with much 
bloodshed, loss of life and property, violence and terror imposed rigorously 
upon the Hos of refractory Pirs (see Jha 1964; Singh 1978; Sahu 1985). 
After such terrorizing and violent processes of subjugation, the British placed 
the Hos under the direct management of a sympathetic British officer who 
would administer them according to their customary (munda-manki) system, 
codified by Sir Thomas Wilkinson; and hence, known as Wilkinson’s rules. 
Thus, the KGE was formed; land settlement in 622 villages was made in 
1837 with the imposition of an annual rent of eight anna per plough. The 
mundas and mankis had considerable powers and autonomy to decide the 
internal affairs of their villages. They also were entrusted with the duties of 
rent collection, powers to settle waste land with the Ho villages, and to 
administer police and civil justice duties according to their customary 
practices without recourse to civil courts (Jha 1964; Singh 1978; Sahu 1985; 
Streumer forthcoming 2014). By now, Kolhan region had entered into the 
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category of non-regulatory districts under the south West Frontier Agency 
specially introduced, in 1833, by the British to administer more 
‘troublesome’ Adivasi dominant regions (Jha 1964).  
The KGE was a Ho ‘preserve’ (ethno territorial enclosure) established by the 
British in 1836-37 after the great Kol insurrection during 1831-32 against 
dikus (alien exploiters/ strangers who are often troublesome and whose 
strangeness made/ make the Kolarians suspicious) who mercilessly exploited 
the Adivasis of Chotanagpur (Jha 1964, Singh 1978, Sahu 1985).  
The Kol insurrection of 1831-32 was born out of frustration and anger – frustration with 
the new system of government and law, and anger at the people [Hindu and Muslim 
merchants, money lenders, the alien thikadars (contractors), jagirdar (land-gift holders) 
or nilamdar (auction purchasers), petty officials and police] who either enforced them 
or took undue advantage of them… The real tragedy of the tribal people of this area 
was that their chiefs, alienated them by their conversion to Hinduism, and the English 
administrators, born and bred in the tradition of agricultural landlordism, had no 
sympathy with the tradition of tribal [communal] ownership of land or the idea of 
peasant proprietorship (Jha 1964: 240). 
Thus, West Singhbhum district, the KGE proper with several British and 
post-British colonial ‘protective’ provisions, besides Wilkinson’s Rules; and 
the Hos’ numerical majority, gives the Hos a sense of being ‘the sons and 
daughters of the soil,’ although they too have technically been immigrants 
here. Hos normally assert their sense of territorial belonging to West 
Singhbhum (KGE) while being threatened to be displaced from their land. ‘A 
close study of the nature and growth of the Jharkhand movement131 brings to 
light four basic issues which have been instrumental in mobilising the 
otherwise peace-loving tribal people of the region to raise their voice of 
protest against subordination and injustice – land and forest alienation, 
immigration, cultural identity and underdevelopment’ (Ghosh 1991: 1173, 
emphasis added).  
Post-Iindependence District Administration and KGE (munda-manki) 
System  
The Hos were British colonial ‘subjects’ in the KGE which formed a part of 
the British isolationist, paternalistic, and protective policy-outcome from 
1837 to 1947. While the Kolhan system of administration continues to be in 
                                                      
131 The longest ethno-regional movement of the Adivasis of Jharkhand for autonomy and 
self-determination (Munda and Mullick 2003). 
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force, the independent Indian state enthused by its nationalist aspirations 
introduced a uniform rural self-governance system for the entire country. 
Accordingly, in 1948 the united Bihar state, to which Jharkhand was a part, 
introduced the Panchayat system. In Kolhan, Panchayat system was 
superimposed initially without holding elections, which not only sidelined the 
Kolhan (munda-manki) system of local self-governance, but also brought in 
much confusion and chaos of a dual or mixed systems of local governance 
whose roles, and boundaries overlapped (see SE 1978). ‘Bihar was the first 
state in the country to introduce panchayati Raj in 1948. However, elections 
to gram panchayats have not been held in the state since 1978. A number of 
other factors and developments have also been responsible for reducing 
panchayati raj in Bihar to a completely defunct state’ (Bharti 1989: 18). 
Moreover, the office of Kolhan Superintendent (KS) that had functioned in 
close coordination with munda-manki (Kolhan) system became an instrument 
of surveillance over the ‘uncivilized’ Ho ‘tribe.’ The Kolhan system has also 
been undermined by the pan-Indian district (hierarchic, bureaucratic) 
administrative machinery: offices of the district collector (DC), police 
superintendent (SP), various line-departments, district judiciary; Sub-
Divisional Offices (SDOs), Anchals (revenue circles), Community 
Development Blocks (CDBs) and block-level line-departments since 1957-58 
(Choudhury 1958). However, the Ho villagers of Kolhan continue to view 
these superimposed structures and their personnel forming a diku sarkar of 
Dilli-Patna (alien governments of Delhi and Patna, referring to the national 
and state governments respectively) (Yorke 1976). Hence, most villagers do 
not go to any government office except being accompanied by a few 
‘educated’ contractor-middlemen (personal conversations with villagers 
during fieldwork in 2011). 
Colonial Mode of Exploitation, and the ‘Civilizing’ Mission of the British 
and Post-British Colonial (diku) States-Systems 
Interestingly and ironically however, despite several regulatory or protective 
provisions in place favouring Kolhan and its inhabitants, mining, 
industrialization, deforestation, and displacement had begun here since as 
247 
 
early as 1865,132 and have accelerated ever since (Karen 1957; Corbridge 
1996; George 2009).  
Mining has been at the heart of the development debate since official and middle-class 
spokesmen assessed that the surest way to development was to intensify mining. 
Mining in Jharkhand starting in 1774; Adivasi labor in the coal fields has a long history, 
but the situation of the workers has greatly deteriorated both in terms of stability of 
employment and conditions of safety (Carrin 2013: 108). 
… Increasing destitution, accidents in mines, bondage in rural areas, and prostitution in 
industrial centres. These are the contributions of the development processes for the 
people [in Jharkhand] (Sengupta 1982: xix). 
The numbers of open mines and industries have increased ever since 
encouraging the immigration of ever increasing numbers of dikus into 
Adivasi regions, accelerating processes of dikuisation (the process of Adivasi 
elites turning dikus) and massive distress-outmigration of impoverished 
Adivasis. These processes have dispossessed or alienated large numbers of 
economically poorer Hos (Corbridge 1982, 1996; Kishwar 1987).  
The most significant fact about Jharkhand is, therefore, that it is simultaneously the 
homeland of a large Adivasi population and the cradle of heavy industry in India… 
while the process of evicting Adivasis from their land began as early as the early 19th 
century, it became an avalanche with the onset of heavy industry, giant pants, 
townships, extensive mining, hydro-electric power generation etc. Along with this also 
came the rapid disintegration of the traditional communities, the commercial 
exploitation of forests and the heavy influx of outsiders… The gigantic industrialization 
process in Chotanagpur has operated in a vicious circle for the Adivasis: on the one 
hand, it has rendered ever-increasing number of them destitute through eviction, 
destruction of sources of livelihood, etc. and on the other hand, it has utilized their 
destitution to employ them on a very special role in this industrialization – the functions 
of coolies, which is wage slavery (Simon 1982: 213-17). 
In terms of employment, the local men and women were disproportionately directed 
towards temporary, under privileged and unskilled jobs. While this clearly had 
something to do with the lack of relevant skills on their part, and perhaps a preference 
for seasonal employment, nevertheless, it reflected just as much a failure to ensure 
educational and apprenticeship provisions for the tribes, and definite company interest 
in maintaining the village laborers as a segregated, cheap and unorganized workforce. 
... Almost without exception, the tribal elements of the workforce failed to receive 
anything like the level of remuneration that their contribution to the general wealth 
warranted. The same can be said about the region as a whole (Corbridge 1982: 61-61). 
Kolhan and other predominantly Adivasi regions of India have been 
characterized by a coincidental concentration of hills, forests, rivers (water), 
and minerals. In this sense, Jharkhand is known as ‘the Ruhr’ of India with 
37 percent of the total mineral resources of the entire country (George 2009), 
                                                      
132 See appendix-8 for wood-land changes during British colonial period. 
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and Kolhan is known for its best quality iron ore and limestone deposits 
(Areeparampil 1988, 1992; 1996). However, ‘the spurt to industrialization 
and mining activities led to large-scale deforestation and consequent 
contraction of income building asset-base of Adivasi economy. Such large-
scale economic exploitation also coincided with social and cultural 
exploitation’ (Maharaj and Iyer 1982: 167). 
Drinking was no longer an occasion for conviviality. It denigrated into drunkenness 
which not only merely filled the state and liquor contractor’s coffers but also offered a 
convenient tool to the moneylenders and others of their ilk. It also increased the 
incidents of horizontal violence, thus weakening the family and communal ties. The 
rapacity of exploiters also infected village functionaries who fared no better than 
watchdogs to protect the interests of the enemies of tribals… the oppressive 
deterioration in economic conditions of tribals, the disintegration of their social 
institutions, the corruption of their morals, and the failure of tribal political 
organizations and leadership to respond to challenges of the time only exasperated 
tribal patience… (Ibid. 172-4). 
It has been a characteristic feature of all preceding tribal movements that they started 
with a bang only to end with a whimper… The tribals have, today as in the past, shown 
immense capacity to bear the exploitative productivity of the Diku. Only when they had 
been pushed to the walls subjected to all forms of exploitation they did rise in rebellion 
(Ibid.: 197). 
Moreover, state-bureaucratic expansion in Kolhan has always meant a 
display of the ‘will to improve and civilize’ (Li 2008: sic) a ‘defiant’ ‘tribal’ 
population which engenders racial discrimination along with internal 
colonialism (see Sengupta 1982; Mehta 1982; Devalle 1992; Das 1992). 
Dispossession and pauperization of Adivasis along with discriminatory 
treatment by oppressive powers encourage the mostly nonliterate, 
unemployed Adivasi youth also to join the Naxalite (armed insurgency) as 
foot-soldiers, which might enable them at least to vent their anger in the hope 
of demanding their rights by violent means (see Saxena 2009; 2011). 
Half the nations’ minerals are supplied by Jharkhand which enriches the corporate 
setting in Mumbai and Delhi. While 21 districts of the state are affected by left-wing 
extremism and most of the funds of the state government goes to pay for expenses of 
police and paramilitary forces (Nishikant Dube, a member of Loksabha – the people’s 
assembly – on 27 August 2013, reported by the Times of India news service on 28 
August 2013). 
Furthermore, an enduring and unresolved ideological difference in Adivasis’ 
and dikus’ approach to material (water, forest, land and minerals) and human 
resources in the region, and the largely ungoverned (ad hoc) exploitation of 
these resources have caused gross disadvantage to Adivasis and other 
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deprived populations in the region. ‘… The priorities of the state and of the 
Adivasi communities are diverging, since for the latter, land remain a key 
element of their social identity. Given the incapacity of different legislative 
measures to protect Adivasi rights, Adivasis have few options for survival’ 
(Carrin 2013: 117). Clearly, this schismatic difference has been at the heart of 
continued conflict which define Adivasis’ relationship to the idea of both the 
ancient and 'modern' state in India (Béteille 1986, 1998; Saha 1986; Mullick 
1993, 2004; Mundu 2003, 2008). 
A Short Historical Sketch of Repression and Adivasis’ Amazingly 
Resilient Resistance 
The Hos’ responses to colonial mode of exploitation, oppression, and 
‘development’ induced displacement and dispossession needs to be 
understood in their specific historical contexts. Accordingly, the following 
section presents: (1) historical experiences of pre-British colonial negotiated 
subjugation, exploitation and racial oppression; (2) violent and repressive 
British colonial subjugation, paternalism, exploitation and resistance; (3) 
post-British colonial exploitation, and systemic discrimination, and (4) 
Adivasis’ growing destitution and disillusionment with their own leaders. 
Pre-British State Formation and the Churning Among Kolarian Adivasi 
Groups in Chota Nagpur 
The vast hilly and jungle areas of Chotanagpur plateau, comprising several 
districts of Central India – Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, 
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan Gujarat, Maharashtra, and West Bengal – had 
remained a refuge zone for several Adivasi groups such as the Gonds, 
Santals, Oraons, Mundas, Khonds, Hos, Kharias, Bhumijs, Juangs, etc., who 
have had a history of continuous displacement, alienation, and escape away 
from the oppressive state-based, more powerful social formations. (Roy 
1970; Saha 1986; Areeparampil 2002).  Chotanagpur plateau of central 
eastern India is a rugged and thickly forested tract. According to Mangobinda 
(1989), Chotanagpur, during pre-British times, had 44 spoken languages and 
96 castes/ tribes, who were the ‘radical elements’ of Indian civilization (Ibid.: 
52). The Kolarians or Kols, have a longer historical tradition of migration 
prior to their arrival and settlement in Chota Nagpur (Areeparampil 2002: 30-
40).  
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This region and its people, who ‘share some common basic traits (related 
languages, culture, and aspects of social organization) as well as historical 
experiences, and a long history of migrations into the area’ (Devalle, 1992: 
14), had remained relatively insulated from the Hinduised pan-Indian, plain-
based mainstream (Roy 1970 and Saha 1986). However, after several decades 
of semi-settled agriculture, ‘the gradual brahmanizing of the aboriginal non-
Aryan or casteless tribes’ had begun even among the ‘casteless Adivasis of 
Chotanagpur’ (Mamgobinda 1989: 102).  
The tribals were bound by community customs, traditions, and consensus. They would 
take decisions not in camera but in the open. All adult males and females, assembled on 
the occasion, had their right to be heard. Custom had overriding sanction and 
community decisions were easily enforced. They had not produced any Manu or Moses 
to codify laws. Nobody enjoyed any prerogative and no claim could be enforced against 
the community’s decision (Maharaj and Iyer 1982: 167). 
In the early middle ages there was no raja ruling over the country which was divided 
into Parhas/ Pirs of 15 to 20 or even 25 villages, each under its manki and local 
mundas. These local leaders probably received no rents but only assistance in war and a 
salami at festivals. Then at some time between the 6th and 10th century A.C.E., the 
manki of Sutiambe, Pani Mukut Roy, was chosen as chief of mankis or raja by all the 
mankis and mundas. It was said that between that installation and the year 1839, some 
62 rajas of the family had sat upon the Chotanagpur thrown (Jha 1964: 24).  
In 1616, raja Durjan Sal [a descendant of Pani Mukut Roy] was seized by 
Mughal rulers and was for some time held prisoner in Gwalior fort. On his 
return from captivity after 12 years, he took the title ‘Maharaja’ [the great 
king] of Chotanagpur. ‘At much the same time the raja and his court were 
converted to Hinduism. For the Maharaja the Brahmans produced a hitherto 
unsuspected ancestral link with Pundarika, the mythical king of the Nagas or 
snakes. By the 18th century, the “Kshatriya” ruler was looking down upon the 
unconverted tribesmen, of whom Hamilton wrote, “The Dhanggar are still 
impure unconverted mlechas or barbarians”’ (Jha 1964: 30). Thus, Adivasis 
were forced to ‘live among a people who look down up on them as a 
degraded race, and one of whose favourite theories is, the Kols were created 
to serve them. This, no doubt, must be as demoralizing as it is aggravating’ 
(Dalton 1960: 206). 
By the middle of the 18th century the communitarian Adivasi society was already 
encompassed in a large social system. Its isolation had been broken and the seeds of 
dissolution set in. First it was Hinduisation which exploited the disintegration by 
incorporating the Adivasis into its social division of labour represented by caste system 
(Sengupta 1982: 243-4). 
Hinduisation was well under way by the 16th century. The Hinduised Adivasi chieftains 
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erected a number of temples in Palamau. The Cheros adopted Hindu names, borrowed 
Brahmanical gotras [lineages] in support of their claims to Rajput status, and by the 
close of the 19th century, the Palamau Cheros were wearing the sacred thread. 
Anthropologists Dalton, Resley, Henry and Elliot agree in believing them to be the 
Kinsmen of the Mundas and Oraons (Jha 1987: 9). 
The Maharaja, made further elaborate arrangements to extract revenue not 
only to meet the demands of his paramount power but also to create a grand 
life-style befitting that of Hindu kings of the plains. He needed huge amounts 
of revenue to build temples; thus, he introduced feudal relations of landed 
property; and created a new class of feudal landlords who were brought into 
the region from the plains where feudal relations had already existed. The 
Maharaja also created around him a circle of Brahman priests, Rajput and 
pseudo-Rajput courtiers, officials and place-hunters belonging to various 
Hindu castes/ jatis mostly from Bihar and Madhya Pradesh (Saha 1986).  
The large numbers of caste Hindu groups introduced in Chotanagpur with 
large areas of landed estates were again partly or wholly rented out to other 
adventurers for fixed rent. It, thus, created several layers of external property 
interests in Adivasi land. Adivasis, who never paid any rent for their land, had 
to be forced to accept this new system of alien landlords demanding rents. 
Hence, the king and other jagirdars (estate grantees) created private armies of 
rajputs and pseudo-rajput mercenaries with further land grants for their 
services. The brahmanas were also given free land-gifts for their priestly or 
scribal (expert) services. Further, several subsidiary kingships were erected in 
remote parts of the region. These subsidiary kings again employed a similar 
strategy of estate-creation, forced labour and revenue extraction from Adivasi 
producers (Saha 1986; 1994). 
Such extraction and the grant of so much tribal land to oppressive foreigners led to 
conflict between the Kols of Chotanagpur and their Maharaja. In that, the people were 
often aided by their more warlike brethren, the Larka Kols [Hos] of Singhbhum. … In 
the 18th century, the Maharaja therefore, attacked the Larka-Kol country [Kolhan], but 
was defeated by the Kols (Jha 1964:38). 
The history of the East India Company’s connection with Singhbhum before 1831 
shows, how far from being subordinated or pacified the Larka Kols were, even though 
they had executed an agreement of promised quiet. As the infiltration of non-tribal 
outsiders increased, and their own chiefs turned against them, the chances of contrived 
quiet in Singhbhum steadily diminished (Jha 1987: 184-5).  
British Colonial Intrusion, Subjugation, and Paternalism 
Tribal society was already feeling the unhappy effects of Hinduisation and alienation of 
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the tribal rajas and zamindars of the area, when the British penetration began. Both 
impacts were therefore felt at once, and both introduced foreign notions and foreign 
people into the area, in an influx which led eventually to the economic ruin of the 
people. The tribal unrest of 1831-1832 was a crude form of protest against these 
changes and these outside influences. It was a gesture of despair (Jha 1964: 1). 
The process of British subjugation of the Hos or Larka Kols was, no doubt, 
violent and terrorising (Singh 1976; Sahu 1989), however, during the post-
subjugation period (from the establishment of KGE in 1837 to India’s 
independence in 1947), almost all successive British officials had much 
appreciation for the Hos’ way of life, cultural values, and manners in 
comparison to the caste Hindus of the plains. This change in Britiish officers’ 
perception came about as they took special interest in improving their 
understanding of the Ho world-view with a sympathetic approach, which 
perhaps the so-called ‘high’ caste Hindus rarely able to possess (see 
Chaudhuri 2012).   
Colonel Tickell, the first Principal Assistant to the Governor General’s Agent 
in charge of the administration of Singhbhum district and the KGE, wrote in 
1840: 
Three years constant intercourse with them [the Hos], in which their love for truth, their 
honesty, their obliging willingness, and their happy ingenious disposition, forming so 
striking a contrast to the mass of the people in Hindustan, may perhaps have induced 
me to pass lightly over faults to which they are but too liable; but this error (a pleasing 
one), is, I imagine, shared with me by all the European residents who were of Chyebasa 
(quoted in O’Malley 1910: 68).  
However, the paternalism and protectionism broached by the British to keep 
the dikus away were not all that successful, although as Singh (1972, and 
1990) has acknowledged that these were the first ever sympathetic and more 
humane approach to Adivasi issues in India. Moreover, besides their 
isolationist, paternal protectionism,133 the British also advanced their colonial 
interests: they reserved forest and restricted Adivasis’ access to it for 
commercial exploitation, forced sedentarisation and agrarian expansion, 
introduced monetary economy, changed communal ownership of land to 
individual for taxation, and acquired land for industrialization. All of these 
not only contradicted British paternalism but also necessitated the assistance 
of non-Adivasis and encouraged their influx further (Singh 1978; Corbridge 
                                                      
133 British protectionism, reflected in ‘the Bengal Tenancy Act 1885, Central Provinces 
Tenancy Act 1898 & 1920, the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act 1908, the Central Provinces Land 
Alienation Act 1918, covered only a few segment of Indian Tribals’ (Singh 1972: 393-4). 
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1996; Chaudhuri 2008; Das Gupta 2011). Moreover, the only ‘development’ 
policy and works undertaken during British raj was famine relief, that too in a 
defused and fragmentary fashion (Singh 1972).  
Consequently, Adivasi resistance movements, in various parts of 
Chotanagpur, began with the Paharias uprising of 1756-73, subsided only 
with the Birsa Ulgulan during 1895-1900. These were against both the 
‘inroads of colonialism [both Indian and British or sanskritisation and 
westernization] as well as the consolidation of the process of differentiation 
alongside the integration and contestation of the brahmanical domination… 
(see Areeparampil 1993; Pati 2001). Nevertheless, Adivasi resistance 
movements were largely unsuccessful, since they were tainted by 
brahmanical Hinduism especially its method of “othering” the ‘low’ or 
‘outcastes’ (Pati 2013: 56).   
The transformation of the Mundari agrarian system into commercial, feudal, zamindari 
or individual tenures was the key to agrarian disorder that climaxed in the religious 
political movement of Birsa Munda. The foundation of agrarian discontent had been 
laid long before the era of the British domination (Singh 1966: 2).  
Birsa was neither a ‘pious Vishnav’ nor a hypocrite or a trickster. He was a rebel, like 
his people, violently reacting to a piquant situation, sensitive, proud and self-willed 
(Ibid.: 205). 
Post-British Colonial Repression and Resistance  
Unlike the individual sympathy and understanding that characterised the 
British officers, who tried to have direct contact and close knowledge of 
Adivasis issues/ grievances, the post-British ‘high’ cast-Hindu officials 
(Sushma 2014) have consistently and rigorously kept up their ‘civilizing’ 
mission. ‘When the white sahabs (overlords) left India, in 1947, the rule was 
handed over to the brown sahabs who consisted of the ‘high’ caste and 
‘upper’ class combine’ (Areeparampil 2002: 241). There are scholars who 
admit that although, notwithstanding the pit-falls of colonialism, it was the 
British approach to Adivasi issues that has given them a sense of dignity, 
identity as being different from the caste Hindus, as rights bearing citizens 
belonging to their territory as Adivasis, which lies at the root of Adivasi 
assertion embodied in the Jharkhand Movement, and resistance to 
exploitation and oppression in Chotanagpur (see Sengupta 1982; Hardiman 
1987; Rao 2008; Sunder 2009; Damodaran 2013).  
254 
 
Jharkhand region does not only account for the largest tribal population in India, but 
also the regional autonomy movement in Jharkhand has the longest tradition; pan-tribal 
movement in the country was initiated from the region. The movement here has not 
been successful, but in course of the protracted and widespread struggle, the people of 
this region have been the most successful among all tribes in developing their own 
strategy for survival in the modern world (Sengupta 1982: xviii).  
While analysing the origin and cause of Jharkhand movement, Maharaj and 
Iyer (1982) described the depth of post-British colonial repression of 
Adivasis and the fear that have accumulated in their psyche. 
Although tribals were pressing for the restoration of their land rights, they were 
subjected to severe repression resulting in several deaths. The mere sight of a jeep 
would force the whole village to turn into the forest hideouts. The parasites, their 
muscle, and venal government officials would carry away tribal belongings including 
chicks and goats. In many cases even the whole hamlet was set on fire. The so-called 
elites among tribals were threatened with dire consequences in case they made common 
causes with their community (Ibid.: 176-7). 
The Adivasis of Kolhan have witnessed and continue to witness several such 
incidents of bloody repression of their peaceful resistance or protest 
movements by post-British colonial state functionaries. The most striking 
evidence to support this claim was an instance of Jharkhand Mukti 
(liberation) Morcha (front) (JMM) getting overwhelming support from the 
Adivasis of rural Kolhan soon after the inhuman repression by the Bihar 
police on the forest andolan and dam-resistance (movement) in Singhbhum 
during 1970s and 1980s. The police indiscriminately opened fire on the Hos, 
who had gathered to protest state-atrocities on them, at weekly market places, 
and at other places of peaceful gathering. The police fired at innocent Hos, 
killing several of them even at a government hospital in Gua a small mining 
town in West Singhbhum (Swamy et al 1979; Raja 1980; EPW 1980; 
Areeparampil 1992). On April 1978, eight Adivasis, among those who 
protested the Subarnarekha Multi-Purpose (SMP) hydro-electric dam project 
in Chandil, were shot dead and several others were injured (SE 1978).  
Similarly, the public assault and killing of Gangaram Kalundia, the leader of 
people’s opposition to Subarnarekha Multipurpose Project (SMP) at Kuju 
dam near Chaibasa on 4 November 1982 is particularly outrageous. One of 
the most recent instances of state-violence on Ho Adivasis was the 
‘bloodbath’ at Kalinga Nagar, Odisha in 2006134 (Chadha 1993; Iqbal 2012). 
                                                      
134 ‘A Report on the Bloodbath in Kalinga Nagar’ Pati (2006). 
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All these are telling instances of the ‘civilizing’ mission by terror adopted by 
the ruling elite of Bihar regime in Kolhan.135  
The Hos’ response to these incidents of the 1970s and 1980s also resulted in 
the emergence of Kolhan Raksha Sangh (KRS) (the Kolhan Protection 
Organization). Taking recourse to the Kolhan system of administration, 
according to Wilkinson’s Rules that had existed in the KGE during British 
period (1837-1947), they declared Kolhan as an independent country of the 
Hos as it was ‘never part of the British India ruled by the Viceroy from 
Delhi.’ That is, ‘the Indian parliament had no power to pass laws for Kolhan 
and that Kolhan was a sovereign state.’ On 30 March 1981, the leaders of the 
KRS decided to represent the matter to the United Nations, and on 7 August 
1981, two representatives of the KRS made an expedition to the British 
Commonwealth Secretariat and the UN headquarter to lobby for Kohan’s 
independence. However, on their return to India, they were arrested and put 
in jail (Areeparampil 2002: 256-8).  
The ideas proposed by KRS, and the movement propelled by it not only 
continues to exist in the imaginations of impoverished Hos but also there 
have been certain leaders who still benefit by exploiting these sentiments of 
Kolhan being a sovereign territory of the Hos (personal conversation, via 
Skype, with Xavier Dias, activist and writer, 25 November 2012). More 
recently since the post-liberalisation period in India, i.e. since the 1990s, 
when incidents of land grab by (mineral) extraction industries began to 
multiply all over Kolhan, which simultaneously increased the 
impoverishment of Hos’ living in countryside, there have been recent 
‘separatist’ claims similar to that of KRS. Moreover, the so-called ‘left-wing 
extremism also might attract a few defiant village youth,136 while the police 
pick up any village youth suspecting him or her to be an ‘extremist,’ thus, 
making things the worst (Ibid..).  
                                                      
135 There are several other such instances in other part of Jharkhand as well, even soon after 
the separation of Jharkhand from united Bihar in 2000, the police opened fire at Adivasis at 
Koel-Karo Hydro-Electric Project site on 2 February 2001. See Iqbal (2012) and Mullick (2004) 
for more on indiscriminate killing of Adivasis and others who support and try to take Adivasis’ 
communitarian interests forward. 
136 The ‘extremists’ offer strong ‘help’ to protect their land from the diku sarkar while ‘they 
actually are already in tendon with the shadow or mirror of a violent and illegitimate state’ 
(Shah 2006, 2010). 
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For more than100 years, the tribals of Bihar [now Jharkhand], as of other parts of India, 
have been ruthlessly exploited, oppressed and deceived by traders and moneylenders 
from the plains. Their lands have been alienated, their children have been herded off to 
slavery in tea plantations and those who remained have been reduced to semi-slave 
status, bonded to moneylenders. The immense natural wealth of their homelands has 
been plundered without any of the benefits trickling down to them. Time and again, the 
tribals have risen in protest - only to be crushed, because of their own weaknesses and 
the superior forces of their opponents. In the meanwhile the propertied classes and the 
government have raised the bogey of Naxalites. The Central Reserve Police Force, 
Border Security Force and the Bihar Military Police have gone into the area to defend 
the moneylenders and the landlords against the united front of workers and tribal 
peasants (Das 1975: 284). 
Most recently, in November 2012 a young Ho leader, while protesting the 
state government’s outright abuse of Adivasis’ Constitutional Rights, 
including Panchayats Extension to Scheduled Area (PESA) Act 1996 and 
Forest Rights Act 2006, has proposed the idea of demanding a separate 
‘Union Territory Status’ for Kolhan division. "Our experience over the last 
six decades have shown that the nexus between the state government, 
bureaucrats and corporate houses has only led to large-scale exploitation of 
both the minerals and marginalized people under the garb of growth and 
development," (Budhram Laguri, reported by Sridhar 2012). Besides such 
‘separatist’ statements voiced by young Ho leaders, who seek media 
attention, there have been several instances of more localized, unreported 
instances of grass-root mass protests, movements, and demonstrations against 
District Administration, Governor and Chief Minister of Jharkhand state, who 
advance land-leases to exploitative, highly-polluting extraction industries 
(personal conversations with human rights activists in defence of Adivasi 
land rights in Kolhan during July-August 2011 and September-October 2013; 
also see George 2009: 171-72; Sunder 2009: conclusion; Lahir-Dutt 2012; 
Dungdung 2013; Damodaran 2013).  
However, these issues have much deeper roots than they appear to be. For 
instance, some suggest that ‘only an alternative path to development that lays 
stress on dignity and participation of all sections can be an answer to the 
ravages of predatory growth’ (Baduri 2008: 10, emphasis added). However, 
here Baduri seeks an ‘alternative path’ when the present concept of 
‘development’ itself makes humans to pursue individual goals at the expense 
of fellow-beings and the environment. This means that the concept of 
development itself is problematic in the first place. Hence, it is high time to 
redefine the concepts of development, modernity, and freedom so that once 
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the goal is redefined better, choosing an alternative path to achieve it could 
be done with much ease. In other words, ‘There is nothing more practical 
than a good theory’ (Lewin 1952: 169).  
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Appendices 
Appendix-1 
On the Concept of Diku 
[Excerpts from Ranajit Guha (1999) Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial 
India, Dhurham and London: Duke University Press] 
Thus, the Dhangar Kols of Sonnepur who were the first to rise in that region in 1832, were 
promptly of this fraternal act the Larkas were led on this occasion by some of their most 
outstanding chieftains such as Bindrai Manki and Sui Munda. As the insurrection progressed 
further the Kols were joined by most of the other tribal peasantry of Chota Nagpur and 
Palamau – the Bhogta and the Chasi of Tori; the Ho, the Munda and the Oraon of various 
parts of Chotanagpur, the Chero, the Kharwar and the Poliar of Palamau (P.174). 
The term diku used generally in the local tribal languages to describe anyone belonging to 
‘non-tribal out-group’, came to acquire a meaning which indicated at the same time both the 
ethnic and the class aspects of the explanation of the peasantry of these regions. The 
semantic range assigned to this lexeme in Hoffmann’s Encyclopedia Mundarica and 
Boding’s Santal Dictionary clearly brings this out. Diku in these works stands for ‘a Hindu’, 
‘a Hindu landlord’, ‘Hindi or Sadani’, ‘a Hindu or Bengali of the better class’, etc., and diku-
n – ‘to become the landlord of a village’. It has been noticed that in at least one language of 
the Mundari group di means ‘that’ and the plural diku – ‘those’, a telling deixis which leaves 
little room for doubt about the speaker’s insistence on his own separate identity. … The term 
had not only retained its dual function of signifying the non-autochthones (such as Hindus, 
Musalmans, Europeans, Marwaris, Biharis, Bengalis, etc.) and class enemies (such as rural 
capitalists, banias, moneylenders, rajas, zamindars and landlords’ servants), but had acquired 
for itself a new and expressive moral connotation. Diku, said many of the Munda, Oraon and 
Ho informants, deriving, ironically enough, from an alien etymology, meant for them 
‘trouble makers’ (dik dik karnewale). The stereotype which was thus established was backed 
by a host of other words, phrases, imageries and adages to emphasize the malevolence, 
avarice, meanness and generally the negative qualities of the outsider. Looter, deceiver, and 
exploiter – such were the epithets predicated on them. He was unreliable and fearsome. His 
eyes (dik-med) were like those of a dog, for he fawned on his master for small favours and 
snarled at all others to keep them away. He was unfriendly: he would not recognize his own 
neighbour. A diku friend, a thorn tree; they prick’: so ran a Santal proverb. When a Munda 
oppressed another, he was said to be dikuing. And if he set himself up as a zamindar and 
lived of rents extracted from other Munda, he was regarded as dikuized (Ibid.: 281-2). 
Bindrai the Kol leader, spoke for all tribal insurgents of the nineteenth century when he 
explained why his people had taken to arms in 1832: “The Pathan had taken our honour and 
the Sing our sisters and the Koour, Harnath Sha had forcibly deprived us of our Lives were 
considered of no Value, and being of one Caste and Brethren, it was agreed upon that we 
should commence to cut, plunder, murder and eat….. It is with this resolution that we have 
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been murdering and plundering those who have deprived us of both honour and homes….”  
(Ibid.: 282-3). 
Adivasis identify the outsider/colonizer – the state, mahajan (middlemen moneylender), the 
school teacher, the police and, today, the mining companies – with the word diku, defining 
the relationship. Diku is and onomatopoeic word. It evokes the sound of the heart as it beats 
faster and faster, dik dik dik, in fear, intimidation or terror. This identity is exclusively 
reserved for the outsider [Xavier Dias (2006) ‘Laboring Newborn Consciousness: The adivasis 
of Jharkhand’, Labor File: A bimonthly journal of labor and economic affairs, 4(4): 1-6]. 
Appendix-2 
Brahmanical Institutions of Social Control 
Brahmanic Social Order is structured to secure and preserve the total dominance of a small 
elite. Much of its religious doctrine serves to evolve, codify, rationalize, and create the social 
and psychological conditions needed for mass acceptance of the institutions the elite requires 
to exercise control across the entire political economic spectrum. The central institutions of 
social control are the following, which operates together as an interlocking device: 
1. The varna system of social hierarchy strictly determined by birth and lineage, the order 
of which later further splintered into a large number of occupation-related jatis. 
2. The dharma, or the code of religious duties requiring that everyone adhere to the 
occupation associated with his caste (varna and jati) and that the people of the lower 
castes continuously discharge their obligation of service, ritual payments, and ritual 
obedience to the higher castes. 
3. The twin doctrines of metempsychosis and karma, which stipulates that a person’s soul 
transmigrates from birth to birth, that suffering in this life is attributable to lapses in the 
performance of dharma duties in an earlier life, and, conversely, that rigorous 
performance of those duties in this life would lead to happiness and possible salvation in 
the next (birth) life. 
4. The doctrine that state power draws its legitimacy from its ability and will to protect 
rights and superior legal and ritual status of the Brahmins, and, to a lesser extent, of the 
Kshatriyas and Vaisyas, and to enforce strictly the performance of dharma duties by all 
classes. 
5. A regime of strict control of women, particularly on their sexuality, to secure that wealth 
and property remain and accumulate within the elite classes and do not spread through 
intergenerational transfer to the non-elite classes.  
[Excerpts from Surajit Kumar Saha (1994) ‘The Brahmanic social Order and Tribal Society’ 
in Arthur Bonner with Kancha Ilaiah, Surajit Kumar Saha, Asghar Ali engineer and Gerard 
Heuze (co-authors) Democracy in India: A Hollow Shell, Washington, D.C.: The American 
University Press: pp. 67-68] 
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Appendix-3 
The Kol Insurrection 1831-32 and the Establishment of the Kolhan 
Government Estate (KGE) 
 “Maharaja of Chotanagpur, now reduced to the status of a zamindar with some maintenance 
grants by the East India company (EIC), gave twelve villages that belonged to Singrai Manki 
(headmen of a cluster of Ho villages) in Sonpur province in Singhbhum to certain 
Muhammadans and Sikhs. The Sikhs dispossessed the Manki and seduced or ravished two of 
his sisters. A Munda (village headman) of Bandhgaon was abducted and his wife was 
dishonoured. Some other Mankis were also equally dissatisfied with such dispossession and 
dishonour. These Mundas and Mankis called all the Kols (Mundas and Hos) to assemble at a 
village in Tamrah. While addressing the assemblage the leaders said, 'The Pathans and the 
Singhs (Sikhs) have dishonoured us; the Kunwar Harnath Singh has forcibly deprived us of 
our villages, which he has given to the Sings. Our lives are no longer of value. We are all 
brethren, let us act together – commence to burn, plunder, and murder and eat'” (Singrai 
Manki's testimony as quoted in Dalton [1872] 1960).  
“The Kols attacked the places of these Muhammadans and Sikhs where they had their 
residences with huge wealth of cattle and other possessions; several of the dikus (alien-
exploiters and troublemakers) were being murdered and their cattle and wealth plundered 
during December 11-25, 1831. The court-accountant of Sherghati (another place in the same 
province) made an announcement that if they had maintained peace in the country, their 
lands would be restored. The Kols replied, they would not listen to anyone except to the 
Maharaja of Chotanagpur.137 Meanwhile a secret preparation for a war against all dikus in 
their territory was being made by the circulation of arrows (a practice of summoning their 
brethren to arm) among villages. From mid-January the Adivasis – Hos, Mundas and Oraons 
jointly entered into the zeal of the great Kol insurrection; they chased all the foreign 
exploiters from their territory and murdered everyone who fell into their hands.” 
“This rebellion followed a thorough military operation by the EIC to subjugate the 
troublesome larka (fighting) Kols who constituted the leading figures of the Kol insurrection 
in Singhbhum and Chotanagpur. After several military operations, by 1837, the Hos were 
thoroughly subjugated and the Kolhan Government Estate (KGE) was established as a 
'reserve' for the Hos by maintaining Munda-Manki (Kolhan) system being co-opted by the 
colonizers for peaceful administration of the Hos. The Mundas and Mankies were given 
special police powers and the land tax was collected by them. The British did not interfere in 
most traditional customary practices.138 The KGE was disrupted during the rebellion in 1855-
57 but later resumed more or less undisturbed till 1937 or so till the Indian national 
                                                      
137 Probably, the Kols had no idea that the Maharaja himself had been getting foreigners into 
their country, had himself made alliances with the EIC and was now reduced to be a 
zamindar. 
138 Although the British followed the policy of non-interference, Ho villagers who preferred to 
seek justice from the British legal system, at Chaibasa civil court, could always do so (Sen 
2012). 
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movement took prominence in Chotanagpur” [E.T. Dalton, 1960, Descriptive Ethnology of 
Bengal, Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing: 169-170]. 
“The Kols are compelled to cultivate the ground for the thikadar and to pay all kinds of 
illegal cesses. And these thikadars allow them only so much as will enable them to work on 
for their benefit. When the oppressor wants a horse, the Kol must pay; when he desires a 
palki, the Kols have to pay, and afterwards to bear him therein. They must pay for his 
musicians, for his milch-cows, for his pan. Does someone die in his house? He taxes them; is 
a child born? Again a tax; is there a marriage or puja [worship ceremony], a tax. Is the 
thikadar [contractor] found guilty at court and sentenced to be punished? The Kol must pay 
the fine. Or does a death occur in the house of a Kol? The poor man must pay a fine. Is a son 
or daughter married? The poor Kol is still taxed. And this plundering, punishing, robbing 
system goes on till the Kols run away” [J. Thomson, Deputy Secretary to government at the 
time of the Kol insurrection quoted in Roy, 1970: 127]. 
Appendix-4 
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar on Indian Society 
Dr. Ambedkar in one of the meetings of the Indian Constitutional Assembly pointed out one 
of the most striking and enduring contraditions in ‘Indian Society’ when he said, “We must 
begin by acknowledging first that there is complete absence of two things in Indian society. 
One of these is equality. On the social plane, we have in India a society based on privilege of 
graded inequality which means elevation of some and degradation for others. On the 
economic plane we have a society in which there are some who have immense wealth as 
against the many who are living in abject poverty. On the 26th January 1950, we are going to 
enter into a life of contradictions. In politics we will have equality. In politics we will be 
recognizing the principle of one man and one vote and one vote one value. In our social and 
economic structure, continue to deny the principle of one man one value. How long shall we 
continue to live this life of contradictions? … We must remove this contradiction at the 
earliest possible moment. Or else those who suffer from inequality will blow up the structure 
of political democracy which this assembly has so laboriously built up” [B.R. Ambedkar, 
quoted by Justice Krishna Iyer, in the judgement of J. Krishna Iyer on the State of Kerala 
versus N.M. Thomas and Others, 1976, All India Report, Supreme Court of India: 490]. 
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Fundamental differences between the Adivasi and ‘modern’ civilizations 
Fundamental differences between the Adivasi and ‘modern’ civilizations 
Area Adivasi central values Modernity influential values 
1. nature (jal, 
jungle and 
zameen) 
• interrelationship with all living 
beings 
• Balance with the environment 
• Land and community (for past, 
present and future generations) 
and ownership not transferable 
• exploitative relationship 
• tries to dominate the nature 
• all being in nature is to serve 
humans 
2. economic 
system 
• Communitarian  
• Common good 
• Communitarian ownership 
• Cooperation 
• To meet the present needs 
• Barter system of transaction 
• Decentralized 
• Re-creative 
• protective 
• individualism 
• individual benefits 
• individual wealth 
• competition –  
• savings/profit oriented 
• consumerist 
• money based transactions 
• centralized 
• Non-re-creative? 
• Destructive 
• Food based 
3. social 
systems 
• Egalitarian 
• Equality in male female 
relationships 
• Manual labour is esteemed 
• Communitarian (community gets 
supremacy) 
• Individual is a member of the 
society 
• Cooperation 
• hospitality 
• Inequality, stratified 
• Patriarchal 
• Some works are looked down 
upon 
• Individualistic (individual and 
household gets more importance) 
• competition 
4. politics  • self-rule, village self-governance 
•  Participatory democracy 
• Consensus decision making 
• People’s claims 
• Representative democracy 
• Influenced by power and money 
• Power claiming and bureaucracy  
5. culture  • Human culture is indivisible from 
nature 
• Culture is the celebration of 
nature i.e. live in harmony with 
nature 
• Complementarities nature? 
• Culture is above nature, it is 
human made 
• Tendency to control everything 
by man 
6. Literature, 
arts and music 
• Folklore 
• Communal expression, village 
dancing ground is the centre 
• participation 
• urbanization 
• Pretention? and exhibition  
• commercialization of art 
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7. religion • global 
• naturalism 
• stress on integration among 
nature and community 
• stress on practices that are 
appreciated by community 
• human cantered 
• stress on individual salvation 
• industrious 
8. philosophy • importance on joyfulness 
• life is not only of work, but for 
relaxation and celebration of joy 
• over work is bad because it 
persecutes other beings 
• work as much as necessary to  
earn a living 
•  life is for celebration 
• Importance on hard work 
• Without hard work nothing can 
be gained 
• Life is a serious affair. Each 
person is given importance 
according to his/her tangible 
achievements  
Source: Areeparampil, M. (2000) Abua Raj: Jharkhandis Struggle for Self-rule, Chaibasa: Tribal 
Research and Training Centre [TRTC]. 
Socioeconomic profile of Jharkhand state – Social Group Wise 
Social categories All ST SC OBC Others 
Educational level (percentage) 
Not Literate 47.7 57.7 54.9 45.9 31.1 
Just Literate 20 20.2 22.3 20.5 16.6 
Primary 10.9 8.6 9.9 12.5 11.3 
Middle 10.4 7.8 7.7 11.2 14.3 
Secondary 4.9 2.9 3 4.8 9.8 
Higher secondary/Diploma 3.1 1.5 1.6 3.2 6.8 
Graduate and Above 2.9 1.3 0.5 1.9 10.1 
Land in hectares (percentage) 
Landless 0.2 0.5 0 0.2 0 
0.001-0.004 3.9 1.5 8.9 4.1 2.7 
0.005-0.4 43.6 32.4 61.2 44 46 
0.41-1 31.5 38 21.4 31.2 30 
1.01-2 16.2 21.2 7.3 17 13.3 
2.01 to 4 3.5 5 1 2.9 5.5 
4.01 and above 1 1.4 0.1 0.6 2.6 
Occupation (percentage) 
Agriculture 49.1 72.2 34.7 46.1 33.6 
Industry 28.1 19.1 43.9 27.9 28.7 
Service 22.8 8.6 21.4 25.9 37.7 
Source: extracted and computed from NSSO, socio-economic survey 61st round: July 
2004-June 2005 by the author 
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Appendix-8 
Forest and Woodland Changes in Chotanagpur 1870-1890 (Hectares) 
Areas in Chotanagpur plateau Year 1870 Year 1890 Difference 
Dhanbad 10382 9794 534 
Hazaribagh 316408 306495 9913 
Palamau 555413 530025 25388 
Ranchi 344317 338749 5568 
Santhal Parganas 308138 177577 130561 
Singhbhum 274258 244826 29732 
Total 1808916 1607466 201450 
Source: Richard, J.F., R.H. James, S.H. Edward (1985) ‘Changing land use in Bihar, 
Punjab and Haryana 1850-1970’, Modern Asian Studies, 19(3): 699-32. 
 
Spatial Distribution of below Poverty Line Households in 
Jharkhand 
BPL households (Percentage) Districts 
80 per cent and above Gumla, Simdega, West Singhbhum, Latehar 
Percentage Districts  
70-80 per cent Lohardaga, Saraikela Kharsawan 
60-70 per cent Ranchi, Dumka, Jamtara 
50-60 per cent Deoghar, Pakur, Sahebganj, Garhwa 
40-50 per cent Giridih, Koderma, Godda, Hazaribagh,  
Below 40 per cent Bokaro (36.22%), Dhanbad (8.3%),  
Source: Annual Report 2004-05, Department of Food, Civil Supplies and Commerce, 
Government of Jharkhand, p. 50 
